



European  
Commission



**DG ECHO**

**Reports on food security**

Release n° 3 – November 2022

Directorate-General for European Civil  
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

*Civil Protection and  
Humanitarian Aid*



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**DG ECHO**

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## List of Organisations

DG ECHO	Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
DG INTPA	Directorate General for International Partnerships
DG NEAR	Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (UK)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM	International Office for Migration
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Program

## List of acronyms

CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
COHAFA	Council working party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid
CVA	Cash and Voucher Assistance
DREF	Disaster Response Emergency Fund
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EDF	European Development Fund
EiE	Education in Emergencies
ERP	Emergency Response Plan
FSL	Food Security and Livelihoods
GFD	General Food Distribution
GNFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
GRFC	Global Report on Food Crises

HIP	Humanitarian Implementation Plan
HDP	Humanitarian – Development – Peace nexus
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IPC/CH	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basked
MPCT	Multi-purpose Cash Transfer
MSNA	Multi-Sector Needs Assessment
PLW	Pregnant Lactating Women
RHD	Refugee Hosting District
RMRP	Refugee and Migrant Response Plan
RPCA	Food Crisis Prevention Network
RRM	Rapid Response Mechanism
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SMEB	Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket

## Executive summary

**Food security is deteriorating globally** according to recent analyses from the Global Network against Food Crises (GNFC)<sup>1</sup>. There are currently up to 205 million people acutely food insecure and in need of urgent food assistance (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent) across 45 countries, twice as many as in 2016<sup>2</sup>. Around 970 000 people worldwide are projected to face catastrophic conditions of food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2022. Specialised agencies warn that hunger is likely to further increase in the immediate future<sup>4</sup>.

In 2022, food insecurity was exacerbated by the **direct effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine** on the global economy, including on food prices, global supply of grains, as well as on the price of energy and fertilisers. These factors compounded food crises that were already raging due to conflicts, weather extremes (notably droughts and flooding resulting from climate change), and economic shocks due to the fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic.

Despite hunger being already on the rise for the past five years, **funding to address this has been lagging behind**<sup>3</sup>. Furthermore, the humanitarian system overly relies on only a limited number of donors.

EU humanitarian assistance is funded through the European Commission's **Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid** (DG ECHO). It is designed and implemented in a nexus approach, whereby synergies between humanitarian, development and peace actions are actively pursued and absolutely necessary. DG ECHO has **reacted swiftly** and decisively to address the hunger crisis by substantially increasing funding for countries most at risk and stepping-up advocacy efforts.

**In 2022 alone, DG ECHO has already allocated around EUR 950 million for humanitarian food assistance, 64% more than in 2021 and almost 90% more than in 2020.** This includes EUR 150 million to be spent in the most vulnerable countries in Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP), which are part of a broader package of EUR 600 million mobilised from de-committed European Development Fund (EDF) reserves. Furthermore, an additional EUR 395 million recently mobilised from the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserves (SEAR), with a considerable food security component of at least EUR 160 million.

Against this backdrop, the **objectives** of the present report are threefold. Firstly, to provide information on the situation in a set of 21 countries and regions considered of maximum concern from a food security perspective. Secondly, to outline DG ECHO's interventions to meet rising humanitarian needs. And lastly, to identify critical needs and opportunities for coordinated action against food insecurity, with a view to scale-up assistance to the populations most in need. It encapsulates information collected from DG ECHO's field and geographical desks at the end of November 2022 and is intended to provide a more granular picture of the realities from a field perspective. This knowledge is further complemented with references to public sources of information.

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<sup>1</sup>Global Report on Food Crises mid-year update (13 September 2022) and Hunger Hotspots Report (21 September 2022).

<sup>2</sup>Figure from the latest update of the Global Report on Food Crises (published on 13 September). This figure underestimates the actual needs, as the update covers eight countries less than the previous report (covering 2021). If we add the 2021 figures for these eight countries, the total figure would be above 220 million people.

<sup>3</sup>[Financing Flows and Food Crises](#) (GNFC).

<sup>4</sup>[Global Humanitarian Overview 2023](#)



This report provides detailed information about the six hunger hotspots as identified by the GNFC, namely **Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Nigeria**, as they all have populations facing or projected to face starvation (Catastrophe, IPC/CH Phase 5) and are facing additional stressors that may lead to a further deterioration. Recent IPC/CH analysis (November 2022) reveal the increase of populations in IPC/CH phase 5 in Burkina Faso, and also foresees cases in Mali. These countries may thus join the list of countries at risk of famine in the next edition.

In addition to these, the report covers the **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Sahel region (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad), Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Mozambique, Central America, Venezuela, Colombia**, where the GNFC warns about the possible intensification of life-threatening conditions in the coming months.

Climate change and related weather extremes remain a key driver of food insecurity in many of the countries under analysis, **such as Kenya, Madagascar, and Somalia, where extreme droughts** are causing crops to deteriorate and harvests to fail. **Floods and irregular rains in Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe**, for example, are bringing about similar consequences.


Many countries are affected by high inflation, notably on food prices. Critical cases include, for instance, **Venezuela**, with an estimated inflation of 155%, **Burkina Faso**, where national average prices are 23% (rice) to 70% (sorghum) higher than the average for 2021 and the last 5 years, reaching up to 150 % in some conflict areas (the situation is similar in Mali), **and Lebanon**, where the currency has lost 94% of its value, compared to the USD.

Lastly, escalating internal and regional conflicts continue to have a disproportionate impact on food security (alongside its four pillars of availability, access, utilisation and stability), as well as on livelihoods, markets access, crop yields and the provision of essential services. This translates into the higher numbers of severely food insecure people. In this respect, countries like **Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Haiti** – among others – have been gravely affected.

Most of the countries under analysis are faced with multiple overlapping challenges at the same time: high food inflation, displacement, increasing insecurity, prolonged effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, structural poverty and lack of governance are only some of the additional causes contributing to the exacerbation of the global food crisis.

## 1. Global picture

On the 12<sup>th</sup> of September, an update of the Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) was published, providing the most recent and detailed picture of the global food insecurity situation. This report estimates at **205 million** the number of people in need of food assistance, compared to 193 million at the end of 2021. Despite the increase, this report does not provide a full picture, as it covers 45 countries only (compared to the 53 covered in the previous one) due to the lack of recent analysis in some countries. If we only consider the 45 countries covered by the update, the number of people in acute food insecurity has increased by 21% since the last report covering 2021<sup>5</sup>.




Source: Global Report on Food Crises, Sept 2022

This is the highest figure since the GRFC is published and confirms a daunting trend: the number of people in acute food insecurity has increased systematically since the first edition of the report (covering the year 2016), and the current figures are double those of 2016.

The most significant increases in food insecurity were observed in Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen. Ten countries recorded an increase of more than 50% in the numbers of people in food crisis. The largest crises in absolute terms are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Yemen.


### Seven countries/territories saw an increase of over 1 million people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above between 2021 and 2022



Source: Global Report on Food Crises, Sept 2022


<sup>5</sup> If figures from the previous report for the eight missing countries are added, the total figure would be above 220 million.

## Numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent in 45 countries/territories in 2022



Source: Global Report on Food Crises, Sept 2022

Not only global numbers, but also the severity of hunger remain very high. Projections indicate that, end of 2022, around 45 million people will reach Emergency levels of food insecurity (IPC/CH phase 4, second highest in the scale). This includes 970 000 people projected to face catastrophic conditions (IPC/CH phase 5, highest in the scale), if no action is taken.




Source: Global Report on Food Crises, Sept 2022

In the latest Hunger Hotspots report, published in September, six countries were considered to be at risk of famine: Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Somalia. As mentioned above, new countries may join this list in the next edition, as famine-like conditions are increasing in the Sahel, even without a formal declaration.

The drivers of food insecurity remain conflict, global and local economic shocks, and weather extremes, added to a background of poverty and inequality. In the last years, the successive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have accelerated the trend.

### 1.1. How the Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated the global food crisis

The ripple effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on global food security have been extensively discussed, and projections have been made by several organisations, but so far, they haven't been objectively measured. The picture provided by the GRFC update, despite being published in September, doesn't fully capture these effects, as many of the analyses on which it is based were carried out before these effects were fully visible. The next edition of the GRFC should provide a more precise estimation of this impact, which should also be associated with an analysis of the speculative mode of operation of international markets.



Source: FAO

The most obvious effect of the invasion has been the increase in global food prices. Before the invasion, these were already at a ten-year high due to the economic effects of Covid-19. The invasion further increased prices, as both Russia and Ukraine were major food exporters, and together provided one third of global cereal supply, and 80% of global sunflower oil. February reached the highest level since its inception in 1990.

Food prices stabilised in the second quarter of the year and decreased to pre-invasion levels after the signature of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July. In November, prices remained very similar to those of October, with small decreases for most products.

However, the Initiative is unlikely to fully stabilise markets, as quantities exported from Ukraine remain below historical levels, the situation in the Black Sea remains fragile (as recent events testify), and global trade patterns have been significantly altered. Food prices are thus expected to remain volatile and high in the next couple of years.

Beyond food prices, the Russian invasion is also impacting food security through its negative effect on the prices of energy and fertiliser – which were already very high before the invasion. Fertiliser prices are two and half times their 2019 level, and affordability is at its lowest since 2008/09. While farmers in developed regions are likely to maintain high levels of

fertiliser use, in poorer countries fertiliser use is expected to decline. As a consequence, global grain supplies are expected to tighten in 2022-23.

The combination of elevated commodity prices, increasing production costs, and persistent currency depreciations translate into higher domestic food price inflation in many countries.

Countries that were highly dependent on grain and oil imports from the Black Sea region were the first to suffer the effects of the crisis. The cost-of-living crisis that followed is affecting particularly low-income, food-importing countries with macroeconomic difficulties and limited coping capacities. This includes many countries in the MENA region and Sub-Saharan Africa, some of which were already facing serious food crises.

Soaring food and fuel prices also compromise the ability of humanitarian actors to supply food to the areas with the direst needs. WFP estimated that their operational costs would increase by EUR 26.1 million per month in 2022, compared to pre-invasion levels, and EUR 63.8 million per month compared to pre-pandemic levels. This is leading to a reduction of food assistance, which would further aggravate some of the world's worst food crises.

The food crisis is expected to continue into next year: fertiliser price increases, compounded by the decrease of Ukrainian exports and skyrocketing energy costs will have a negative impact on agricultural productivity and global markets in the next months.


## 1.2. Drought in the Horn of Africa and famine forecast in Somalia

On 5 September 2022, the Famine Review Committee forecasted that a famine would occur in two districts of Somalia. Unless urgent action was taken, a formal declaration of famine could happen before the end of the year, likely to last until March. This is mainly the consequence of the persistent drought in the Horn of Africa, but also decades of conflict, severe economic shocks, and mass population displacement.

The drought in the Horn of Africa started in 2020 and has stretched over four rainy seasons, making it the most extensive and severe in four decades. It has caused a dramatic increase of acute food insecurity in the three countries, affecting up to 19-21 million people. It has also caused over 1.5 million displacements, and may lead in Somalia to the first famine declaration in five years.

The current rainy season (October – December 2022) is also being below average in certain areas. Due to this, the number of people in need of urgent food assistance could increase to an estimated 23-26 million people, including more people in famine-like situation.

Whilst a famine hasn't been declared in Somalia yet, the risk remains high.





Source: IPC

### 1.3. Food crisis in the Sahel


The Sahel region, one of the poorest and most fragile regions in the world, is affected by a combination of protracted and recurrent major humanitarian crises with constantly increasing food insecurity, particularly since 2017-2018. This is mostly due to the intensification and geographical extension of conflicts and the number of internally displaced persons (nearly 8.5 million in September 2022, 14% more than in 2021).

In October-November 2022, the last round of IPC/CH analysis shows an increase of 25% in the number of people in acute food insecurity (IPC/CH phases 3 and above) in West Africa, compared to November 2021. Of particular concern are the projected increases in the highest IPC/CH phases: 103% increase in IPC/CH phase 4 by December 2022, and 88% increase of IPC/CH phase 5 for the 2023 lean season. Such increases are even more striking if put in a longer perspective: in the Sahel and Lake Chad countries, the number of people in food crisis has increased by 245% compared to the 2015-2019 average.




Source: ECHO


Conflict, insecurity, and forced displacement are the main drivers of acute food insecurity and other important humanitarian needs in the region. These are affecting mostly the central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) and the Lake Chad basin, and have aggravated in the last years, especially since 2019.




This conflict situation builds on a backdrop of poverty, poor access to basic services, chronic and acute structural malnutrition, as well as the recurrence of more extreme climatic shocks (droughts and floods) due to climate change. Indeed, Chad and Niger are among the ten countries most vulnerable to climate change worldwide, and Mauritania has suffered four consecutive years of drought. The region was also severely affected by the ripple effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global economy and trade.

Sahelian countries count also among the most affected by the current cost-of-living crisis. This concerns notably food prices, which are 80% higher than in 2021. In conflict areas, especially Burkina Faso, our field partners report shortages of staple foods in several markets and price increases of around 150%.





**Comparaison annuelle des principaux aliments de base**  
 (Septembre 2021 – Septembre 2022)



**Comparaison sur 5 ans des principaux aliments de base**  
 (Septembre 2022 – 5 years average)



## 2. Geographical focus

This section compiles intelligence about the main food crises from the DG ECHO field network and geographical units. For each country, highlights are provided regarding the status and evolution of food insecurity, the main underlying factors, and the main interventions of DG ECHO and other actors. Finally, some ideas for action are put forth, including opportunities for a reinforced HDP nexus.

Among these, increasing humanitarian funding and better targeting is suggested for most countries. Many opportunities for nexus are identified, including coordination with agricultural, livelihood and resilience activities; links with social protection schemes; etc.

Other recurrent recommendations relate to:

- Improving the efficiency of aid through e.g., more rapid and anticipatory action approaches systematic and use of cash transfers.
- Improving data and information systems and analyses (more integrated/common analyses).
- Reinforcing advocacy on a variety of issues (increased funding, respect of IHL, etc).

Examples of these are:

- Support initiatives to develop synergies, complementarities and coordination between DG INTPA, DG ECHO and other actors at regional level (e.g. following the approach of the high-level meeting on food and nutrition crises in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions), but also at country level, following recent examples in Mali, Niger or Burkina Faso.
- Support nexus initiatives in the CAR, through joint financing and strong coordination. To this end, continue to coordinate with the EU Delegation on the possible reprogramming of unspent budget support to redirect it to resilience and food security funding.
- Advocate both internally and externally to donors for increased engagement on Yemen.
- Advocating with other EU services and donors for increased engagement in Syria for integrated programming that boosts ability of people to earn a living. Livelihoods programmes, including agricultural projects, market strengthening, job creation and restoration of basic services.

More granular detail is provided in the country fiches below.

NOTE: To describe the food insecurity status, these fiches use the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) scale, which is the most broadly used framework. This scale classifies food insecurity in five levels (see below). Expressions like “IPC/CH 3+” are frequently used, meaning “IPC/CH phase 3 and higher”.

In West African countries, IPC can be referred to as CH (Cadre Harmonisé). CH is an analogous system, considered fully compatible with IPC. Hence, CH and IPC/CH phases can be considered equivalent and are often referred to as the IPC/CH framework.

Qualifying Levels of Acute Food Insecurity Using the Reference Table for Area Classification

	Mild acute food insecurity		High acute food insecurity		Critical acute food insecurity
<b>Phase name and description</b>	<b>Phase 1 None/Minimal</b>  Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	<b>Phase 2 Stressed</b>  Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	<b>Phase 3 Crisis</b>  Households either: • Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition;  or • Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	<b>Phase 4 Emergency</b>  Households either: • Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality;  or • Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	<b>Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine</b>  Households have an extreme lack of food and/ or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident.  (For Famine Classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality)
<b>Priority response objectives</b>	Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction	Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods	<b>Urgent action required to:</b>		
			Protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps	Save lives and livelihoods	Revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods

Source : IPC

• West and Central Africa


**Burkina Faso**

*Situation and evolution*


Food security continues to deteriorate in Burkina Faso despite a good agro-pastoral season and an increase of production of cereals, tuber, cash crops (respectively +2,3%, +8.3% and +8.16% versus the 5-year average) and livestock fodder.

These trends should be put into perspective in conflict zones, given the difficulties of access to agricultural fields. Six regions recorded deficits of around 3% to 34%, notably in high insecure areas like Sahel (-34%), North (-15%), Center (-12%), East (-8%).

In the November 2022 IPC/CH exercise (harvest period), there is an increase of 59% of people in IPC/CH phase 3 and above (3.54 million of people) compared to November 2021, with an increase of 192 % of people in phase 4 (342 000 people) and probably occurrence of people in IPC/CH phase 5 (Famine), for the first time since analyses are conducted.




The closure and reduction of functionality of health centres (183 closed, 363 minimally functioning) affects more than 1.5 million people. The inflationary situation experienced by Burkina Faso (one of highest in West Africa) since the 2021 harvest continues to worsen. Despite the start of the harvest period, which is usually synonymous with lower food prices, national average prices are still abnormally high: 23% (rice) to 86% (sorghum) higher than the average for the last 5 years.




In areas of very high insecurity or blockade (notably in the Sahel region), 53% of people are in food insecurity, including 21% in acute food insecurity and in need of humanitarian assistance, with unprecedented severity levels. Food prices are higher than the national average and can reach increases of 67% to +100% for oil, 67% to 80% for millet and 70% to 80% for sugar. Our partners report a shortage of staple food in most markets in conflict-affected areas and price increases of around 150% on average, compared to the last five years.

Conflict intensified in recent months with an increase in towns and populations under blockade and without food (Djibo, Solan, etc.) due to both non-state armed groups' activism and government restrictions (more than 96 trucks were destroyed in a single attack last September). OCHA estimates that one million people reside in 13 blockaded areas. Increasingly, emergency assistance must be provided by expensive helicopter operations in a context of limited resources and access.


Landlocked areas and areas outside State control represent 40% of the territory. By the end of September, the lean season response has reached only 21% of populations in IPC/CH 4 and 55% of populations IPC 3 phases.



Source: OCHA



The Minimum Food Expenditure Basket (MFEB) cost increased by over 27% since the beginning of 2022. The Government has put in place measures to limit the prices of local cereals and some basic necessities by reducing some taxes, without significant effect, nor respect by traders. It was expected to assist more than 3.3 million people.



At the end of September, 34% of households in IPC/CH phase 3 and above (1.17 out of 3.45 million people) were assisted by humanitarian workers (Food security cluster, Nov. 2022). On the Government side, only 11% of the planned food could be distributed, close to one million had still not been reached.

The coverage of the rapid response to displaced persons is working correctly: WFP targets have received reduced rations of 50 to 75% depending on localities, but reach only 60% of intended beneficiaries. In September, the rapid response capacities of DG ECHO's partners to displaced people were fully exhausted.

### Drivers

The high prices of basic food items, the intensification of conflict and insecurity with targeting of civilians, food and markets blockage by non-state armed groups using starvation as a weapon of war, the lack of humanitarian access, internal displaced people (more than 1.5 million people) are the main direct and indirect drivers of the food and nutritional crisis, aggravated by political instability.

Other factors include the rise in national, sub-regional and international food prices (cf. FAO Index) since 2021. The price of hydrocarbons and transport have also risen, and more than doubled in blockaded areas. The war in Ukraine has only exacerbated inflation and speculation. The high insecurity on the roads (improvised explosive devices, illegal controls and detentions, thefts, and other attacks) and destruction of infrastructure also led to a very strong negative impact on the markets and access to beneficiaries.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- About EUR 52.5 million have been released to support a multi-sectoral humanitarian response, including 6.5 million of food assistance from the European Development Fund, EUR 2 million from the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR), EUR 5.5 million of the Operational Reserve, or the mobilisation of EUR 3 million under the Enhanced Humanitarian Response Capacity to support a 3-month air bridge operation and of the Small-Scale Tool for displacements totalling EUR 0.3 million. Upcoming: transfer of EUR 1 million from Luxembourg to DG ECHO and discussion in progress with Austria about a contribution of EUR 0.8 million.
- Food assistance (41%), health and nutrition (12%) and protection (11%) are priority sectors. DG ECHO provides assistance mainly through cash and in-kind deliveries.
- EU is a leading actor in diplomacy and coordinated humanitarian advocacy. On 6 April 2022, DG ECHO co-hosted (with the Global Network Against Food Crises - GNFC, the OECD and the Club du Sahel) a high-level Panel during the Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) bi-annual meeting, where the food insecurity crisis and related drivers were emphasised along with the underfunded response. EUR 2.5 billion were mobilised for the sub-region including funds already planned/allocated and for non-humanitarian responses that do not target households in food crisis.

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- EU delegation: FPI, PDU and Pasanda's (closing) programs
- USAID/BHA: USD 110 million including a USD 40 million top-up for food assistance in June-July 2022.
- World Bank support to WFP and Ministry for Humanitarian Action with USD 388 million.
- GBP 33 million for 35 months from the FCDO/UK Sahel Regional Fund, starting in 2023.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- The triple crisis affecting Burkina Faso (conflict, food insecurity, political instability) requires scaling up the response to essential basic needs including minimum dietary requirements of vulnerable displaced and hosts communities, despite the operational constraints.
- Severely underfunded crisis. Additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Improve prioritisation of assistance ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups including new IDP's and refugees.
- Increase the efforts and advocacy of the EU and other partners for more efficient emergency and post-emergency assistance of productive sectors and infrastructure in rural areas, in a nexus perspective.
- Operationalise the HDP nexus on EUR 150 million budget support reprogramming for resilience and the early recovery of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

## Central African Republic (CAR)

### *Situation and evolution*

Currently there are 484 335 IDPs recorded in the country, the vast majority (75%) staying with hosting families/relatives.

2.6 million people are currently in IPC/CH Phase 3 and above over the period September 2022 to March 2023 (September 2022 IPC), which represents 44% of the total population analysed. The projected figure for the period of April to August 2023 is 3 million people, representing 49% of the total population. This represents an increase compared with the number of people in crisis or emergency reported in 2021 (2.3 million); however this is partly due to an increase of the population analysed (from 4.9 million of people in April 2022 to 6.1 million people in September 2022), and to an update of the demographic projections of the population released by ICASSES - the national institute of statistics. 19 sub-prefectures and 641 000 people are classified in IPC/CH Phase 4 (Emergency).

In 2022, the lean season is taking place in a particularly deteriorated economic context, due to the global impact of the Russian aggression in Ukraine. As result of the global inflation on food and fuel prices, the authorities have restricted cereal exports, there have been fuel shortages and confiscation by the authorities, and the cost of transporting foodstuffs has soared. Market prices of basic foodstuffs have been impacted with significant increases between June and July 2022 for cassava (+20%), rice (+17%) and maize (+5%), which are the main staples. The increased cost of fertilisers will also affect further the resilience of the affected populations, through lower agricultural output in the next agricultural season.

### *Drivers*

Protracted crisis and logistical challenges are major obstacles to the production and commercialisation/ distribution of food.

Recurrent violence and resulting displacements continue to reduce the resilience and livelihood opportunities of the communities affected by these fluid conflict dynamics. These long-term drivers are now being exacerbated by the current shocks of the global impact of the war in Ukraine and of the reduction or suspension of development aid, especially budget support, owing to the political situation in CAR (concerns over the regime's reliance for security on Russia's private military contractor Wagner).

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 17 million have been allocated under the HIP 2022.
- Actions mitigating food insecurity represent 24% (EUR 4 million of the ECHO portfolio, followed by Education in Emergencies (21%), health (11%) and Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM 10%).
- EDF funding to address the consequences of the war against Ukraine on global food insecurity has been confirmed. DG ECHO budget for emergency food assistance in CAR includes an additional EUR 4 million allocated to WFP (multi-country project).

### Other actors' main interventions

- In CAR, USAID/BHA is by far the largest humanitarian donor. So far in 2022, BHA contributed to the HRP with USD 181 million, of which 37.6% (USD 154 million) is for food security. The HRP for CAR (USD 461 million) is currently funded at 78.3%, the funding response to the food security sector for 2022 is currently reaching 93.3%.

### Needs and opportunities


- Improve prioritisation of assistance ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups, through EDF funding for emergency assistance in the food sector in CAR.
- Ensure immediate support during the crop season to ensure a better agricultural production level and a rapid recovery.
- Support nexus initiatives, through joint financing and strong coordination including with the EU Delegation on the possible reprogramming of unspent budget support to redirect it to resilience and food security.

## Chad

### Situation and evolution

Around 810 000 people are still in IPC/CH Phase 3 and above in Chad during the 2022 post-harvest season (October to December), even if a very good rainy season has been recorded. Regarding the 2023 lean season projections, needs have decreased compared to 2022 lean season going from 2.1 million to 1.5 million people in Phase 3 and above. Although it represents an encouraging decrease, the situation remains very worrying with nearly 10% of the population requiring emergency food assistance.

The graph below compares the situation of admissions for Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) in Chad in 2022 compared to the average for the past 5 years.



Source: ECHO

In the Sahel belt region, food demand outweighs supply and is focused on own consumption. Food supply comes mainly from the Southern parts of the country, also in production deficit this year, which has a strong impact on price trends.



The Russian invasion of Ukraine affects basic food prices and generates a lack of access to agricultural inputs for the rural communities. This limits production capacities in 2022 and therefore the ability of vulnerable households to recover from this crisis.

The situation in the Lake Chad region is characterised by a significant number of internally displaced people, with 381 289 people in total. Insecurity has not decreased: 1 331 incidents have been reported from January to August 2022. 35 184 refugees from the Far North of Cameroon who came in late 2021 are still in host communities in N'Djamena and in camps around the capital.

Moreover, the unprecedented floods of the 2022 rainy season, which affected almost 1 million people in 18 provinces out of 23, have destroyed 79 000 homes, 465 000 hectares of land and 19 400 heads of cattle. The Chadian government has put a contingency plan in place and is working with humanitarian actors to meet the needs of flood-affected populations. In addition to the multiple spontaneous relocation sites that have cropped up in N'Djamena and surrounding areas, three official camps have been set up in and around the capital where an estimated 88 590 individuals have been registered as of the end of October, with more expected.

The IPD/CH analysis done in October 2022 used very incomplete data regarding the impact of these unprecedented floods. Fluvial floods might continue to harm households' livelihoods for several weeks, destroying fields and livestock. Therefore, the IPC/CH analysis planned for March 2023 might depict a more severe situation after all the final evaluations have been conducted.

Chad was one of the initial 6 pilot countries of the EU Triple Nexus approach. FAO and WFP already benefit from a EUR 44 million program (P2RSA) by DG INTPA in support of food security and nutrition (for example through the local production of fortified flours), social protection, as well as local governance and cohesion.

### *Drivers*

Persistent violence in Chad and in bordering countries continues to cause displacements. According to the latest Displacement Tracking Matrix and UNHCR data, Chad registers some 574 833 refugees (from Sudan, CAR, Cameroon, Nigeria), 381 289 IDPs, and 101 551 returnees.

The lack of rain in 2021 has significantly affected the agricultural and fodder production, aggravating the already critical food situation of the most vulnerable and the conflict-affected households. The most common coping strategies are the sale of livestock, the sale of productive and non-productive assets, and the migration of one or more household members. The 2022 rainy season has recorded historical above-average rainfalls, resulting in floods that affected 1 million people. This may affect the food security situation of thousands during the upcoming months. However, this also opens other opportunities such as counter-season Sorghum production along with gardening production.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 48 million allocated in 2022, with the main sectors being health and nutrition (23%), food assistance (34%) and Rapid Response Mechanism (13%). 43% of the RRM is allocated to food assistance, bringing total food assistance to around EUR 19 million (40%).
- DG ECHO is also supporting the Food Security Cluster at national and Lac Province level.
- Including the EDF de-committed funds, the DG ECHO budget for emergency food assistance in Chad is now EUR 7.5 million.
- ECHO has activated both DREF and ALERT (Activation Small Scale Tool) emergency response mechanisms to provide additional assistance to the flood-affected population.

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- USAID/BHA is the other main donor to fund emergency food assistance and has recently approved a significant top-up of USD 25 million to WFP to address the consequences of the food crisis.
- WFP has launched a USD 95 million appeal for emergency funding to assist Sudanese and Central African refugees for the next months. Additionally, WFP still needs USD 12.3 million to assist flood-affected populations in urgent need of food assistance.
- Other donors and pooled funds have confirmed their contributions to respond to the consequences of flooding: CERF, Start Fund, BHA, CDCS, GAC.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Continue to improve prioritisation of assistance, ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups.
- Also, as part of the nexus approach, advocate for immediate support to crop production to ensure a better agricultural production level and a rapid recovery, in complementarity with emergency food assistance.

## ***Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)***

### *Situation and evolution*

26.4 million people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are estimated to be acutely food insecure. This includes 3.8 million people at emergency level (IPC/CH phase 4). Even if the number of people classified as food insecure has decreased compared to the last analysis, the situation remains worrying, and the DRC still tops the ranking of countries with the largest number of people affected.

Agricultural productivity is low in the DRC. Structural poverty and under-development, poor infrastructure and poor governance that limit agricultural and economic activities in rural areas, livestock, and agricultural pests, forced displacement due to conflict, weather conditions and climate change, as well as recurrent epidemics, contribute to the alarming food insecurity.

The humanitarian community warns that the food security situation continues to rapidly deteriorate in the North Kivu province of Eastern DRC, after violence between M23 and the national armed forces started again in March of this year. Families fleeing the conflict live with host families or in makeshift shelters and face multiple needs, including food, healthcare and shelter. OCHA estimates that 685 200 people need food and 257 400 people need appropriate nutritional care, of which 59 700 are malnourished children. WFP plans to scale up its response and is targeting 250 000 people with in-kind food and cash assistance for an initial six months, resources permitting. Food prices in the affected areas have gone up by almost 20%.

According to the last market price update from August 2022, the median cost of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) for all assessed territories is relatively high compared to July (+4%), with the exception of North Kivu province, where the median MEB was stable. The high cost of fuel, particularly following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and poor conditions of rural agricultural feeder roads, have produced an increase in transports cost with an impact on the prices of food products. (REACH ICSM - August 2022 and IPC/CH - July 2022).

### *Drivers*

Armed and inter-community conflicts affect mainly five of the 26 provinces of the DRC. 5.53 million people are internally displaced (IDP) and over 96% of displacement is conflict-driven. This figure does not consider the new displaced persons following the new inter-community conflict that broke out in July 2022 in the territory of Kwamouth (Mai-Ndombe province, western DRC), where several thousands of displaced people are reported. Preliminary reports indicate that these displaced people face significant food needs.

Insecurity does not allow farmers to till their land, access markets, etc. IDPs depend on host populations and humanitarian aid, including food assistance.

The DRC is severely under-developed, with all related consequences, including the absence or poor conditions of roads, which keeps many rural communities isolated, limiting their access to markets and essential social services. The DRC's human capital index stands at 0.37 – meaning a Congolese child born today can only hope to achieve 37 % of its potential. The rate of stunting in the DRC is one of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, and malnutrition is the underlying cause of almost half of the deaths of children under five.

Three quarters of the Congolese population – 60 million people – live on less than USD 1 a day, according to the World Bank. Seven out of ten Congolese live in rural areas, mostly subsistence farmers in conditions of precariousness and poverty. Increases in food prices have further reduced the purchasing power of the Congolese population.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- Initial allocation of EUR 44 million in 2022, including one third on Food Security and Livelihoods (including Multipurpose Cash Transfers - MPCT, which accounts for the large majority) and 5.5% for nutrition. Current budget stands at EUR 54.4 million, partly delivered through DG ECHO-funded rapid response projects/mechanism. DG ECHO Humanitarian Food Assistance focuses on newly emerging needs linked to conflict and recent displacements. The EUR 14.5 million allocated to food security and livelihoods / MPCT represents 1.9 % of the needs for the DRC, according to the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), and the EUR 2.5 million in nutrition less than 1 % of the nutrition needs described in the HRP.

## Other actors

- US funding stands at USD 426.3 million, representing 68.4 % of all HRP funding so far in 2022).

## Needs and opportunities

- The 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan for the DRC requires USD 1.88 billion. It was 37 % funded on 19 October 2022, according to OCHA. WFP needs USD 151 million for its emergency response to cover the period September 2022 to February 2023. The total 2022 funding requirements are USD 645 million.
- There is a need to develop a clearer picture of nexus opportunities, and possible links with humanitarian interventions.


## Mali


### Situation and evolution

The food security situation seems to improve significantly, according to the latest IPC/CH analysis in October 2022. 630 000 people are in IPC/CH phase 3 and above, including around 15 000 in phase 4. This is respectively 46% and 64% lower than in November 2021. Even if the agro-pastoral campaign was good to very good, these improvements need to be nuanced, in view of the abnormally high prices, insecurity, and absence of basic services (especially in the centre and North of the country).

According to the latest FAO DIEM (Data in Emergency Situations) bulletin (October), for 60.8% of households on average, the main difficulty was access to fertilisers, especially in Timbuktu (75%). The most important shock remains the high food prices (+32.3% on average), followed by the resurgence of illness or death of household members (29.9%), the price of fuel (+15.6%) and the incidence of insecurity (10.1% on average but 43% in Mopti).

Despite the good to very good agro-pastoral season, and the fall in the prices of several basic food products, the average prices remain much higher than in 2021 (except for corn) and than the average of the last 5 years. Millet and sorghum are still 90 and 77% more expensive than 2021 and the last 5-year average. The increase in the value of the Minimum Expenditure Basket varies from +17% (national average) to +33% (insecure and conflict areas). Increased cost of fuel impacts food prices and cost of assistance.






2 500 000 people received emergency assistance, including 269 419 IDPs. This exceeds the target of 1.8 million people, probably underestimated, for the lean season (IPC/CH analyses not carried out in March 2022). Among these beneficiaries, 681 459 people received a “one shot” assistance for one month and 1 807 000 people received more than one month of assistance (recurring assistance). Government assisted 1 192 000 people.

Only 30% of the planned households received livelihood support. Nutritional responses have only targeted 13% and 34% of moderately and severely malnourished children respectively. 18% of the 6-23 month old benefited from preventive flours according to the response report (source: Pregec, Oct. 2022).

The security and humanitarian situation have particularly worsened in the North and centre of the country, while insecurity keeps spreading further South, notably Sikasso. In September 2022, the number of internally displaced reached another peak since the crisis in 2012, with over 440 000 individuals. The situation is very worrying in Gao with continuous arrivals from Ansongo, Talataye, Tessit and Menaka. Children represent 63% of the internally displaced population.

October 2022 was the month having experienced the highest number of security incidents since the beginning of the year. 66% of incidents recorded in October targeted civilian populations. Constraints on humanitarian access and people's access to their livelihoods and basic services are increasing. Attacks and threats against medical personnel, health centres, as well as predation on medical equipment and drugs, is increasing. There is a need to maintain or even increase logistical and air support to our partners in order to be able to maintain assistance to the most affected populations.



Source: Food Security Cluster, October 2022

A significant increase in the prevalence of severe acute malnutrition has been reported in 2022 in many regions, notably those in conflict (Gao, Timbuktu, Taoudeini), compared to 2021, with a national average above the emergency threshold.

International partners have largely put their development cooperation with the government on hold, with negative effects on financial assistance for the poorest and most vulnerable populations. The latest cuts in French funding (decree of 29/11/2022) further reduce financial assistance, including for humanitarian actions.

### Drivers

Worsening conflict, violence against civilians, and extension of conflict-affected areas are the main drivers of food insecurity. This translates into limited access to markets for populations and providers, high and increasing insecurity, irregular controls on the main commercial roads, destruction of land, crops and livelihood by armed actors, restriction of access to land, etc.

The abnormally high prices of basic food at national, sub-regional and international levels (cf. FAO Index) since the end of 2021 has a significant impact. General inflation in 2022 is estimated at 7% by the World Bank.

The country is very dependent on imports (14% for cereals, 25% for fuel, 25% of fertilisers), and is severely affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

### Ongoing interventions

#### ECHO interventions

- EUR 48.3 million allocated in 2022, including EUR 2 million contribution from Italy, EUR 6 million from EDF, EUR 1 million from SEAR and EUR 1 million from operational reserve being contracted.
- Rapid Multi-sectoral Response (44%) including food assistance, shelter, wash and non-food items; health/nutrition (28%); food assistance (12%); protection (5%); and education (6%). DG ECHO increasingly provides aid through cash and vouchers interventions.

#### Other actors' main interventions

- EU delegation: EUR 62.5 million including PDU<sup>6</sup> programs in rural areas in 2022.
- USAID/BHA: USD 75 million including 15-32 million top up for food assistance in 2022.
- GBP 33 million for 35 months from the FCDO/UK Sahel Regional Fund (starting in 2023).

<sup>6</sup> Programme de Développement d'Urgence


## Needs and opportunities

- Additional short and long-term financial support and scaling up of the response is required for more efficient emergency and post-emergency assistance: functionality of basic services, livelihood and productive support, infrastructure, durable solutions for long-term Internally Displaced Persons, etc.
- Continue to play a leading role in coordination and advocacy for the respect of IHL, principled aid delivery and increased assistance to Mali, and advocate with other services and donors for increased engagement in Mali.
- Opportunities for nexus are limited due to the political crisis and security environment, with the almost total suspension of development cooperation by EU and EU MS.

## Mauritania


### Situation and evolution

Despite a good agro-pastoral season, the last IPC/CH analysis (October 2022) shows that 10% of the population is still facing food crisis or worse (approx.441 000 people). This is 27% more than last year's analysis, but 21% less than the last lean season. 6 times more people (56 000) are in phase 4 compared to last year.



Source: ECHO


Despite a good agro-pastoral season and a significant increase of production, the food price of basic food remains high especially for imported products, Mauritania being highly reliant on food imports. Wheat is the mean example, with prices up 79%, compared to the average of the last five years. Depending on the region, oil prices are between 58 and 73% more expensive than the last five years average. For sugar, its +36 to +54 %, and +24 to +51% for maize.



The government was not able to sustain fuel and gas subsidies, which led to fuel price increase (+50%, after being stable for more than a decade) and associated social tensions.

The response to the food crisis is expected to cover almost 80% of the people in need. Assistance is delivered by the Government (62%), WFP (33%), NGOs (5%). The food basket could not be revised upwards to take into account significant price increases, due to lack of funding. Coverage and duration of the assistance (4-month support) were prioritised over the level of assistance (about 36% of the food basket). The food situation of the Malian refugees (about 90 000 people, mainly children) also keeps deteriorating, despite assistance from WFP and from the government.

The poor nutritional situation is also concerning: 13.2% of average national acute malnutrition, ranging between 19.6% and 2.4% of severe acute malnutrition (> of 2%, emergency situation). Six Wilayas (Provinces) are in critical situation (MAG >15 and/or SAM >2%).





The first result of agricultural and pastoral campaign shows an increase of cereal production (+33% versus last 5 years average, net surplus of 367 468 tonnes) and livestock fodder. Areas at risk of pocket of drought and chronic poverty should be subject to close monitoring during the coming months.

### *Drivers*

The persistence of a high level of basic food prices, of poverty and extreme poverty in rural areas are the key driver.

The limited access to food is aggravated by the high dependency of importation with high international food prices; Mauritania has a 70% dependency on food imports (nearly 10% of its GDP), with 50% of its imported wheat originating from Russia and Ukraine.

Mauritania is currently exposed to a high risk of debt distress and therefore has limited fiscal space to manage this situation effectively.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 10.1 million in 2022: Food assistance (40%), health and nutrition (24%), disaster preparedness (18%), education (15%), logistic support (3%). DG ECHO provides food assistance mainly through cash (100% of food ration through cash and local enriched flour in kind). This includes a EUR 1.5 million allocation from EDF to address emergency food needs (contracting ongoing).
- EU is a leading actor on diplomacy and coordinated humanitarian advocacy.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- EU Delegation rural development program (Rimrap, Rimdir, Rimfil: EUR 46 million) in the closing phase – Top up of EUR 12 million considered with EDF leftover funds.
- USAID/BHA: USD 9 million, including USD 5 million top up for food assistance in 2022 June-July.
- World Bank: National social safety nets extension including Malian refugees of Mberra.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Sustain coverage of the food needs and ensure better mechanisms to avoid exclusion of the most vulnerable, including refugees.
- Increase long-term financial support and investment to improve food security sustainably.
- Increase in the State budget for the agro-pastoral sector in accordance with the Maputo commitments<sup>7</sup>, while guaranteeing better effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure.
- Continue to ensure a leading role in coordination and advocacy for an increased interest in Mauritania (“forgotten” Sahelian country in West Africa).

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<sup>7</sup> Programme détaillé pour le développement de l'agriculture africaine (PDDAA), launched in 2003 in Maputo by Heads of State and Government under the auspices of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

## Niger

### Situation and evolution

The 2022 October IPC/CH analysis shows a quite significant improvement of food security: 0.44 million of people are in IPC/CH3+ food insecurity. It's 21% and 35% less compared to those of November 2021 and 2022 lean season. For people in phase 4 (79 000 people), it's 47 and 63% less than last year and last 2022 lean season.

There has been a significant pre-lean state response in 2022 and actors and the government mobilisation for the 2022 emergency food response. In October, approximately 4 million of people (90% of the lean season caseload) were covered in humanitarian assistance by humanitarians and the Government (37%): 1.6 million people by the government, 2 million by WFP, 0.4 million by NGO's and Red Cross movement. However, the first governmental food distribution (only cereals and salt) was late and the second one has been finalised in mid-October. 1.4 million people should benefit from subsidised cereal prices in a non-targeted way. WFP announced a gap of USD 14.4 million for emergency response (including protracted IDP's) for the period from September 2022 to February 2023.




Figure 3 : Tendances de la malnutrition aigüe chez les enfants de 6 à 59 mois, du retard de croissance et de l'insuffisance pondérale chez les enfants de 0 à 59 mois (Réf OMS, 2006/Flag OMS).

In mid-November, there is a downward trend in food prices, but they remain slightly higher than those of 2021 (+1% for maize, +2% for millet and +3% for sorghum and rice based on national average) and even more compared to the average of the last 5 years (+9% for rice to +20% for millet and +23% for millet) but we observe a very high variability of price levels (some time from simple to double) between regions for the same commodity. These price anomalies are down compared to the lean season, and clearly lower than those of Mali and Burkina Faso.

The security situation in October remains volatile despite a slight decrease in the number of incidents compared to the previous period. As of September 30 2022, around 711 642 people were in a situation of forced displacement, including 376 809 internally displaced people. Their number has doubled over the past three years in the three border areas and in the Lake Chad Basin due to attacks by non-state armed groups. Among the refugees living in Niger, 63% come from Nigeria, 22% from Mali, 7% from Burkina Faso and 8% from other countries (Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, Chad, etc.).

The first results of the good agro-pastoral campaign forecast an increase of production of cereal (+65% and +9.9%) and cash crops (+19% and +15%), compared to 2021 and the average of the last 5 years respectively. An overall fodder deficit of around 12.5 million ton of dry matters is expected with larger deficits in the Tillabery region and Tahoua, to a lesser extent (cf. ACF SIG Sahel web site). The agro-pastoral season should be put into perspective in conflict zones (Tillabery, Tahoua, Diffa and Maradi), given the difficulties of access to fields, the low yields in these zones and the dependence of IDPs on assistance.

## *Drivers*

The main direct and indirect drivers are the consequences of the intensification of conflict in neighbouring countries Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. In particular, there is a substantial deterioration of security and humanitarian access in the Tillabery area, and security concerns in Tahoua, North-West Nigeria and Maradi. The crisis is aggravated by a historic deficit of agro-pastoral production which occurred in 2021 (-36% compared with the 2020 campaign and the average of the last five years), at national and sub-regional level as well as by the rise of national, sub-regional and international food prices (cf. FAO Index) since 2021. The increase of price of diesel fuel (+24%, at the beginning of August) and its shortages are additional negative factors.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- Close to EUR 52 million have been released to support a multi-sectoral humanitarian response notably by rapid response mechanisms. Food assistance (45%), rapid multi-sectoral response to IDP's (21%) and health (8%) are the most important sectors. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash (increasing) and in-kind deliveries. This includes EUR 6 million from EDF, EUR 2 million from SEAR and 2 million from OR, being contracted.
- EU is a leading actor in diplomacy and humanitarian advocacy coordination. On 6 April 2022, DG ECHO co-hosted (with GNAFC, OECD, Club du Sahel) a Panel during the Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) bi-annual meeting, where the food insecurity crisis, related drivers and insufficient funding of the response were highlighted. EUR 2.5 billion (including funds already planned and development funding) have been mobilised for the sub-region targeting households in food crisis.

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- EU delegation: FPI, Programme de Développement d'Urgence (résilience) in rural areas.
- USAID/BHA: USD 25 million top up for food assistance in 2022 June-July.
- Ongoing reallocation of resources from the World Bank and USD 5.3 million from the African Development Bank.
- GBP 33 million for 35 months from the FCDO/UK Sahel Regional Fund (starting in 2023).

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Need for more efficient and scaled-up response to essential basic needs and prioritisation of assistance to vulnerable households.
- Additional short and long-term financial support is required as well as more efficient emergency and post-emergency assistance of food assistance, of livelihood, of productive sectors and infrastructure in rural areas.
- Increase the funding efforts and advocacy of the EU and other partners.
- Accelerate the concrete operationalisation of the Nexus and its monitoring and evaluation, for IDPs.

## Nigeria

### *Situation and evolution*

Nigeria is part of the 6 countries at the highest alert level, as there are populations facing starvation (Catastrophe, IPC/CH Phase 5) or at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, as they are already critically food insecure (Emergency, IPC/CH Phase 4) and are facing severe aggravating factors. 17 million people are in CH Phase 3 to 5 during the 2022 post-harvest season, which represents 8% of the analysed population in food crisis. Severe food needs remain very high, especially in the Northeast (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States - BAY) and in the North-West, where acute food needs have significantly increased over the years along with acute malnutrition.

The Humanitarian Situation Monitoring of October 2022 in BAY States shows concerning food consumption deficits and limited diversity of diets in the inaccessible areas surveyed. Almost half of the households struggle to have sufficient food intake, and nearly 54.7% experienced a crisis or higher levels (IPC/CH Phase 3+) of food deprivation and hunger. 40% of the households rely on crisis coping strategies to meet their food needs.

The levels of acute malnutrition among new arrivals from the inaccessible areas are serious (Phase 4 IPC/CH Acute Malnutrition Classification) with the overall Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate at 20.1% and Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) at 7.2%. Overall, both crude and under five mortality rates (CMR and U5MR) were above the emergency threshold of 1 deaths/10 000 population/day and 2 death/10 000 children.

The ongoing local policy to close all IDP camps continues, reducing access to those in need. Through the second wave of camps closure, about 139 000 IDPs were relocated from several IDP camps in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (M.M.C.), Jere and Konduga Local Government Areas (LGAs) to other locations in Borno State. The Borno State Government-led camp closures and relocation, resettlement, and return has elicited significant concerns regarding IDPs' safety and dignity, and around the guiding principles of voluntariness and informed consent. Dire living conditions and limited access to basic services and assistance have also triggered secondary, or multiple, population movements into congested IDP camps. The uncoordinated resettlement and relocation of IDPs to inaccessible or hard-to-reach areas risks increasing food insecurity and malnutrition.

### *Drivers*

Insecurity linked to ongoing conflict between non-State armed groups (NSAG) and government security forces (Northeast), banditry (Northwest) and intercommunal clashes remain the key drivers of food insecurity. Farmers struggle to access their lands and cultivate their fields, while herders cannot move their livestock freely. Many local government areas remain completely or partially inaccessible for humanitarian assistance, and it is estimated that in 2022 that 1 million people nationally are in areas inaccessible to international humanitarian actors.

Climate change also reduces the resilience of community and fuels intercommunity violence on the use of natural resources. The elevated levels of consumption gaps, malnutrition, mortality, are largely driven by the limited availability of food stocks, restricted access to functional markets and poor water, health and sanitation services, which might heighten morbidity risk, and impact more negatively on households' ability to engage in labour for food or resource gathering. An additional factor is the unsustainable use of emergency coping strategies, which entails people spend their savings, borrow money and sell their assets/goods. Emergency coping strategies are begging or selling land or a house. Crisis strategies is translated in withdrawing children from school and selling productive assets or means of transport.

The recent rainfalls witnessed in Nigeria, coupled with the opening of a dam in Cameroon, resulted in the devastation of shelters and camp facilities in six camps hosting 15 618 individuals. Nearly 2.7 million of vulnerable population live in the flooded areas and it is estimated that 743 000 hectares of cropland have been flooded.

The war against Ukraine has worsened the situation with skyrocketing prices, affecting basic food commodities and agricultural inputs, affecting the production capacities of farmers. Moreover, the Naira has depreciated on the parallel market by 33% (year-on-year). The ongoing devaluation of the Naira will continue to exert pressure on food prices throughout Nigeria. Consumers' purchasing power is still lowered, with a substantial increase in cereal prices compared to the same time last August. Particularly, local rice had a 24 % year-on-year increase in Maiduguri and 25 % in Damaturu.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- ECHO is providing a total of EUR 58.5 million to respond to the urgent needs of conflict affected population in Nigeria. This includes an indicative amount of EUR 9 million from the European Development Fund to address the food crisis following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.
- Sectors: Food assistance (23%), health and nutrition (16%), protection (16%) and WASH/Shelter (16%) are priority sectors. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash, vouchers, and in-kind deliveries.
- Advocacy: EU/ECHO is a leading voice in humanitarian advocacy in the Northeast.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- BHA, and to some extent FCDO, focusing on emergency food assistance programming.
- BHA has recently validated a significant top-up of USD 38 million to WFP to address the consequences of the food crisis, bringing their total budget to WFP to USD 338 million.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Improve prioritisation of assistance and vulnerability assessment, ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups, including through the de-committed EDF funds for food emergency assistance.
- Assist forcibly displaced people from the Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) and Jere camp closure.
- Leverage funding to assist all vulnerable IDPs in the garrison towns' camps who do not have access to long-term sustainable livelihood opportunities.
- Where feasible, immediately support agriculture in this the crop season to ensure better agricultural production.

- East and Southern Africa

## **Ethiopia**

### *Situation and evolution*

The severity of food insecurity in Ethiopia is among the worst globally, due to the impacts of ongoing conflict, violence, and climatic shocks, such as prolonged droughts.

22.6 million people are estimated to be food insecure in the country, including some 11.8 million people estimated to be food insecure due to significant livelihoods losses in drought affected areas: In the southern, south-eastern, and eastern parts of the country mainly due to droughts. In northern and western parts, Tigray's conflict is the main driver of food insecurity. This adds to high inflation and disruption of income and food sources due to displacements. There are reports of growing rates of food insecurity in areas in western Oromia and parts of Benishangul Gumuz that are not accessible.

Despite the agreement signed on 2 November between the Federal Government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) to cease hostilities leading to some improvements in the security and humanitarian access situation in Tigray, food and nutrition needs still remain high in Afar, Amhara, and Tigray regions, with rising cases of acute malnutrition recorded among conflict-affected communities. The lack of adequate health facilities, most of which were damaged during the conflict, will likely further deteriorate the health of the population.

Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) outcomes will likely be widespread in multiple areas of the country. Tigray was the area of highest concern until the start of the harvest in October 2022. The latest WFP Food Security Assessment in Tigray in June 2022 found 89% of households as food insecure and 47% as severely food insecure (of a population of 6 million). The situation could rapidly worsen due to the renewed fighting which took place between the warring parties in late August. This could possibly signify a return to large-scale military conflict.

The revised updated Horn of Africa Drought Regional Overview (24 August 2022) indicated that nearly 10 million people are in need of food assistance, and 2.9 million children and pregnant and lactating women require nutrition interventions until the end of the year in the drought affected areas. To date, more than 3.5 million livestock have died, while at least 25 million are at risk and are very weak and emaciated with no or little milk production, the main source of nutrition for children. The projections of the October to December seasons forecasted a below average seasons, setting the stage for an unprecedented fifth failed rainy season.

Increase in malnutrition is reported from across the country. People in need of nutrition support are estimated to be 7.5 million (Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) and Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM), U5 and Pregnant Lactating Women (PLW)). There is a widespread shortage of F-75 in the country and irregular availability of SC+ and MAM commodities affecting the nutritional treatment.

Scaled-up access to basic services and sustained food assistance, as well as unfettered humanitarian access, is needed immediately to save lives.

## *Drivers*

Conflict in the northern part of the country that affects three regional states directly (Tigray, Afar and Amhara). In addition, several other parts of the country are impacted by localised conflicts, which further worsens the food and nutrition security of the affected populations.

Drought in the East, South, and South-Eastern part of the country, currently affecting Afar, Somali Regional State, Southern Oromia and Southern SNNPR.

The crisis in Ukraine and macro-economic situation have affected the food import and market prices. In June 2022, inflation across the country reached the highest rate in Eastern Africa (34%). Only during the first half of 2022 food prices increased by 26% and the cost of the food basket by 33% (65.2% in one year). Despite price control measures, petrol prices showed a marked increase compared with pre-war levels (up 16%). Between June 2022 and June 2021, Ethiopia recorded one of the highest year-on-year depreciations of local currency, down by 194% against the USD.

Limited access, due to insecurity and major bureaucratic impediments, is reducing the capacity of humanitarian agencies to deliver, particularly in Tigray.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 58 million allocated in 2022 (plus EUR 8 million under the upcoming EDF de-committed funds).
- Food assistance (12%), WASH (7%), Health (13%), Nutrition (19%), S/NFIs (5%), protection (7%), DRR/DP (15%), Coordination (4%), logistic (7%) education (6%) and cash (6%).

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- The Ethiopian Humanitarian Country Team (EHCT) produced a dedicated drought response plan (USD 1.66 billion) to which contributions have been made, mainly by the US (over USD 400 million). Currently the plan is largely under-funded.
- The Ethiopia Safety net program has a crisis/shock response capacity besides its routine response covering over 8 million people.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Scaling up of the response is urgently required.
- Need to produce more comprehensive specific and tangible data and specific analyses to support targeted responses.
- Need to enhance support from development actors to build further resilience of affected communities.

## Kenya

### *Situation and evolution*

The October to December (OND) rainy season has been characterised by late onset, sporadic, and poor spatial and temporal distribution of rains. 14 counties are currently in alarm phase. Humanitarian partners estimate that there will be 6.4 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in 2023 in the ASALs region, including 5.8 million Kenyans and 602 000 refugees. On 21 October, the UN, together with the GoK (including the Kenyan Deputy President Gachagua), have launched the 2023 Kenya Drought Response Plan worth US 472.6 million.

With more than 2000 newcomers on a weekly basis, the UNHCR faces the emergency influxes of refugees in Turkana (Kakuma and Kalobeyei camps) and Garissa (Dadaab complex), urgently requires USD 4.4 million to deliver the response till December 2022.

On 6 December, the Refugee Donor Group under the ECHO Country Office lead has organised a Multi-stakeholder Roundtable Debriefing Session on Refugee Response with participation from the Department for Refugee Services (DRS) Commissioner, UNHCR country representative to Kenya, WFP, UNICEF, the INGO Refugee Working Group and some donors.

The Kenya Red Cross Society reported that there is no sufficient medical/epidemiologic screen to prevent that Ebola cases might get through the borders. During the reporting period, 7 events have been uploaded onto the EVD Regional Platform, against the 21 cases reported by the Red Cross. All the 21 resulted negative to the Ebola test.

The drought-induced decline in crop production and the related reduced availability of cereals on markets has increased food prices. The fallout of Ukraine's war adds onto this, as increased production costs (fuel and inputs) are also contributing to the price spikes. Due to reduced availability, food inflation is exceeding annual inflation in Kenya, with food price increases almost double the annual inflation (13.8 vs. 7.9%). Over the last year the price of the local food basket has increased particularly for maize, flour, and wheat/grains (up to 123%), thus leading to a significant increase of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (up to 35% in Turkana County only).

### *Drivers*

Limited access to food is compounded by several factors:

- Climatic shocks: four consecutive poor rainy seasons have led to severe droughts.
- Cost and availability of fuel: high fuel prices are pushing up the inflation rate, including food inflation rates, leading to a significant increase in the overall cost of living.
- August political elections: the political campaigns have diverted the needed attention from the current drought and new arrivals' registration in the Dadaab refugee camp.
- Localised population movements linked to resource-based tensions: local conflicts over resources (among the ASAL pastoral communities) as well as increased cross-border displacement induced by the drought (with reports of over 25 000 individuals newly arrived in Dadaab refugee camp alone).
- The worsening economic crisis: the effects of low incomes, the depreciation of the Kenyan shilling against the US dollar.



- The Russian invasion of Ukraine is contributing to the increase of food prices on local market, particularly for wheat, further highlighting the dependency on imported goods such as fertilisers, fuel, and wheat.

### Ongoing interventions

The Kenya Drought Appeal launched by OCHA has been revised: USD 157.2 million have been funded (or 61% of the appeal). However, USD 250.5 million are still needed.

### ECHO interventions



- Total funding HIP 2022: EUR 16.4 million.
- Ratio/percentage of allocation for priority sectors: Food assistance (WFP EUR 4 million + Kenya Cash Consortium EUR 1.5 million for MPCA), health and nutrition (IRC EUR 2.4 million + UNICEF EUR 1 million).

### Other actors' main interventions

- Funding from other main stakeholders such as USAID, FCDO, DE, etc: Germany USD 2 170 154 (committed); Sweden USD 1 027 855 (committed); Norway USD 1 761 841 (paid). In August, the U.S. government committed USD 310.9 million in emergency assistance to tackle the consequences of the severe drought.

### Needs and opportunities

- Funding gap: additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Improve prioritisation of assistance for the most vulnerable groups.
- Explore nexus possibilities with the EDF de-committed funds (ECHO EUR 2.55 million for humanitarian food assistance in Kenya and Djibouti, and INTPA EUR 10 million for food production).
- Advocate with other services and donors for increased engagement in Kenya.



Source: Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update

## Madagascar

### *Situation and evolution*

Madagascar's Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est are still dealing with the aftermath of a large drought and cyclones, with livelihoods eroded and populations having very little coping capacity. According to the preliminary results of the recent IPC/CH analysis 36% is currently highly food insecure (between November and March 2023), with 252 000 people in IPC/CH Phase 4, which is a light improvement compared to the last projection, mainly thanks to large scale humanitarian assistance that was provided and sustained since the beginning of the crisis. In the coming months, for the first projection period (April to July 2023) and for the second projection (August to October 2023), a further improvement of the food security situation is expected. However, 30% of the analysed population is still expected to be in need of assistance, 59 000 of them in IPC/CH Phase 4.

Commodity prices remain higher than both last year and the 5-year average (rice and cassava prices in Madagascar are over 200 percent higher than the five-year average according to FEWSNET), demonstrating the rising cost of living for households. Rising gasoline prices are expected to contribute to continued increases in food prices, especially in the Grand Sud, where markets are dependent on imported and locally produced staples being transported long distances from surplus producing areas in other regions.

### *Drivers*

The food insecurity currently experienced in Madagascar is driven by several factors and notably: (i) Southern Madagascar continues to experience its worst drought in 40 years, leaving part of the population fighting for survival. More than 3 years of consecutive severe drought have wiped out harvests and hampered access to food in the Grand Sud; (ii) Between Mid-January and April 2022, six tropical cyclones and storms hit Madagascar. The 2021/2022 cyclonic season affected more than 960 000 people in the North and Southern part of the country. Floods affected about 60 000 hectares of rice fields, which resulted in a below-average harvest in May, undermining both farmers' livelihoods and food supply in country; (iii) the government's actions in raising gasoline prices in July by 43%, while the price of diesel increased by 44%. Price shocks within the COVID-19 context and the Russian aggression of war against Ukraine, combined with crop losses due to climatic phenomena, have the potential to transform the creeping inflation rate into galloping inflation; and (iv) insecurity related to bandits in the Grand Sud restricts people's movement and affects livelihoods, amplifying food insecurity.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- In 2022, EU humanitarian assistance amounted to nearly EUR 20 million to respond to the food insecurity and nutrition emergency needs; 2) the consequences of the 2021/2022; and 3) to reinforce early warning systems to drought in Grand Sud along a nexus approach. This amount also includes the EUR 4.25 million allocated to support the scale-up of food and nutrition assistance and last mile delivery further undermined by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and its impact of global food prices.
- Priority sectors: Food Assistance and nutrition integrating protection (EUR 14.5 million (WFP, UNICEF and ACF) (72.5%), disaster preparedness (EUR 4.1 million (UNDP and IFRC), logistics, health and shelter.

## Other actors' main interventions

- The flash appeal launched on 18 January 2021 has been further extended until December 2022 with additional funding requirement of USD 158.6 million for the period May - December 2022, including USD 114.8 million for the Food Security sector. USA, Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and SIDA represent the main contributors in 2022.
- Total funding towards food insecurity in 2022: USD 67 177 021 including ECHO (some of the funding received in 2022 are not part of the latest flash appeal extension until December 2022).

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Need to remain vigilant and engaged in supporting the most vulnerable populations still confronted to the impact of the drought/climate change.
- The mechanisms in place are not sufficiently shock responsive. More investments on resilience building and capacity strengthening activities to support affected communities' livelihood in areas recurrently affected by climate shocks is critical. System relies on structures that are overwhelmed, and organisations are not quick in putting in place emergency measures.
- The EU development cooperation programming for the next period includes structuring long-term activity in the Grand Sud. The EU's Development Programming in Madagascar (country-wide) amounts to EUR 325 million for the 2021-2024 period. The three priority areas are: Governance and human development, Sustainable growth and jobs, and Green Deal.
- NEXUS: 10th/11th EDF de-committed funds allocation to DG INTPA provisionally earmarked EUR 10 million for boosting agricultural production in Madagascar (expected duration: 7.5 years).

## *Mozambique*

### *Situation and evolution*

Between April and September 2022, 1.4 million people (10% of the population) are projected to face Crisis or worse conditions (IPC/CH Phase 3+), including approximately 24 000 in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). 1.1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3+), including 23 500 in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4), are in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia. This is an 18% year-on-year increase. The rise in global food and non-food costs is resulting in higher living costs in Mozambique. According to the preliminary results of the IPC/CH analysis, a deterioration of the food security situation is expected. In Cabo Delgado, 60% more people are expected to be severely food insecure (IPC/CH Phase 4) due to additional displacements and food price increase. Besides in conflict-affected areas of northern Mozambique, Crisis (IPC/CH 3) outcomes persist in drought-affected areas of southern and central Mozambique, as well as in cyclone/storm affected areas in the Nampula province, following a significantly below-average 2022 harvest. The rise in global food and non-food costs is resulting in higher living costs in Mozambique. In August, the year-on-year inflation rate increased to 12.1%, the highest value in over 4 years. Compared to the 5-year average, maize grain prices in September are 11% to 47% above the 5-year average in most monitored markets. The above-average trend in maize grain prices in most markets across the country is likely

driven by the cumulative effect of successive price increases over the past 4 years, following multiple production shocks including cyclones, floods, and below-average rainfall. High transportation costs and increased demand for non-wheat products (maize, cassava, sweet potato) are also keeping food prices high.

- In August and September, the Food Security Cluster (FSC) partners provided humanitarian food assistance to just over 1 million people in northern Mozambique. Due to funding constraints and increased need, WFP is continuing to distribute half rations equivalent to 39% of daily calories required through November 2022, and will likely resume distributing regular rations, equivalent to 78% of daily calorie required in the December 2022/January 2023 cycle.
- Additionally, WFP is continuing to conduct a vulnerability-based targeting exercise to prioritise assistance according to vulnerability status instead of displacement, including a review of their current beneficiary lists.
- In October, WFP began providing humanitarian food assistance to more than 22 500 people in the drought-affected areas, complemented by the distribution of agricultural kits to boost food production during the 2022/2023 agricultural season.

### *Drivers*

The main drivers of food insecurity in the current period include: (i) the armed conflict in Cabo Delgado province which, according to IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of 30 June 2022, has displaced 946 508 people; (ii) shortage of rainfall or irregular rains in parts of Nampula, Tete, Manica, Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo provinces; (iii) increasing food prices; (iv) economic impact of COVID-19 restrictive measures. Moreover, at the beginning of 2022, the northern provinces were hit by two severe extreme weather events, which left more than 700 000 people in need of food and shelter. The southern regions on the other hand, were adversely affected by a lack of rainfall during the same period, which resulted in moderately drier than average conditions. Throughout February and until mid-March severe drought conditions developed in the south of the country.

Mozambique depends on imports for 90% of its wheat and sunflower seed oil needs; the country imports more than a third (39%) of its wheat from Russia (31%) and Ukraine (8%). Mozambique currently imports almost 20% of fertilisers from Russia. Elevated global fertiliser prices are concerning as reduced availability/accessibility will result in lower food production in Mozambique, which in turn would result in higher food import needs at a time when global food prices are rising steeply.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 28.25 million allocated to Mozambique in 2022 (EDF: EUR 8.25 million). This amount includes the EUR 8.25 million allocated to support the scale-up of food and nutrition assistance and last mile delivery further undermined by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and its impact of global food prices.
- Food Assistance (42.5%), Nutrition (3.5%) and Multi-Purpose Cash Transfers (5%). DG ECHO provides aid mainly through in-kind and cash deliveries.

## Other actors' main interventions

- On 20 July 2022, USAID pledged USD 116 million in additional assistance to respond to needs, including severe food insecurity, in Mozambique. This funding brings US humanitarian assistance to Mozambique to USD 167 million in Fiscal Year 2022.
- OCHA HRP 2022 in Northern Mozambique (Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa):
  - a total of 1.01 million - 104% of 970 000 people targeted - have been reached with humanitarian food and livelihoods assistance. This represents 92% of total people in need (1.1 million).
  - a total of 84 000 – 41% of 203 000 people targeted – have been reached with nutrition intervention. This is 26% of total people in need (327 000).
  - EU NutriNorte (AAP 22) allocates EUR 30 million on Nutrition for a duration of 5 years (2022-2027) targeting the provinces of Zambezia, Nampula and Cabo Delgado.
- 10th/11th EDF de-committed funds INTPA allocation provisionally earmarked EUR15 million for expansion of ongoing agricultural programme in Nampula to Zambezia, Tete, Manica, Sofala and Gaza. Duration: 7.5 years.

## Needs and opportunities

- The Cabo Delgado crisis is underfunded, with deteriorating food security and nutrition situation. The 2022 HRP is 63.5% funded only as of December 2022.
- In 2023, at least 2 million people are in need of life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian assistance in Northern Mozambique and it is estimated that USD 512.9 million are required to assist the most-vulnerable – equivalent to a 33% and 32% year-on-year increase respectively.
- Improved prioritisation of assistance by employing a vulnerability-based targeting approach
- OCHA is launching (Nov 2022) the HRP 2023 planning process which will identify humanitarian food assistance needs for Northern Mozambique in 2023.
- OCHA is carrying out a scoping mission to evaluate the feasibility of a Country-Based Pool Fund (CBPF) in Mozambique. If the scoping mission confirms CBPF is viable, pool funds could be established starting from 2024.

## Somalia

### Situation and evolution

The latest IPC/CH analysis indicates that extreme and prolonged drought has resulted in approximately 6.7 million people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3+) between October and December 2022, with famine projected during that period in the Baidoa and Burhakaba districts (Bay Region). An additional 17 districts are at risk of famine. Follow-up assessments in the most exposed districts were conducted in October and November 2022. The results have not been published at the time of drafting this report, however it seems unlikely that a famine is declared for the moment, although the risk of famine remains high.

Humanitarian needs are extremely high due to the impacts of unprecedented four consecutive seasons of poor rainfall, with the ongoing fifth season also being below-average.

The latest market updates from WFP are showing that, overall, local food prices are on a downwards trend through the country, while the imported ones are stable, at fairly high, levels. Escalating conflict in central Somalia has also deepened logistic constraints faced by businesspeople and transporters, leading to over-reliance on longer transport routes – with additional costs being transferred to end customers of basic goods.

The number of people displaced by extreme drought in Somalia since January 2021 increased by 122 000 in October 2022, reaching over 1.25 million in total. On top of drought-induced displacement, 538 000 people have been forced out of their homes by conflict in 2022. The recent increase of conflict between Al Shabaab and several clans backed by the Somali National Army is also forcing people to displace, compounding the negative effects. On top of drought-induced displacement, 538 000 people have been forced out of their homes by conflict in 2022. These factors continue to increase the influx of refugees into Dadaab camp area in Kenya.

### *Drivers*

The Deyr (October to December) rainy season is almost over and, although some parts of the country are still receiving sporadic rains, which provide some relief to water stress, more rains are required to bring an end to the current drought conditions across Somalia. Normal rainfall is unlikely in the upcoming rainy season (March to May 2023) as La Nina conditions are forecast by several climate models to continue well into 2023, and are associated with lower rainfall and drought conditions in the Horn of Africa. Climatic changes are the primary drivers of this unprecedented and prolonged extreme drought.

The rainy season did not interrupt the ongoing conflict between Al Shabaab and several clans backed by the Somali National Army, in Hiran, Middle Shabelle and Galgadug regions. A spread of the conflict into neighbouring regions, in particular Jubaland, is still expected. People fleeing the conflict are displacing towards areas where the drought already has a severe impact (Baidoa, Banadir regions), and this influx brings increasing pressure on a severe humanitarian situation.


### *Ongoing interventions*

ECHO has allocated close to EUR 100 million since December 2021 to the drought response, with EUR 79.5 million allocated in 2022 and launched a Humanitarian Air Bridge to deliver emergency supplies to hard-to-reach areas. Over 30 flights have so far transported close to 200 metric tonnes of life-saving nutrition and health commodities to underserved and hard-to-reach locations.

In August, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator announced a system-wide scale-up of the response. In October, the Humanitarian Response Plan funding requirement was revised to USD 2.26 billion, an increase of 54% from the original requirement of USD 1.46 billion, to duly reflect the severity of the humanitarian situation. The overall population targeted by humanitarian assistance has been revised to 7.6 million people from 5.5 million originally. The current funding by donors represents 57.3% of the HRP requirement, with the main donors being USAID (59.3% of the total funding), UK (4.3%), EU (4%) and EU member states (around 3,8%). An Integrated Response Framework, which aims at responding in a holistic way to newly displaced people and critically underserved people living in areas most hit by the drought, has been developed by the Humanitarian Country Team, to improve the efficiency of the response. This response is also striving at a better inclusion of chronically underserved marginalised groups in their access to humanitarian aid.

## Needs and opportunities

- The recent increase in the HRP requirement underlines the funding gap for the response, despite several important announcements by main donors.
- Improved prioritisation of assistance, fully implementing the use of the Integrated Response Framework, in order to ensure a better coverage of populations in need.
- Support the system-wide scale-up to operationalise plans and deliver at scale, in particular by implementing inter-operable registration and assistance systems between major responders (WFP and IOM).
- Advocate with other services and donors for increased engagement on Somalia through additional funding or reorientation of existing ones.



Source: CHIRPS

## South Sudan

### Situation and evolution

About 6.6 million people, over half of South Sudan's population (54%), have been experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity, classified in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) or worse, between October and November. Of those, 2.2 million people have been experiencing worse conditions in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) acute food insecurity and an estimated 61,000 people in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) acute food insecurity in Fangak, Canal/Pigi and Akobo of Jonglei State; Pibor County in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area. The most food insecure states between October and November 2022, in which more than 50% of their populations are facing Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) or worse acute food insecurity, are Jonglei (68%), Unity (66%), Northern Bahr el Ghazal (62%), Upper Nile (58%), Warrap (57%), and Lakes (57%). Between July 2022 and June 2023, an estimated 1.4 million children under five are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition.

Given the high levels of severe acute food insecurity in South Sudan, there is a need for immediate scale-up of multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance to save lives and prevent the total collapse of livelihoods in the affected counties, particularly those with a high share of populations in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) acute food insecurity.

The highly food insecure populations are in locations with chronic vulnerabilities worsened by frequent climate-related shocks (severe flooding and dry spells), the macro-economic crisis, conflict and insecurity, and low agricultural production. Between October and November 2022, 33 counties across South Sudan are classified in Emergency acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 4), and 42 counties in Crisis insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3). In the post-harvest projection period of December 2022 to March 2023, 29 counties will likely be in Emergency food insecurity, 43 counties will likely be in Crisis food insecurity, four counties will likely be in Stressed food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 2), and one county will likely be in Minimal food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 1). In the lean season projection period of April to July 2023, 47 counties will likely be in Emergency food insecurity, 29 counties will likely be in Crisis food insecurity, and one county will likely be in Stressed food insecurity.

South Sudan continues to grapple with persistent food and nutrition insecurity, stemming largely from a combination of multiyear climate shocks, conflict, and socio-economic insecurity. This has eroded household capacity to access food and income. In addition, persistent flooding, combined with pockets of drought, is likely to reduce production in the subsistence farming during the upcoming harvest season. The overall cereal production deficit in 2022 is estimated at around 541 000 tonnes, representing 40% of South Sudan's cereal needs, an increase by 16% of the 2021 deficit and the five-year average (2017–2021). Persistent macroeconomic shocks leading to hyperinflation have led to market price volatility. Impacts of both COVID-19 and Russian invasion of Ukraine make the situation worse. Between mid-2021 and mid-2022, the fuel prices in the country increased by 43% (UNHAS).

Conflict is likely to rise again and peak early 2023 during the dry season.

Seasonal increases in conflict are likely at the end of 2022 due to worsening socioeconomic pressures, including the devaluation of the South Sudanese pound, coupled with high prices for food and essential non-food goods.

### *Drivers*

- **Economic Decline:** South Sudan's economy is experiencing a macroeconomic crisis caused by the depreciation of the local currency and the global impacts of the conflict in Ukraine.
- **Climatic Shocks:** the country is highly prone to natural disasters, particularly floods and dry spells that affect agriculture, disrupt livelihoods, and hamper humanitarian access.
- **Conflict and Insecurity:** Persisting conflict is disrupting livelihoods and leading to the loss of productive assets. They also limit and disrupt humanitarian delivery.
- **Low production:** exacerbated by drier-than-average conditions and severe rainfall deficits in South Sudan negatively impact agricultural production, resulting in high humanitarian needs.



## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- As of October 2022, the ECHO HIP is worth EUR 79.8 million. The funding is divided between food and nutrition (32%), health (17%), protection (9%), WASH (8%), Cash/Multi-Purpose Cash Transfers (5%), Camp Coordination and Camp Management (5%), Education in Emergencies (4%) and coordination/logistics (18%). Programmatic Partnerships: UNICEF is contracted for nutrition (EUR 5 million); IFRC for disaster preparedness (EUR 2 million) including MPCT; and Concern for nutrition and health (EUR 2 million).
- Under the HIP modification, in addition, an amount of EUR 5.5 million is available to support the following priorities: (1) an immediate scale-up of life-saving emergency/rapid multi-sectoral assistance in areas with IPC/CH phase 3 and above, including health, protection, WASH, and nutrition, supporting the food security outcomes; (2) WASH and shelter non-food items (SNFI) pipeline in the country.
- ECHO finances emergency food assistance in IPC/CH phases 4 and 5 areas. Agricultural production and road feeders' rehabilitation are also funded in a nexus approach.

### **Other actor's main interventions**

- Key donors (USAID, FCDO) dedicate large part of their funding to food assistance and nutrition, being the most critical lifesaving sectors in the country with health.


## *Needs and opportunities*

- The South Sudan crisis is underfunded, with deteriorating food security and nutrition situation. The 2022 HRP is 54% funded only as of October 2022.
- The Food, Security and Livelihoods (FSL) cluster is also underfunded but better funded than other sectors.
- Pursue coordination efforts with WFP and FSL actors to increase cash modality wherever feasible and reinforce coordination with development donors to scale-up long-term investments on agriculture, basic services, and infrastructures.
- Monitor malnutrition closely (21% SAM number increase in 2022 compared to 2021).
- Activate collective diplomatic advocacy towards the Government of South Sudan to enforce law and reduce violence.

## Uganda


### Situation and evolution

A new IPC/CH analysis was released on 25 November 2022 showing an improvement in the situation in Karamoja. Compared to May 2022, the number of people in urgent need of food assistance has decreased from 518 000 to 315 000. It is expected to decrease further to 308 000 by end of January 2023: 276 000 people in IPC/CH phase 3, compared to 428 000 individuals in May 2022, and about 38 000 in IPC/CH 4, compared to almost 90 000 in May. Nutrition surveys for Karamoja have not been updated or undertaken, but admission rates for severely acutely malnourished children have drastically reduced to the long-term-average in October 2022.



Source: Regional Food Security and Nutrition Working Group, November 2022

In October 2022, the average monthly price of the local food basket was 45% higher than in October 2021, which is a slight improvement from September where the food basket was 53% higher than the previous year.




Source: WFP Uganda National Market Monitor: [https://analytics.wfp.org/t/Public/views/RefugeeMarketMonitorDashboard/UgandaRefugeeMarketMonitor/18cc98a3-cb17-4ad2-a586-28ab8a47f561/CustomView?%3Adisplay\\_count=n&%3Aembed=y&%3AisGuestRedirectFromVizportal=y&%3Aorigin=viz\\_share\\_link&%3AshowAppBanner=false&%3AshowVizHome=n](https://analytics.wfp.org/t/Public/views/RefugeeMarketMonitorDashboard/UgandaRefugeeMarketMonitor/18cc98a3-cb17-4ad2-a586-28ab8a47f561/CustomView?%3Adisplay_count=n&%3Aembed=y&%3AisGuestRedirectFromVizportal=y&%3Aorigin=viz_share_link&%3AshowAppBanner=false&%3AshowVizHome=n)


All food commodities continue to show a stabilising trend since July 2022, especially foods Ugandans are heavily dependent on, such as Matoke, Millet, Maize, Sorghum. The exception to this is vegetable oil, which has shown a downward trend since July, while still being 30 % above 2021.

In refugee settlements, out of the 1.46 million refugees and asylum seekers, approximately 92% rely on continuous food assistance (either in-kind or in-cash). For refugees the Minimum Expenditure Package (MEB) continue to increase.

Food consumption scores (FCS) for refugees and host populations shows differences with host populations generally having better food consumption.



Source: WFP: 2022 Refugees and Host community; FSNA Results; 28/10/2022



UNHCR's requirement for 2022 is USD 343.4 million, and as of 21 October 2022 is only 43% funded (USD 148.6 million). The Country Refugee Response Plan Emergency Appeal has been extended from April to December 2022 and increased from USD 48 million to USD 68 million, but is only 24% funded. Due to critical underfunding, WFP has implemented food ration cuts since November 2021. With no new resources, WFP assistance are facing critical breaks for cash by end 2022 / early 2023 and for in-kind end January / early February 2023.

### *Drivers*

- **Conflict:** regular influx of refugees from South Sudan and DRC (almost 130 000 new refugees in 2022). In Karamoja, there is localised conflict and insecurity.
- **Climate shocks and hazards:** poor rainfall performance, frequent flash floods with corresponding waterlogging and occasional devastating landslides.
- **Acute Malnutrition:** inadequate food and water access, poor dietary diversity, structural poverty, low value livelihood options, as well as poor hygiene and sanitation. Very poor levels of food consumption among children of 6-23 months, with only 4% of the children consuming a minimum acceptable diet.
- **Economic factors:** the economic impacts of COVID-19 restrictions continue to limit household income sources, which has been exacerbated by the war of aggression against Ukraine. Headline inflation rate increased to 10.7% in October up from 10% in September, 9.9% in August and 7.9% in July 2022, the highest level since July 2012. Inflation in cost of food is twice that of 22.2%. Transport cost has stabilised with fuel prices decreasing.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- As of end October, the total HIP 2022 for Uganda stood at EUR 34.5 million up from EUR 30,0 million at the beginning of the year: food assistance 18%; protection 30%; EiE 21%; health 9%; MPCT 12%; coordination 1%; disaster preparedness 10%. In addition, for Disaster Response, 3 DREF operations (total EUR 450 000) has been supported, including for Ebola preparedness, as well as the Programmatic Partnership with IFRC for EUR 2.6 million. An Ebola epidemic response package of EUR 3 million has been finalised and financed under the DG-ECHO epidemics tool.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- Design and feasibility for the Kagera Water Supply Pipeline, including branches to refugee settlements in Isingiro Refugee Hosting District, is ongoing. The concept note by the EU delegation to access funding from the Flexible Mechanism to support the response in Southwest is being finalised. In September, the US provided an additional support of USD 82 million: USD 21 million for USAID and USD 61 million for the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) with USD 41 million for UNHCR and USD 20 million for other programs.

### *Needs and opportunities*

UNHCR alone needs USD 195 million for their operations for the rest of 2022. An overview for the full Uganda Refugee Response Plan (RRP) was compiled at the end of the third quarter of 2022; the Uganda RRP remained at USD 804 million with 45% funded at end of September. No additional funding is currently available for the last month of 2022. UNHCR issued also an Ebola appeal of USD 14.8 million but has so far not received any contributions.

Recurrent and continuous shortfalls of resources call for extending the donor base, operationalising the needs-based approach through better targeting, and looking for more sustainable and resilient solutions in the context of a protracted refugee crisis.

## Zimbabwe

### *Situation and evolution*

According to Rural Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) 2022 findings, nearly a third of the urban (1.63 million people) and 3.04 million of the rural populations are facing severe food insecurity. Food insecurity of rural households is expected to increase further to 3.82 million people from January to March 2023. Zimbabwe was added to the FAO/WFP list of Hunger Hotspots in June 2022 due to an erratic rainfall season and consequent drop in expected crop production (which declined by 43% nationally and by nearly 50% for communal farmers, as compared to last year). According to WFP's Hunger Map, the estimated number of people resorting to 'crisis and above' food-based coping increased to 7.6 million. The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) has projected an increase in the number of people experiencing Crisis phase food security outcomes, in deficit-producing areas, for October 2022.


In October, the southern and western parts of Zimbabwe received above average rainfall, while the central and northern regions received below average rainfall. This is in line with the national seasonal outlook, which predicted a high chance of normal to above normal rainfall for the period October/ November/ December (OND), for the southern part of the country, and normal to below normal for the northern part.

According to WFP's Hunger Map LIVE, the estimated number of people with insufficient food consumption increased during October by 7% from about 5.4 million (end of September) to 5.8 million, while those estimated to be resorting to 'crisis and above' food-based coping increased to 7.6 million. The FEWSNET projected an increase in the number of people experiencing Crisis phase (IPC/CH Phase 3) food security outcomes in deficit-producing areas for October 2022.

This is compounded by the effects of persistently high inflation (which has increased from 132% to 191% between May and June), while the local currency (ZWL) has been depreciating against the USD, and the gap between the official and informal market rates continues to widen. As per ZimVAC findings, there is a concerning increase in global wasting in 38 high-priority districts. There is also concern over the low rates of exclusive breastfeeding, low dietary diversity, and high rates of micronutrient deficiencies in women, adolescents, and children. As Zimbabwe heads for 2023 presidential elections, access to reliable food security data is challenging. No IPC/CH analysis has been conducted yet in country. Additionally, a continuation of the Russian aggression against Ukraine could further exacerbate supply disruptions and increases of food, fertilisers and fuel prices.

### *Drivers*

The Zimbabwe current food crisis is driven by (i) the impact of the below average 2021/22 crop production, with severe food insecurity being projected in many areas in which households have already depleted stocks from their own production; (ii) The October-December rains are likely to be mixed with mid-season dry spells and cyclones, affecting crop production and other livelihoods; (iii) a protracted economic crisis, characterised by high inflation rates that have sharply eroded households' purchasing power; (iv) spiking parallel market foreign currency exchange rates, which is the prime driver of rapidly increasing inflation. Maize meal and bread prices in ZWL increased by approximately 50% and 30% respectively, between March and April 2022.



Source: *Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update*

Selected basic commodities disappeared mostly in formal markets and there are fears of shortages for some commodities as the macro-economic situation deteriorates. As of July, and earlier than usual, poor households are expected to cope with the situation by reducing consumption and by either intensifying existing livelihood strategies or extending to other measures or activities, such as petty trading, informal mining, and barter. As most poor households typically earn income in ZWL and have limited access to USD, heavy pricing in USD and high ZWL price volatility is reducing their purchasing power and access to food. Due to these liquidity challenges, households in rural areas are slowly resorting to bartering, using grains and livestock to access certain goods or services.

### Ongoing interventions

#### ECHO interventions

- In 2022 DG ECHO funded interventions in Zimbabwe - excluding regional actions – amount to EUR 6.8 million. This amount includes the EUR 4 million allocated for food assistance (through cash in urban settings) to support the scale-up of food and nutrition assistance delivery further undermined by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its impact of global food prices.
- The total allocation supports actions for humanitarian food assistance (EUR 4 million) Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) /Disaster Preparedness (DP) (EUR 2 million) and reinforce the roll-out of COVID19 vaccination campaigns (EUR 0.8 million top-up).

#### Other actors’ main interventions

- The African Development Fund has approved a grant of around USD 25.65 million to help enhance domestic food production and supply by distributing certified seeds and fertiliser.

### Needs and opportunities

- Support with actions that help secure alternative sources of cereal produce like wheat, to replace 55% disrupted due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

## Sudan

### *Situation and evolution*

The conflict has reignited in Blue Nile State, Wad-Al-Mahi locality, fighting continues to be reported in the Dam towns, and the situation remains tense. Since mid-July, at least 70 000 people have reportedly been displaced within the state and into neighbouring localities and states due to the inter-tribal conflict, according to the International Organisation for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM DTM), bringing the total newly displaced for Sudan in 2022 to approximately 21 000.

Almost a quarter of Sudan's population, a record 11.7 million people, were estimated to be facing acute food insecurity. With 3.1 million people in IPC/CH 4, Sudan is one of the countries with the highest number of people in this Emergency level of food insecurity.

The cultivation season has been challenged by the high cost of inputs, due to the increase in irrigation costs, as well as the impact of torrential rains and flash floods which damaged approximately 100 000 hectares of cropped land.

In 2022, people in need of nutritional support increased in Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) outpatient program (OTP) by 7.7%, SAM stabilisation centres (SC) by 19.7%, and Targeted Supplementary Feeding Program (TSFP) by 3.9%.

Sudan is affected by the high prices of wheat on international markets, coupled with low foreign reserves and the continued devaluation of the national currency. The country's domestic needs for 2022 and first quarter of 2023 is estimated at 2.7 million tonnes. Sudan will have to disburse close to USD 1.5 billion at the rate of USD 550 per ton of wheat to cover its wheat gap.

In September 2022, the consumer price index increased by 10%, and the inflation rate stood at 107%. Staple food prices remained 250-300% above last year and 550-700% above the five-year average. WFP announced serious funding challenges from December 2022 onwards to deliver cash transfers to IDPs and refugees. In addition to that, funding is urgently needed to secure supplies of Ready-to-Use Supplementary Food.

### *Drivers*

Intercommunal clashes, high prices, and flooding remained the key drivers of acute food insecurity in Sudan. National food supply contraction coincided with increased staple food and agricultural input prices. A lack of hard currency reserves in the banks and continued devaluation of the currency is adding to the shortages.

September turned out to be a typical lean season in Sudan. However, the increased conflict and insecurity jeopardise access to cultivated land and lead to a more significant proportion of households relying on markets. The military coup of 25 October 2021 has led to the suspension of some of the long-term funding (IDA19 of USD 2.3 billion, WB USD 1 billion, US USD 700 million, and the cancellation of the debt relief). The HRP for Sudan is funded at 38% according to the latest Financial Tracking Service (FTS) from OCHA (17/10/2022). Additionally, the 2021-2022 below-average harvest requires Sudan to import 2.5 metric tonnes of wheat from Russia and Ukraine. This will be hindered by the war.

Huge gaps exist between the nutritional needs and the response: below 60% for SAM and below 50% for MAM.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 46.8 million (HIP 2021 and 2022) allocated for food security and cash assistance projects. An additional Programmatic Partnership with CONCERN for Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) and nutrition for a total amount of EUR 1.25 million.
- HIP 2022 has an EUR 40 million initial budget: FSL and MPCA & MPCT 20%, health 19%, protection 18%, nutrition 13%, education 10%, WASH 6%, coordination 5%, support to operations 4%, shelter 3%, crisis modifiers 2%.
- The ECHO Rapid Response Mechanism is responding to ongoing emergency needs due to displacement and heavy rains in Darfur, White Nile, River Nile, South Kordofan states (RRM beneficiaries spending over 70% of cash to meet their basic food needs).

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- Draft report presenting the findings from the Sudan case study on the “HDP Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for its Implementation”.
- WFP received EUR 2.5 million from Italy to support emergency nutrition activities (May 2022), as well as GBP 3 million from the UK and USD 4.5 million from Japan for emergency food assistance (August 2022).
- The Sudan Emergency Safety Nets Project funded by World Bank and implemented by WFP is starting to provide 1.8 million vulnerable families with cash assistance and 186 000 people with in-kind assistance each month for four months.
- FAO supported 440 172 households with agriculture and livestock inputs.
- USAID announced more than USD 88 million in additional humanitarian funding for the people of Sudan to provide food assistance (WFP) and support nutritional programming (UNICEF).

## *Needs and opportunities*

- WFP USD 7 million urgently needed to sustain nutrition implementation.
- Government requires USD 340 million for wheat production by November 2022.
- Food security and livelihood (FSL) sector working in Nutrition and FSL integration strategy.
- Started social protection coordination with participation of WFP, UNICEF, World Bank, WHO, ILO and others.



- Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

## Lebanon


### Situation and evolution

The 2022 Global Report on Food Crises indicated that in 2021, Lebanon ranked third globally among food-crisis countries hosting the highest numbers of refugees/asylum seekers.


The first results of an IPC/CH exercise covering the Lebanese and Syrian refugee population due to be published in December 2022 indicated that 37% (1.99 million) of the population are facing acute food insecurity (IPC/CH phase 3 and above) between September and December 2022. This comprises 33% (1.29 million) of the Lebanese and 46% (0.69 million) of the Syrian refugee population in IPC/CH phase 3 and above. A total of 307,000 people (6%) are experiencing emergency levels (IPC/CH phase 4) of acute food insecurity. The acute food security conditions are precipitated by soaring inflation, significant currency depreciation, removal of subsidies from food, fuel, health, transport, communication and other basic goods, limited job opportunities, loss of purchasing power to afford basic needs and compromised value of the humanitarian and social assistance due to continued rise in prices.

The food security outlook for 2023 remains grim, the initial IPC/CH analysis projects that an additional 275,000 people will fall into IPC/CH phase 3+ between January to April 2023. This translates into 2.26 million people (42%) in IPC/CH phase 3+ out of which 354,000 (7%) are projected in the emergency phase (phase 4). The potential drivers informing the bleak outlook include limited political progress to ensure macro-economic reforms, increasing inflation, which will further limit access to food and basic needs, continued currency depreciation - the exchange rate could reach LBP 50 000 by February 2023, and the real value of humanitarian assistance is expected to further decline impacting the purchasing power, of the refugees in particular. In addition, the level of assistance towards the Syrian refugees is projected to reduce by up to 20% due to shrinking aid budgets.

### Lebanon Current Acute Food Insecurity (September-December 2022)





### Lebanon Projected Acute Food Insecurity (January to April 2023)



Akkar, Baalbek-Hermel, Tripoli and regions of Mount Lebanon host the highest caseload of food insecure Lebanese households. High caseloads of food insecure Syrian households are situated in Akkar, Baalbek and Zahle.


Lebanese Residents (IPC AFA – Sep - Dec 2022)






Severe economic, political, and social crisis, compounded by high dependency on imports, currency depreciation, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and a global increase in food and fuel prices, are adding to the already dire situation in Lebanon.

Parallel market rate vs events in October 2022.



Concerning trends regarding food imports continue to be reported in 2022: a 14% reduction was registered in the first nine months of 2022 in comparison 2021, 23% and 36% compared to 2020 and 2019 respectively. Food imports were 17% lower in September 2022 compared to the same period in 2021.

**Analysis of food import trends 2019-2022**




Source: WFP VAM

Recent vulnerability assessment reports point that 90% of Syrian refugees, 53% of Lebanese households and 73% of Palestinian refugees need assistance to meet their basic needs. Over 90% of Syrian and Lebanese households have adopted at least one food-based coping strategy, the most prominent being reduced portion size of meals. This reflects increasing levels of food insecurity across the board.

Currency depreciation, inflation and the removal of subsidies from key commodities (including medicines and medical supplies or fuel), have translated into an exponential increase in the cost of food and other basic goods and services (rent, transport, education, health, household utilities). A 10% increase in the cost of the survival minimum expenditure basket (SMEB) was registered between August and September, along with an 8% increase in the consumer price index during that same period.

**Economic Indicator – Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) Jan 2021 to Sept 2022**



Source: WFP

The cost of the food SMEB has been steadily rising this year. According to the Mercy Corps October Crisis Update, the cost of the food SMEB was far less than the average public salary, implying the need to earn an additional earning of USD 184 in order to afford the food basket.

94% of Syrian refugee households continued to incur debt to survive, mostly to buy food (93%) and pay rent (49%).

The response framework is mainly split between the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), jointly drafted with the Lebanese Government, and the OCHA-led Emergency Response Plan (ERP), targeting Lebanese, Palestinians, and migrants. The food Security sector under the ERP 2022 is 72% funded (approx. USD 48 million out of USD 66.5 million) as per FTS data. LCRP coverage for Food Security in the first quarter of 2022 is 14% (USD 138 million out of USD 975 million), while the coverage level for the Basic Assistance sector in the second quarter of 2022 is 18.2% (USD 96.3 million out of USD 530 million). Cash transfers are used to cover food, often at the expense of meeting other types of needs. WFP has a funding requirement for the period August 2022-January 2023 of USD 422 million. For 2023, the funding horizon looks very bleak, the MPCT programme being cut by at least a quarter due to decreasing funds.

### *Drivers*

The impact of the severe financial and economic crisis results in the downgrading of the country from upper middle-income to lower middle-income country. Low foreign currency reserves have reduced food imports, impacting the replenishment of supplies, as the country depends on imports for 80% of its food needs.

Food imports decreased 21% in the first 6 months of 2022 compared to the same period in 2021, mainly due to a 39% decrease in imports of live animals and a 30% decrease in cereals. Wheat imports have also been impacted by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. The recent halting of exports may thus have another significant impact in Lebanon.

Subsidies provided by the government on essential food items have been lifted, except for wheat used to produce staple pita bread, which still has witnessed an 8.6-fold increase in price, compared to October 2019.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 74 million have been allocated to Lebanon in 2022, including a EUR 5 million top-up to address the consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular in the food security sector. EUR 43 million are used to fund direct multi-purpose cash transfers (MPCT) for Syrian refugees and Lebanese households who are not included in the Government's social safety net.
- DG ECHO allocated EUR 100 000 to the 2022 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA), implemented by REACH/IMPACT.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- The European Union, Germany, and the United States of America are the most significant donors to WFP in Lebanon.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Improve targeting and review the transfer value addressing the need to reduce caseload, without jeopardising support to the most vulnerable and potentially increasing the transfer value (at present set at only 67% of the minimal survival basket).
- The upcoming Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASYR), the Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA), and the IPC/CH will provide more granular data and ensure a comparative analysis of all population groups in the country, allowing for better humanitarian decision-making.
- Advocate for an inclusive and needs-based social protection framework that allows for the poorest (and often illiterate) households to access services, including the stateless.

## **Syria**

### *Situation and evolution*

64% of the population is facing food insecurity (13.9 million), with 12 million facing acute food insecurity and 1.9 million people at risk of sliding into food insecurity. In October 2022 food prices in Syria were 52% higher than at the beginning of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and 91% higher compared to the same time last year. In April 2022, The World Food Programme (WFP) was forced to reduce food rations to 995 kcal. The crisis remains underfunded. Out of the USD 1.7 billion required under the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for the Food Security and Agriculture cluster, USD 858 million (50.2%) has been received as of November 2022 leading to a funding gap of USD 851 million.

Three years ago, the standard reference expenditure basket was almost 15 times lower than now. Surging food prices are likely to take a toll on vulnerable households as food accounts for a significant proportion of their spending while the increase in commodity prices will likely limit the fiscal space for government transfers on food and energy.

South-central Syria and Government of Syria (GoS) controlled areas (GCA) rely on Russia for their wheat supply. Between January and May 2022, the prices of wheat flour in GCA increased by 35% and cooking oil by 64%. On 19 September, the Central Bank of Syria (CBS) devalued the official exchange rate to SYP 3 015/USD, while the rate in the informal sector reached SYP 5 600/USD. The local currency has depreciated by 31% in 12 months and 54% in two years. Additional devaluation this year will likely further raise food prices due to a direct correlation between exchange rates and food prices, and as other key fundamentals (such as low agricultural production levels) remain unchanged. Northeast Syria (NES) controlled by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) has not reported any major food shortages and maintains flour reserves of 1 to 6 months. However, the replenishment of these may be hindered by the increased cost of flour imports, reduced relief flour, and the insufficient local wheat production which is at great risk due to the drought and poor climate conditions. Northwest Syria (NWS), controlled by the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), where some 1.4 million people rely on WFP food assistance delivered cross-border, is heavily dependent on imports transiting through Turkey, many of which originate from Ukraine or Russia. The UN Security Council resolution 2 642, allowing cross-border assistance, will come to an end on 10 January 2023. The continuation of the WFP response will be dependent on the possible renewal of the resolution at the UN Security Council in early 2023. The increase in fuel prices will have a knock-on effect on food costs as the cost of transporting food continues to rise.

## *Drivers*

Political conflict, economic collapse, the Lebanon financial crisis, war in Ukraine, the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change resulting in severe drought, water scarcity and historic low yields are the key drivers of food insecurity.

Syria is currently facing one of its worst water crises, severely impacting the population's access to both drinking and irrigation water directly impacting food security. In NES, wheat production for the 2020-2021 season was at 1.045 million tonnes, down from 2.8 million tonnes in 2020 and from 4.1 million tonnes before 2011. The forecast for 2022 is expected to be in a similar range. The seasonal outlook for October-December 2022 suggests below-normal precipitation and above-normal temperatures potentially leading to further deterioration of drought.

In GCA, it is expected that the Syrian Pound will continue to depreciate. In NWS, price increases, insufficient reserves, and the inability of the SIG or SSG to set up and implement a fully-fledged food security policy will continue to have adverse effects.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 150 million were initially allocated in 2022, with EUR 24 million allocated to the WFP to address the rising food insecurity. Approximately 51% of the total budget is contributing directly to food security: in-kind food-basket distributions, cash assistance, livelihoods, and approximately 15% of ECHO budget allocated to early recovery activities.
- DG ECHO has been advocating with the Government of Syria and the Central Bank of Syria to introduce an adjustable preferential rate for INGOs and UN agencies in order to compensate for the depreciation of the Syrian pound and hyperinflation.
- DG ECHO organised an event on food assistance and food security in the margin of the 6<sup>th</sup> Brussels conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region, trying to mobilise donor support for a better coordinated response.


### **Other actors' main interventions**

- DG NEAR: Additional allocation of EUR 10 million for food/livelihoods is being negotiated with selected INGOs partners in close coordination with DG ECHO.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Prioritise funding of immediate lifesaving response to vulnerable Syrians, with focus on food and nutrition assistance as well as early recovery interventions.
- Advocate with other EU services and donors for increased engagement on Syria for integrated programming that boosts ability of people to earn a living. Livelihoods programmes, including agricultural projects, market strengthening, job creation and restoration of basic services.
- Develop strategies to operate in context of high inflation and currency depreciation supporting hybrid modalities balancing cash and in-kind assistance.
- Strengthen humanitarian cash and shock responsive mechanisms.


Syria's compounded economic crisis (2019-2022)



Source: Whole of Syria Food Security Sector

Exchange rates (formal (official) and informal) and food price trends

Source: WFP Syria, October 2022






Funding progress by clusters

Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Response Plan  
2022 - 2023




<https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1088/summary>



Not specified: US\$147,435,052

Multiple clusters/sectors (shared): US\$260,249,343



Source: OCHA FTS, December 2022

## Yemen

### *Situation and evolution*

IPC/CH updated analysis indicates that for the period October to December 2022, approximately 17 million people or over half of the population analysed in Yemen, will experience high levels of Acute Food Insecurity (AFI), classified as Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). The primary concern is the 6.1 million people classified in IPC/CH Phase 4, one Phase away from starvation. This analysis update indicates a slight improvement in the food security situation compared with the previous projection (June to December 2022), where over 19 million (60%) people were highly food insecure, including over 160 000 classified in IPC/CH Phase 5, Catastrophe. The updated analysis shows that while IPC/CH Phase 5, Catastrophe has been reversed and prevented, more than half of the population remains acutely food insecure – with over 6 million people still classified in IPC/CH Phase 4, Emergency. When comparing current number of people facing acute food insecurity between January-May 2022 of 17.4 million to the updated projection of 17 million, it can be considered that very limited change of the food security situation will occur by the end of 2022 compared to the beginning of the year. Yemen remains one of the most food insecure countries in the world. For nearly a decade – even before the war – more than half of the population has consistently been food insecure, mainly driven by structural instability aggravated by human-induced factors and climate change. This analysis, therefore, emphasises that the slight improvement is a temporary reprieve and further efforts need to be put in place to sustain and completely reverse this trend that has been persistent for over a decade.

Prior to the conflict in Ukraine, the national average price of wheat had already risen by 246.7% from 122 Yemeni Rials (YER) per kilo in 2014 to 423 YER per kilo in September 2021. Between January and October 2022, wheat flour prices have increased by another 67% in the Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) area, while it has increased by 12% in the Houthis controlled areas. The Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) cost has increased in the same period, especially in the south of Yemen. As the wheat imports continue (under the terms of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, the first WFP-chartered vessel carrying Ukrainian wheat flour for WFP's general food assistance programme berthed at Al Hodeida port on 15 October), ACAPS reported that the import data and the monitoring of local market dynamics indicate that there are sufficient wheat supplies in Yemen. Therefore, the problem is not availability but affordability of wheat.

The Yemen crisis is still underfunded, even if the appeal is now covered at 54% (vs. 53.1% in October), due to recent additional funding from the US and the EU. In 2021, an additional pledging conference was organised in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) during which over USD 600 million was raised. This year however, no second pledging event is foreseen. Out of the USD 2.1 billion required under the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for the Food Security sector, funding received is over USD 1.15 billion (compared to just over 1 billion in the previous month).

The funding gap is forcing the World Food Programme (WFP) to further cut food rations. Despite the important amount of funding received so far in 2022 and the efforts to prioritise assistance to the populations facing the highest needs, WFP is still constrained to distribute reduced rations equivalent to 65 percent of the standard food basket, providing around 1 100 kilocalories per person per day.

Reduced rations and suspension of assistance are dangerously becoming the new norm. The Food Security actors will inevitably no longer meet the standards of humanitarian food assistance. The result could be malnutrition and further impoverishment.

## *Drivers*

The economic crisis (effects of low incomes, depreciation of the Yemeni currency and irregular or non-payment of salaries of civil servants), persistence of pockets of conflict, reduced access to basic services and low humanitarian food assistance are the key drivers of food insecurity. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is also contributing to the deterioration of the food security situation in Yemen. Yemen is 90% dependent on food imports, with 46% of wheat coming from Russia and Ukraine.

Restrictions and obstructions of access to services and assistance are major aggravating factors for the functioning of the humanitarian response and the private sector hampered by limited volumes of imports. The recent UN-brokered truce (started on 2 April and renewed until 2 October 2022) has led to a reduction of hostilities and a temporary increase of fuel imports allowed into the north of Yemen. Fortunately, the expiration of the truce agreement in early October did not affect the fuel supply into Yemen. The flow of imported fuel through Red Sea ports in October 2022 was nearly three times the level of October 2021. As a result, total fuel imports during January-October 2022 increased by 249% compared to the same period last year.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 170 million allocated in 2022, including additional allocation of EUR 35 million mobilised through the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR), to address the food security crisis (through Food and Cash). This means that approx. 80% of the budget contributing directly (Food Security 34%) and indirectly (health and nutrition 21%, basic needs/Multipurpose Cash Assistance (MPCA) 16%, WASH 6% and DRR 3.5%) to food security outcomes. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash and in-kind deliveries.
- The EU is a leading actor on diplomacy and coordinated humanitarian advocacy. On 23 June 2022, DG ECHO co-hosted the fourth humanitarian Senior Official Meeting jointly with Sweden (SOM process), where the food insecurity crisis and related drivers were emphasised and action points for collective action identified.


### **Other actors' main interventions**

- USAID/BHA: USD 1 billion was allocated in 2022 alone (including a significant part of food in-kind). This is already above 2021 (USD 800 million) and 2020 (USD 600 million).

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Improve prioritisation of assistance ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups.
- Continue to play a leading role in coordination and advocacy for the respect of IHL, principled aid delivery and increased assistance to Yemen.
- Advocate both internally to other Commission services and externally to donors for increased engagement on Yemen.
- Develop specific strategies to operate in context of high inflation and depreciation (e.g., flexible programming, market monitoring and contingency planning).
- Strengthen the humanitarian cash and shock responsive social protection (SRSP) nexus as well as livelihood support and diversification, inter-sectoral programming and monitoring and early warning systems.

**Acute Food Insecurity Projection October – December 2022**




Source: IPC/CH Yemen, July 2022

**Funding progress by cluster in Yemen**

**Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2022**

<https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1077/summary>




Not specified: US\$219,490,844

Multiple clusters/sectors (shared): US\$90,205,833

## Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2022



<https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1077/summary>



Amounts shown for the current year (far right bar) are for the year to date. No data is shown in years where there was no plan/appeal.

- Latin America and Caribbean

### Central America

#### Situation and evolution

Food insecurity in the region, in particular in the Dry Corridor (consisting of parts of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua) is aggravating. In 2021, a total of 8.4 million people were suffering of food insecurity (IPC/CH phase 3 and 4), including an estimated 500 000 in Nicaragua. According to WFP, 8 in 10 households in the Dry Corridor are resorting to crisis coping mechanisms and more than 25% of the population do not have enough money to buy basic foods.

Guatemala and Honduras are the two countries with the largest needs, with 6.6 million people in need of food assistance (OCHA, HNO 2021). FAO/WFP’s report for June-September 2022 (Hunger Hotspots) states that the situation in Honduras and Guatemala requires close monitoring, as their agricultural sectors are significantly exposed to elevated international food and agricultural supply prices during the lean season (March-August). Potential storms in the hurricane season impacts could aggravate an already-dire food and nutrition situation in Northern and Central America (FEWSNET)<sup>8</sup>.

The main needs in the Dry Corridor are food assistance and supplementary nutrition for children under 5, as for pregnant and lactating women. In addition, people need livelihoods’ protection and support in their recovery.

## Guatemala

The situation in Guatemala is particularly worrisome as food insecurity has known a 6-fold increase since 2013, with 24 % of it's the population food insecure. In addition, around 47% of children under 5 are being affected by chronic malnutrition (UNICEF) and 16 611 cases of acute malnutrition and 46 deaths in children under five from January to September 2022 (Ministry of Health, October 2022). This is the highest rate in Latin America and the Caribbean and is the 6th highest rate of chronic malnutrition or stunting in the world (WFP, August 2022).

According to IPC/CH, the number of people experiencing high level of acute food insecurity (IPC3 or above) and in need of assistance has reached 4.6 million (26% of the total population) in September 2022 and is expected to decrease to 3.2 million people for the period leading up to February 2023. WFP estimates that more than 100 000 Guatemalans suffer from severe food insecurity, IPC4 (WFP, October 2022). Children are particularly vulnerable. The different projection didn't take into account the impact of meteorological hazard as from April to mid-October 2022 and particularly more than 4.8 million people have been affected by consecutive rains (Some 851 000 people in Guatemala have been affected by Tropical Storm Julia).

The main drivers are high food and transport prices, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine causing high prices in fertilisers (an increase of 85% since 2021), the depletion of basic grain reserves, the loss of jobs and income and the COVID-19 pandemic consequences.

The purchasing power of households continues to be negatively affected by international trends. In June, the highest year-on-year inflation in eleven years (7.5%) was reported. The inflationary trend is even higher in Alta and Baja Verapaz, with 9.7%, and in Huehuetenango and Quiché, with 9.2%. The prices of white corn, black beans and rice are the highest recorded since 1998 (Ministry of Agriculture). Basic Food Basket data reveal that the price of edible oil increased 31.4%, compared to the previous year. The National Statistics Institute (INE) indicates that a family of five needs USD 427.90 per month to purchase the Basic Food Basket, while the average minimum wage is USD 267. 40% of the households spent more than 50% of their income on food.

Acción Contra la Hambre (ACH)'s forecasting system, PREDISAN, forecasts that 4% of Guatemala's population would be in a zone of concern of very high food security and up to 40% in a high zone.

## Honduras

According to IPC, over 2.6 million people (28% of the population analysed) are in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), requiring urgent action. Of these people, at least 1.9 million are in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) and 353 000 in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4).

According to ACH's forecasting system, PREDISAN, 14% of Honduras' population were in a zone of concern of very high food security and up to 71% in a high zone, between June and September 2022.

Inflation has caused a deterioration in the purchasing power of the population, which currently depends mainly on purchases due to the annual lean season. Food prices increased with 6.3% and transport with 3.6%. The price of the Basic Food Basket increased with 5% since December 2021, with a 68% increase of maize, 23% of beans and 15% of oil.

With a seasonal decline in employment options in rural areas, access to food has been reduced, especially for the poorest households. They are reducing the number of daily meals, increasing the use of credit or third-party food support, and selling productive assets, increasing the possibility that they will be classified in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3).

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<sup>8</sup> <https://fews.net/>

## *Drivers*

Food insecurity is stemming from structural and systemic deficiencies, causing increasing poverty rates, linked to violence and climate change (26% population is at high climate risk). The connection between food insecurity, climate, and violence on the one side and (forced) migration on the other has been highlighted by some stakeholders in the region, such as WFP and ACH. CARE draws attention on the impact of gender inequality on food security.

Indeed, the aggravated food insecurity is mainly caused by an accumulation of impacts and simultaneous shocks, including El Niño, consecutive droughts, hurricanes Eta and Iota, coffee rust, socio-economic impact of COVID-19, ongoing inflation, violence, and the impact of the war on Ukraine. In the first semester of 2022, the cost of the food basket increased by more than 80%, while ongoing drought limits livelihood and harvest opportunities.

Atypically high prices are worsening the impact of the ongoing lean season. These prices, according to Fewsnet, will limit seasonal improvements in food availability, purchasing power, and access to food for very poor households who have yet to recover from the economic and climatic events of recent years. Poor households are expected to experience Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) outcomes, while very poor households, in the Dry Corridor and areas affected by hurricanes Eta and Iota, face Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) outcomes.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- Since 1994, DG ECHO has allocated EUR 281 million to Central America, of which EUR 45 million were allocated to food security and nutrition, and EUR 91 million were allocated to Disaster Preparedness.
- In its current projects, DG ECHO focusses on the Dry Corridor, and particularly the areas mostly affected by the recent hurricanes Eta and Iota. It provides food assistance and short to medium-term livelihood recovery, while helping to build resilience within relevant nexus strategies. At the same time DG ECHO raises awareness on the prevailing food crisis through FSN information systems, through an action of EUR 1 million, implemented by OXFAM.
- EUR 5 million has been allocated to Central America to respond to the current crisis.
- Due to the rapid degradation of nutritional situation, nutritional data collection, surveillance and response will be also supported through new actions.
- The food assistance interventions target households in IPC/CH phase 4 (Emergency) and households in IPC/CH phase 3 (Crisis) that have additional constraints, like being a single parent household or having a poor food-consumption and asset base, having a high number of dependents, being displaced, etc. A special focus is given to children under five and pregnant women. DG ECHO supported 187 546 beneficiaries in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua with direct cash transfer, vouchers, and in-kind assistance.

**Other actors' main interventions:**

The **European Union** is funding several development projects at regional level, which are related to food insecurity and resilience building in the sector:

- for EUR 6 million, the Information Systems Program for the Resilience of Food and Nutrition Security in the SICA Region (PROGRESAN-SICA), generating information for the development of public strategies and policies, with a focus on resilience of food and nutrition security (SAN). It is currently funded under the Climate Resilience of rural households in the Dry Corridor and managed as a component of the national programme in Nicaragua and ends in October 2023.
- for EUR 16.045 million, the Central American Program for Coffee Rust Integrated Management (PROCAGICA) is benefitting 330 000 family producers and 6 133 family farms in the selected areas in controlling the rust and avoiding severe damage to their plantations. Its activities will end at the end of 2022.
- for EUR 6 million, the AGRO-INNOVA for the adaptability of agro-forestry systems in the Central American Dry Corridor, aims to enhance capacities of 3 000 producers and 12 organisations in 6 countries on water harvest, bio-supplies production, forestry nurseries, planting nutrition and provision of drought-resistant varieties. Its activities will end in November 2023.

The European Union is funding several food related projects in Nicaragua:

- The European Union is funding the Boosting Rural and urban Economy in Times of Crisis and Beyond (BOOST) programme, providing incentives to sustain value chains related to the School Meals Programme in the context of a protracted socio-political crisis. It is aiming to contribute to reducing poverty and fostering the economic empowerment of women for EUR 15 million. Its activities will end in January 2024.
- The EU is also funding the Climate Resilience of Rural Households in the Dry Corridor (Dry Corridor), by strengthening of the policy framework on climate change adaptation at the regional level (in particular, within the SICA system) and shock responsiveness mechanism and inclusive adaptability of safety nets with a focus on climate change, food and nutrition security and women's empowerment for EUR 13 million. These activities will end in August 2024.

The European Union is funding three food related projects in Guatemala:

- It funds an integral approach to build resilience in communities, vulnerable to food insecurity and climate shocks, called PRO-RESILIENCE, implemented by WFP for EUR 15 million. Its activities will end in 2025.
- It funds a comprehensive strategy to fight chronic malnutrition, through the support of the National Strategy for Prevention of Chronic Malnutrition, implemented by UNICEF for EUR 15 million. Its activities will end at the end of May 2024.
- Finally, it funds support to the Primary Health System to fight Chronic Malnutrition in Guatemala, implemented by PAHO for EUR 20 million. Its activities will end in November 2023.

In addition, the EU will adopt a new program with a total budget of EUR 14 million, aiming at strengthening budgetary execution at institutional level and public policy implementation capacities of the Ministries who are responsible for the fight against malnutrition. It will also strengthen the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Finance which supports them. Furthermore, the EU will strengthen food security in the most vulnerable regions of Guatemala and promote income generation, through the development of sustainable and climate-resilient agriculture, as well as alternative economic activities in rural areas.




**WFP** signed an agreement with the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES) to strengthen the Ministry's actions in food and nutrition security.

**USAID** announced funding to address food security and resilience in the LAC region.

- In Fiscal Year 2022, USD 21.8 million is dedicated for USAID/BHA food assistance operations in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Activities include emergency food assistance, via cash transfers and multipurpose cash assistance, agricultural interventions, and livelihood support. Partners include WFP (El Salvador), World Vision and CRS (Guatemala), ADRA and CRS in Honduras.
- At the same time, nearly USD 92 million of emergency food assistance and related humanitarian programming, such as nutrition, health, and protection, as well as water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions has been announced for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (of which USD 87.5 million in emergency funding and USD 4.3 million in early recovery, risk reduction and resilience).
- USD 95 million of FY 2021 Feed the Future funds that will help smallholder farmers in Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Peru improve productivity of high-value horticulture crops, increase incomes, and bolster farmers' capacity to withstand shocks like higher fertiliser prices and impacts of climate change.


### Needs and opportunities

- The food security crisis in Central America remains severely underfunded. WFP reports a funding gap of 43% for its operations in Guatemala and 69% for Honduras.
- Partners are requested to further prioritise and target the most vulnerable individuals.
- Continue to advocate with other services and donors for an increased engagement in Central America's Dry Corridor.
- The Food security and Nutrition Information system support in Central America was recently finalised. No new support from the EU and other donors is foreseen for the moment, and this in a significantly changing context due to political and violent crises and the ongoing impact of the conflict in Ukraine.
- To improve the operationalisation of the nexus for Shock responsive social Protection and Anticipatory action, as well as the coordination between DP programs, Euroclima and resilience building programs.




Source: GUATEMALA: IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot | March 2022 - February 2020<sup>9</sup>

### Trend Analysis December 2020 - August 2022



Source: HONDURAS: IPC/CH Food Security Phase Classification Snapshot | December 2021 - August 2022<sup>10</sup>



Source: HONDURAS: IPC/CH Food Security Phase Classification Snapshot | December 2021 - August 2022<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Guatemala\\_AcuteFoodInsec\\_2022Mar2023Feb\\_Snapshot\\_English.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Guatemala_AcuteFoodInsec_2022Mar2023Feb_Snapshot_English.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Honduras\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insec\\_2021Dec2022\\_Aug\\_Snapshot\\_English.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Honduras_Acute_Food_Insec_2021Dec2022_Aug_Snapshot_English.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Honduras\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insec\\_2021Dec2022\\_Aug\\_Snapshot\\_English.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Honduras_Acute_Food_Insec_2021Dec2022_Aug_Snapshot_English.pdf)

## Colombia

### *Situation and evolution*

In 2021, 39.3% of Colombians (19.6 million people) were below the monetary poverty line with a monthly income per capita of only 354 000 Colombian pesos (EUR 80.5). Furthermore, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) projects that in Colombia total poverty will be 1.7% higher than 2021 due to inflation. Extreme poverty affects disproportionately ethnic minorities, including indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, usually located in former conflict zones with little state presence. About 7.3 million Colombian residents were estimated to have food security related humanitarian needs in 2022, while moderate and severe food insecurity has been affecting 42% of the resident population (21.4 million), with severe food insecurity having slightly improved since the end of 2021 (FAO-WFP). As of July 2022, 75.7% of Colombian households ate three meals a day compared to 85.5% before the COVID-19 pandemic (DANE); 23.2% of households ate twice a day (30% in July 2021) and 1.1% only once. Moreover, 10.8% of children under 5 years of age suffer from chronic malnutrition. In addition to Colombians, 60% of Venezuelan migrants and refugees (1.08 million) living in Colombia were estimated to be food insecure (FAO-WFP) in the first half of 2022. Food insecurity among migrants and refugees is aggravated by significant levels of internal displacement and accelerating food inflation. The data shows a slight improvement in the situation from two years ago, when 73% were food insecure; however, the price of hot meals has increased by 60% by August 2022 (WFP).

Due to the combined effect of inflation stemming from COVID-19 related restrictions and the crisis in Ukraine, food prices have increased by an average of 23.6% between February 2021 and June 2022 with an annual inflation of 9.7% and 139% increase of fertiliser prices (DANE). Colombia imports an estimated 75% of its fertiliser (approximately half from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine), and approximately 28% of its food commodities. Increasing food prices and shortages of agricultural inputs have a significant negative impact on low-income communities in the country, such as Venezuelan migrants and refugees.

### *Drivers*

Persistent violence among non-state armed groups and recurring natural disasters in Colombia continue to cause internal displacement and limit Colombians' ability to access crops, livelihoods, essential goods, and services, thus exacerbating food insecurity and nutrition issues among vulnerable households. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic and related mitigation measures lead to reduced access to health and protection services, worsening food insecurity.

In addition, approximately 2.3 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees have sought refuge in Colombia, along with more than 980 000 Colombian returnees. These factors have strained local services and increased humanitarian needs, including food, health, livelihoods, nutrition, protection, shelter, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), not only among migrants, refugees, and returnees, but also host communities in both rural and urban areas. Furthermore, other aggravating factors are worsening the current situation, such as loss of agricultural livelihoods and reduction of agricultural productive capacity due to the increase in the costs of production (15-35%).

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- DG ECHO interventions focus on the immediate risks of the most vulnerable and affected populations on prioritised sectors like protection, health, education in emergencies and nutrition. Those are sectors where DG ECHO has a real added value in complementarity and coordination to other donors. Food security interventions are prioritised under rapid response mechanisms.
- Over EUR 84 million has been allocated by DG ECHO to the Food Security Sector in Colombia between 1994 and 2022, representing 23% of total allocations. Food assistance remains greatly underfunded in both the HRP (funding gap 68%) and RMRP (funding gap 69%).

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Need to improve the triple nexus with EU Delegation and Member States for a more holistic response to the needs (from humanitarian protection, health, EiE response to economic inclusion, support from social protection systems and documentation from development programs).
- Expanding food security and nutrition assessment to also include Colombian populations nationwide, also remote areas. The idea is to perform an IPC/CH in Colombia in 2022 in order to have more precise figure about needs and priority area.
- Improve DG ECHO-funded project CASH response.

## **Haiti**

### *Situation and evolution*


In Haiti, the last IPC/CH data (October 2022) shows a considerable deterioration of the food security situation. Regarding the number of people in need of assistance (IPC/CH phase 3 and above), the number of 4.33 million recorded in 2021 increased to 4.7 million in 2022 (i.e., nearly half of the population is experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity) representing an increase of 8.5%. For households classified in emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4), the number increased from 1.33 million to 1.77 million, an increase of 33% also the number of areas classified in the said phase (Phase 4 of the IPC) increased from five in September 2021 to fifteen in September 2022. The situation is particularly worrying due to the registration of approximately 0.3% of households (i.e., 19 200 people) in phase 5 of the IPC/CH (Catastrophe) in Cite Soleil. Increasing insecurity and gangs 'territorial control' prevents household access to livelihood opportunities and markets. Haiti imports 70 % of its food commodities. The increase in global food prices due to the war in Ukraine, the annual inflation standing at 29% (July 2022), the scarcity of fuel leading to higher transport costs and commodity prices and the depreciation of the Haitian national currency (nearly 22% in one year) will likely further diminish household purchasing power. The latest assessment by the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP) and UNICEF in the commune of Cité Soleil (one of the most affected by gang violence), concludes that approximately 20% of children under the age of five are suffering from severe or moderate acute malnutrition.

For over a year now, 3.5 million people living in Southern departments, still recovering from the effects of the August 2021 earthquake, are deeply impacted by the blockage of roads departing from Port-au-Prince by gangs. This prevents farmers to sell their production in the markets of the capital and to receive humanitarian assistance, forcing vulnerable households to adopt negative coping strategies to meet basic needs (OCHA).

## Drivers

The food insecurity situation is expected to deteriorate further in the coming months, due to the water deficit during the spring agricultural campaign, a poor coverage of acute needs during past food and nutrition crises, the rising food and fuel prices (linked to the war in Ukraine), the depreciation of the national currency, the political instability, the impacts of the 2021 earthquake and the gang violence, which continues to increase in 2022 and is causing displacement, market disruptions, limit humanitarian access and exacerbating the economic crisis.

The country's level of structural vulnerability and the accumulation of stressors also explain why many households are extremely sensitive to shocks (climate hazards, rising prices, crop losses, etc.) and are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity.



Source: Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update


## Ongoing interventions

### ECHO interventions

The 2022 HIP first EUR 6 million allocation of Humanitarian assistance was mainly devoted to respond to protection, health and education needs and priorities. In May 2022, a EUR 5 million top up was approved to provide emergency food assistance, such as the provision of cash for food, food vouchers, and in-kind food assistance to communities under the most acute food needs (IPC/CH 4). The strategy included response in urban areas and complemented the WFP's Social Protection program. In October 2022, and EUR 6.5 million package has been allocated to Haiti, from the de-committed funds of the European Development Fund for humanitarian food assistance in the most vulnerable countries in Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific. The actions are going to focus on areas with identified population on IPC/CH 5 and high concentration of population in IPC/CH 4 in order to prevent further deterioration of the food crisis.

## Needs and opportunities

- Underfunded crisis (HRP 2022 only 42% funded as of December 2022). Additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Advocating with other services and donors for increased engagement in Haiti is necessary.
- Promote additional nutritional assessments to have sufficient information of the nutrition status of children under the age of 5.
- Concerns related to the accelerated devaluation of the currency against the dollar and the high cost of living have a great impact on the amount of cash transfers and it is therefore necessary to monitor the markets and adapt ECHO intervention in coordination with the Cash Working Group.
- Maximising Nexus with the EU Delegation to improve coordination via a joint analysis of needs to promote complementarities at geographical level, be support shock responsive, and ensure the implementation of social protection and anticipatory actions.



Source: IPC, October 2022

## Venezuela

### *Situation and evolution*

The estimated number of food insecure people ranges between 14.4 and 18.5 million, according to figures from HumVenezuela. 80.6% of households (23.1 million people) can't buy quality food and in sufficient quantities. 13.4 million people (46.7%) have lost their source of income and 5 million people (17.7%) exhausted their means of life. Venezuelan migrants and refugees displaced abroad amount to 6.1 million as of April 2022, with forecasts for 3.5 million in need of food assistance in 2022 (Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan, RMRP - Plataforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes, R4V – 2022). Venezuela is importing 75% of the food it needs and is therefore affected by shortages on the international market. Additionally, the World Bank assessment indicated that inflation stands at 155%. In 2021, the extreme poverty rate and the poverty rate were at 76.6% and 95.4% respectively (National Household Survey). There is a deficit of 95% of the minimum wage (USD 23) in relation to the basic basket of June 2022, which was USD 459.84, showing an increase of 5.05% compared to May 2022. Around USD 15 are needed per day to cover food costs, while the minimum salary is estimated at USD 16 per month.

### *Drivers*

The war in Ukraine, added to pre-existing political and economic factors, that have weakened the lives and livelihoods of the population, exacerbates the crisis. In the period 2014-2020 the GDP shows an accumulated reduction of 74%, thus a significant decrease in potential production capacity and productivity in the country (ENCOVI). Moreover, the poverty and extreme poverty rate of the Venezuelan population is 95.4% and 76.6% respectively.

Russian food imports dependency and fuel scarcity affected 1.2 million tonnes of wheat, 80% of fertilisers imported. Lack of financing and sufficient income and increased fuel prices, as well as limited access to seeds also have an impact.

Increasing insecurity and violence due to the conflicts between armed groups and the dispute to control the territory continue to affect food insecurity in the country. Lastly, extreme weather has increased flooding in recent years, resulting in loss of food crops. Climatic variations have also altered cycles, making it difficult to take advantage of rainy periods for irrigation and the water public service has severe deficiencies.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

EUR 20.15 million allocated inside Venezuela in 2022 for all HIP priorities under the initial allocation, EUR 6 million under a second (Operational Reserve) allocation and EUR 30 million (new funds allocated and currently under discussion with partners, to respond to basic needs inside Venezuela and to Venezuelan migrants' acute needs outside Venezuela). DG ECHO is funding WFP operations implemented in schools in Venezuela which focus on food assistance. Other key partners such as NRC also work with schools in EiE complementing with food security interventions.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

In a true nexus approach, the EU continues to support food availability through the promotion of the development of associative schemes. Through a second project, they are also supporting family farming through the reinforcement of food production capacities.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- The funding received for the HRP Venezuela (in-country) 2021 only covered 37% of the required funds.
- The lack of official data to support the humanitarian crisis (particularly on the ongoing food and nutrition crisis) hinders the visibility of the situation and the access to funds to attend the needs of the most vulnerable population. Thus, DG ECHO needs to make the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela visible and increase advocacy with donors, including in a nexus approach.
- The work of FAO on food production and support to family farming gives a real opportunity for nexus with ongoing DG ECHO funded EiE and food security response project throughout school feeding.
- The impossibility of developing cash interventions in Venezuela for a year and a half, prevents reaching a greater number of people in need.

- **Asia and Pacific**

### ***Afghanistan***

#### *Situation and evolution*

Food security continues to remain at critical levels in Afghanistan. The Sept. 2022 Global Network Against Food Crisis (GNAFS) outlook includes Afghanistan amongst the highest concern hotspots with catastrophic conditions. The severity of food insecurity suggests that significant loss of life may already be occurring as nearly 6 million people are expected to be in Emergency.

According to the latest IPC/CH analysis concluded in October 2022, (yet to be endorsed), 19.9 million people are in IPC3+ during November 2022 – March 2023 representing 46% of the population. All 34 provinces remain in IPC3+ of which 14 are in IPC4. 42% of rural households and 38% of urban households has poor food consumption. The massive scale-up of humanitarian assistance has permitted a stabilisation of number of food insecure people comparing with same period of previous year. However, the situation remains alarming requiring the highest engagement to sustain the humanitarian effort. Winter, difficult access, natural hazard induced disasters and conflicts require to be vigilant on possible localised famine situation. There is the need for more granular analysis and continuous monitoring of IPC4 areas.

In September, the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) has revised the standard food and livelihood assistance composition and values setting at USD 96 the cash equivalent to the food assistance basket. The Cash Working Group (CWG) adjusted the Transfer Value for Multi-Purpose Cash Transfer to USD 180 based on updated value of MEB.

WFP managed to consistently scale-up its operation to a cumulative of 21.92 million people reached from January to September 2022 with 850 000 million tonnes of food distributed and USD 234 000 million of cash-based transfers. In October 2022, 12.5 million people were assisted with 94 000 million tonnes of food distributed and USD 29 million cash transferred.

In preparation of the challenging access during winter, WFP has prepositioned 100 000 million tonnes of food in hard-to-access areas to cover food and nutrition needs for 1.5 million people over 5 months, five times higher than winter 2021/2022.



Keep on securing both physical and humanitarian access during winter months remains the major challenge for the delivery of humanitarian food assistance.

As of 29/11/22, the OCHA Financial Tracking System (OCHA FTS) indicates a total of USD 2.42 billion, 54.5% of the total USD 4.4 billion required. Food Security and Agriculture has received USD 1 071 million out of a total requirement of USD 2.7 billion, therefore the sector is only 38.6% covered.

### *Drivers*

Limited access to food is compounded by several factors: a devastating economic crisis (according to the World Bank the real GDP per capita may decline by around 34% between end-2020 and end-2022 – declined by 21% in 2021 alone). After months of high volatility, during the past couple of months, the exchange rate of AFG is stabilising. Access to cash, for the population and for humanitarian actors, remain very difficult. International assistance, beyond humanitarian, is resuming at a very slow pace. Sanctions and frozen Afghan Central Bank assets are continuing to play a negative role. More expensive financial services from hawala system, MoneyGram, and WesternUnion.

According to FEWSNET, remittances inflow, that in 2020 represented USD 787 million, 4% of the GDP and a source of income for 10% of Afghan households, have resumed and expected to be above average. Remittances from Iran, however, are significantly lower than in recent years. Payment of salaries of civil servants are also irregular.

Prices of food commodities have increased, in particular cereals, sugar, and pulses. The food basket increased by 52% compared to 2 years ago.

According to the latest WFP price bulletin (3/11/22), the price of DAP and UREA fertilisers increased by 50% and 44%, respectively, compared to last year limiting farmer access and negatively impacting next year's agriculture production.

The Ukrainian crisis impacts on the cost of humanitarian operations in the region, in particular in terms of food support.

The World Meteorological Organisation and to the latest NOAA Advisory (by the International Research Institute for Climate and Society), predicts that due to persistent La Niña conditions during winter 2022-23, cumulative precipitation in Afghanistan's 2022/23 winter wet season (October 2022 to February 2023) and spring (March to May 2023) is most likely to be below average. The 2022/23 wet season has started off well below average and as of mid-October, most of the country had not received any precipitation. Exceptions are areas bordering Pakistan that received above-average rainfall during the dry season. These unfavourable conditions at the initial stage of the season will further aggravate the production capacity of farmers after two consecutive dry seasons since 2020 and limited access to fertilisers and inputs.

Due to poor pasture conditions and high fodder prices, livestock owners' fodder stocks are likely below normal. Fodder costs will likely further increase during the winter

According to estimates from Afghanistan's National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA) and Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), wheat production in the recently concluded 2021/22 season was 5% below the previous season and around 15% lower than the five-year average. According to MAIL estimates, Afghanistan's wheat deficit for the 2022/23 marketing year stands at 2.6 million MT. This compares to 2.3 million MT in the prior year.

## Ongoing interventions

### ECHO interventions


- As of end of November 2022, DG ECHO has deployed a total EUR 189 million, in the region. This includes a recently allocated EUR 75 million in October 2022 and EUR 1 million mobilised through the Acute Large Emergency Response Tool (ALERT) following the earthquake that struck the country on 22 June. Almost one third of the funding has been allocated to food assistance.
- In addition, since September 2021 and as of 12 October 2022, 24 Humanitarian Air Bridge flights departed from Europe to Afghanistan carrying approx. 775 tonnes of mainly medical and nutritional goods. Two additional HABs are in the pipeline to be deployed by 10 December 2022. The EU is an important player in Afghanistan, it is one of the very few donors who has maintained a physical presence in the country. The DG ECHO field office has never interrupted its activities and continues to carry out monitoring missions across the country.

### Other actor's main interventions

- As of mid-October, OCHA FTS, USA is the first donor with USD 615.5 million, which represents 23% of the overall funding response plan/appeal while the UK is the second donor, with USD 409.5 million (15.3%) and the Asian Development Bank, the third one, with USD 380 million (16.3%). At the time of the Pledging Conference (31/03), the EU plus Member States pledged and equivalent to USD 586 million.

## Needs and opportunities

- To continue to be able to address the most urgent needs, WFP needs additional funding of USD 1.1 billion between August 2022 and January 2023. USD 220 million per month are needed to sustain WFP operations.



Source: Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update

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