



## DG ECHO Reports on food security

Release nº 8 – August 2024

Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid

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PDF/Volume\_01 KR-AE-22-003-EN-N 2600-5468

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2024

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### List of Organisations

| DG ECHO  | Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid        |
|----------|--|
| DG JRC   | EU Joint Research Centre   |
| DG INTPA | Directorate General for International Partnerships                   |
| DG NEAR  | Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations   |
| FAO      | Food and Agriculture Organisation                                    |
| FCDO     | Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (UK)                      |
| GNFC     | Global Network against Food Crises                                   |
| IASC     | UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee                                   |
| ICRC     | International Committee of the Red Cross                             |
| IFRC     | International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies |
| IOM      | International Organisation for Migration                             |
| MdM      | Médecins du Monde  |
| OCHA     | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs   |
| OXFAM    | Oxford Committee for Famine Relief                                   |
| UNHCR    | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees                        |
| UNICEF   | United Nations Children's Fund                                       |
| WFP      | World Food Program   |

### List of acronyms

| CCCM   | Camp Coordination and Camp Management                  |
|--------|--|
| COHAFA | Council working party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid |
| CVA    | Cash and Voucher Assistance                            |
| DREF   | Disaster Response Emergency Fund                       |
| DRR    | Disaster Risk Reduction                                |
| EDF    | European Development Fund                              |
| EiE    | Education in Emergencies                               |
| ERP    | Emergency Response Plan                                |
| FSL    | Food Security and Livelihoods                          |
| GFD    | General Food Distribution                              |
| GRFC   | Global Report on Food Crises                           |

|        | -   |
|--------|---|
| HDP    | Humanitarian – Development – Peace nexus      |
| HRP    | Humanitarian Response Plan                    |
| IDP    | Internally Displaced Person                   |
| IPC/CH | Integrated Food Security Phase Classification |
| MAM    | Moderate Acute Malnutrition                   |
| MEB    | Minimum Expenditure Basked                    |
| MPCT   | Multi-purpose Cash Transfer                   |
| MSNA   | Multi-Sector Needs Assessment                 |
| PLW    | Pregnant Lactating Women                      |
| RHD    | Refugee Hosting District                      |
| RMRP   | Refugee and Migrant Response Plan             |
| RPCA   | Food Crisis Prevention Network                |
| RRM    | Rapid Response Mechanism                      |
| SAM    | Severe Acute Malnutrition                     |
| SEAR   | Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve          |
| SMEB   | Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket           |
|        |   |

Humanitarian Implementation Plan

HIP

### Executive summary

**Global food insecurity remains at worrying levels**. According to the 2024 Global Report on Food Crises, in 2023 there were around 282 million acutely food-insecure people requiring urgent food assistance in 59 food-crisis countries. This corresponds to 21,5% of the population analysed, broadly unchanged since the previous year. The fact that hunger has become chronic at such large scale indicates a critical crisis in global food security. As in previous years, the main drivers behind acute food insecurity – conflict, weather extremes and economic shocks - persisted and, in some instances, intensified, confirming that the situation is not improving. **The outlook for the next months is bleak**.

Against this backdrop, **this report aims to accomplish several objectives**. Firstly, to raise awareness and provide detailed information on the situation in the countries and regions of maximum concern from a food security perspective during the February – July 2024 period<sup>1</sup>. Secondly, to outline DG ECHO's interventions to meet rising humanitarian food assistance needs. Thirdly, **this report is released towards the end the mandate of the current European Commission and ahead of the appointment of a new College of Commissioners**. This report elaborates on the key initiative put forth by the EU in recent years to tackle the global food crisis – the Team Europe response to global food insecurity, adopted in 2022 and implemented thereafter. Finally, the report puts forward key policy messages and recommendations, both general and country-specific, to step up the fight against food insecurity.

The latest Hunger Hotspots report, published in June 2024, warned that acute food insecurity was likely to deteriorate further in 18 hunger hotspots, with five countries or territories at risk of famine: Mali, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Sudan, South Sudan and Haiti. Conflict and violence are the main drivers behind food insecurity in these hotspots and in all the countries analysed in this new edition of DG ECHO's food security report. Since our last report in March 2024, escalating conflict and lack of access have further exacerbated food insecurity in several regions.

**In the Occupied Palestinian Territories**, the IPC/CH<sup>2</sup> analysis released in June 2024 highlighted that around 96% of the population in the Gaza Strip (about 2.15 million people) were suffering acute levels of food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), including 0.5 million (22% of the population) in catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 5). Hostilities have left the entire population highly food insecure and at **risk of famine**.

**In Sudan**, intense conflict and organized violence have driven approximately 25.6 million people into acute food insecure between June and September 2024 - 50% more than at the same period last year. This includes 755 000 individuals facing catastrophic levels of hunger (IPC/CH Phase 5). This deterioration has culminated in a **famine declaration** for the Zamzam refugee camp in Sudan on 1 August 2024 — the first such declaration since 2017.

**Economic shocks** remain a prominent driver of hunger. The economic resilience of poor countries keeps decreasing and they now face extended recovery periods and have less ability to cope with future shocks. The impact of **Russia's invasion of Ukraine** on global food insecurity persists through its ripple effect on trade and food prices. Many countries are affected by high inflation, notably on food prices, and debt stress. Examples include the DRC where, in just a year, the Congolese Franc has depreciated by more than 20% against the US dollar. In Sudan, the cost of the standard food basket has surged by 230% since

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> ECHO makes use of the most up to date food insecurity information from multiple sources. To ensure the highest possible quality of the information, ECHO closely coordinates with other services of the EC, including DG INTPA and the JRC, who are supporting multi-stakeholder food insecurity analysis and reporting.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Integrated Phase Classification / Cadre Harmonisé (see beginning of Section 3 for more details).

the current crisis began in April 2023. There is also concern and uncertainty about the potential economic implications of **Burkina Faso**, **Niger and Mali's** recent announcement of their **withdrawal from** the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

**Climate change** and related weather extremes remain a key driver of food insecurity in many of the countries under analysis. **In 2023, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has suffered the worst floods in decades,** affecting 18 out of 26 provinces. These have destroyed crops and severely impacted road access.

Further details and analysis can be found in the **13** *country fiches* included in the report. These include the five countries and territories at risk of famine mentioned above, namely Mali (part of the Central Sahel Crisis), Sudan, South Sudan, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Haiti. In addition to these, the report also covers the countries with the highest number of acutely food insecure people: DRC, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Syria, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

As mentioned above, the **spotlight topic** of this report delves into the Team Europe response to global food insecurity adopted by the EU in 2022. This initiative aims to provide a common framework for the EU and its Member States in their responses to the global food crises, serving as the primary reference for the EU in this domain.

Finally, against this challenging background, **the report includes policy and advocacy recommendations to enhance efforts in addressing food crises**. These span from practical suggestions to accelerate the effectiveness and efficiency of food crises responses to the necessity of intensifying multilateral efforts to uphold International Humanitarian Law, and the pressing need to identify and leverage Humanitarian – Development – Peace Nexus opportunities to tackle the root causes of food crises.

### 1. Spotlight topic

# 1.1. The Team Europe response to the global food crisis: progress two years on.

On 20 June 2022, the EU adopted at the Foreign Affairs Council a Team Europe Global Food Security Response. This initiative sets a comprehensive framework for a coordinated response from the EU and its Member States. It is built around four pillars:

- i. Solidarity (encompassing the humanitarian response),
- ii. Production (aiming at promoting sustainable food production and resilience in affected countries),
- iii. Trade (including the solidarity lanes to allow Ukrainian food exports reach global markets through alternative routes, such as rail, road, inland waterways, as well as the defence of open and operational markets), and
- iv. Effective multilateralism (aiming at an EU response that is well coordinated and integrated with the actions of other global actors).

The European Commission committed EUR 8.3 billion to support this initiative for the period 2021-2024. Including Member States commitments, the pledge reached ca. EUR 18 billion.

Preliminary data shows that the EU is well on course to meet, if not surpass, this pledge. Since the beginning of Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, the EU and its Member States disbursed over EUR 13.5 billion in grants to support food security globally. EUR 6.65 billion have been disbursed under the 'Solidarity' pillar, which encompasses the humanitarian component of this response, with the European Commission mobilising over EUR 1.7 billion on emergency food and nutrition assistance for the most vulnerable countries in 2022-2023.

Global food insecurity persists at alarming levels, both in scope and intensity, as evidenced by the recent famine declaration in Sudan—the first such declaration worldwide since 2017—and the looming risk of famine in the Gaza Strip. Against this backdrop, the EU's commitment to combating food insecurity and its root causes is stronger than ever. Under the Hungarian Presidency of the European Council, food security is a top priority. The Council aims to enhance, refine, and expand the Team Europe response to global food insecurity, ensuring a more robust and coordinated effort.

### 2. DG ECHO key policy messages

This section highlights the key policy messages and recommendations of section 3. *'Geographical Focus'* for this reporting period. It comprises both key policy messages common to most contexts under review and a summary of some of the more salient messages at country level.

Country-specific policy messages:

- In <u>Sudan</u>, to immediately restore safe, unimpeded, and uninterrupted humanitarian access to the entire territory and population. To enable immediate, unconditional, and unhindered passage of humanitarian relief to the people in need, including across conflicts lines and international borders.
- In the <u>Occupied Palestinian Territories</u>, an immediate ceasefire, as called by the UN Security Council resolution 2735, "without delay and without condition" is urgently needed. Sufficient food must be allowed to enter the Gaza Strip each month to meet the recommended minimum nutritional requirements.
- In the <u>Sahel</u>, additional financial support and scaling up of the response is required, particularly in the areas affected by the security crisis, including Diapaga, Titao, Gorom-Gorom and Djibo in Burkina Faso; the Ménaka region and the Ansongo circle (Gao region) in Mali and in many parts of Niger including the Tillabéri region in the "zone des trois frontières".
- In <u>Ethiopia</u>, to scale up multisectoral responses and to advocate for the reinstatement of the IPC/CH analysis in the country.
- In <u>Yemen</u>, an increase in funding for the Yemen response and a de-escalation of the Red Sea crisis are essential.
- In <u>Myanmar</u>, to continue advocating for humanitarian access in both State Administration Council (SAC) and Ethnic Armed Organisation (EAO) controlled areas.

Key policy messages **common** to most contexts affected by food crises include:

- Higher-level efforts are needed by the international community to <u>guarantee</u> <u>humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas</u>. In this regard, a coordinated advocacy approach for the respect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is paramount. Food and nutrition security must not be weaponised under any circumstances and <u>UN Security Council Resolution 2417</u>, which condemns the use of starvation as a method of war, must be implemented systematically.
- <u>Additional funding is needed to tackle food crises</u>, which remain at an unprecedented scale. Most of the world's major food crises are severely underfunded and the situation risks becoming protracted, with more people facing starvation and others rapidly falling into the same category. More donors and new ways of funding are needed concurrently with additional efforts to deliver humanitarian food assistance more efficiently.
- <u>Improved targeting practices and prioritisation of assistance</u> are needed to ensure life-saving interventions and a consistent coverage for the most vulnerable groups.
- There is an urgent need to identify, accelerate and leverage Humanitarian Development – Peace <u>nexus opportunities</u>, both internally at EU level and in coordination with external actors to reinforce links between humanitarian, lifesaving operations and more long-term interventions, including resilience-oriented programming, livelihoods support activities, linkages with country-level safety nets, or restoration of basic services and trade flows.
- Food assistance needs to be provided in the most efficient way possible. This implies notably to continue pushing for <u>cash-based interventions</u> whenever

possible and the need to act ahead of disasters through enhanced disaster preparedness and <u>anticipatory actions</u>.

### 3. Geographical Focus

NOTE: To describe the food insecurity status, these fiches use the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) scale, which is the most broadly used framework. This scale classifies food insecurity in five levels (see below). Expressions like "IPC/CH 3+" are frequently used, meaning "IPC/CH Phase 3 and higher".

In West African countries, IPC/CH can be referred to as CH (Cadre Harmonisé). CH is an analogous system, considered fully compatible with IPC. Hence, CH and IPC/CH Phases can be considered equivalent and are often referred to as the IPC/CH framework.

Qualifying Levels of Acute Food Insecurity Using the Reference Table for Area Classification

|                                 |   | Mild acute food insecurity   | High acute food insecurity   | Critical acute food insecuri  | ty  |  |
|---------------------------------|---|--|--|---|---|--|
| Phase name and description      | Phase 1<br>None/Minimal   | Phase 2<br>Stressed  | Phase 3<br>Crisis  | Phase 4<br>Emergency  | Phase 5<br>Catastrophe/ Famine  |  |
|                                 | Households are able to<br>meet essential food and<br>non-food needs without<br>engaging in atypical and<br>unsustainable strategies to<br>access food and income. | Households have<br>minimally adequate<br>food consumption but<br>are unable to afford<br>some essential non-food<br>expenditures without<br>engaging in stress-coping<br>strategies. | Households either:<br>• Have food consumption<br>gaps that are reflected by<br>high or above-usual acute<br>malnutrition;<br>or<br>• Are marginally able<br>to meet minimum<br>food needs but only<br>by depleting essential<br>livelihood assets or<br>through crisis-coping<br>strategies. | Households either:<br>• Have large food<br>consumption gaps which<br>are reflected in very high<br>acute malnutrition and<br>excess mortality;<br>or<br>• Are able to mitigate large<br>food cosumption gaps<br>but only by employing<br>emergency livelihood<br>strategies and asset<br>liquidation. | Households have an<br>extreme lack of food and/<br>or other basic needs even<br>after full employment<br>of coping strategies.<br>Starvation, death,<br>destitution and extremely<br>critical acute malnutrition<br>levels are evident.<br>(For Famine Classification,<br>area needs to have<br>extreme critical levels of<br>acute malnutrition and<br>mortality.) |  |
| Priority<br>response objectives | Action required to build resilience and for disaster  | Action required for disaster<br>risk reduction and to<br>protect livelihoods   | Urgent action required to:   |   |   |  |
|                                 | risk reduction  |  | Protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps   | Save lives and livelihoods  | Revert/prevent<br>widespread death and<br>total collapse of livelihood  |  |

Source : IPC

#### 3.1. West and Central Africa

#### 3.1.1. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

#### Current situation and evolution since the last report

The latest IPC/CH analysis available estimate that 23.4 million people experienced acute food insecurity between January and June 2024. A new analysis was launched in Summer 2024 for the period from July 2024 to June 2025, and the results will be known in September 2024.

The escalation of violence in the DRC does not abate. The continuous clashes between different armed groups, particularly in the eastern provinces of the country, led to nearly 700 000 new displaced people and to a total of 7.3 million displaced people in June 2024. Displacements continue in a context of humanitarian underfunding. As of 27 June 2024, OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS) estimates the funding rate for the 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) at 25.9%, or USD 669 million out of a total budget of USD 2.58 billion.

In addition, according to the analysis carried out by FEWSNET in May 2024, the poor harvests of the second cropping cycle (season B), due in June, should not significantly

improve household's food availability, particularly in conflict zones like Masisi, Rutshuru (North Kivu Province) and Kwamouth (Mai-Ndombe Province). These territories are expected to persist in facing IPC/CH Phase 3 (Crisis) or phase 4 (Emergency) food insecurity.

Furthermore, the local currency's depreciation and rising fuel costs continue to drive up food prices.

Over 1.1 million children aged 6 to 59 months and approximately 605 000 pregnant or breastfeeding women (PBW) were estimated to face elevated levels of acute malnutrition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between July 2023 and June 2024. This includes approximately 254 000 children who are severely malnourished. This analysis only covers part of the country (122 health zones out of 519), giving an idea of the severity of acute malnutrition.

For health zones classified in IPC/CH Phase 3 or Phase 4, the main causes of acute malnutrition are low food quality (due to poor infant and young child feeding practices - IYCF), acute food insecurity, high rates of childhood illness (fever and diarrhoea), poor hygiene conditions (inaccessibility to adequate sanitation facilities), very low access to drinking water and the negative effects of the security situation resulting in massive population displacement.

#### Food insecurity forecast

According to the May 2024 FEWSNET update, floods occurred in several provinces of the DRC since the end of 2023 have destroyed crops and severely impacted road access. In such a context, a deterioration of food availability is expected in affected areas, in which the number of households facing a Crisis situation (IPC/CH Phase 3) is likely to increase. As a reminder, 18 out of 26 provinces in the DRC have been affected by floods since the end of 2023.

#### Overview of DG ECHO response

- DG ECHO has been a key actor in supporting the IASC "System Wide Scale-Up" declared on 16 June 2023 to intensify the humanitarian operations in response to the M23 crisis. This scale-up had a focus on food, protection (including gender-based violence), and disease outbreaks (cholera, Mpox, etc.). Three provinces (Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu) were targeted by this response, which ran until December 2023.
- As part of the Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) 2024 initial budget, DG ECHO funded the humanitarian response in the DRC with EUR 63.75 million. This budget was used to finance multi-sectoral projects including food security and nutrition. Furthermore, following the heavy flooding that the DRC has been facing since the end of 2023 and the exacerbation of the M23 crisis in the province of North Kivu also affecting the neighbouring province of South Kivu, DG ECHO has contributed up to EUR 0.5 million for three Disaster Response Emergency Fund (DREF) actions submitted by IFRC.
- Commissioner for Crisis Management Janez Lenarčič visited the DRC in June 2024 and announced an additional EUR 35 million to fund the humanitarian response (including for food security and nutrition).

#### Key recommendations and key policy/advocacy messages:

- Humanitarian Development Peace nexus opportunities targeting people both in IPC Phase 3 and 4 should continue to be pursued, combining emergency assistance through food distributions and cash transfers for IPC phase 4 populations with emergency agricultural and livelihoods recovery actions for IPC phase 3 populations when feasible.
- Strengthen the analysis and the response integrating protection and gender mainstreaming approaches and referral pathways toward protection actors to respond to risk exposures linked to food insecurity.

- Develop social safety nets funded by non-humanitarian resources to build resilience and reduce the proportion of people in humanitarian need (as of today, the World Bank is supporting this type of approach mainly in urban settings).
- Given the high level of prostitution in Internal Displacement People (IDP) sites (survival sex), particularly in the North Kivu province, interventions should prioritize support for income-generating activities for this category of people and those at risk.

#### 3.1.2. Central Sahel crisis

#### Situation and evolution

The insecurity in Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) continues to significantly impact the safety, food security, livelihoods and access to basic services of the population.

Agriculture and pastoralism are the main livelihoods of the populations at risk, which are highly vulnerable to conflict and climatic shocks disrupting agricultural activities, transhumance routes and access to markets. Many farmers have lost access to their land, and the few who haven't face increasingly unpredictable weather patterns. For pastoralists, the inability to follow typical transhumance routes affects livestock health and productivity.

During this lean season, average to insufficient pastoral resources and a high concentration of herds in limited areas have been observed. This situation translates in an increase in the prices of livestock feed, and a drop in the prices of small ruminants, and hence unfavourable terms of trade for pastoralists. Livestock theft by non-state armed forces is increasingly recorded, especially in areas with strong security challenges.

Lack of access remains a major problem. As an illustration, in Burkina Faso there are 39 enclaved areas, 7 inaccessible areas and 12 areas under surveillance throughout the territory.

Food prices remain high. In Burkina Faso, while the price of staple cereals may appear stable compared to last year's high, variations are significant compared with the five-year average: +26% for maize, +30% for millet, and +39% for sorghum. As mentioned, this is mainly driven by the insecurity that limits market supply. The largest five-year variations in cereals are found in the Sahel (+49%), North-Central (+32%), East (+31%) and North (+28%) regions.

According to the Agricultural Market Information System (SIMA), Niger has been facing an increase in cereal prices since the start of 2024, far exceeding the price levels recorded in 2022. Prices of all cereals remain significantly higher compared to the same period in April 2023, with an increase of 35% for rice, 27% for sorghum, 31% for corn, 21% for millet and 45% for cowpea. Consequently, the effective cost of the food basket in April 2024 exceeded the one recorded in April 2023 in all regions, with an increase of 17% at the national level.

Mali is the country that registered the most moderate variations. Still, weighted national average producer prices for dry cereals continue to experience slight upward fluctuations: +6% for millet, +5% for sorghum and +7% for corn. When comparing these prices to their average values over the past five years, prices for the month of April 2024 are up +17% for millet, +20% for sorghum and +3% for corn.

It must be noted that on 28 January 2024, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger jointly announced their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), thus further increasing tensions in the region as well as economic insecurity. Already, the depreciation of the CFA franc against the dollar, caused by the depreciation of the euro (which has a fixed parity with the CFA franc) has negatively affected the import capacities of market participants. This has led to inflation in the prices of imported staple foods and a decrease in their availability in the markets. While all three countries currently remain members of the West African Economic and

Monetary Union (UEMOA), the transitional president of Niger also mentioned his intention to change the national currency.

#### Food insecurity forecast

The latest IPC/CH analysis published in March 2024 show that, during this lean season (June-Sept), more than 7,5 million people are in IPC/CH Phase 3 and above, including over 2 500 in IPC/CH Phase 5.

| PROJECTED SITUATION: June -August 2024 |   |   |   |  |  |                                  |
|--|---|---|---|--|--|----------------------------------|
|  | Number of affected persons by phase   Period: June - July - August 2024 |   |   |  |  |                                  |
| Country                                | Total<br>Population in<br>Phase 1<br>Minimal                            | Total<br>Population in<br>Phase 2<br>Stress | Total<br>Population in<br>Phase 3<br>Crisis | Total<br>Population in<br>Phase 4<br>Emergency | Total Population<br>in Phase 5<br>Catastrophic /<br>Famine | Population<br>in Phase 3<br>to 5 |
| Burkina<br>Faso                        | 14,992,187  | 5,242,700                                   | 2,310,858                                   | 423,338  | -  | 2,734,196                        |
| Mali                                   | 17,478,673  | 4,051,701                                   | 1,246,750                                   | 120,923  | 2,575  | 1,370,248                        |
| Niger                                  | 15,417,024  | 7,300,982                                   | 3,310,720                                   | 126,172  | -  | 3,436,892                        |
| Central<br>Sahel                       | 47,887,885  | 16,595,382                                  | 6,868,328                                   | 670,434  | 2,575  | 7,541,337                        |

*Emergency needs in the Central Sahel Source: Cadre Harmonisé, March 2024* 

The nutritional situation remains worrying in the region due to, among others, poor food and hygiene practices, food deficits, insecurity limiting access to basic social services, and the high prevalence of waterborne diseases as access to safe drinking water is also limited in many parts of the region. Furthermore, the persisting closure of health facilities in many conflict-affected areas of the region disrupts access to health care for the population, and medicines are regularly out of stock including supplies to treat malnutrition.

In Mali, the Nutrition Cluster informed that, as of end of May 2024, only 36% of the children under 5 years old with severe acute malnutrition, 18% of those with moderate acute malnutrition (MAM), and 89% of pregnant and lactated women with MAM, were admitted and treated.

In Niger, as of June 2024, around 166 000 children with severe acute malnutrition (SAM) were admitted to nutritional canters, including 24 000 complicated cases. This marks an increase of about 44 000 children suffering from SAM since May. The rise is attributed to supply shortages, with over 50% of health centres out of essential supplies in March 2024.

In Burkina Faso, rapid SMART surveys from Q1 2024 show alarmingly high malnutrition rates, exceeding 15% in Boulsa and Bogandé. Rates in other regions vary between 10% and 15%. Compared to 2023, SAM cases increased by 20% to around 12 500 in Q1 2024, and moderately acute malnutrition (MAM) cases rose by 26% to about 22 700.

In this challenging context, the delivery of aid and access to local populations in conflict-affected areas remain limited. Rules imposed by non-state armed groups and by regular armed forces often result in denial of access, restrictions in the movement of civilians, bureaucratic impediments, arbitrary detentions of humanitarian staff, abductions and other forms of retaliation. The humanitarian community is still present, but the assistance provided is insufficient to cover the needs, and their capacity to deliver assistance is in some cases also hindered by national regulations. Needs must be addressed by both humanitarian aid and development assistance.

#### Overview of DG ECHO response

- At the beginning of 2024, DG ECHO allocated EUR 74.75 million under the 2024 Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) to support the humanitarian response in the Central Sahel region. Later in the year, this allocation was increased by an additional EUR 26 million, bringing the total funding to EUR 100.75 million. Allocations contributed to a rapid multi-sectoral response, including food assistance, shelter, wash and non-food items, health/nutrition, protection and education in emergencies. DG ECHO increasingly provides aid through cash and vouchers interventions. Mutualised logistics services and support to operations are also very important in DG ECHO-funded actions.
- The EU is a leading actor in diplomacy and coordinated humanitarian advocacy (Global Network Against Food Crises, the OECD and the Club du Sahel, Food Crisis Prevention Network bi-annual meeting), where the food insecurity crisis and related drivers are emphasised along with the underfunded response.
- On 28 May 2024, DG ECHO organised a Senior Officials Meeting in Brussels titled "Scaling up the humanitarian response to the crises affecting countries of the Sahel and Lake Chad basin regions". Attended by delegates from over 80 countries, the meeting resulted in an additional EUR 201 million in humanitarian aid for the Sahel and Lake Chad regions, including EUR 27 million for Burkina Faso, EUR 24 million for Mali, and EUR 25 million for Niger.

#### Key recommendations and policy/advocacy messages

- Additional financial support and scaling up of the response is required, particularly in the areas affected by the security crisis, including Diapaga, Titao, Gorom-Gorom and Djibo in Burkina Faso; the Ménaka region and the Ansongo circle (Gao region) in Mali and in many parts of Niger including the Tillabéri region in the "zone des trois frontières".
- As the intensification of conflict and the insecurity lead to the targeting of civilians, food and markets blockages by non-state armed groups and the use of starvation as a weapon of war, it is crucial to continue advocating for the respect of IHL, principled aid delivery and increased assistance to the region.
- Opportunities for Humanitarian Development Peace nexus are limited due to the political crisis and security environment, with the almost total suspension of development cooperation by the EU and its member states. However, engaging in resilience actions in food-insecure areas is essential.
- In addition to the provision of food assistance, there is the need to maintain and strengthen actions to prevent and manage malnutrition and to support livelihood recovery for the displaced, refugee and returnee populations.

#### 3.1.3. Nigeria

#### Situation and evolution

There are 31.8 million in IPC/CH Phase 3 and above according to the March 2024 IPC/CH analysis during the lean season, which represents 9% of the population analysed. The situation has particularly deteriorated in the North-West and North-Central States where civil insecurity keeps spreading.

The humanitarian crisis in Northeast Nigeria continues, with civilians bearing the brunt of a conflict that has resulted in widespread displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and a near-collapse of basic social services. As of June 2024, around 2.1 million people are internally displaced in the most affected northeast states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (BAY), of which over 80% are in Borno State, with women and children comprising most of those internally displaced according to IOM.

The food and nutrition crisis, which has been compounded by soaring food prices, is primarily due to continued conflict and insecurity in the BAY states, alongside climate

change impacts. Without immediate and coordinated intervention, this threatens to become catastrophic. The prices of staple foods like beans and maize have increased by 300% to 400% over the past year following the removal of the fuel subsidy and the depreciation of the Naira. Inflation is outpacing the ability of families to cope, making essential food items unaffordable.

Despite generally stable food cultivation conditions across the state, low yields from the 2023/24 agricultural season raised concerns about household food stocks during the current period of the analysis. Around 80% of the population analysed, particularly in rural areas, have either depleted their reserves or will exhaust them before the start of the lean season. The low stock levels could impact negatively food consumption levels even with the anticipated stock increases from the upcoming dry season harvest.

The high cost of agricultural inputs and its negative impact on overall food production threatens the stability of market reserves due to disruptions in the agricultural production chains. Furthermore, the loss of agricultural land to non-farming activities and the migration of the agricultural workforce towards less strenuous and more lucrative occupations poses long-term threats to stable food availability.

The food inflation index rose to 40.9% in June from 40.7% in April 2024, driven by increased prices of some food items. In May 2024, the official Naira (NGN) to Dollar exchange rate closed at NGN 1484 per USD, an 11.5% depreciation from the previous month. Year-on-year, from May 2023 to May 2024, the Naira has depreciated by approximately 95.5%.

Between April and May, the cost of 70% of a Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) for a family of five increased by 2% in Damaturu, Yobe State, and by 17% in Damboa, Borno State.

It is estimated that nearly 4.4 million children under 5 years were suffering from acute malnutrition in the period of May 2023 – April 2024 in northwest and northeast Nigeria. This includes 1.04 million cases of Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) and 3.37 million cases of Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM).

In the North-West and North-Center, banditry, kidnapping, and farmer/herder attacks continue to displace households and disrupt livelihoods. Attacks were reported in October and November in Benue, Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara states. The insecurity has disrupted the ongoing harvest in the worst-affected areas, limiting income generation and access to food. This, in conjunction with the decline in cross-border trade with the Niger Republic, is also disrupting market functionality.

IDPs in major urban areas in the northwest are living in makeshift shelters and heavily reliant on limited community-based food assistance, domestic labour, and negative coping strategies, such as begging and prostitution. IDPs have limited household assets and no access to land for cultivation and are likely facing wide food consumption gaps. Despite the harvest, estimates indicated that households in the northwest and North-Center were likely to experience food consumption gaps and IPC/CH Phase 3 outcomes through May 2024. A subset of very poor households in the most conflict-affected areas were unable to cultivate and are relying heavily on bartering, foraging, and begging to access food and are likely facing IPC/CH Phase 4 conditions.

#### Food Insecurity forecast

Insecurity linked to the ongoing conflict between non-state armed groups (NSAG) and government security forces, banditry, and intercommunal clashes remain the key drivers of food insecurity. Farmers struggle to access and cultivate their lands, while herders cannot move their livestock freely. Many local government areas remain completely or partially inaccessible for humanitarian assistance, and in 2023 it was estimated that one million people in Borno State were in areas inaccessible to international humanitarian actors.

Climate change also reduces the resilience of communities and fuels intercommunity

violence on the use of natural resources. Food consumption is expected to worsen over the coming months. The elevated consumption gaps, malnutrition, and mortality are largely driven by the limited availability of food stocks, restricted access to functional markets and poor water, health, and sanitation services, which might heighten morbidity risk, and impact more negatively on households' ability to engage in labour for food or resource gathering. An additional factor is the unsustainable use of emergency coping strategies.

Based on all these elements, the number of people affected by acute food insecurity IPC/CH Phase 3 and above, is expected to increase up to 31.8 million people during the 2024 lean season from June to September 2024, including one million people in IPC/CH Phase 4 Emergency in North-East, North-West and North-Centre states. This represents a 6.4% increase of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 and above compared to 2023 for all Nigeria, with a very significant increase of 26% in the North-West States. It is the first time that more people will be affected by acute food insecurity in the North-West states than in the North-East States.

With a deteriorating food security and nutrition crisis in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) states this lean season (May to September), the Government of Nigeria, national and international partners launched on 14 May 2024, an appeal seeking USD 306 million to fast-track the response.

#### Overview of DG ECHO response

- EUR 31.5 million were initially allocated under the 2024 Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) to support a multi-sectoral humanitarian response. Food assistance and nutrition support are top priorities, with over 30% of the funds allocated to these sectors. In August 2024, the EU released an additional allocation of EUR 5 million for humanitarian assistance to Nigeria, as the region continues to face a dire humanitarian situation.
- DG ECHO is a leading voice in humanitarian advocacy on the Northeast.

#### Key recommendations and policy/advocacy messages

- Improve prioritisation of assistance and vulnerability assessment, ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups, especially in a context of funding decrease.
- Assist forcibly displaced people from the Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) and Jere camp closure when they present themselves to a formal camp.
- Leverage funding to assist all vulnerable IDPs in the garrison towns' camps who do not have access to long-term sustainable livelihood opportunities.
- Where feasible and safe, immediately support agriculture in the crop season to ensure better agricultural production in a "do no harm" and principled manner.

#### 3.2. East and Southern Africa

#### 3.2.1. Ethiopia

#### Current situation and evolution since the last report

In 2024, Ethiopia is facing multiple crises, including the ongoing conflict (and the legacy of previous ones) and the impact of recurrent climate-related shocks, in parallel to health emergencies (such as cholera, measles and malaria outbreaks) that increase the vulnerability, and economic challenges.

In northern Ethiopia, areas that saw active conflict continue to face multiple needs. At the same time, there are concerns about the ongoing and planned gradual return of IDPs from Tigray to their place of origin in the contested areas whether the returns are principled, i.e. that they are voluntary, informed, safe, and dignified.

In Amhara and Oromia, insecurity makes access challenging, and vulnerable communities cannot be provided with the assistance they need. Floods caused by El Niño have recently affected areas in Oromia, Sidama and Somali region, with more than 560 000 people impacted by the event, of whom nearly 100 000 individuals have been displaced. The floods have caused significant damage to houses and other infrastructures such as health and school facilities, and disrupted the livelihoods of the people affected, resulting in losses in crops and livestock. Some of the areas hit in 2024 had previously experienced drought (until early 2023) followed by floods in late 2023, jeopardising people's capacity to recover.

As a result of these compounded causes, 15.8 million people are estimated to be acutely food insecure in Ethiopia in 2024, according to the HNO/HRP. The HRP is targeting 10.4 million of this population for emergency food assistance. The acutely food insecure population include about 4.5 million IDPs, 87% of whom are displaced in the Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, and Somali regions.

The nutrition situation is alarming, particularly in zones of Afar, Amhara, Somali, and parts of South Ethiopia Region (SER) where communities have been affected by the severe drought fuelled by El Niño.

Malnutrition rates in parts of these regions have already surpassed high thresholds, and are very high in Somali Region, according to the Nutrition Cluster. Reports show high numbers of children dying due to medical complications and severe malnutrition in Oromia and in South Ethiopia. As of March 2024, the proportion of severely malnourished children with complications had risen to 10.3%, compared to 9.4% at the same time last year.

#### Food security forecast

Food insecurity is expected to deteriorate during the lean season, which runs from June to the next main harvest in October. According to the food cluster, 12.9 million people are in need of food assistance during this period.

In the absence of an IPC/CH analysis in Ethiopia, FEWS NET is projecting widespread IPC/CH Crisis (IPC/CH phase 3) food security outcomes in most of the food-insecure areas of the country, assuming adequate food assistance is provided. Otherwise, a worse scenario is expected.

FEWS NET also indicates areas with an IPC/CH Emergency (IPC/CH phase 4) food security outcome in parts of Tigray, Amhara, and Afar regions. This does not include the situation in refugee communities. Ethiopia hosts more than 1 million refugees, including an influx of refugees from Sudan since the conflict started in the latter, who rely on humanitarian assistance for their basic needs.

The forecast for 2024 suggests a deteriorating trend, primarily driven by a high likelihood of increased conflict, additional climate shocks fuelled by the La Niña phenomenon in the last quarter of the year, and planned economic reforms that are expected to further impact the most vulnerable.

Despite the critical situation, in Ethiopia the HRP 2023 was funded at 35% with a USD 1.3 billion contribution out of the USD 3.9 billion funding requirement. The 2024 HRP is requesting USD 3,24 billion, of which USD 1 billion is designated for a Prioritization Plan focused on lifesaving activities.

#### Overview of DG ECHO response

 DG ECHO mobilised in 2024 an initial amount of EUR 86,2 million to provide lifesaving emergency assistance to the most vulnerable people, who are highly impacted by man-made crises and natural hazards in areas with the most acute needs. This assistance prioritised responses to new emergencies, life-saving interventions, disaster preparedness and the strengthening of the humanitarian response. By July 2024, about 44% of the funding contracted is supporting the food and nutrition response, which includes MPCT - the preferred modality in Ethiopia. In August 2024, the EU released an additional allocation of EUR 42 million for humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia, as the country continues to face a dire humanitarian situation.

Key recommendations and policy/advocacy messages

- Urgently scale-up multisectoral responses including food, nutrition, health, and wash. Cash-based interventions must be prioritised where the context permits.
- Ensure high-quality programming and reinforce principled approaches in responses.
- Advocate for the reinstatement of the IPC/CH assessment in Ethiopia as an internationally recognised and comparable tool to understand the state of food security and malnutrition in the country.
- Strengthen food security information systems, as well as multisectoral analyses, to better tailor the humanitarian response according to priorities and help mobilise funds.

#### 3.2.2. South Sudan

#### Current situation and evolution since the last report

South Sudan food security is deteriorating due to a combination of factors: escalating intercommunal violence, adverse effects of climate change (including flooding and drought), a severe economic crisis with soaring food and non-food prices, and a continuous influx of returnees and refugees from Sudan.

Food aid needs are rising sharply. Some 7.1 million people or 56% of the population will face acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) during the lean season from June to September 2024, necessitating humanitarian food assistance according to HNO 2024.

According to the latest IPC/CH analysis (April 2024), 2.34 million people are expected to remain in a crisis (IPC/CH Phase 4) situation across in 23 counties. Additionally, around 80 000 people are at risk of facing Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) during the lean season in several parts of the country, notably in Pibor County.

According to IPC, between July 2023 and June 2024, around 1.65 million children under five and 870 000 pregnant or lactating women were expected to be acutely malnourished. In Aweil County, a survey conducted in March found Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates of around 30%, approaching extremely critical levels due to poor food consumption, lack of dietary diversity and very poor health and sanitation practices. Data from April 2024 shows that one million people received food assistance, a 16,66% decrease from the 1.2 million assisted in March and less than half of the planned beneficiaries for the month.

The conflict in Sudan has had direct repercussions in South Sudan. As of 2 July 2024, over 730 000 people have crossed into South Sudan, adding an extra caseload of acutely food insecure people. Newly arrived returnees and refugees in Rubkona, Renk and other areas of transit and destination are expected to continue facing high to extreme food consumption gaps. Food security will also deteriorate for host communities as they also face significant food consumption gaps and resort to negative coping mechanisms. Counties of highest

concern include those hosting most returnees and suffering from protracted years of asset and livelihood erosion, including Renk, Rubkona, Aweil East, and Luakpiny/Nasir.

Protracted displacement continues for more than 1.68 million people, many of whom are unable to return to their areas of origin and are hence faced with a dire limitation of livelihood opportunities.

Trade flows from Sudan remain significantly disrupted due to the conflict, while cross-border trade with Uganda continues. In May, import volumes of maize flour and grains from Uganda were generally lower, with overall importation levels 87% below last year.

Main season crop production in Greater Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal is expected to start on time but will be hindered by flooding and La Niña-driven rainfall. Farmers face inadequate tools, inputs, and market access due to insecurity and poor roads. Agricultural production has declined over five years due to conflicts, climate change, lack of inputs, and displacement. However, improved rainfall in 2023 has increased pasture and livestock product availability.

In parallel, and not factored into these forecasts, the country is plunging into a deep economic crisis driven by a significant loss in oil revenue (over 90% of national income) due to a ruptured pipeline in Sudan. The local currency's depreciation has caused strong inflation in basic commodity prices. The cost of the standard food basket has surged by 230% since the Sudan crisis began in April 2023, leading to rising food insecurity, especially in urban areas.

#### Food insecurity forecast

During the peak of the lean season (June through September), food insecurity and malnutrition conditions are expected to continue to deteriorate further in 2024 due to complete depletion of food stocks, high staple food prices linked to deteriorating economic conditions, high returnee burden. Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) outcomes are expected to expand from 17 to 34 counties, Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) outcomes are expected to continue in Pibor County in Great Pibor Administrative Area and Duk county of Jonglei notably. The continued influx of thousands of South Sudanese returnees and Sudanese refugees will increase the acute humanitarian needs, worsening malnutrition and extreme food consumption gaps. In parallel, the economic crisis may generate more and unexpected food insecurity among people who were not considered as being at risk at the time of the IPC/CH survey.

#### Overview of DG ECHO response

 DG ECHO 2024 Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) has a current budget of EUR 58.2 million, of which about 23 % is allocated to food assistance and basic needs. Due to the magnitude of needs compared to resources available, DG ECHO finances emergency food assistance in areas classified as IPC/CH Phase 4 and 5. In August 2024, the EU released an additional allocation of EUR 40 million for humanitarian assistance to South Sudan.

#### *Key recommendations and policy/advocacy messages*

- This food crisis remains severely underfunded, with only 20% of the 2024 HRP covered. Urgent, substantial funding is needed to aid 9 million people, 80% of whom urgently need food assistance.
- Increase the efficiency of humanitarian aid systems through integrated approaches and stronger coordination. This includes enhancing the interoperability between activities, increasing the use of cash modality and exploring nexus opportunities with development actors, especially to scale up long-term investments in agriculture, basic services and infrastructure.
- Reinforce collective diplomatic advocacy towards the Government of South Sudan to enforce laws and reduce violence that hinders both humanitarian access and populations' access to livelihoods.

#### 3.2.3. Sudan crisis

#### Current situation and evolution since the last report

On 1 August, the Famine Review Committee (FRC) of the IPC concluded that famine conditions were prevalent in parts of North Darfur, including the Zamzam camp south of El Fasher. It also highlighted that many other areas throughout Sudan remain at risk of famine as long as the conflict and limited humanitarian access continue.

Prior to the FRC conclusions, the last IPC/CH analysis update was released on 27 June 2024 after close to three months of data gaps, reporting the worst levels of acute food insecurity ever recorded by the IPC/CH in Sudan. Such magnitude and severity of food insecurity has not been seen in Sudan since the Darfur crisis in the early 2000s. Moreover, in addition to acute food insecurity, Sudan is among the four countries with the highest prevalence of acute malnutrition globally.

Key drivers of this stark and rapid deterioration of the food security situation are threepronged. First, pervasive conflict and insecurity continues to impact the lives of millions of people due to restricted movements, disrupted markets and basic services, hampered agricultural production and livelihoods, and curtailed humanitarian access.

Furthermore, with 10.5 million IDPs, Sudan is the largest internal displacement crisis in the world. An additional 2.2 million have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. This massive displacement led most displaced individuals to lose their livelihoods and increased competition and pressure on available food resources and services. Sudan has been experiencing a rise in food prices, with up to 130-296% increases for the main commodities in May compared to the five-year average.

In addition to mass displacement and disruption of supply routes, market systems and agricultural production, the insecurity but also deliberate obstructions from the warring parties have severely restricted the provision of humanitarian assistance. According to OCHA, in June 2024 about 1.78 million people were denied crucial humanitarian assistance due to violence, logistic constraints and travel approval delays.

The situation is especially critical for populations trapped into areas affected by direct conflict, insecurity and lack of protection. IDPs and refugees, many of whom rely on humanitarian assistance, are a major cause for concern. Between June and September, at least 534 000 IDPs and refugees in conflict-affected localities and states for which data were available (representing around 20% of the displaced population in Sudan) will likely experience critical or catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 4 or 5).

In areas where humanitarian assistance has been heavily restricted, informal safety nets, remittances and local response systems have largely contributed to preventing further deterioration of the food security conditions. Yet, the sustainability of these mechanisms remains unclear, particularly in conflict affected areas where food stocks are about to deplete, and supplies are not flowing in.

#### Food insecurity forecast


During the lean season (June-Sept 2024), over half of the analysed population (25.6 million people) face crisis or worse conditions (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). This includes 755 000 people facing catastrophic levels of hunger (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 10 active conflict states including Greater Darfur (all five states), South and North Kordofan, Blue Nile, Al Jazirah, and Khartoum. Another 8.5 million people (18% of the population) face emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). Compared to the same time last year (June 2023), the number of people classified in IPC/CH Phase 3 and above has increased by over 50%.

The last IPC/CH analysis released in June reported that if the conflict escalates further, there will be a risk of Famine in 14 areas (five localities and nine clusters of IDPs and refugees in Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, Al Jazirah states and some hotspots in Khartoum). This would contribute to the ongoing restrictions on

#### DG ECHO Reports on food security

humanitarian access to the besieged population in critical areas and restrict people's ability to engage in farming and casual labour activities during the upcoming agricultural season.

Acute Food Insecurity (1st projection) | June - September 2024



While in the harvest season (October 2024-February 2025) the conditions of some households are expected to slightly improve due to food availability from local production and partial stabilisation of food prices, over 21 million people are expected to continue to face high levels of acute food insecurity, with around 6.4 million in emergency levels (IPC/CH Phase 4) and nearly 109 000 people experiencing catastrophic conditions (IPC/CH Phase 5). During this period, seven areas are expected to continue to face a risk of famine.

The nutrition outlook is expected to further deteriorate due to decline in access to food and compromised health, WASH and nutrition services. According to UNICEF, over 700 000 children are likely to suffer from severe wasting, the deadliest form of malnutrition, in 2024.

Beyond food insecurity, humanitarian needs are tremendous. The health system has almost collapsed, and health services are highly dysfunctional. Coupled with water contamination and poor sanitation and hygiene conditions, the situation is extremely dire. Increased morbidity to water-borne diseases is expected to further reduce the absorption capacity of the little food available for children and adults. Consequently, cases of acute malnutrition, which have already reached extremely high levels in some areas, will likely increase. Moreover, the fast-approaching rainy season and expected floods will likely further exacerbate disease outbreaks and affect the agricultural season through the spread of pests and plant diseases.

#### Overview of DG ECHO response

- In 2024, the EU's initial allocation for the humanitarian response in Sudan alone is EUR 117 million, which includes a response to the food security and malnutrition crisis. This comes on top of an allocation of EUR 128 million for Sudan in 2023, including an additional EUR 52 million since the outbreak of hostilities in April 2023, of which about EUR 39 million (31%) was allocated to respond to food security needs.
- Since the onset of the conflict in April 2023, DG ECHO also allocated over EUR 105 million to neighbouring countries to respond to the impact of the Sudan crisis.
- Approximately 65% of DG ECHO additional funding for the humanitarian response

in Sudan (EUR 45 million pledged at the April Paris Conference) is focused on food security, livelihoods, multipurpose cash transfers, and nutrition, in line with the Emergency Directors Group's analysis for famine response. Food assistance, protection, and health/nutrition remain among the sectors most supported by DG ECHO funds in Sudan in 2024.

- DG ECHO remains active in all strategic, technical, and operational discussions linked to the Sudan context and contributes to food security and cash working group discussions.
- DG ECHO prioritises populations in IPC/CH 4 and above areas in Sudan, which is necessary due to the magnitude of needs.

#### Key recommendations and policy/advocacy messages

- The recently declared famine in North Darfur and the risk of famine conditions in other areas require to immediately restore safe, unimpeded, and uninterrupted humanitarian access to the entire territory and population, including across conflicts lines and international borders.
- Ensure minimum security conditions in and around distribution points and health centres, and safeguard supply chain of nutrition supplements and basic medicines to IDPs and refugee camps and urban centres. Safe routes for the movement of displaced people from hotspots and besieged areas need to be negotiated and ensured.
- Provide immediate multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance and ensure the access to food, water, and basic services to all the people in need. Scale-up emergency cash transfers to reduce food consumption gaps, prevent loss of lives and mitigate the risk of complete collapse of livelihoods in areas facing Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) and Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4).
- Restore and scale up nutrition interventions through the implementation of blanket supplementary feeding programmes to prevent large-scale malnutrition among children under five and pregnant and breastfeeding woman. Implement urgent malnutrition treatment, including community-based management of acute malnutrition and infant and young child feeding in emergencies services. Ensure the availability of ready-to-use formula for non-breastfed infants and access to safe drinking water for preparation.
- Pursue food security data collection surveys in Al Fasher, Khartoum, and other hard-to-reach/inaccessible hotspots at risk of famine for real-time monitoring. Scale up nutrition and mortality surveys and screenings in localities with populations in IPC/CH Phase 5, and systematically record information for children aged 6-59 months.
- Immediately disburse the funds committed at the International Humanitarian Conference for Sudan and Neighbouring Countries (Paris, 15 April 2024).

#### 3.3. Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

#### 3.3.1. Occupied Palestinian Territories

#### Current situation and evolution

The Gaza Strip is experiencing a humanitarian catastrophe while the West Bank is sliding into a severe crisis due to intensified settler violence, extensive Israel military operations, an increased coercive environment, heavy restrictions of movement, and the effects of internal and regional dynamics. The large-scale hostilities in and around Gaza that broke out after the terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, which left more than 1 200 Israelis dead, have led to almost 40 000 fatalities to date among

Palestinians and 1.9 million displaced (90% of the Gaza Strip), disruption of basic services and local economy making the population of Gaza totally dependent on humanitarian assistance.

Despite small improvements in April, humanitarian access in Gaza has dramatically deteriorated since 6 May to an absolute minimum with the closure of crossings, including Rafah, while hostilities continue unabated. The humanitarian community lacks the supplies and fuel to provide a minimum level of support. The humanitarian situation and severe food insecurity is likely to deteriorate even further due to a significant lack of adequate shelters, health facilities or fuel to operate minimum services. Since March 2024, unprecedented cash liquidity issues have severely limited the ability of vendors to distribute over-the-counter cash to recipients. In Deir Al Balah and Khan Younis, although food availability has increased, it remains too expensive for the average person to afford. Overall, in the entire Gaza Strip, food prices are exorbitant, especially for fresh food, salt and sugar.


The Rafah operation has made it hard for the humanitarian community to help people. According to the Food Security Cluster, only 4 705 people were reached with food assistance in Rafah during the first half of June. WFP's main warehouse has been destroyed. Most humanitarian partners and agencies have moved to Al Mawasi and the Middle areas. The Food Security Cluster partners have been unable to consistently and safely transport aid commodities from the Kerem Shalom border crossing point in the southern Gaza Strip to central and southern Gaza due to fighting, criminal activities, and the risk of looting along Salah Ad-Din Road, forcing them to reduce food rations and limit coverage.

Overall, the Food Security Cluster reached some 865 000 individuals during the first half of June in the entire Gaza Strip (41% of the population) and only 12 humanitarian organisations were able to operate. The main partners were WFP (427 000 individuals reached) and UNRWA (301 000).

Before the Israeli offensive, around 90% of the fresh fruit and vegetables and a significant part of the meat consumed in Gaza were produced locally. Following the offensive, around 2/3 of the agricultural land is no longer productive. The scarcity of fresh produce and protein-rich foods is a significant contributor to malnutrition, and it is a challenge that humanitarian food aid alone can scarcely address.

#### Food insecurity forecast

On 25 June, the IPC Famine Review Committee (FRC) reported a high risk of famine across the whole Gaza Strip through September 2024 as long as conflict continues and humanitarian access is restricted. About 96% of the population (2.15 million people) face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above). 495 000 people (22%) are facing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 5), with households experiencing an extreme lack of food, starvation, and exhaustion of coping capacities.



#### PROJECTED SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (16 JUNE - 30 SEPTEMBER)

Disclaimer: The information shown on the maps does not imply official recognition or endorsement of any physical and political boundaries I For more information please contact ipc@fao.org.



#### Overview of DG ECHO response

- Despite ongoing security risks and logistical hurdles, DG ECHO significantly increased humanitarian funding for Palestinians. In 2023, DG ECHO provided EUR 103 million. In 2024 DG ECHO has so far allocated EUR 192 million to support partners working on the ground.
- Food security is the second largest sector in DG ECHO's Palestine Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) for 2024, receiving 16% of the total financial allocation. WFP has received EUR 55 million so far to provide essential food assistance for Gazans. Since November 2023, WFP has delivered ready-to-eat meals, food items, and wheat flour to 1.1 million people with ECHO funding.
- DG ECHO is also supporting other partners like UNICEF, Mercy Corps and Oxfam to provide multipurpose cash assistance to affected households in Gaza.
- DG ECHO remains active in all strategic, technical, and operational discussions linked to this crisis.

#### Key recommendations and policy/advocacy messages

- It is imperative to ensure the respect of IHL in the territories under attack. This includes effective mechanisms to prevent hostilities from affecting civilians and humanitarian operations, safeguarding the protection of civilians and the protection of humanitarian workers as well as their means of work
- An immediate ceasefire, as called by the UN Security Council resolution 2735, "without delay and without condition" is urgently needed.
- Safe, unconditional, and unimpeded humanitarian access through all possible entry points and pipelines, as well as law and order inside Gaza, are absolute priorities Sufficient food must be allowed to enter the Gaza Strip each month to meet the recommended minimum nutritional requirements and prevent the risk of famine from increasing among the population. Malnutrition services must be

restored and scaled-up. Delivery of commercial goods should continue, complementing humanitarian assistance. Fuel must enter Gaza to enable the proper functioning of services, including hospitals, water extraction and purification, food preparation and operation of the communication networks. Water supplies must be provided for Gaza's population in line with the minimum humanitarian emergency response standards.

- Complementarity between the commercial sector and the humanitarian response needs to be ensured, as humanitarian aid alone cannot meet all the needs. Increasing commercial imports into Gaza is a matter of priority to start restoring marketing functionality.
- Beyond humanitarian aid and the restoration of commercial supply chains, it is crucial to urgently rebuild food production capacities, particularly for fresh fruits and vegetables, protein-rich foods (such as poultry), and to rehabilitate bakeries, in order to enhance dietary diversity.

#### 3.3.2. Syria

#### Current situation and evolution since the last report

Humanitarian needs in Syria continue to be at record-high levels. The second quarter of 2024 continued to be characterised by active hostilities and insecurity across the country, directly impacting people's access to basic services.

According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024 (HNO), in 2024 15.1 million people (about 65% of the total population) are food insecure across Syria, including more than 3 million severely food insecure, as needs and vulnerability continue to increase. According to WFP, Syrians are further exhausting their coping strategies and changing their food consumption patterns. Many families are consuming only one meal per day while many adults are forced to eat less food or skip meals just to allow their children, elders, or other fragile family members, to eat.


The declining economic situation contributes significantly to increasing humanitarian needs, as everyday life has become almost unaffordable for the Syrian population. While food prices were relatively stable in April 2024, food prices remain high, with the cost of the reference food basket being nearly 3.5 times higher than the minimum wage.

Severe funding shortfalls, including to the WFP response, have added yet another layer of complexity and continue to hinder the ability of humanitarian actors to provide humanitarian assistance at scale to vulnerable populations. WFP beneficiaries have dropped from more than 5 million in the first half of 2023 to a mere 1 million targeted in 2024.

As of July 2024, the 2024 Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) was only funded at 18%.

WEP

#### Syria's compound economic crisis (September 2019 – March 2024)



Source: WFP

#### Food insecurity forecast

In Northwest Syria price increases, insufficient reserves, and the inability of the defacto authorities to set up and implement a fully-fledged food security policy will continue to have adverse effects.

The driving factors of food insecurity are likely to remain in place for the second half of 2024 and, according to the Food Security Cluster, if the required support is not provided, there is a high probability that vulnerable people will fall into extreme poverty and that the number of people in need will increase further during the year.

For the first time since the onset of the Syria crisis, malnutrition rates across the country in 2024 are alarming, with maternal malnutrition and malnutrition in children under-five years of age at global emergency thresholds. Preliminary indications from the latest statistics by WFP reveal that the prevalence of Global Acute Malnutrition has surged threefold across Syria, raising from 1.7% in 2019, to 4.7% in 2023.

Malnutrition among children under five years of age is increasing. Wasting surged by 40% in 2023 compared to 2019, while stunting increased from 12.6 to 16.1% between 2019 and 2023. Five out of fourteen governorates report unacceptably high stunting rates above 20%. Malnutrition among pregnant and breastfeeding women and girls is equally concerning.

#### Overview of DG ECHO response

- In 2024, DG ECHO's allocation under its Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) amounts to EUR 149.74 million. DG ECHO will continue to support a multi-sectorial humanitarian response. Considering the critical needs in Syria, food security will remain one of the prioritised sectors of intervention. In 2024, about 37% of ECHO budget has been allocated for food security and cash transfers, including an allocation of EUR 17 million to support the WFP response alone.
- DG ECHO continues to advocate the Government of Syria and the Central Bank of Syria to introduce an adjustable preferential rate for NGOs and UN agencies to compensate for the depreciation of the Syrian pound and hyperinflation.

#### Key recommendations and policy/advocacy messages

• Prioritise funding for immediate lifesaving response to vulnerable Syrians, with a focus on food and nutrition assistance, including livelihood support.

- Advocate for increased engagement on integrated programming that boosts the ability of people to make a living: livelihoods programmes including agricultural projects, market strengthening, job creation and restoration of basic services, as well as early recovery interventions.
- Implement mitigation measures to operate in a context of high inflation and currency depreciation supporting hybrid modalities balancing cash and in-kind assistance and develop strategies for more effective livelihood interventions.
- Strengthen humanitarian cash and shock-responsive mechanisms.
- Explore options for a regional advocacy plan to address water shortages in the Euphrates and Tigris River basins and related reduced agriculture productivity.

#### 3.3.3. Yemen

#### Current situation and evolution from last report

The humanitarian situation in Yemen remains one of the worst in the world while funding for lifesaving interventions is decreasing. According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) in 2024, 17.6 million people (more than half of the population) are likely to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above), making Yemen one of the most food insecure countries in the world. In addition, Yemen is experiencing some of the highest malnutrition rates ever recorded: approximately 5 million children under five and 2.7 million pregnant and lactating women (PLW) need life-saving humanitarian integrated nutrition interventions.

A partial IPC/CH analysis was released in February 2024 covering areas controlled by the Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) between October 2023 and February 2024. The analysis showed a worsening of the situation compared to the previous projection analysis for June-December 2023, with a 12% increase of populations in IPC/CH Phase 3 and above, increasing the proportion of people affected by high levels of acute food insecurity from 41% to 45% within the population analysed.

Of primary concern are the 1.3 million people classified in IPC/CH Phase 4 (Emergency). While the IPC/CH analysis in areas controlled by the De Facto Authorities (DFA) has not been yet released, FAO and WFP report that food insecurity continues to deteriorate in 2024. According to WFP, in May 2024, the share of households with inadequate consumption of food reached 58% nationwide, with historic highs of 60% in southern Yemen under the IRG of Yemen and 57% in northern Yemen in Ansarullah (AA) controlled areas.

The high levels of food insecurity are the result of a combination of different factors, which include a worsening economic situation, a progressive funding shortage (the 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan is currently funded at 23.8% and only 8% of the required food security budget is funded), and the military escalation in the Red Sea since January 2024.

With the constant decrease of funding, WFP had to announce in mid-2023 the reduction of their caseload which came in addition to an already reduced food ration (less than 40% of the food basket since 2022). After months of negotiations with the DFA and no agreement on the retargeting of food aid beneficiaries, in November 2023 WFP took the decision to pause general food assistance (GFA) in DFA-controlled areas affecting around 9.5 million beneficiaries.

Since then, an agreement was reached and a pilot for the retargeting approach was successfully implemented. Currently, negotiations are ongoing for a roll out of this new approach through the resumption of GFA. According to the most recent WFP data, there is now clear evidence that the deterioration in DFA-controlled areas is directly linked to the pause of GFA. The pause forced vulnerable households to resort to extreme negative coping strategies. Meanwhile, 3.6 million beneficiaries in IRG-controlled areas continue receiving assistance equivalent to approximately a quarter

of their minimum daily energy requirements.

During the first half of 2024 the economic war between the IRG and the DFA has further intensified leading to serious disruptions in the banking sector, including a cash shortage and the blacklisting of certain banks.

In parallel, the military escalation in the Red Sea has caused severe disruptions to global trade, with spikes in costs of basic food commodities and fuel. Considering that Yemen imports up to 85% of its food requirements, further escalation of the conflict in the Red Sea could lead to reduced imports, putting an additional strain on food insecure households across the country.

Finally, a severe cholera outbreak has been spreading across Yemen, with more than 76 000 suspected cases of Acute Watery Diarrhea (AWD)/Cholera since beginning of 2024, putting further at risk the most vulnerable people and degrading an already dire humanitarian situation.

#### Food insecurity forecast

Yemen will remain among the worse food security crises in the world. FAO and WFP expect acute food insecurity to deteriorate amid the protracted economic crisis, exacerbated by ongoing hostilities in the Red Sea. The Famine Early Warning Network System (FEWSNET) has warned that in the face of highly limited incomeearning opportunities, above-average food prices, and the ongoing pause in humanitarian food assistance in areas controlled by the de facto authorities (DFA), up to 18 million people (55% of the total population of the country) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity in October 2024.

The military escalation in the Red Sea is expected to push freight and insurance costs up, further increasing the cost of staple foods and other imports. Elevated import costs could lead to a further increase in the cost of the minimum food basket in governmentcontrolled areas, which reached an all-time high level in February 2024. In this context, Yemenis' vulnerability to food insecurity across the country has the potential to worsen.

According to FAO and WFP, the malnutrition situation countrywide is also likely to deteriorate throughout 2024, with 2.4 million children expected to be acutely malnourished in 2024 – a 9% increase from 2023.

#### Overview of DG ECHO response

• DG ECHO is allocating EUR 125 million to Yemen in 2024, compared to EUR 145.12 million in 2023. A large part of this budget will contribute directly and indirectly to food security outcomes.

#### Key recommendations and policy/advocacy messages

- Considering the expected deterioration of the food security situation over the coming months, an increase in funding for the Yemen response and a deescalation of the Red Sea crisis is essential. The small gains made over the last years (e.g. slight decrease in child mortality) could otherwise easily be reversed.
- To ensure greater coverage of the most vulnerable communities with multisectorial interventions, the humanitarian response needs to be prioritised and targeted. In complement to humanitarian aid, development actors should support livelihoods, basic services and economic conditions for long-term solutions.
- Humanitarian and development actors should develop specific strategies to operate in contexts of high inflation and depreciation such as Yemen (e.g. through flexible programming, market monitoring and contingency planning).
- Aid actors should strengthen response coordination and humanitarian advocacy efforts to increase joint ability to prepare for additional shocks, to access those most in need and promote International Humanitarian Law (IHL) compliance.

#### 3.4. Asia and Pacific

#### 3.4.1. Afghanistan

#### Current situation and evolution since the last report

Following peak hunger levels in 2021 and 2022, Afghanistan has experienced fragile improvements in food security. This is the combined effect of multiple factors: the massive scale-up of life saving humanitarian assistance at the peak of the crisis, improvements in drought conditions, the easing of market supply constraints through reduction of taxation on food imports, continued improvement of physical access across the country, and the injection by the UN of a significant volume of cash through 2022/23. In March 2024 14,2 million people were experiencing IPC/CH Phase 3 and above conditions, including 2.9 million in IPC/CH Phase 4. These levels are comparable to the pre-Taliban takeover.

Despite this improvement, the food crisis in Afghanistan remains one of the worst globally both in terms of scale and severity, and the main drivers behind food insecurity persist: the protracted economic crisis, increasing returns from Pakistan, the ban on women to work and an uncertain cereal production outlook due to weather related shocks.

Despite the near collapse of institutional systems during the Taliban takeover, the estimated 30% contraction in GDP since then and the commensurate stress placed on institutional systems in Afghanistan, households have reported some improvement in their capacity to meet basic needs. However, poverty still impacts one out of every two Afghans. Deflation has been on the rise since April 2023, likely due to the stabilisation in global market prices and a strengthening of the local currency. However, the economy still struggles to generate sufficient demand, with real purchasing power remaining below pre-COVID levels.

Meanwhile, structural food insecurity remains the single strongest contributor to malnutrition in Afghanistan. Approximately 4 million malnourished children and pregnant and breastfeeding women require acute malnutrition treatment services. The number of mobile health nutrition teams decreased from approximately 700 to 363, leaving tens of thousands without access to decentralized treatment services.

The labour market continues to struggle to keep up with supply – particularly due to high levels of unemployment and the influx of returnees from Pakistan. Moreover, the ban on women to work is significantly contributing to the food insecurity of female headed households.

The enduring repercussions of three successive severe dry spells or droughts from 2021 to 2023 persist, leaving numerous households burdened with high levels of debt. Furthermore, additional natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes have exacerbated the already limited resilience of the population, entrenching further the impact of acute food and livelihood insecurity. Livestock populations have faced depletion from distressed selling and have been weakened by climatic variabilities exposing them to various threats and risks.

The UN has appealed for around USD 3 billion to respond to humanitarian needs in 2024. The funding rate for 2024 remains very low: as of June, only 21.9% of the UN's 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) has been funded - at the end of 2023, the HRP secured 45.5% of the funding requirements. As of August 2024, the Food Security and Agriculture Sector has received only 19% of the required budget.

#### Food insecurity forecast

Around 12.4 million (28%) Afghans are projected to be in high levels of acute food (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) from May to October 2024. Food commodity prices have

stabilised and are currently below the May 2020 levels, and they are expected to further decline with the wheat harvest in June/July. While the continued gradual decrease in food commodity prices has boosted purchasing power, it is also partly a product of lower demand in the economy. The Afghan economy is expected to remain stagnant through 2025 with no GDP growth and declining income per capita due to population growth. Adding to this is the low level of employment and livelihood opportunities, reduced humanitarian assistance and decreased remittances from neighbouring countries – mainly Iran and Pakistan.

Additionally, due to massive funding shortfalls (40% of WFP funding requirements met to date), the humanitarian food assistance coverage is expected to significantly reduce in the forecasted period. The WFP will entirely phase out the emergency humanitarian food assistance throughout the IPC/CH projection period and refocus the strategy with smaller scale assistance adopting a reactive "hotspot response" in specific subdistricts. During the harvest period from May to September, an average of 3 million people will be reached in the "hotspot locations." Starting in October, the WFP's Operational Plan aims to expand its reach to 9 million individuals.

#### Overview of DG ECHO response

• Under the Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) 2024 DG-ECHO allocated EUR 113 million and an additional EUR 10.6 million operational reserve top up to support a multi-sectoral humanitarian response including covering the needs of communities affected by recent strong flash floods. It is estimated that around one third is allocated to address food security needs.

#### Key recommendations and policy and advocacy messages

- The sustained reduction in humanitarian aid resourcing has led to a drastic scaledown of food assistance. Further reductions in funding and resources, will erode the fragile food security improvements achieved since 2021.
- Any reduction in funding will be borne heavily by women and children. Women, unable to work, face severe food shortages, protection risks, and mental health issues. Donors are reminded that they are the first to bear the cost of inaction especially if food insecurity and nutrition needs are unaddressed.
- DG ECHO in collaboration with member states and other donors should reinforce their investment in joint, holistic and integrated approaches addressing food security, nutrition, WASH, health, livelihoods, and protection for enhanced impact on the immediate and medium-term needs.
- Sustainable, flexible, and predictable funding: the protracted nature of the current crisis coupled with surges of recurrent and predictable shock requires a critical thinking in the funding strategies across the humanitarian and medium-term funding instruments. This includes: considerations for multi-year, flexible funding to ensure continuity of projects; investing in joint approaches addressing all drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition, and testing new ideas with more forward-looking donors; pooled funds should enable a flexible response and be as fast as possible, ensuring that global standards are applied.

#### 3.4.2. Myanmar

#### Current situation and evolution since the last report

Ongoing armed conflict across the country continues to trigger escalating humanitarian needs, increasing displacement, grave human rights violations and deadly protection threats to civilians.

As of 24 June 2024, the number of UNHCR verified Internally Displaced People (IDPs) has reached almost 3.2 million, up from 2.8 million in March 2024. As per multiple

reports from local partners, the actual number of IDPs is significantly higher. It is anticipated that displacement will rise to at least 3.6 million by the end of 2024.

There are few opportunities for return due to ongoing conflict and landmine contamination in IDP's places of origin. The spread of unexploded ordnance across farmlands, along with extremely high inflation and shortage of agricultural inputs undermines the farmers' ability to produce and sell food. Major livelihood changes are evident in conflict-affected areas. This includes the abandonment of land, distress destocking, or migration, all of which lead to reduced agriculture production.

In addition to armed conflict and displacement, poverty and inflation are driving food insecurity. The latest FAO-WFP Hunger Hotpots report highlights Myanmar as the sixth highest country of global concern, with 13.3 million people acutely food insecure.

Myanmar's economy continues to face significant challenges and growth is expected to remain feeble as conflict, macroeconomic instability, and displacement constrain production. Myanmar is now estimated to have 7 million more people living in poverty than it did immediately prior to the Covid-19 pandemic. 37% of people in Myanmar are adopting Crisis or Emergency livelihoods coping strategies<sup>3</sup>.

WFP's May market price monitoring shows a nationwide surge in food prices compared to the previous month. The cost of a basic food basket is up by 50% compared to last year, rising from USD 15.50 to USD 23.20. Despite an increase in transfer value by WFP, it still only covers 75% of the actual cost of the basic food basket in some areas.

Currency devaluation, combined with significant shortages of commercial supplies due to transport blockages imposed by armed actors, as well as rising fuel prices, has left many people struggling to meet their basic needs. With the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) only funded at 12% more than halfway through the year, IDPs targeted for life-saving food assistance likely receive little assistance in other sectors. This results in cash for food being used as multipurpose cash, further aggravating people's food insecurity.

#### Food insecurity forecast

Intensified conflict in Myanmar is expected to persist in the coming months, driving displacement, destroying livelihoods, limiting access to food, thus driving critical levels of acute food insecurity.

Economic deterioration and conflict are likely to be compounded by below-average rainfall during the monsoon season between May and October, impacting the 2024 harvest. The food cluster projects 13.3 million people (24% of the population) facing high levels of acute food insecurity (equivalent to IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), including 2.7 million people in Emergency (equivalent to IPC/CH Phase 4) between June and August 2024. The increasing number of IDPs and the rise of negative coping mechanisms among host communities are expected to exacerbate food security gaps in the coming months. IDPs/returnees will face serious levels of food insecurity if aid is not scaled up due to underfunding.

#### Overview of DG ECHO response

• The ongoing conflict in Myanmar has significantly increased humanitarian needs, prompting DG ECHO to release an additional EUR 13.5 million in June 2024 to help people access essential services, including food assistance. This brings the total humanitarian funding for 2024 to EUR 33.4 million as of June 2024 (of which around 14% to urgent humanitarian food assistance).

#### *Key recommendations and policy/advocacy messages*

• Continue advocating for humanitarian access in both State Administration Council (SAC) and Ethnic Armed Organisation (EAO) controlled areas.

- Continue advocating for uninterrupted major transportation corridors (road, waterways etc) to transport humanitarian and commercial supplies in support of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the full functioning of market systems.
- Continue advocating for the protection of civilians from violence. This includes humanitarian aid workers and humanitarian infrastructure.
- Scale up emergency food and nutrition assistances to reach displaced populations, including in hard-to-reach areas.

#### 3.4.3. Bangladesh

#### Current Situation and evolution from last report

Bangladesh is one of the most susceptible countries to climate change - The Climate Risk Index ranks Bangladesh amongst the top ten climate risk countries globally. Natural hazards, mainly occurring in the high-risk flood prone northeastern region, monsoon flood prone northwestern and central areas, and cyclone and tidal surge southwest and south-central zones, affect more than one million people at any given time and are the main drivers of internal displacements and recurrent loss of productive assets and seasonal income opportunities and seasonal surges in acute food insecurity.

Layered on the extreme climatic events, the massive displacement of more than 700 000 Rohingya refugees from Rakhine State in Myanmar to Cox's Bazar district – one of the poorest regions – has resulted in significant strain on the limited asset base and livelihood opportunities for the neighboring host population. Since 2021 around 35 000 Rohingya refugees have been relocated to Bashan Char Island along the Bay of Bengal.

The latest IPC/CH Acute Food security analysis conducted in 29 disaster prone districts including Cox's Bazaar, classified 14,6 million people in IPC/CH Phase 3 and above (including 0.3 million in IPC/CH Phase 4) in the February to March 2024 period. The report further confirmed the worrisome food security vulnerabilities amongst refugee population comprising around 45% and 30% of the Rohingya refugee caseload in Cox's Bazaar and Bashan Char, respectively. In addition to the climatic vulnerabilities indicated above, the report points to the undying consequences of the 2017 refugee influx and the persistent trends of high food prices as the key drivers to acute food insecurity amongst the host population.

For the refugee population, in addition to the above drivers, the restrictive government policy on access to income-generating and other livelihood opportunities has implied full dependence on humanitarian assistance. Consequently, significant shortfalls in the funding pipeline, as was the case in most of 2023 and early part of 2024, resulted in 40% ration cuts, compounding further the fragile food and nutrition security of the Rohingya population. Rates of acute undernutrition spiked to slightly over the 15% emergency threshold for the first time since 2018.

#### Food insecurity forecast

The fragilities in the food security conditions are projected to further deepen from April to October 2024, with a total of 16.5 million people likely to be in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. This includes around 60% of the Rohingya population in Cox's Bazaar and Bashan Char, who are projected to face worrisome food security conditions in the coming months.

The projection period coincides with the peak of the climate induced natural hazards, occurring normally between May and August and compounding further losses on the productive asset base and household capacity to meet basic needs, particularly for communities impacted by successive shocks in the recent past. Inflation is expected

to remain high, compromising further purchasing and coping capacities of affected households. Escalating conflict in the bordering region in Myanmar pose additional risk of a new large-scale influx to the resource-constrained Cox's Bazaar district.

Nonetheless, initial stability in the food security situation of the Rohingya population in the two settlements is anticipated following important support (USD 78 million) from the United States. This will ensure beneficiary access to 100% of entitlements from August 2024 through to September, and important improvements in the food security and nutrition outcome can be envisaged.

#### Overview of DG ECHO response

- In 2023 DG ECHO allocated more than EUR 35 million, while up to June 2024 it has allocated EUR 29 million. Of the 2023-2024 funding EUR 21.5 million (33.6%) was allocated for food assistance and nutrition. For the same period 88% of funding was allocated for the Rohingya refugee and host community response in Cox's Bazar the remaining 12% was allocated mostly for disaster preparedness and emergency response (e.g. sudden onset floods) in other parts of Bangladesh.
- DG ECHO included cash transfers as part of pre-disaster early actions for Anticipatory Action for flood and cyclone, which also supports vulnerable households for food assistance.

#### Key recommendations and policy/advocacy messages

- Closely monitor the evolution of the food security situation, taking into consideration the compounding impact of recurrent climatic induced disasters and the deepening socio-economic fragilities due to inflation.
- The Joint Response Plan (JRP) for 2024 is funded at 30% only. Of the USD 232 million requested by the Food Security Sector, 51% (USD 118 million) has been committed. There is a need to advocate for additional funding.
- Government of Bangladesh (GoB) restrictions prevent the large-scale use of cash and income-generating activities in the Rohingya refugee camps. Linkages between markets in the Rohingya camps and host communities are also severely restricted. These impediments place additional pressure on the delivery of decreasing humanitarian funds. DG ECHO along with other stakeholders continues to advocate the GoB to change its policy.
- Closely monitor the evolution of the conflict situation in neighbouring Rakhine state in Myanmar. Define specific contingency measures aimed at addressing potential population influx into Bangladesh.
- Leverage the learning from the ongoing disaster preparedness approaches aimed at mitigating the severe impact of climate induced disasters to inform the reinforcement of early warning systems and other critical preparedness and response measures.

#### 3.5. Latin America and the Caribbean

#### 3.5.1. Haiti

#### Current situation and evolution since the last report


Food insecurity across the country has worsened and is likely to deteriorate further with rising costs and logistical challenges due to gangs' activities. In the first quarter of the year, some 2 500 people were killed or injured by gangs' violence, representing an

increase of more than 53% compared to the last 2023 quarter according to the OHCHR. Recent armed attacks in Delmas and Gressier municipalities in May 2024 have forced more than 8 000 additional people to relocate. Violent clashes in several parts of the metropolitan area of Port-au- Prince led to more than 362 500 IDPs - nearly half of them are children.

The key drivers to the deterioration of food security are increased gang violence, rising prices, low agricultural production due to below-normal rainfall, and the lack of previously planned humanitarian aid.

The increase in gang violence limits the circulation of goods and contributes to the increase in the prices of basic foodstuffs. The cost of the food basket has now accumulated an increase of 27% (following six consecutive years of double-digit inflation), which leads, according to the WFP, to a reduction in household capacity to access food in Port-au-Prince, the capital, and its metropolitan area. Compared to the previous IPC/CH projection made during the August 2023 analysis, the situation has deteriorated, with approximately 4.97 million people (50% of the analysed population) facing high levels of acute food insecurity for the March-June period 2024. This includes approximately 1.64 million people (17% of the analysed population) classified in IPC/CH Phase 4 (Emergency), and another 3.32 million (33% of the analysed population), classified in IPC/CH Phase 3 (Crisis). The current update shows a stark deterioration of food security in Haiti, with 532 000 additional people experiencing acute food insecurity compared to previous estimates for this season.

Intensified by escalating insecurity, blocked roads and a collapsing health system, Haiti's nutrition crisis is pushing children to their limits according to UNICEF. The latest IPC/CH Acute Malnutrition analysis for Haiti shows that nearly 277 000 children aged under five and pregnant and breastfeeding women are facing malnutrition, including 125 046 severe cases (SAM) and 151 690 moderate cases (MAM). About 40% of them reside in the capital, Port-au-Prince.



Source: IPC

#### Food insecurity forecast

Haiti is one of the five countries/territories of highest concern according to the latest Hunger Hotspots report (June to October 2024 outlook), indicating the possibility of catastrophic conditions (IPC/CH 5) in the outlook period. This is driven by the escalation of violence by non-state armed groups (NSAGs), forcing the population to leave their homes and livelihoods - including the abandonment of cropland, the protracted economic crisis, and the likelihood of extreme rainfall and an above-average hurricane season.

The next IPC/CH analysis is planned for August 2024.

#### Overview of DG ECHO response

 The Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) 2024 initial allocation to Haiti was EUR 20.5 million, including EUR 20 million for humanitarian assistance and EUR 0.5 million for disaster preparedness. An additional allocation of EUR 10,2 M has been awarded to reach EUR 30,7 million in response to the deteriorating situation caused by the recent outbreak of gang violence. The main EU humanitarian priorities are food security, nutrition and protection.

#### Key recommendations and policy and advocacy messages

- The situation calls for an enhanced support to the ongoing scale up of the humanitarian response, commensurate to the urgency, proportion and severity of needs. Additional resources are urgently required to meet the essential needs of the Haitian population affected by an acute multidimensional crisis.
- All humanitarian actors, including humanitarian donors, should continue to advocate for and support stronger humanitarian coordination in the country and join efforts to increase operational capacity on the ground.
- DG ECHO should pursue its efforts for the development and continuous implementation of a Triple Nexus approach.

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