



**DG ECHO**

## **Reports on food security**

Release n° 1 – September 2022

Directorate-General for European Civil  
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

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## List of Organisations

DG ECHO	Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
DG INTPA	Directorate General for International Partnerships
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Program

## List of acronyms

CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
COHAFA	Council working party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid
CVA	Cash and Voucher Assistance
DREF	Disaster Response Emergency Fund
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EDF	European Development Fund
EiE	Education in Emergencies
ERP	Emergency Response Plan
FSL	Food Security and Livelihoods
GFD	General Food Distribution
GNFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
GRFC	Global Report on Food Crises
HDP	Humanitarian – Development – Peace nexus
IDP	Internally Displaced Person

IPC/CH	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basked
MPCT	Multi-purpose Cash Transfer
MSNA	Multi-Sector Needs Assessment
PLW	Pregnant Lactating Women
RHD	Refugee Hosting District
RMRP	Refugee and Migrant Response Plan
RPCA	Food Crisis Prevention Network
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SMEB	Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket

## Executive summary

**Food security is deteriorating globally** according to recent analyses from the Global Network against Food Crises (GNFC)<sup>1</sup>, and it is reaching alarming levels and an all-time high. There are currently up to 205 million people acutely food insecure and in need of urgent food assistance (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent) across 45 countries, twice as many as in 2016<sup>2</sup>. Around 970,000 people worldwide are projected to face catastrophic conditions of food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2022. Specialized agencies warn that hunger is likely to further increase in the immediate to near future in 19 countries or situations.

In 2022, food insecurity was exacerbated by the **direct effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine** on the global economy, including on food prices, global supply of grains as well as on the price of energy and fertilizers. These factors compounded food crises that were already raging due to conflict, drought and floodings particularly associated with climate change, and protracted negative socio-economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Despite hunger being already on the rise for the past five years, **funding to address this has been lagging behind**<sup>3</sup>. Furthermore, the humanitarian system overly relies only on a limited number of donors.

EU humanitarian assistance is funded through the European Commission's Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO). It is designed and implemented in a nexus approach, whereby synergies between humanitarian, development and peace actions are actively pursued and absolutely necessary. Low humanitarian budgets cannot address structural effects and causes. DG ECHO has **reacted swiftly** and decisively to address the hunger crisis by substantially increasing funding for countries most at risk and stepping-up advocacy efforts. Longer-term measures include supporting countries in the transformation towards resilient and sustainable food systems by strengthening coordination with international actors, including with G7 members, intensifying anticipatory action and improving data collection and usage.

**In 2022 alone, DG ECHO has already allocated EUR 770 million for humanitarian food assistance, 32% more than in 2021.** This includes the recent mobilization of an additional EUR 150 million de-committed funds from the European Development Fund for humanitarian food assistance in the most vulnerable countries in Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific. We have also co-organized pledging conferences for the Sahel and Lake Chad region (4 April), the Horn of Africa (26 April), and Syria (9-10 May), which helped raise around EUR 10 billion from several donors and organizations.

Against this backdrop, the **objectives** of the present report are threefold. Firstly, to draw attention to the situation in a set of 21 countries and regions considered of maximum concern from a food security perspective. Secondly, to outline DG ECHO's intervention in the field to meet rising humanitarian needs. And lastly, given the scale and severity of the hunger crisis, to identify critical needs and opportunities for coordinated action against food insecurity, with a view to scale-up assistance to the populations most in need. It encapsulates information collected from DG ECHO's field and geographical desks at the end of August 2022 and is intended to provide a more granular picture of the realities from

<sup>1</sup> Cfr. Global Report on Food Crises mid-year update (13 September 2022) and Hunger Hotspots Report (21 September 2022)

<sup>2</sup> Figure from the latest update of the Global Report on Food Crises (published on 13 September). This figure underestimates the actual needs, as the update covers eight countries less than the previous report (covering 2021). If we add the 2021 figures for these eight countries, the total figure would be above 220 million people.

<sup>3</sup> Latest data available (GNFC).

a field perspective. This knowledge is further complemented with references to public sources of information.

This report provides detailed information about the six hunger hotspots as identified by the GNFC, namely **Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Nigeria**, as they all have populations facing or projected to face starvation (Catastrophe, IPC/CH Phase 5) or at serious risk of deterioration due to critical food insecurity (Emergency, IPC/CH Phase 4). In addition to these, the report covers the **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Sahel region (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad), Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Mozambique, Central America, Venezuela, Colombia**, where the GNFC warns about the possible intensification of life-threatening conditions in the coming months.

Climate change and related weather extremes remain a key driver of food insecurity in many of the countries under analysis. **Droughts in countries such as Kenya, Madagascar and Somalia**, are causing crops to deteriorate and harvests to fail as in Niger and Mauritania as well. **Floods and irregular rains in 2021 in Niger, Mauritania, Chad, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe**, for example, are bringing about similar consequences.

Many countries are affected by the global economic downturn that was already raging due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, affecting – among others – the currency market and causing high rates of inflation notably on international food prices. Critical cases include, for instance, **Venezuela**, with an estimated inflation of 155 percent; **Burkina Faso**, where the inflation has increased the price of the main food products by more than 47 percent, reaching up to 70 percent for some products and around 150 percent in some conflict areas (the situation is similar in Mali); **and Lebanon**, where the prices of the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket has increased by 1522 percent, compared to October 2019.


Rising prices of oil, fertilizer and food following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, disproportionately impacted on countries with already high levels of food insecurity and highly dependent on imports from Russia and Ukraine. These include, for example **Syria**, where food prices in June 2022 were 45 percent higher than in January; **Mauritania**, where prices of sorghum, local beans, and wheat in June recorded an increase of +60, +50, and +35 percent, respectively, compared to 2021, while oil is 70 percent more expensive; **and Uganda**, where the average monthly price of the local food basket in June 2022 increased by 31 percent year-on-year.

Lastly, internal and regional expanding conflicts are an additional layer that continue to more and more impede on the 4 pillars of food security, on livelihood and markets access, crops and essential services which translates into significant increase of caseload of people in severe food insecurity throughout the year, also due to the absence of other types of longer-term assistance. In this respect, countries like Burkina Faso, **Mali, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Haiti** and others have been gravely affected.

Most of these countries are faced with multiple challenges at the same time which overlap and exponentially aggravate the situation a. High food inflation, displacement, increasing insecurity, prolonged effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, structural poverty and lack of governance, , and many other factors are additional causes contributing to the exacerbation of global food crises.

## 1. Global picture

On 12 September, an update of the Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) has been published, providing the most recent and detailed picture of the global food insecurity situation. This report estimates at **205 million** the number of people in need of food assistance, compared to 193 million at the end of 2021. Despite the increase, this report does not provide a full picture, as it covers 45 countries only (compared to the 53 covered in the previous one) due to the lack of recent analysis in some countries. If we only consider the 45 countries covered by the update, the number of people in acute food insecurity has increased by 21% since the last report covering 2021<sup>4</sup>.




Source: Global Report against Food Crises, Sept 2022

This is the highest figure since the GRFC is published, and confirms a daunting trend: the number of people in acute food insecurity has increased systematically since the first edition of the report (covering the year 2016), and the current figures are double those of 2016.

The most significant increases in food insecurity were observed in Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen. Ten countries recorded an increase of more than 50% in the numbers of people in food crisis.

The largest crises in absolute terms are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Yemen.


Seven countries/territories saw an increase of over 1 million people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above between 2021 and 2022



Source: Global Report against Food Crises, Sept 2022

<sup>4</sup> If we add the figures from the previous report for the eight missing countries, the total figure would be above 220 million. This would be a conservative estimate, as it doesn't consider any increase of food insecurity in these countries.


## Numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent in 45 countries/territories in 2022



Source: Global Report against Food Crises, Sept 2022

We note a very strong deterioration and acceleration of food insecurity in West Africa and in particular in the Sahel: +48% and +153% of people in food crisis (phase 3 and +) compared to 2021 and the average of the last 5 years with a greater and worrying increase of people in phase 4 (Emergency phase or "pre-famine" phase because just before famine phase): +72% and +228% versus 2021 and its last 3 years.

Not only global numbers, but also the severity of hunger remains very high, with around 39 million people in Emergency levels of food insecurity (IPC phase 4, second highest in the scale) and almost 500,000 people in catastrophe level in four countries (IPC phase 5, highest in the scale):



Source: Global Report against Food Crises, Sept 2022


In the latest Hunger Hotspots report, published in June, five countries were considered to be at risk of famine: Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan and Somalia. Such risk is likely to materialise in Somalia, where it has been forecasted that a famine will occur in October, unless urgent action is taken, affecting the districts of Baidoa and Burhakaba, in the Bay region. There have only been two declared famines in the 18-year history of the IPC, the last in 2017.

The drivers of food insecurity remain conflict, global and local economic shocks, and weather extremes, against a background of poverty and inequality. In the last years, the successive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have accelerated the trend and contribute explaining the dramatic situation.

## 1.1. How the Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated the global food crisis

The ripple effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on global food security have been extensively discussed, and projections have been made by several organisations, but so far they haven't been objectively measured. The picture provided by the GRFC update, despite being published in September, doesn't fully capture these effects, as many of the analyses on which it is based were carried out too early. The next edition of the GRFC should provide a more precise estimation of this impact which should also be associated with an analysis of the (speculative) mode of operation of international markets . It would be interesting to analyze the chronology of announcements and the effects of price increases (cf. immediate increase in prices even when stocks existed, price per barrel versus price at the pump, etc.).

The most obvious effect of the invasion has been the increase in global food prices. Before the invasion, these were already at a ten-year high due to the economic effects of COVID-19. The invasion further increased prices, as both Russia and Ukraine were major food exporters, and together provided one third of global cereal supply, and 80% of global sunflower oil February and reached the highest level since its inception in 1990.




Source: FAO

Food prices stabilised in the second quarter of the year and decreased to pre-invasion levels after the signature of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July. However, food prices still remain 7.9% higher than in August 2021. Furthermore, the Initiative is unlikely to fully stabilise markets, as quantities exported remain low, the situation in the Black Sea remains fragile, and global trade patterns have been significantly altered. Food prices are thus expected to remain volatile and high in the next couple of years.

Beyond food prices, the Russian invasion is also impacting food security through its negative effect on the prices of energy and fertiliser – which were already very high before the invasion.

Countries that were highly dependent on grain and oil imports from the Black Sea region were the first to suffer the effects of the crisis. The cost-of-living crisis that followed is affecting particularly low-income, food-importing countries with macroeconomic difficulties



Source: IPC

and limited coping capacities. This includes many countries in the MENA region and Sub-Saharan Africa, some of which were already facing serious food crises.

Soaring food and fuel prices may compromise the ability of humanitarian actors to supply food to the areas with the direst needs. WFP estimated that their operational costs would increase by EUR 26.1 million per month in 2022, compared to pre-invasion levels, and EUR 63.8 million per month compared to pre-pandemic levels.

This is leading to a reduction of food assistance, which could further aggravate some of the world's worst food crises.

The effects are expected to continue into next year: in 2022, fertilizer prices have increased significantly, and around 30% of the agricultural land will remain unharvested or not planted this year in Ukraine. The World Bank anticipates that energy prices will rise more than 50% in 2022, before easing in 2023 and 2024. This will certainly have a negative impact on agricultural productivity in the next planting seasons. It is estimated that the decline in fertiliser use alone could reduce food production by 20% in Africa.

## 1.2.Drought in the Horn of Africa and famine forecast in Somalia

On 5 September, the Famine Review Committee forecasted that a famine will occur in two districts of Somalia unless urgent action is taken. This is mainly the consequence of the persistent drought in the Horn of Africa, which also affects Ethiopia and Kenya, but also decades of conflict, severe economic shocks and mass population displacement.

The drought in the Horn of Africa started in 2020 and has stretched over four rainy seasons, making it the most extensive and severe in four decades. It has caused a dramatic increase of acute food insecurity in the three countries, affecting up to 19-21 million people. It has also caused over 1.5 million displacements, and originated the first famine declaration in five years.

There is a high likelihood that the next rainy season (October – December 2022) will also be below average – which would be an extremely rare event. If this happens, the number of people in need of urgent food assistance could increase to an estimated 23-26 million people, including more people in famine-like situation.

## 2. Geographical focus

This section compiles intelligence about the main food crises from the DG ECHO field network and geographical units. For each country, highlights are provided regarding the status and evolution of food insecurity, the main underlying factors, and the main interventions of DG ECHO and other actors. Finally, some ideas are put forth for needs and opportunities for action are put forth, including opportunities for a reinforced HDP nexus.

Among the ideas put forth, increasing humanitarian funding and better targeting is suggested for most countries. Many opportunities for nexus are identified, including coordination with agricultural, livelihood and resilience activities; links with social protection schemes; etc.

Other recurrent recommendations relate to:

- Improving the efficiency of aid through e.g. a more rapid and anticipatory action approaches systematic and use of cash transfers.
- Improving data and information systems and analyses (more integrated/common analyses)
- Reinforcing advocacy on a variety of issues (increased funding, respect of IHL, etc.).

Example of these are:

- Support initiatives for synergy/complementarity and coordination of INTPA - ECHO funding such as in the Sahel (PDU/FFU, CRIALCES), Mali (DUE funds in central Mali), Niger (FPI) and Burkina Faso (FPI),
- Support nexus initiatives in the CAR, through joint financing and strong coordination. To this end, continue to coordinate with the EU Delegation on the possible reprogramming of unspent budget support to redirect it to resilience and food security funding
- Take advantage of the decommitted EDF funds, which, , will lead to additional funding in the food security sector for Chad. See if/how these additional resources can feed into the nexus approach in the Sahelian belt.
- Advocate both internally and externally to donors for increased engagement on Yemen.
- Advocating with other EU services and donors for increased engagement in Syria for integrated programming that boosts ability of people to earn a living. Livelihoods programmes, including agricultural projects, market strengthening, job creation and restoration of basic services.

More granular detail is provided in the country fiches below.

NOTE: To describe the food insecurity status, these fiches use the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) scale, which is the most broadly used framework. This scale classifies food insecurity in five levels (see below). Expressions like “IPC 3+” are frequently used, meaning “IPC 3 and higher”.

In West African countries, IPC can be referred to as CH (Cadre Harmonisé). CH is an analogous system, considered fully compatible with IPC. Hence, CH and IPC phases can be considered equivalent, and are often referred to as the IPC/CH framework.

Qualifying Levels of Acute Food Insecurity Using the Reference Table for Area Classification

	Mild acute food insecurity		High acute food insecurity		Critical acute food insecurity
<b>Phase name and description</b>	<b>Phase 1 None/Minimal</b>  Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	<b>Phase 2 Stressed</b>  Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	<b>Phase 3 Crisis</b>  Households either: • Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition;  or • Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	<b>Phase 4 Emergency</b>  Households either: • Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality;  or • Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	<b>Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine</b>  Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident.  (For Famine Classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality)
<b>Priority response objectives</b>	Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction	Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods	<b>Urgent action required to:</b>  Protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps		
			Save lives and livelihoods	Revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods	

Source: IPC

## 2.1. West and Central Africa

### Burkina Faso

#### Situation and evolution

Food security continues to deteriorate in Burkina Faso. In the March 2022 CH/IPC (before the aggression against Ukraine), there is an increase of 20 % of people food insecure IPC/CH3+ expected in lean season versus 2021, +112% on the last 5-year average, reaching 3.45 million people, with an increase of 82% of people in IPC phase 4 (prefamine: 628,464 people). This is the highest caseload since the CH/IPC analyses of 2015. 179,000 children require also life-saving nutrition treatment. The closure and reduction of functionality of health centres (183 closed, 363 minimally functioning) affects more than 1.5 million people. The inflationary situation experienced by Burkina Faso (one of highest in WA) since 2021's harvest continues to worsen. In June-July, the main products consumed such as oil, millet, maize, sorghum, and cowpea are up, on average, by + 59, +56, +70 and +47% respectively compared to 2021. In areas of very high insecurity and/or blockade (notably in Sahel region), 53% of people are in food insecurity, including 21% in a humanitarian emergency with unprecedented severity in some conflict area. The Minimum Food Expenditure Basket (MFEB) cost increased by over 27% since the beginning of 2022. The Government has put in place measures to limit the prices of local cereals and some basic necessities by reducing some taxes but without much effect, nor respect by traders. It also plans to assist more than 3.3 million people. At the end of June, only 50% coverage is expected for emergency food assistance and less than 20% for livelihood support. The WFP announces a response to 1.7 million people with reduced rations of 50 to 75% depending on the beneficiaries. A USD 138 million net funding requirement was announced in July 2022 by WFP5 without however disaggregating the different needs.

<sup>5</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/report/burkina-faso/wfp-burkina-faso-country-brief-may-2022>

## *Drivers*

The intensification of conflict and the insecurity with targeting of civilians, food and markets blockage by non-state armed group using "starvation" as a weapon of war, the gap of humanitarian access, internal displaced people (more than 1.9 million people) are the main direct and indirect drivers of the food and nutritional crisis aggravated by political instability. Other factors are the significant agricultural and pastoral deficits in 2021 at the national and sub-regional level, and the rise in national, sub-regional and international food prices (cf. FAO Index) since 2021. The price of hydrocarbons and transport (the prices have more than doubled in the blockaded areas) have also risen. The Ukrainian conflict has only exacerbated inflation and speculation. The high insecurity on the roads (improvised explosive devices, illegal controls and detentions, thefts and other attacks) and destruction of infrastructure also leads to a very strong negative impact on the markets and access to beneficiaries.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- About EUR 38 million have been released to support a multisectoral humanitarian response.
- Replenishment of a DREF request for food insecurity & Small-Scale Tool for displacements totaling EUR 0.48 million. Upcoming: transfer of funds of EUR 1 million from Luxembourg to DG ECHO and discussion in progress with Austria about a contribution of EUR 0.8 million.
- Food assistance (41%), health and nutrition (12%) and Protection (11%) are priority sectors. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash and in-kind deliveries.
- EU is a leading actor on diplomacy and coordinated humanitarian advocacy. On 6 April 2022, DG ECHO co-hosted (with the Global Network Against Food Crises - GNFC, OECD, Club du Sahel) a high-level Panel during the Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) bi-annual meeting, where the food insecurity crisis and related drivers were emphasized as well as the underfunded response. EUR 2.5 billion were mobilized for the sub-region including funds already planned/allocated and for non-humanitarian responses that do not target households in food crisis.

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- EU delegation: FPI, PDU and Pasantad's (closing) programs
- USAID/BHA: USD 110 million including USD 40 million top up for food assistance in June-July 2022.
- World Bank support to WFP and Ministry for Humanitarian Action with USD 388 million.
- GBP 33 million for 35 months from the FCDO/UK Sahel Regional Fund, starting in 2023.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- The triple crisis affecting Burkina Faso (conflict, food insecurity, political instability) requires scaling up the response to essential basic needs including minimum dietary requirements of vulnerable displaced and hosts communities, despite the operational constraints.
- Severely underfunded crisis. Additional short and long-term financial support is required.

- Improve prioritization of assistance ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups including new IDP's and refugees.
- Increase the efforts and advocacy of the EU and other partners for more efficient emergency and post-emergency assistance of productive sectors and infrastructure in rural areas, in a nexus perspective.
- Accelerate operationalization of the HDP nexus and its monitoring/evaluation, esp. for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

## **Central African Republic (CAR)**

### *Situation and evolution*

After a peak of violence during the post-electoral crisis in 2021, the situation has stabilized, but activities of armed groups persist widely, exacerbating an already fragile and tense socio-economic situation, with the most affected areas being the Northwest, Central, and Eastern regions.

Currently there are 647,883 IDPs recorded in the country, the vast majority (75%) staying with hosting families/relatives. This is a slight decrease compared with a year ago (> 700,000 IDPs during the post-electoral crisis), but internal displacements have increased again since May.

2.2 million people are projected in IPC Phase 3 to 5 over the period April to August 2022 (April 2022 IPC), which represents 45% of the total population analysed. This represents a slight decrease compared with the number of people in crisis or emergency reported in 2020 (2.4 million) and 2021 (2.3 million) but still a 15% increase over the 5-year average number of people in crisis or emergency. 23 sub-prefectures are classified as IPC Phase 4 Emergency, with 638,000 people nationwide classified as Phase 4 emergency with immediate "risk of mortality".

This year, the lean season is taking place in a particularly deteriorated economic context, due to the global impact of the Russian aggression in Ukraine. As a result of the global inflation on food and fuel prices, the authorities have restricted cereal exports, fuel shortages (and confiscation by the authorities) have happened and the cost of transporting foodstuffs has soared. Thus, supply flows to local markets are impacted internally by the security situation and externally by the international economic context. Consequently, market prices on basic foodstuffs in May 2022 show very worrying trends, with +68% for rice and +14% for corn compared to 2021. The increased cost of fertilisers will also affect further the resilience of the affected populations, through lower agricultural output in the next agricultural season.

### *Drivers*

The protracted crisis which started in CAR has structurally undermined productivity in the agricultural sector, because of the lack of investment in rural infrastructural and agricultural inputs. Logistical challenges leading to insufficient access (poor road/transport infrastructures) are also major obstacles to the production and commercialization/distribution of food.

Recurrent violence and resulting displacements continue to reduce the resilience and livelihood opportunities of the communities affected by these fluid conflict dynamics. These long-term drivers are now being exacerbated by the current shocks of the global impact of the crisis in Ukraine (inflation of food prices, fertilisers and fuel) and of the reduction or suspension in development aid, especially budget support, owing to the political situation in CAR (concerns over the regime's reliance for security on Russia's private military contractor Wagner).

The pressure on the national budget is reinforced by the rising cost of essential goods acquired on the international market and which are subsidized by the government (e.g. fuel) – the risks of State bankruptcy are real and discontent is growing within the population.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 17 million allocated under the HIP 2022, the smallest allocation for the CAR crisis since 2014.
- Actions mitigating food insecurity represent 24% (EUR 4 million) of the ECHO portfolio, followed by Education in Emergency (EIE 21%), Health (11%) and Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM 10%).

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- In CAR US/BHA is by far the largest humanitarian donor. In 2022, so far, BHA contributed to the HRP with USD 159 million (53% of the donor's allocations); the funding is predominantly allocated to the food security sector (USD 106 million), this includes a recent top-up of USD 35 million.
- The HRP for CAR (USD 461 million) is currently funded at 65%, the funding response to the food security sector for 2022 is currently reaching 93%.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Improve prioritization of assistance ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups, through EDF funding for emergency assistance in the food sector in CAR.
- Immediately support during the crop season to ensure a better agricultural production level and a rapid recovery.
- Support nexus initiatives, through joint financing and strong coordination including with the EU Delegation on the possible reprogramming of unspent budget support to redirect it to resilience and food security.

## **Chad**

### *Situation and evolution*

2.1 million people are expected in IPC Phase 3 in Chad during the 2022 lean season (June to August) which represents an increase of 18% compared to 2021, including 101,000 people in Phase 4 - Emergency. In the current lean season, the needs are particularly high in the Lake region (153,000 in IPC3+), in the Sahelian belt (844,000 people in IPC3+) and in the border areas with Cameroon. A total of 24 departments are projected to be in Phase 3 during the 2022 lean season.

National Malnutrition rates are above emergency thresholds with 2% severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and 10.9% global acute malnutrition (GAM). Health centres in the capital city are saturated because of the increased caseload compared to the projections for the year.

On 1 June 2022, the President of Chad declared a food and nutrition emergency through Decree 1520/PCMT/PMT, emphasising the dire consequences expected in case of no further resources are mobilised by the state and donors.

In the Sahel belt region, demand outweighs supply, and is focused on own consumption. Food supply comes mainly from the southern parts of the country, also in production deficit this year, which has a strong impact on price trends. The war in Ukraine affects basic food stuffs prices and generates a lack of access to agricultural inputs for the rural communities. This limits production capacities in 2022 and therefore the ability of vulnerable households to recover from this crisis. The pastoral situation is critical, with the late installation of pastures in addition to the poor rainy season in 2021 in addition to the unprecedented floods of 2022 rainy season, that affected almost 1 million people in 18 provinces over 23, destroyed 79.000 homes, 465.000 hectares of land 19.400 animals. Transhumant herders arriving in the Sahel will cause additional pressure on natural resources which may impact coexistence among the communities.

The situation in the Lake Chad region is characterised by a significant number of internally displaced people, with 381,289 people in total. Insecurity has not abated: 1,331 incidents have been reported from January to August 2022. 35.184 refugees from the Far North of Cameroon who came in late 2021 following intercommunity on the other side of the border are still in host communities in Ndjama and in camps around the capital.

Chad is one of the 6 pilot countries of the EU Triple Nexus approach. FAO and WFP already benefit from a EUR 44 million program (P2RSA) by DG INTPA in support of food security and nutrition (for example through the local production of fortified flours), social protection, as well as local governance and cohesion.

### *Drivers*

Persistent violence in Chad and in bordering countries continues to cause displacements. According to the latest DTM and UNHCR data, Chad registers some 573,762 refugees (Sudan, CAR, Cameroon, Nigeria), 381,289 IDPs, and 101,551 returnees.

The lack of rain in 2021 had significantly affected the agricultural and fodder production, aggravating the already critical food situation of the most vulnerable and the conflict-affected households. The most common coping strategies are the sale of livestock, the sale of productive and non-productive assets, and the migration of one or more household members.

The 2022 rainy season has started, with above-average rainfalls and resulting floods affecting 1 million people.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 39.8 million allocated in 2022, including among main sectors: health and nutrition (29%), food assistance (24%) and Rapid Response Mechanism (17%). 43% of the RRM is allocated to food assistance, bringing total food assistance to around EUR 11.6 million (31%).
- DG ECHO is also supporting the Food Security Cluster at national and Lac Province level.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- US/BHA is the other main donor to fund emergency food assistance and has recently approved a significant top-up of 25 million USD to WFP to address the consequences of the food crisis.
- WFP plans to cover 1.061 million people out of 2.1 million in food crisis but has so far announced a funding gap of 85% which is partially covered by the BHA top up.

## Needs and opportunities

- Continue to improve prioritization of assistance, ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups.
- Take advantage of the EDF decommitted funds, which, will lead to additional funding in the food security sector. See if/how these additional resources can feed into the nexus approach in the Sahelian belt.
- Also, as part of the nexus approach, advocate for immediate support to crop production to ensure a better agricultural production level and a rapid recovery, in complementarity with emergency food assistance.

## Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

### Situation and evolution

A staggering 27 million people in the **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)** are estimated to be highly food insecure. This includes six million people at emergency level (IPC 4), primarily in four territories: Djugu (Ituri province), Irumu (North Kivu), Kamonia (Kwilu) and Gungu (Kasai). Agricultural productivity is low in the DRC. Structural poverty and under-development, poor infrastructure and poor governance that limit agricultural and economic activities in rural areas, livestock and agricultural pests, forced displacement due to conflict, weather conditions and climate change, as well as recurrent epidemics, contribute to the alarming food insecurity. In addition, the lack of appropriate and accessible/affordable health care, access to clean water, availability of sanitary infrastructure, knowledge as well as insufficient nutritional support mechanisms contribute to the fact that an estimated 2.5 million children under five years of age suffer from global acute malnutrition.

According to the last market price update from May 2022, the median cost of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) for all assessed territories remained relatively stable compared to April (+0.2%), with the exception of North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, where the median MEB was slightly higher. However, one in two traders reported challenges with restocking (REACH ICSM May 2022).

The DRC relies heavily on imported food (around 23% of cereals are imported) and refined petroleum, exposing the country to the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine (Hunger Hotspots report) and poor conditions of rural agricultural feeder roads.

### Drivers

**Conflict and violence:** Armed and inter-community conflicts affect mainly five of the 26 provinces of the DRC. 5.53 million people are internally displaced (IDP) and over 96 percent of displacement is conflict driven. Insecurity does not allow farmers to till their land, access markets, etc. IDPs depend on host populations and humanitarian aid, including food assistance.

**Poverty and under-development:** The DRC is severely under-developed, with all related consequences, including the absence or poor conditions of roads, which keeps many rural communities isolated, limiting their access to markets and essential social services. The DRC's human capital index stands at 0.37 – meaning a Congolese child born today can only hope to achieve 37 percent of its potential. The rate of stunting in the DRC is one of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, and malnutrition is the underlying cause of almost half of the deaths of children under five.

Three quarters of the Congolese population – 60 million people – live on less than USD 1.90 a day, according to the World Bank. Seven out of ten Congolese live in rural areas,

mostly subsistence farmers in conditions of precariousness and poverty. Increases in food prices have further reduced the purchasing power of the Congolese population.

**Climate change:** The DRC is prone to numerous natural disasters, including volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, flooding, landslides, and drought, as well as epidemics, which have become more frequent in recent years. The Congo River Basin is expected to be heavily affected by climate change, with rising temperatures and extreme weather events, such as floods.

### Ongoing interventions

#### ECHO interventions

- Initial allocation of EUR 44 million in 2022, including one third on Food Security & Livelihoods (including Multipurpose Cash Transfers - MPCT, which accounts for the large majority) and 5.5 percent for nutrition. Current budget stands at EUR 54.4 million, partly delivered through DG ECHO funded rapid response projects/mechanism. ECHO Humanitarian Food Assistance focuses on newly emerging needs linked to conflict and recent displacements. The EUR 14.5 million allocated to FSL/MPCT represents 1.9 percent of the FSL needs for the DRC according to the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), and the EUR 2.5 million in nutrition less than one percent of the nutrition needs described in the HRP.


#### Other actors

- US funding stands at USD 426.3 million, representing 68.4 percent of all HRP funding so far in 2022).

### Needs and opportunities

The 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan for the DRC requires USD 1.88 billion. It was 33.1 percent funded on 29 August 2022, according to OCHA. WFP needs USD 111 million for its emergency response to cover the second semester in 2022.

There is a need to develop a clearer picture of nexus opportunities, and possible links with humanitarian interventions.



Source: Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update

## **Mali**

### *Situation and evolution*

The country faces an important deterioration of its Food security situation in 2022 with a 41% increase of food insecure people (IPC/CH3+) during the lean season in comparison to 2021 (an 84% increase in comparison to the last 5-year average). More than 1.8 million people are food insecure, including 157,000 in pre-famine situation (IPC 4).

According to the WFP Hunger Map (August 2022), 63% of Malians (12 million people) have insufficient food consumption, which represents an increase of more than 2 million people in the last 3 months; and 32% (6.3 million people) have adopted crisis feeding strategies. 3.4 million people need humanitarian nutrition assistance, of which 309,000 severe acute malnourished children need immediate live-saving assistance. As of July 2022, weak grain stocks are reported, and the price of basic traditional food such as millet, sorghum, maize, rice increased respectively in average by +69%, +59%, +57.3%, +9.6% to +11.1% in comparison to last year same period. The increase in the value of the Minimum Expenditure Basket varies from +17% (national average) to +33% (insecure and conflict areas). Increased cost of fuel (+ 24% in August since January) impacts food prices and cost of assistance.

The crisis is critically underfunded (only 27% of Mali HRP was funded as of August 2022), with critical gaps in food security and nutrition sectors. WFP announces a 64% pipeline gap for all kind of Emergency Food Assistance as of September 2022 until January 2023. At the end of June 2022, only 1.4 million people were assisted (50% of caseload) with a 77% gap in livelihood support.

### *Drivers*

Worsening conflict, violence against civilians, and extension of conflicts affected areas are the main drivers of food insecurity: limited access to market for population and providers, high and increasing insecurity and irregular controls on the main commercial roads, destruction of land, crops and livelihood by armed actors, restriction of access to land, etc. The crisis is aggravated in 2022 by a historic deficit in agro-pastoral production (-15% and -10% compared to the 2020 campaign and the last five years) at the national and sub-regional level.

The rise of national, sub-regional and international food prices (cf. FAO Index) since the end of 2021 has a significant impact. ECOWAS sanctions on Mali (linked to the political situation) from January to June 2022 and increased insecurity added additional layers to price inflation, in a situation in which EU and EU MS development cooperation is mostly suspended. General inflation 2022 is estimated at 7% by the World Bank.

The country is dependent on imports (14% for cereals, 25% for fuel) and therefore affected by the Russian war in Ukraine. In 2019, wheat imports from the two countries accounted for 40% of total wheat imports (accounting for 60% of all cereal imports). Mali also imports around a quarter of its fertiliser from Russia and Belarus. The lack of fertiliser, or delay in provision this year, could have an impact on production and economic/ food insecurity situation in 2023.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 40.4 million allocated in 2022 (including contribution from Italy and IFRC Programmatic Partnership).


- Rapid multisectoral Response (44%) (including food assistance, shelter, wash and NFI); health/nutrition (28%); food assistance (12%); protection (5%); and education (6%). DG ECHO provides aid through cash (increasing) and in-kind deliveries.

### Other actors' main interventions

- EU delegation: EUR 62.5 million including PDU programs in rural areas in 2022.
- USAID/BHA: USD 75 million including 15-32 million top up for food assistance in 2022.
- GBP 33 million for 35 months from the FCDO/UK Sahel Regional Fund (starting in 2023).

### Needs and opportunities

- Additional short and long-term financial support and scaling up of the response is required for more efficient emergency and post-emergency assistance: functionality of basic services, livelihood and productive support, infrastructure, durable solutions for long-term Internally Displaced Persons, etc.
- Continue to play a leading role in coordination and advocacy for the respect of IHL, principled aid delivery and increased assistance to Mali, and advocate with other services and donors for increased engagement in Mali.
- Opportunities for nexus are limited due to the political crisis and security environment, with the almost total suspension of development cooperation by EU and EU MS.



Variation in cereal prices in West Africa in June 2022 compared to the five-year average  
Nutrition: voir rapport CO/Juillet 2022

## Mauritania

### Situation and evolution

In Mauritania more than 20% of the population is facing food crisis or worse, approx. 879 000 people). In March 2022, an increase of 82% of food insecure IPC/CH3+ people was expected during the lean season versus 2021, or +74% as compared to 5 year average, with an increase of 285% of people in CH4 (83,000 people). These projections were made before the Russian aggression against Ukraine, with Mauritania being highly reliant on food

imports. Malnutrition is concerning but prevalence has remained stable for decades. In spite of good forecasts for the agropastoral campaign and the State's willingness to encourage a "return" to farming, other factors such as floods occurring since end of July and high prices of food, fertilizers and energy have tempered these positive trends.

Food prices continue to increase since 2021 harvests. In June, price increases were reported as follows: +73% on oil, + 50% for local beans, +60% for sorghum, +40% for sugar, +35% for wheat versus 2021. The government was not able to sustain fuel and gas subsidies, which led to fuel price increase (so far stable for more than a decade) and associated social tensions.

The response to the food crisis is expected to cover almost 80% of the people in need. Assistance is delivered by the Government (62%), WFP (33%), NGOs (5%). The food basket could not be revised upwards to take into account significant price increases, due to lack of funding. Coverage and duration of the assistance (4-month support) were prioritized over the level of assistance (about 36% of the food basket). The food situation of the Malian refugees (about 90,000 people, mainly children) is also continuing to deteriorate despite assistance from WFP and partly from the government.

### *Drivers*

The persistence of a high level of poverty and extreme poverty in rural areas is the key driver.

The limited access to food is aggravated by several factors, poor agropastoral results in 2021, high dependency on food imports, high food and input prices, and extreme weather events such as droughts and floods.

Mauritania has a 70% dependency on food imports (nearly 10% of its GDP) with 50% of its imported wheat coming from Russia and Ukraine.

Mauritania is currently exposed to a high risk of debt distress and therefore has limited fiscal space to manage this situation effectively.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 8.6 million in 2022: Food assistance (40%), health and nutrition (24%), disaster preparedness (18%), education (15%), logistic support (3%). DG ECHO provides food assistance mainly through cash (100% of food ration through cash and local enriched flour in kind).
- EU is a leading actor on diplomacy and coordinated humanitarian advocacy.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- EU Delegation rural development program (Rimrap, Rimdir, Rimfil: EUR 46 million) in the closing phase – Top up of 12 million considered with EDF leftover funds.
- USAID/BHA: USD 9 million, including USD 5 million top up for food assistance in 2022 June –July.
- World Bank: National social safety nets extension including Malian refugees of Mberra.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Sustain coverage of the food needs and ensure better mechanisms to avoid exclusion of the most vulnerable, including refugees.

- Increase long-term financial support and investment to improve food security sustainably.
- Increase in the State budget for the agro-pastoral sector in accordance with the Maputo commitments<sup>6</sup>, while guaranteeing better effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure.
- Continue to ensure a leading role in coordination and advocacy for an increased interest in Mauritania (“forgotten” Sahelian country in west Africa).

## Niger

### *Situation and evolution*

The 2022 March IPC analysis (based on data from before the Russian aggression against Ukraine) shows an increase of 91% of food insecure people in IPC/CH3+ expected in the lean season 2022 versus 2021 and 166% more than the last 5-year average, reaching 4.4 million people, with an increase of 95% of people in IPC phase 4 (425,805 people) – or 411% if calculated on the last three years. This is the highest caseload since the IPC analyses of 2015. From January to June 2022, 190,913 children under five suffering from severe acute malnutrition were admitted for treatment (i.e., 39% of the annual target of 491,822 SAM).

Mid-August, the price of the main products consumed, i.e. millet, sorghum, maize and rice, changed on average by +8, -3, -4 and +3% respectively, compared to 2021, and by +13, 6, 14 and 9% respectively, compared to the last 5 years. The prices of basic goods continue to increase, in particular milk and flour. The Minimum Food Expenditure Basket (Food MEB) cost was revised at the end of November 2021 with an increase of 22%.

There has been a significant pre-lean state response in 2022 and significant progress in the mobilization of actors and the government for the 2022 emergency food response: at the end of July, planned food assistance should cover 97 % of the caseload (1.5 million people by the government, 2.2 million by WFP, 0.3 million by NGO's and 86,000 by ICRC). 1.4 million people will also be assisted by moderating the price of cereals. The WFP announced a USD 23.5 million net funding requirement for the period from August 2022 to January 2023.

### *Drivers*

The main direct and indirect drivers of the food and nutritional crisis are the consequences of the intensification of conflict in neighboring countries Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria). In particular, there is a substantial deterioration of security and humanitarian access in the Tillabery area, and security concerns in Tahoua, NW Nigeria and Maradi. The crisis is aggravated by a historic deficit of agro-pastoral production which occurred in 2021 (-36% compared to the 2020 campaign and the average of the last five years) at the national and sub-regional level as well as by the rise of national, sub-regional and international food prices (cf. FAO Index) since 2021. The increase of price of diesel fuel (+24%, at the beginning of August) and its shortages are additional negative factors.

<sup>6</sup> Programme détaillé pour le développement de l'agriculture africaine (PDDAA), launched in 2003 in Maputo by Heads of State and Government under the auspices of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- Close to EUR 42 million have been released to support a multisectoral humanitarian response notably by rapid response mechanisms. Food assistance (45%), rapid multisectoral response to IDP's (21%) and health (8%) are the most important sectors. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash (increasing) and in-kind deliveries.
- EU is a leading actor in diplomacy and humanitarian advocacy coordination. On 6 April 2022, DG ECHO co-hosted (with GNAFC, OECD, Club du Sahel) a high-level Panel during the Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) bi-annual meeting, where the food insecurity crisis, related drivers and insufficient funding of the response were highlighted. EUR 2.5 billion (including funds already planned and development funding) have been mobilized for the sub-region targeting households in food crisis.

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- EU delegation: FPI, Programme de Developpement d'Urgence (resilience) in rural areas.
- USAID/BHA: USD 25 million top up for food assistance in 2022 June –July.
- Ongoing reallocation of resources from the World Bank and USD 5.3 million from the African Development Bank.
- GBP 33 million for 35 months from the FCDO/UK Sahel Regional Fund (starting in 2023).

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Need for more efficient and scaled-up response to essential basic needs and prioritization of assistance to vulnerable households.
- Additional short and long-term financial support is required as well as more efficient emergency and post-emergency assistance of food assistance but also of livelihood, of productive sectors and infrastructure in rural areas.
- Increase the funding efforts and advocacy of the EU and other partners.
- Accelerate the concrete operationalization of the Nexus and its monitoring and evaluation, for IDPs.

## **Nigeria**

### *Situation and evolution*

19.5 million people are projected in CH Phase 3 to 5 during the 2022 lean season, up by 52% from 2021. Severe food needs remain very high in the overall country, especially in the Northeast (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States - BAY) and in the North-West, where acute food needs have significantly increased over the years along with acute malnutrition. According to the available information, almost 40% of households in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe have inadequate food consumption during the current lean season. Only 33% of cultivating households have some food stocks remaining and only 16% have stocks that will last longer than a month. The ongoing local policy to close all IDP camps in and around Maiduguri (7 camps closed out of the existing 9) only reduces access to those in need.

The Humanitarian Situation Monitoring of June 2022 in BAY States shows concerning food consumption deficits and limited diversity of diets in the inaccessible areas surveyed. Almost half of the households struggle to have sufficient food intake and nearly 68% experienced a crisis or higher levels (IPC Phase 3+) of food deprivation and hunger. 39% of the households relied on crisis coping strategies to meet their food needs, which heightens economic vulnerability. The levels of acute malnutrition among new arrivals from the inaccessible areas are serious (Phase 4 IPC Acute Malnutrition Classification) with the overall Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate at 16.9% and Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) at 6.3%. The high levels of acute malnutrition indicate an extremely stressed population in relation to food insecurity. Overall, both crude and under five mortality rates (CMR and U5MR) were above the emergency thresholds.

In the Northeast of Nigeria, the returnee population includes more than 1.8 million IDP returnees and 323,277 returnees from abroad (former refugees).

### *Drivers*

- Insecurity linked to ongoing conflict between non-State armed groups (NSAG) and government security forces (Northeast), banditry (North West) and intercommunal clashes remain the key drivers of food insecurity. Farmers struggle to access their lands and cultivate their fields, while herders cannot move their livestock freely. Many local government areas remain completely or partially inaccessible for humanitarian assistance. Climate change is another root cause, which reduces the resilience of community and fuels intercommunity violence on the use of natural resources. The elevated levels of consumption gaps, malnutrition, mortality, and unsustainable use of emergency coping strategies (people spend their savings, borrow money and sell their assets/goods. Emergency coping strategies are begging or selling land or a house. Crisis strategies is translated in withdrawing children from school and selling productive assets or means of transport), are largely driven by the limited availability of food stocks, restricted access to functional markets and poor water, health and sanitation services, which might heighten morbidity risk, and impact more negatively on households' ability to engage in labour for food or resource gathering. The war against Ukraine has worsened the situation with skyrocketing prices affecting basic food commodities but also agricultural inputs, which affects the production capacities of farmers.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- 2022 budget: EUR 49.5 million, focused on the Northeast crisis.
- Sectors: Food assistance (23%), health and nutrition (16%), protection (16%) and WASH/Shelter (16%) are priority sectors. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash, vouchers and in-kind deliveries.
- Advocacy: EU/ECHO is a leading voice in humanitarian advocacy in the Northeast.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- BHA, and to some extent FCDO, focusing on emergency food assistance programming.
- BHA has recently validated a significant top-up of USD 38 million to WFP to address the consequences of the food crisis, bringing their total budget to WFP to USD 338 million.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Improve prioritization of assistance and vulnerability assessment, ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups, including through the decommitted EDF funds for food emergency assistance.
- Assist secondly forcibly displaced people from the Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) and Jere camp closure.
- Leverage funding to assist all vulnerable IDPs in the garrison towns' camps who do not have access to long-term sustainable livelihood opportunities.
- Where feasible, immediately support agriculture in this the crop season to ensure better agricultural production.

## 2.2. East and Southern Africa

### *Ethiopia*

#### *Situation and evolution*

The severity of food insecurity in Ethiopia is among the worst globally due to the impacts of ongoing conflict and violence, and climatic shocks such as the prolonged drought. The HRP 2022 indicates that 20 million people are in need of food assistance.

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely be widespread in multiple areas of the country. Tigray is expected to remain the area of highest concern until the start of the harvest in October 2022. The latest WFP Food Security Assessment in Tigray in June 2022 found 89% of households as food insecure and 47% as severely food insecure (of a population of 6 million). The situation could rapidly worsen since, as of the time of writing (29 August), renewed fighting took place between the warring parties. This could possibly signify a return to large-scale military conflict.

The revised updated Horn of Africa Drought Regional Overview (24 August 2022) indicated that nearly 10 million people are in need of food assistance in the drought affected areas. To date, more than 3.5 million livestock have died, while at least 25 million are at risk and are very weak and emaciated with no or little milk production, the main source of nutrition for children. Most recent forecasts project that the October to December season will also be below average, setting the stage for an unprecedented fifth failed rainy season.

Increase in malnutrition is reported from across the country. People in need of nutrition support are estimated to be 7.5 million (both Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) and Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) U5 and Pregnant Lactating Women (PLW)). There is a widespread shortage of F-75 in the country and irregular availability of SC+ and MAM commodities affecting the nutritional treatment.

Scaled-up and sustained food assistance, as well as unfettered humanitarian access, is needed immediately to save lives.

#### *Drivers*

Conflict in the northern part of the country that affects three regional states directly (Tigray, Afar and Amhara). In addition, several other parts of the country are impacted by localised conflicts that further worsen the food and nutrition security of the affected populations.

Drought in the East, South and South-Eastern part of the country, currently affecting Afar, Somali Regional State, Southern Oromia and Southern SNNPR.

The crisis in Ukraine and macro-economic situation have affected the food import and market prices. In June 2022, inflation across the country reached the highest rate in Eastern Africa (34 percent). Only during the first half of 2022 food prices increased by 26% and the cost of the food basket by 33% (65.2% in one year). Despite price control measures, petrol prices showed a marked increase compared with pre-war levels (up 16%). Between June 2022 and June 2021, Ethiopia recorded one of the highest year-on-year depreciations of local currency, down by 194 percent, against the USD.

Limited access, due to insecurity as well as major bureaucratic impediments, is limiting the capacity of humanitarian agencies to deliver, particularly in Tigray.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 58 million allocated in 2022 (plus 8 million under the upcoming EDF decommitted funds).
- Food assistance (12%), WASH (7%), Health (13%), Nutrition (19%), S/NFIs (5%), protection (7%), DRR/DP (15%), Coordination (4%), logistic (7%) education (6%) and cash (6%).

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- The Ethiopian Humanitarian Country Team (EHCT) produced a dedicated drought response plan (USD 1.66 billion) to which contributions have been made, mainly by the US (over USD 400 million). Currently the plan is largely under-funded.
- The Ethiopia Safety net program has a crisis/shock response capacity besides its routine response covering over 8 million people.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Large scale crisis with limited response capacity. Scaling up of the response is urgently required.
- No comprehensive data collection and analysis. Need to produce more specific and tangible data and specific analyses to support targeted responses.
- Need to enhance support from development actors to build further resilience of affected communities.

## **Kenya**

### *Situation and evolution*

According to the findings of the long rain assessment (MAM season), 3.5 million people are food insecure in the Arid and Semi-Arid Land regions (ASAL), with Marsabit, Wajir, and Mandera counties facing IPC Phase 4 food security outcomes between March and June 2022. Significant deteriorations were also reported in Mandera and Wajir, moving them from IPC Phase 3 to Phase 4.

The drought-induced decline in crop production and the related reduced availability of cereals on markets has increased food prices. The fallout of Ukraine's war adds onto this, as increased production costs (fuel and inputs) are also contributing to the price spikes. Due to reduced availability, food inflation is exceeding annual inflation in Kenya, with food price increases almost double the annual inflation (13.8 vs. 7.9 percent). Over the last year the price of the local food basket has increased particularly for maize, flour and wheat/grains

(up to 123%), thus leading to a significant increase of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (up to 35% in Turkana County only).

Up to 70 percent of the cropland in the ASALs was affected by the severe drought. Cereal production prospects are therefore unfavourable, likely leading to a fourth consecutive poor harvest.

Estimates indicate that at least 2.4 million livestock have died in Kenya. Water availability for livestock is also at below-normal levels and is expected to deteriorate quicker than usual during the June to September dry season. For all livestock species combined across the six assessed Kenyan counties (Garissa, Kitui, Kwale, Laikipia, Marsabit and West Pokot), the Body Condition Score (BCS) in June 2022 was found to be poor.

### *Drivers*

Limited access to food is compounded by several factors:

- Climatic **shocks**: four consecutive poor rainy seasons have led to severe droughts.
- Cost and availability of fuel: high fuel prices are pushing up the inflation rate, including food inflation rates, leading to a significant increase in the overall cost of living.
- August political elections: the political campaigns have diverted the needed attention from the current drought.
- Localised population movements linked to resource-based tensions: local conflicts over resources (among the ASAL pastoral communities) as well as increased cross-border displacement induced by the drought (with reports of over 25,000 individuals newly arrived in Dadaab refugee camp alone).
- The worsening economic crisis: the effects of low incomes, the depreciation of the Kenyan shilling against the US dollar.
- The Russian invasion of Ukraine is contributing to the increase of food prices on local market, particularly for wheat, further highlighting the dependency on imported goods such as fertilizers, fuel, and wheat.

### *Ongoing interventions*

The drought appeal launched by OCHA in 2021 is 131.4% funded with the US being by far the largest contributor with 94.5% of the requirements met with their recent pledge.

#### **ECHO interventions**

- Total funding HIP 2022: EUR 16.4 million.
- Ratio/percentage of allocation for priority sectors: Food assistance (WFP EUR 4 million + Kenya Cash Consortium EUR 1.5 million for MPCA), health and nutrition (IRC EUR 2.4 million + UNICEF EUR 1 million).



#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- Funding from other main stakeholders such as USAID, FCDO, DE, etc: Germany USD 2,170,154 (Committed); Sweden USD 1,027,855 (committed); Norway USD 1,761,841 (paid). In August, the U.S. government committed USD 310.9 million in emergency assistance to tackle the consequences of the severe drought.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Funding gap: additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Improve prioritisation of assistance for the most vulnerable groups.

- Explore nexus possibilities with the EDF decommitted funds allocations (ECHO EUR 2.5 million for Kenya and Djibouti and INTPA EUR 10 million for food production).
- Advocate with other services and donors for increased engagement in Kenya.



Source: *Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update*

## Madagascar

### Situation and evolution

Around 1.68 million people out of the 5.25 million people of the Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est regions of Madagascar analysed are experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+) between April and August 2022. In the Grand Sud, although the situation remains fragile, it has improved compared to April 2021. However, 33% of the population in the Grand Sud is still highly food insecure (IPC Phase 3+), including 122,000 people in IPC Phase 4.

In the coming months, both for the first projection period (September to November 2022) and for the second projection (December 2022 to March 2023), a deterioration in the food security situation is expected. While seasonal price drops have been observed for most staple foods in recent months, prices remain higher than both last year and the 5-year average, demonstrating the rising cost of living for households. Rising gasoline prices are expected to contribute to continued increases in food prices, especially in the Grand Sud, where markets are dependent on imported and locally produced staples being transported long distances from surplus producing areas in other regions.

### Drivers

The food insecurity currently experienced in Madagascar is driven by several factors and notably: (i) Southern Madagascar continues to experience its worst drought in 40 years, leaving part of the population fighting for survival. More than 3 years of consecutive severe drought have wiped out harvests and hampered access to food in Grand Sud; (ii) Between

Mid-January and April 2022, six tropical cyclones and storms hit Madagascar. The 2021/2022 cyclonic season affected more than 960,000 people in the North and Southern part of the country. Floods affected about 60,000 hectares of rice fields, which resulted in a below-average harvest in May, undermining both farmers' livelihoods and food supply in country; (iii) the government's action in raising gasoline prices in July by 43%, while the price of diesel increased by 44%. Price shocks within the COVID-19 context and the Russian invasion of Ukraine combined with crop losses due to climatic phenomena have the potential to transform the creeping inflation rate into galloping inflation; and (iv) insecurity related to bandits in the Grand Sud restricts people's movement and affects livelihoods, amplifying food insecurity.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- In 2022, EU humanitarian assistance amounted to EUR 12.4 million to respond to the food insecurity and nutrition emergency needs. This includes EUR 1.9 million to respond to the 2021/2022 cyclonic season and EUR 4 million newly allocated to the humanitarian response to support the scale-up of food assistance delivery. In addition, EUR 1 million is being allocated to reinforce Early Warning Systems to drought in Grand Sud along a nexus approach with EU delegation.
- Priority sectors: Food Assistance (WFP EUR 6 million) (48%), Nutrition (UNICEF EUR 2 million, ACF EUR 1.5 million) (28%) and MPCT (WFP EUR 1 million) (8%).

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- The flash appeal launched on 18 January 2021 has been further extended until December 2022 with additional funding requirement of USD 158.6 million for the period May - December 2022, including USD 114.8 million for the Food Security sector. USA, Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and SIDA represent the main contributors in 2022.
- Total funding towards food insecurity in 2022: USD 67,177,021 including ECHO (some of the funding received in 2022 are not part of the latest flash appeal extension until December 2022).

### *Needs and opportunities*

- 10th/11th EDF decommitted funds allocation to DG ECHO provisionally earmarked EUR 4 million for food assistance in 2022 to vulnerable populations in the Grand Sud and South-East of Madagascar.
- 10th/11th EDF decommitted funds allocation to DG INTPA provisionally earmarked EUR 10 million for boosting agricultural production in Madagascar (expected duration: 7.5 years).
- The EU development cooperation programming for the next period includes structuring long-term activity in the Grand Sud. The EU's Development Programming in Madagascar (country-wide) amounts to EUR 325 million for the 2021-2024 period. The three priority areas are: 1) Governance and human development, 2) Sustainable growth and jobs and 3) Green Deal.

## Mozambique

### Situation and evolution

Between April and September 2022, 1.4 million people (10% of the population) are projected to face Crisis or worse conditions (IPC Phase 3+), including approximately 24,000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The large majority, 1.1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3+), including 23,500 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), are in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia. This is an 18% year-on-year increase. The rise in global food and non-food costs is resulting in higher living costs in Mozambique. In June, the year-on-year inflation rate increased to 10.81%, the highest value in over 4 years. Typically, food prices decreased between May and July, driven by increased market supply following the annual harvest, but high transportation costs and increased demand for non-wheat products (maize, cassava, sweet potato) are keeping food prices high. In June, fuel prices increased an additional 4-19%, following previous price increases in March and May. With the deepening of the Ukraine crisis, there are concerns about the impact on local prices and availability as the region is a net importer of wheat and edible oil, energy, and fertilizers.

### Drivers

The main drivers of food insecurity in the current period include: (i) the armed conflict in Cabo Delgado province which - according to IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of 30 June 2022 has displaced 946,508 people; (ii) shortage of rainfall or irregular rains in parts of Nampula, Tete, Manica, Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo provinces; (iii) increasing food prices; (iv) impact of COVID-19 restrictive measures. Moreover, at the beginning of 2022, the northern provinces were hit by two severe extreme weather events which left more than 700,000 people in need of food and shelter. The southern regions on the other hand, were adversely affected by a lack of rainfall during the same period, which resulted in moderately drier than average conditions. Throughout February and until mid-March severe drought conditions developed in the south of the country.

Mozambique depends on import for 90% of its wheat and sunflower seed oil needs; the country imports more than a third (39%) of its wheat from Russia (31%) and Ukraine (8%) combined. Mozambique currently imports almost 20% of fertilizers from Russia. Elevated global fertilizer prices are concerning as reduced availability/accessibility will result in lower food production in Mozambique, which in turn would result in higher food import needs at a time when global food prices are rising steeply.

### Ongoing interventions

#### ECHO interventions

- EUR 20 million allocated to Mozambique in 2022 (HIP22: EUR 14 million; SEAR: 5 million; Alert: EUR 1 million).
- Food Assistance (20%), Nutrition (5%) and Multi-Purpose Cash Transfers (6.7%). DG ECHO provides aid mainly through in-kind and cash deliveries.
- EU NutriNorte (AAP 22) allocates EUR 30 million on Nutrition for a duration of 5 years (2022-2027) targeting the provinces of Zambezia, Nampula and Cabo Delgado.

#### Other actors' main interventions

- On 20 July 2022, USAID pledged USD 116 million in additional assistance to respond to needs, including severe food insecurity, in Mozambique. This funding brings US humanitarian assistance to Mozambique to USD 167 million in Fiscal Year 2022.
- OCHA HRP 2022 in Northern Mozambique (Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa):

- a total of 1.01 million - 104% of 970,000 people targeted - have been reached with humanitarian food and livelihoods assistance. This represents 92% of total people in need (1.1 million).
- a total of 84,000k – 41% of 203,000 people targeted – have been reached with nutrition intervention. This is 26% of total people in need (327,000).
- Needs and opportunities 10th/11th EDF decommitted funds allocation to DG-ECHO. Provisionally, EUR 8 million earmarked for Food Assistance in 2022 to vulnerable populations in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique.
- 10th/11th EDF decommitted funds INTPA allocation provisionally earmarked EUR 15 million for expansion of ongoing agricultural programme in Nampula to Zambezia, Tete, Manica, Sofala and Gaza. Duration: 7.5 years.

## **Somalia**

### *Situation and evolution*

Extreme drought has put 17 districts at Risk of Famine, with an official declaration of famine in the Baidoa and Burhakaba districts (Bay Region) on 5 September (famine projected in October unless action is undertaken). 7.1 million people are acutely food insecure and 213,000 people are experiencing catastrophic food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 5). Over 1 million people have been displaced by extreme drought affecting 90% of the country. Malnutrition and disease outbreaks have spiked though responses have mitigated the situation. Compared to the same period in 2021, admissions of severe wasting cases have increased 48%.

Annual inflation rose to 7% in June 2022, the highest since 2005. Compared to the 5-year average, the food MEB cost has increased dramatically in all regions, e.g. Bay, Lower Shabelle and Middle Juba with increases of 112%, 60%, and 56% respectively, it has become the most expensive food basket in Eastern Africa. In Mogadishu, diesel prices have increased by 86% compared to the same period last year and 53% since January. Livestock prices have decreased by 25% to 33% per head due to increased supply of animals with poor body conditions. This is negatively impacting the terms of trade and drastically reducing the amount of food households can purchase in exchange for their livestock. Food imports have decreased significantly - in May by 71% compared to the previous month and 75% compared to last year. In comparison with the 5-year average, food imports decreased by 53% (due to lower purchasing power of households affected by micro- and macroeconomic conditions, regional competition for substitute items, and the inability of Somali households to keep pace with global price spikes).

Cross border trade between Somalia and Ethiopia at Feerfeer border point halted in July due to armed confrontations between Ethiopian forces and Al Shabaab and US airstrikes.

### *Drivers*

The March to June rainy season was extremely poor, with rainfall amongst the lowest in 70 years, a fourth consecutive failed season. Staple food prices have more than doubled or tripled. Groundwater levels are decreasing at alarming rates from over-pumping. Water trucking for domestic and animal use has intensified. The Juba and Shabelle River have little water for crop irrigation. Forecasts indicate a below-average upcoming rainy season. Drought conditions are expected to deteriorate in the coming months, which is the primary driver of new displacement. This will affect availability and prices of food. Armed conflict also forces people to displace, disrupts supply chains, and results in elevated costs in areas with limited road or air-only access.

The war in Ukraine is compounding these shocks. Exceptionally high fuel prices are pushing up inflation, leading to an increase in the overall cost of living. Higher transportation costs are also reflected in price of food paid by consumers.



### Ongoing interventions

ECHO has allocated EUR 80 million since December 2021 to the drought response, EUR 61.5 million in 2022, and launched a Humanitarian Air Bridge to deliver emergency supplies to hard-to-reach areas. An estimated 50 to 70 flights will transport 650 metric tonnes of life-saving nutrition and health commodities to underserved and hard-to-reach locations.

The UN Emergency Relief Coordinator has announced a System-Wide Scale-Up of the response. The Humanitarian Response Plan is currently 72.6% funded with the main donors USAID USD 840 million; EU EUR 52.7 million; EU Member States EUR 46.9 million (Germany 15.7 million; Sweden 14.3 million; Netherlands 9.7 million; Denmark 6 million; Ireland 5.8 million; Finland 0.9 million; Italy 0.5 million); and the UK USD 36.6 million. Much of this assistance is yet to be allocated or dispersed and critical response gaps remain.

### Needs and opportunities

- Despite recent announcements, the crisis is underfunded with critical response gaps.
- Improved prioritization of assistance ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups is required to ensure what is available is used effectively and efficiently.
- Support the System-Wide Scale-Up to operationalise plans and deliver at scale.
- Advocate with other services and donors for increased engagement on Somalia through additional funding or reorientation of existing ones.



Source: Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update

## South Sudan

### *Situation and evolution*

About 7.74 million (63%) South Sudanese are acutely food-insecure (IPC 3+). Of these, 87 000 are experiencing catastrophic food insecurity conditions (IPC 5) in Jonglei, Lakes and Unity. About 1.34 million children under five years old are malnourished, representing an increase of 18% compared to 2021 (Nutrition SMART Surveys).

Protracted and localised conflict and insecurity significantly disrupted farming, livestock, and trade activities in multiple areas across the country. This has eroded household capacity to access food and income. In addition, persistent flooding, combined with pockets of drought, is likely to reduce production in the subsistence farming during the upcoming harvest season. The overall cereal production deficit in 2022 is estimated at around 541,000 tonnes, representing 40% of South Sudan's cereal needs, an increase by 16% of the 2021 deficit and the five-year average (2017 – 2021). Persistent macroeconomic shocks leading to hyperinflation have led to market price volatility. Impacts of both COVID-19 and war in Ukraine make the situation worse. Between mid-2021 and mid-2022, the fuel prices in the country increased by 43% (UNHAS).

Floods in June-October (main rain season), increase the risk of water-borne diseases and deteriorate the WASH conditions. With the lean season, it leads to a trend of rising malnutrition.

### *Drivers*

- Recurring flooding and subnational violence, including intercommunal conflicts, cattle raiding, and proxy-war instigated by Juba-based political leaders trigger population displacement, livelihoods' destruction, trading reduction and roads and supply chains' cuts.
- The country is heavily reliant on food and non-food commodity imports from Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda. Any increase in production and transport costs from these countries and elsewhere will be passed on to the South Sudanese consumer, whose purchasing power is already compromised.
- Regional tensions (Ethiopia and Sudan) have led to (temporary) closures of supply roads and/or borders, reducing the trading and impoverishing market supplies and the WFP's supplies too. The dependency on international supplies also makes the country more sensitive to macro-economic shocks for food commodities, fertilizers and other agricultural inputs.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- As of August 2022, the ECHO SSD HIP is worth EUR 73.7 million. The funding is divided between food and nutrition (32%), health (17%), protection (9%), WASH (8%), Cash/Multi-Purpose Cash Transfers (5%), Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) (5%), EiE (4%) and coordination/logistics (18%). Programmatic Partnerships: UNICEF is contracted for nutrition (EUR 5 million); IFRC for disaster preparedness (EUR 2 million) including MPCT; & Concern for nutrition and health (EUR 2 million).
- ECHO finances emergency food assistance in IPC 4 and 5 areas. Agricultural production and road feeders' rehabilitation are also funded in a nexus approach.

### *Humanitarian funding gap*

- The 2022 HRP is only **32% funded** as of August 2022.
- Late and low funding (-20% compared to 2021), led to cutting 1.7 million beneficiaries from General Food Distribution (GFD). IPC 2, 3 and partly 4 areas were not covered since May 2022. However, WFP is changing its plan to cover again a total of 6.1 million people in country.
- Food, Security and Livelihoods (FSL) cluster is also only 32% funded (USD 441 million gap out of USD 650 million required).

### **Other actor's main interventions**

- Key donors (BHA/USAID, FCDO) dedicate large part of their funding to food assistance and nutrition, being the most critical lifesaving sectors with health in country.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- The South Sudan crisis is underfunded, with deteriorating food security and nutrition situation.
- Pursue coordination efforts with WFP / FSL actors to increase cash modality wherever feasible and reinforce coordination with development donors to scale up long-term investments on agriculture, basic services and infrastructures.
- Monitor malnutrition closely.
- Activate collective diplomatic advocacy towards the Government of South Sudan to enforce law and reduce violence.

## **Uganda**

### *Situation and evolution*

According to the IPC data released at the end of May 2022 for Karamoja, 518,000 people are in urgent need of food assistance: 428,000 individuals in IPC3 and almost 90,000 in IPC4. In addition, 91,600 children under five and 9,500 pregnant women will be acutely malnourished and in need of treatment for the period February 2022-January 2023. In refugee settlements, out of the 1.5 million refugees and asylum seekers, 1.4 million rely on continuous food assistance. The poor production season this year and recurrent natural disasters have resulted in casualties and damage and loss of human and animal lives, property damage, destruction of crops and infrastructural developments. In June 2022, the average monthly **price** of the local food basket has increased by 31% in one year. Compared to May 2021, prices in May 2022 changed for beans (4% higher), vegetable oil (49% higher), and maize (79% higher). The price of salt is 11% lower. Compared to January 2022, prices in May 2022 changed for beans (40% higher), vegetable oil (22% higher), and maize (50% higher). The price of salt has remained stable. UNHCR's requirement for 2022 is USD 343.4 million and as of 5 July 2022 is only 22% funded (USD 76.6 million). The Country Refugee Response Plan Emergency Appeal for April-June 2022 of USD 48 million is only 7% funded with USD 7.28 million received. Due to critical underfunding, WFP has since November 2021 implemented a food ration cut: groups of refugee settlements receive 70%, 60% or 40% of food rations.

## Drivers

**Conflict:** regular influx of refugees from South Sudan and DRC. In Karamoja, localised conflict & insecurity.

**Climate shocks and hazards:** poor rainfall performance, occasional water logging & flash floods.

**Acute Malnutrition:** inadequate food and water access, poor dietary diversity, structural poverty, low value livelihood options, as well as poor hygiene and sanitation. Low, though increasing access to improved sanitation facilities. Very poor levels of food consumption among children 6-23 months, with only 4% of the children consuming a minimum acceptable diet.

**Economic factors:** the economic impacts of COVID-19 restrictions continue to limit household income sources. The annual inflation rate accelerated to 7.9% in July of 2022, the highest since December 2015. The monthly variation rate of the Consumer Price Index has been 1%, the accumulated inflation in 2022 is 6.4%. Due to the war in Ukraine, the prices of the key commodities in general food baskets increased by USD 14.1 million (+46%) with the highest increase for vegetable oil (+179.2%) and maize (+38%).

## Ongoing interventions

### ECHO interventions

- As of August, the total HIP 2022 for Uganda is EUR 34 million: food assistance (18%); protection (30%); EiE (21%); Health (9%); MPCT (12%); coordination (1%) DP (10%). In addition, for Disaster Preparedness, 2 DREF operations (total EUR 250,000) and Programmatic Partnership with IFRC for EUR 2.6 million.

### Other actors' main interventions

- Kagera Water Pipeline including Isingiro Refugee Hosting District (RHD). Discussions are ongoing with the EU delegation to access funding from the Flexible Mechanism to support the response in Southwest. US announced an additional support of USD 82 million: USD 21 million for USAID and USD 61 million for the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) (USD 41 million for UNHCR, USD 20 million to other programs)

## Needs and opportunities

USD 197 million are required for July 2022 to June 2023, with a current shortfall of USD 63 million over the next six months. This shortfall calls for extending the donor base, operationalising the needs-based approach and looking for more sustainable and resilient solutions in a context of a protracted crisis.

## Zimbabwe

### Situation and evolution

Zimbabwe was added to the FAO/WFP list of Hunger Hotspots in June 2022 due to an erratic rainfall season and consequent drop in expected crop production (which declined by 43% nationally and by nearly 50% for communal farmers as compared to last year). This is compounded by the effects of persistently high inflation (it has jumped from 132% to 191% between May and June), while the local currency (ZWL) has been depreciating against the USD and the gap between the official and informal market rates continues to widen. An estimated 2.9 million people in rural areas were food insecure during the January to March

2022 lean season according to the Rural Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) 2022. As per ZimVAC findings, there is a concerning increase in global wasting in 38 high priority districts. There is also concern over the low rates of exclusive breastfeeding, low dietary diversity, and high rates of micronutrient deficiencies in women, adolescents, and children. As Zimbabwe heads for 2023 presidential elections, access to reliable food security data is challenging. No IPC has been conducted yet in country, but discussions are on-going to hold such an exercise second half of 2022 (tbc). A continuation of the Russian aggression against Ukraine could further exacerbate supply disruptions and food price, fertilizers and fuel increases.

### *Drivers*

The Zimbabwe current food crisis is driven by (i) the significantly below average 2021/22 crop production; (ii) a protracted economic crisis, characterized by high inflation rates that have sharply eroded households' purchasing powers; (iii) spiking parallel market foreign currency exchange rates, that is the prime driver of rapidly increasing inflation. Maize meal and bread prices in ZWL increased by approximately 50% and 30%, respectively, between March and April 2022. In June, food inflation had seen a month-on-month increase of 31.7% and an increase of 226.2% since June 2021, contributing significantly to overall price increases on the market; (iv) Prices are anticipated to come under further upward pressure given the increasing international prices. For example, fuel prices have risen 26 percent between March 2021 and 2022. Zimbabwe is 60 and 30 percent import-dependent on wheat and sunflower oil, respectively. Further price increases of agricultural inputs (i.e. fuel and fertilizers) would diminish households' ability to purchase these goods for the next cropping season, starting from September 2022. Selected basic commodities disappeared mostly in formal markets and there are fears of shortages for some commodities as the macro-economic situation deteriorates. As of July, and earlier than usual, poor households are expected to cope by employing consumption coping strategies and by either intensifying existing livelihood strategies or extending to other measures or activities such as petty trading, informal mining, and barter. As most poorer households typically earn income in ZWL and have limited access to USD, heavy pricing in USD and high ZWL price volatility is reducing purchasing power and access to food. Due to these liquidity challenges, households in rural areas are slowly resorting to bartering using grains and livestock to access certain goods or services.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**


- Current DG ECHO funded interventions in Zimbabwe - excluding regional actions – amount to EUR 2 million for 2022.
- Total allocation supports actions in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) /Disaster Preparedness (DP) (IOM EUR 0.5 million and CARE 1.5 million).

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- The African Development Fund has approved a grant of around USD 25.65 million to help enhance domestic food production and supply by distributing certified seeds and fertilizer.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- 10th/11th EDF decommitted funds allocation to DG ECHO. Provisionally, EUR 4 million has been earmarked for food assistance (through cash in urban settings) in 2022 for Zimbabwe.
- Support with actions that help secure alternative sources of cereal produce like wheat to replace 55% disrupted due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.



Source: *Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update*

## Sudan

### Situation and evolution

Almost a quarter of Sudan's population, a record 11.7 million people, are estimated to be facing acute food insecurity from June to September. With 3.1 million people in IPC 4, Sudan is one of the countries with the highest number of people in this Emergency level of food insecurity.

Close to 63,652 newly displaced people were recorded in June and July across Sudan as a result of localised conflicts, bringing the total newly displaced for Sudan in 2022 to 151,155.

The high prevalence of acute malnutrition in Sudan is contributing to increased morbidity and mortality risks among children under-five years, with an estimated 650,000 SAM children. Sudan is recording the highest yearly food inflation rate of the region at 106.1 percent. Between July and August, staple food prices increased seasonally by 10-15 percent, remaining approximately 170-235 percent higher than in August 2021 and about seven times higher than the five-year average across most monitored markets. Meanwhile, on 20 June, WFP in Sudan announced that it had been forced to cut rations in half for refugees across the country due to severe funding shortfalls.

### Drivers

- Increase in demand of cereals from Ethiopia and South Sudan increase local cereal prices.
- Fuel prices continue adversely impacting prices of food and agricultural inputs.
- Increased conflict and insecurity jeopardise access to cultivation land and lead to a more significant proportion of households relying on markets.
- The 2021-2022 below-average harvest requires Sudan to import 2.5MT of wheat from Russia and Ukraine. This will furthermore be hindered by the war.
- Lack of hard currency reserves in the banks and continued devaluation of the currency.
- Above average rains this year have flooded 25,750 hectares of cropland.
- The military coup of 25 October 2021 has led to the suspension of some of the long-term funding (IDA19 of USD 2.3 billion, WB USD 1 billion, US USD 700 million, and

the cancellation of the debt relief). The HRP for Sudan is funded at 36.7% according to the latest Financial Tracking Service (FTS) from OCHA (31/08/2022).

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 46.8 million (HIP 2021 & 2022) allocated for food security and cash assistance projects. An additional Programmatic Partnership with CONCERN for Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) and nutrition for a total amount of EUR 1.25 million.
- HIP 2022 – EUR 40 million initial budget: FSL&MPCA 20%, health 19%, protection 18%, nutrition 13%, education 10%, WASH 6%, coordination 5%, support to operations 4%, shelter 3%, crisis modifiers 2%.
- DG ECHO participating in all FSL coordination events (cash working group, Food Security Livelihood meetings, and WFP donor’s meetings) to advocate and highlight the needs and facilitating the WFP Country Director visit to COHAFA discussion.

#### **Other actors’ main interventions**

- Draft report presenting the findings from the Sudan case study on the “HDP Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for its Implementation”.
- WFP received EUR 2.5 million from Italy to support emergency nutrition activities (May 2022), as well as GBP 3 million from the UK and USD 4.5 million from Japan for emergency food assistance (August 2022).
- FAO received USD 12 million from CERF to provide essential agricultural inputs to farming households (June 2022).
- USAID announced more than USD 88 million in additional humanitarian funding for the people of Sudan to provide food assistance (WFP) and support nutritional programming (UNICEF).

### *Needs and opportunities*

- 77% funding gap – FSL sector received only USD 162 million.
- WFP received USD 100 million from the WB to assist with critical emergency cash and food assistance.
- Flexibility in adjusting the cash assistance transfer value based on market findings allowing partners to keep assistance ongoing despite the increase in market prices. Advocate for additional funding from other donors and internally.

## **2.3.Middle East and North Africa (MENA)**

### **Lebanon**

#### *Situation and evolution*

According to WFP, nearly 46% of the Lebanese population were acutely food insecure in the second half of 2021, up from 32% in the first half of the year. Half of the 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon are food insecure.

The first results of an IPC classification exercise will be published in October 2022. The 2022 Global Report on Food Crises indicated that for 2021 Lebanon ranked third globally among food-crisis countries hosting the highest numbers of refugees/asylum seekers. The

report indicated that acute food insecurity was particularly high among Syrian refugees in Lebanon (49%).

Severe economic, political, and social crisis, compounded by high dependency on imports, currency depreciation, Russia's war against Ukraine, and a global increase in food and fuel prices, are adding to the already dire situation in Lebanon.

To address the emerging bread crisis in the country, a USD 150 million loan from the World Bank (WB) to support wheat imports is currently in the approval process by the Lebanese Parliament. Currency depreciation and inflation may, however, continue to drive up the cost of food. Prices of essential food items have increased since October 2019 (e.g. the price of sunflower oil has increased by 4050%). The food costs of the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) in July 2022 have increased by 1522% compared to October 2019, while the consumer price index for food and non-alcoholic beverages has increased by 5289% since the beginning of the crisis. Food assistance provided in the form of cash covers 58% of the total cost of the food component of the SMEB. However, 92% of Syrian refugee households continued to incur debt to survive, mostly to buy food (93%) and pay rent (49%).

The response framework is mainly split between the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), jointly drafted with the Lebanese Government and the OCHA-led Emergency Response Plan (ERP), targeting Lebanese, Palestinians, and migrants. The food Security sector under the ERP 2022 is 72% funded (approx. USD48 million out of USD 66.5 million) as per FTS data. LCRP funding for Food Security as per Q1-2022 figures is 14% (USD138/975 million), while the funding level for the Basic Assistance sector in Q2 2022 is 18.2% (USD96.3/530 million). Cash transfers are used to cover food, often at the expense of meeting other types of needs. WFP has a funding requirement for August 2022 until January 2023 of USD422 million. WFP received a contribution USD560 million in 2021, the same amount it received for 2020.

### *Drivers*

The impact of the severe economic crisis is manifested in the downgrading of the country from upper middle-income to lower middle-income country. Low foreign currency reserves have reduced food imports, impacting the replenishment of supplies, as the country depends on imports for 80% of its food needs. Food imports have decreased 21% when comparing the first 6 months of 2022 to the same period in 2021, mainly led by a 39% decrease in imports of live animals and a 30% decrease in cereals. Wheat imports have also been impacted by Russia's war against Ukraine.

Subsidies provided by the government on essential food items have been lifted, except for wheat used to produce staple pita bread, which still has witnessed an 8.6 fold increase in price, compared to October 2019.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 74 million was allocated in 2022, including 38 million (55%) of multi-purpose cash assistance (MPCA) contributing directly to food security outcomes and targeting vulnerable households - this overall total includes a further EUR 5 million allocated from reserves in October to respond to the food security needs occasioned by Russia's war against Ukraine and which is to be contracted shortly. An additional EUR 0.5 million, including 0.1 million from DG ECHO, is allocated to the second round of the Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA), which includes food security indicators.

### Other actors' main interventions

- The European Union, Germany, and the United States of America are the most significant donors to WFP in Lebanon and maintained similar levels of funding to previous years.

### Needs and opportunities

- Improve targeting to ensure greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups.
- The upcoming Joint analysis from different assessment frameworks, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASYR), Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA), and IPC, will improve the understanding of the situation.
- Advocate for regular revision of the cash transfer value to match the increasing cost of food and non-food SMEB while ensuring that the caseload is not reduced, and the assistance package beneficiaries receive is comprehensive and equitable.



Source: Northwest Syria Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI), May 2022

## Syria

### *Situation and evolution*

64% of the population is facing food insecurity (13.9 million), with 12 million facing acute food insecurity and 1.9 million people at risk of sliding into food insecurity. In June 2022, WFP reported that food prices in Syria were 45% higher than in January, and nearly double compared to the same time last year. The costs of supply in Syria will increase by USD1.7 million per month. In April 2022, WFP was forced to reduce food rations to 995 kcal. The crisis is severely underfunded. Out of the USD1.7 billion required under the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for the Food Security sector, only USD 309 million (18%) has been received.

South-central Syria and Government of Syria controlled areas (GCA) rely on Russia for their wheat supply. Between January and May 2022, the prices of wheat flour in GCA increased by 35% and cooking oil by 64%. Northeast Syria (NES) controlled by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, has not reported any major food shortages and maintains flour reserves of 1 to 6 months. However, the replenishment of these may be hindered by the increased cost of flour imports, reduced relief flour, and the insufficient local wheat production which is at great risk due to the drought and poor climate conditions. Northwest Syria (NWS), controlled by the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), is heavily dependent on imports transiting through Turkey, many of which originate from Ukraine or Russia. The increase in fuel prices will have a knock-on effect on food costs as the cost of transporting food continues to rise.

### *Drivers*

Political conflict, economic collapse, the Lebanon financial crisis, war in Ukraine, the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change resulting in drought, water scarcity and historic low yields are the key drivers of food insecurity. Syria is currently facing one of its worst water crises, severely impacting the population's access to both drinking and irrigation water directly impacting food security. In NES, wheat production for the 2020-2021 season was at 1.045MT, down from 2.8MT in 2020 and from 4.1MT before 2011. The forecast for 2022 is expected to be in a similar range. In GCA, it is expected that the Syrian Pound will continue to depreciate. In NWS, price increases, insufficient reserves, and the inability of the SIG or SSG to set up and implement a fully-fledged food security policy will continue to have adverse effects.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 135 million allocated in 2022 with approximately 40% of the budget contributing directly to food security: in-kind food-basket distributions, cash assistance, livelihood and approximately 15% of ECHO budget allocated in early recovery activities. DG ECHO has been advocating with the Government of Syria and Central Bank of Syria to introduce an adjustable preferential rate for INGOs and UN agencies in order to compensate for the depreciation of the Syrian pound and hyperinflation. DG ECHO organised an event on food-security at the margin of the 6<sup>th</sup> Brussels conference trying to mobilise donor support for a better coordinated response.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**


- DG NEAR: additional allocation of EUR 10 million for food/livelihoods.

## Needs and opportunities

- Additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Prioritise funding of immediate lifesaving response to vulnerable Syrians, with focus on food and nutrition assistance as well as early recovery interventions.
- Advocate with other EU services and donors for increased engagement on Syria for integrated programming that boosts ability of people to earn a living. Livelihoods programmes, including agricultural projects, market strengthening, job creation and restoration of basic services.
- Develop strategies to operate in context of high inflation and depreciation.
- Strengthen humanitarian cash and shock responsive social protection (SRSP) nexus.

### Syria's compounded economic crisis (2019-2022)

#### Syria's compound economic crisis (2019 – 2022)



Source: Whole of Syria Food Security Sector

## Yemen

### Situation and evolution

19 million people (58% of the population) are projected to experience high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) in the second half of the year. Out of these, an estimated 11.7 million people will experience crisis conditions (IPC Phase 3), 7.1 million emergency conditions (IPC Phase 4) and close to 160,000 catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5). These projections were made before the Russian aggression against Ukraine. An update taking into account the global increase of food and energy prices since the beginning of the year is likely to show worsening projections. During the projection period of June – December 2022, 233 districts are classified in Phase 4 (Emergency), 94 districts in Phase 3 (Crisis) and four districts in Phase 2 (Stressed). 23 districts have been projected to have 161,000 persons in Phase 5 (Catastrophe). The severity increases in the projection

period, with 86 districts moving to higher IPC Phases, 82 of which move from IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) to Phase 4.

**Acute Food Insecurity Projection June – December 2022 (IPC Yemen July 2022):** Prior to the conflict in Ukraine, the national average price of wheat had already risen by 246.7% from 122 YER per kilo in 2014 to 423 YER per kilo in September 2021. Between January and July 2022, wheat flour prices have increased by another 42% in the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) area, while it stayed stable at 400 YER per kilo in the Houthis controlled areas. The Survival Minimum Expenditure Basked (SMEB) cost has increased in the same period, especially in the south of Yemen. As wheat imports from India have been recognised as a key supply line for Yemen, the IRG on 04 August reported that wheat has been secured to cover two and half months of consumption, with 176,400MT of wheat available for August–September. Moreover, the HSG Group, Yemen’s largest wheat importing company announced that it has secured 250,000MT of wheat, sufficient to supply the market until mid-October.

The Yemen crisis is still underfunded, even if the appeal is now covered at 42.4% (vs. 27.4% in May), due to recent additional funding from the US. In 2021, an additional pledging conference was organised in the margins of the UNGA during which over USD 600 million was raised. This year however, no second pledging event is foreseen. Out of the USD 2.1 billion required under the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for the Food Security sector, only USD 888 million (42%) have been received leading to a funding gap of USD 1.2 billion (58%).

**Funding progress by sector in Yemen (OCHA FTS, Aug 2022):** The funding gap is forcing the World Food Programme (WFP) to further cut food rations. WFP will likely scale down their caseload from 13 million to 10.5 million, geographically targeting IPC Phases 4 & 5 districts as well as 'the most vulnerable' population in IPC Phase 3.

Reduced rations and suspension of assistance are dangerously becoming the new norm. The Food Security actors will inevitably no longer meet the standards of humanitarian food assistance. The result could be malnutrition and further impoverishment.

### *Drivers*

The economic crisis (effects of low incomes, depreciation of the Yemeni currency and irregular or non-payment of salaries of civil servants), continuous conflict, reduced access to basic services and low humanitarian food assistance are the key drivers of food insecurity. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is also contributing to the deterioration of the food security situation in Yemen. Yemen is 90% dependent on food imports, with 46% of wheat coming from Russia and Ukraine.

Restrictions and obstructions of access to services and assistance are major aggravating factors for the functioning of the humanitarian response and the private sector hampered by limited volumes of imports. The recent UN-brokered truce (started on 2 April and renewed until 2 October 2022) has led to a reduction of hostilities and a temporary increase of fuel imports allowed into the north of Yemen. It remains unclear whether the truce will hold and will be extended after October. In the meantime, prices continue to rise, especially in the south of Yemen. Should the truce be discontinued, fighting will resume – most likely with high intensity – limiting access further as well as impacting the import of basic commodities by the private sector.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 135 million allocated in 2022, the largest allocation since the onset of the conflict with approx. 75% of the budget contributing directly (Food Security & Livelihood 34%) and indirectly (health & nutrition 19%, basic needs/MPCT 9%),

WASH 7% & DRR 2%) to food security outcomes. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash and in-kind deliveries.

- The EU is a leading actor on diplomacy and coordinated humanitarian advocacy. On 23 June 2022, DG ECHO co-hosted the fourth humanitarian Senior Official Meeting jointly with Sweden (SOM process), where the food insecurity crisis and related drivers were emphasised and action points for collective action identified.


### Other actors' main interventions

- USAID/BHA: USD 1 billion was allocated in 2022 alone (including a significant part of food in-kind). This is already above 2021 (USD 800 million) and 2020 (USD 600 million).


### Needs and opportunities

- Underfunded crisis. Additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Improve prioritisation of assistance ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups.
- Continue to play a leading role in coordination and advocacy for the respect of IHL, principled aid delivery and increased assistance to Yemen.
- Advocate both internally to other Commission services and externally to donors for increased engagement on Yemen.
- Develop specific strategies to operate in context of high inflation and depreciation (e.g., flexible programming, market monitoring and contingency planning).
- Strengthen the humanitarian cash and shock responsive social protection (SRSP) nexus as well as livelihood support and diversification, inter-sectoral programming and monitoring and early warning systems.

### Acute Food Insecurity Projection June – December 2022




Source: IPC Yemen, July 2022



Source: OCHA FTS, August 2022

### Trends in response plan /appeal requirements in Yemen (OCHA FTS, Aug 2022)



Source: OCHA FTS, August 2022

## 2.4.Latin America and Caribbean

### Central America

#### Situation and evolution

Food insecurity in the region, in particular in the Dry Corridor (consisting of parts of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua) is aggravating. In 2021, a total of 8.4 million people were suffering of food insecurity (IPC 3 and 4), including an estimated 500,000 in Nicaragua. According to WFP, 8 in 10 households in the Dry Corridor are

resorting to crisis coping mechanisms and more than 25% of the population do not have enough money to buy basic foods.

Guatemala and Honduras are the two countries with the largest needs, with 6.6 million people in need of food assistance (OCHA, HNO 2021). FAO/WFP's outlook for June-September 2022 (Hunger Hotspots) states that the situation in Honduras and Guatemala requires close monitoring, as their agricultural sectors are significantly exposed to elevated international food and agricultural supply prices during the lean season (March-August). Potential storms in the hurricane season impacts could aggravate an already-dire food and nutrition situation in Northern and Central America (Fewsnet)<sup>7</sup>.

The main needs in the Dry Corridor are food assistance and supplementary nutrition for children under 5, as for pregnant and lactating women. In addition, people need livelihoods' protection and support in their recovery.

### *Guatemala*

The situation in Guatemala is particularly worrisome as food insecurity has known a 6-fold increase since 2013, with 24 % of it's the population food insecure. In addition, around 47% of children under 5 are being affected by chronic malnutrition (UNICEF) and 9,422 cases of acute malnutrition (Ministry of Health, May 2022). This is the highest rate in Latin America and the Caribbean and is the 6th highest rate of chronic malnutrition or stunting in the world (WFP, August 2022).

4 million people experience high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC 3 or above) and need assistance in the coming months. This figure is expected to increase to 4.6 million people (26% of the total population) in the period up to September 2022. WFP estimates that 100,000 Guatemalans suffer from severe food insecurity, IPC4 (WFP, August 2022). Children are particularly vulnerable.

The main drivers are high food and transport prices, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine causing high prices in fertilizers (an increase of 85% since 2021), the depletion of basic grain reserves, the loss of jobs and income and the COVID-19 pandemic consequences.

The purchasing power of households continues to be negatively affected by international trends. In June, the highest year-on-year inflation in eleven years (7.5 percent) was reported. The inflationary trend is even higher in Alta and Baja Verapaz, with 9.7 percent, and in Huehuetenango and Quiché, with 9.2 percent. The prices of white corn, black beans and rice are the highest recorded since 1998 (Ministry of Agriculture). Basic Food Basket data reveal that the price of edible oil increased 31.4 percent, compared to the previous year. The National Statistics Institute (INE) indicates that a family of five needs USD 427.90 per month to purchase the Basic Food Basket, while the average minimum wage is USD 267. 40% of the households spent more than 50% of their income on food.

Acción Contra la Hambre (ACH)'s forecasting system, PREDISAN, forecasts that 4% of Guatemala's population would be in a zone of concern of very high food security and up to 40% in a high zone.

### *Honduras*

According to IPC, over 2.2 million people (24% of the population analysed) are in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), requiring urgent action. Of these people, at least 1.9 million are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and 241,000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). However, WFP estimates that 353,000 Hondurans are severely food insecure (WFP, June 2022).

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<sup>7</sup> <https://fews.net/>

ACH's forecasting system, PREDISAN, forecasts that 14% of Honduras' population would be in a zone of concern of very high food security and up to 71% in a high zone, between June and September 2022.

Inflation has caused a deterioration in the purchasing power of the population, which currently depends mainly on purchases due to the annual lean season. Food prices increased with 6.3% and transport with 3.6%. The price of the Basic Food Basket increased with 5% since December 2021, with a 68% increase of maize, 23% of beans and 15% of oil.

With a seasonal decline in employment options in rural areas, access to food has been reduced, especially for the poorest households. Since they are reducing the number of daily meals, increasing the use of credit or third-party food support, and selling productive assets, they will be classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) until September.

## *Drivers*

### **Structural societal factors coupled with climate change**

Food insecurity is stemming from structural and systemic deficiencies, causing increasing poverty rates, linked to violence and climate change (26% population is at high climate risk). The connection between food insecurity, climate and violence on the one side and (forced) migration on the other has been highlighted by some stakeholders in the region, such as WFP and ACH. CARE draws attention on the impact of gender inequality on food security.

Indeed, the aggravated food insecurity is mainly caused by an accumulation of impacts and simultaneous shocks, including El Niño, consecutive droughts, hurricanes Eta and Iota, coffee rust, socio-economic impact of COVID-19, ongoing inflation, violence and the impact of the war on Ukraine. In the first semester of 2022, the cost of the food basket increased by more than 80%, while ongoing drought limits livelihood and harvest opportunities.

### **Rising food prices and inflation**

Atypically high prices are worsening the impact of the ongoing lean season. These prices, according to Fewsnet, will limit seasonal improvements in food availability, purchasing power, and access to food for very poor households who have yet to recover from the economic and climatic events of recent years. Poor households are expected to experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, while very poor households, in the Dry Corridor and areas affected by hurricanes Eta and Iota, face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- Since 1994, DG ECHO has allocated EUR 281 million to Central America, of which EUR 45 million were allocated to food security and nutrition, and EUR 91 million were allocated to Disaster Preparedness.
- In its current projects, DG ECHO focusses on the Dry Corridor, and particularly the areas mostly affected by the recent hurricanes Eta and Iota. It provides food assistance and short to medium-term livelihood recovery, while helping to build resilience within relevant nexus strategies. At the same time DG ECHO raises awareness on the prevailing food crisis through FSN information systems, through an action of EUR 1 million, implemented by OXFAM.
- The food assistance interventions target households in IPC phase 4 (Emergency) and households in IPC phase 3 (Crisis) that have additional constraints, like being a single parent household or having a poor food-consumption and asset base, having a high number of dependents, being displaced, etc. A special focus is given to children under five and pregnant women. DG ECHO supported 187,546

beneficiaries in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua with direct cash transfer, vouchers and in-kind assistance.

### Other actors' main interventions

The **European Union** is funding several development projects at regional level, which are related to food insecurity and resilience building in the sector:

- for EUR 6 million, the Information Systems Program for the Resilience of Food and Nutrition Security in the SICA Region (PROGRESAN-SICA), generating information for the development of public strategies and policies, with a focus on resilience of food and nutrition security (SAN). It is currently funded under the Climate Resilience of rural households in the Dry Corridor and managed as a component of the national programme in Nicaragua and ends in October 2023.
- for EUR 16.045 million, the Central American Program for Coffee Rust Integrated Management (PROCAGICA) is benefitting 330,000 family producers and 6,133 family farms in the selected areas in controlling the rust and avoiding severe damage to their plantations. Its activities will end at the end of 2022.
- for EUR 6 million, the AGRO-INNOVA for the adaptability of agro-forestry systems in the Central American Dry Corridor, aims to enhance capacities of 3,000 producers and 12 organizations in 6 countries on water harvest, bio-supplies production, forestry nurseries, planting nutrition and provision of drought-resistant varieties. Its activities will end in November 2023.

The European Union is funding several food related projects in Nicaragua:

- The European Union is funding the Boosting Rural and urban Economy in Times of Crisis and Beyond (BOOST) programme, providing incentives to sustain value chains related to the School Meals Programme in the context of a protracted socio-political crisis. It is aiming to contribute to reducing poverty and fostering the economic empowerment of women for EUR 15 million. Its activities will end in January 2024.
- The EU is also funding the Climate Resilience of Rural Households in the Dry Corridor (Dry Corridor), by strengthening of the policy framework on climate change adaptation at the regional level (in particular, within the SICA system) and shock responsiveness mechanism and inclusive adaptability of safety nets with a focus on climate change, food and nutrition security and women's empowerment for EUR 13 million. These activities will end in August 2024.

The European Union is funding three food related projects in Guatemala:

- It funds an integral approach to build resilience in communities, vulnerable to food insecurity and climate shocks, called PRO-RESILIENCE, implemented by WFP for EUR 15 million. Its activities will end in 2025.
- It funds a comprehensive strategy to fight chronic malnutrition, through the support of the National Strategy for Prevention of Chronic Malnutrition, implemented by UNICEF for EUR 15 million. Its activities will end at the end of May 2024.
- Finally, it funds support to the Primary Health System to fight Chronic Malnutrition in Guatemala, implemented by PAHO for EUR 20 million. Its activities will end in November 2023.

In addition, the EU will adopt a new program with a total budget of EUR 14 million, aiming at strengthening budgetary execution at institutional level and public policy implementation capacities of the Ministries who are responsible for the fight against malnutrition. It will also strengthen the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Finance which supports them. Furthermore, the EU will strengthen food security in the most vulnerable regions of Guatemala and promote income generation, through the development of sustainable and climate-resilient agriculture, as well as alternative economic activities in rural areas.

**WFP** signed an agreement with the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES) to strengthen the Ministry's actions in food and nutrition security.

**USAID** announced funding to address food security and resilience in the LAC region.

- In Fiscal Year 2022, USD 21.8 million is dedicated for USAID/BHA food assistance operations in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. Activities include emergency food assistance, via cash transfers and multipurpose cash assistance, agricultural interventions and livelihood support. Partners include WFP (El Salvador), World Vision and CRS (Guatemala), ADRA and CRS in Honduras.
- At the same time, nearly USD 92 million of emergency food assistance and related humanitarian programming, such as nutrition, health, and protection, as well as water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions has been announced for El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras (of which USD 87.5 million in emergency funding and USD 4.3 in early recovery, risk reduction and resilience).
- USD 95 million of FY 2021 Feed the Future funds that will help smallholder farmers in Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Peru improve productivity of high-value horticulture crops, increase incomes, and bolster farmers' capacity to withstand shocks like higher fertilizer prices and impacts of climate change.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- The food security crisis in Central America remains severely underfunded. WFP reports a funding gap of 43% for its operations in Guatemala and 69% for Honduras.
- Additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Partners are requested to further prioritise and target the most vulnerable individuals.
- Continue to advocate with other services and donors for an increased engagement in Central America's Dry Corridor.
- The Food security and Nutrition Information system support in Central America was recently finalized. No new support from the EU and other donors is foreseen for the moment, and this in a significantly changing context due to political and violent crises and the ongoing impact of the conflict in Ukraine.
- To improve the operationalization of the nexus for Shock responsive social Protection and Anticipatory action, as well as the coordination between DP programs, Euroclima and resilience building programs.
- Budget restrictions under the HIP 2022, allowed for the allocation of only EUR 1 million to respond to the ongoing food crisis in Central America.

## **Colombia**

### *Situation and evolution*

In 2021, 39.3% of Colombians (19.6 million persons) were below the monetary poverty line with a monthly income per capita of only 354,000 Colombian pesos (EUR 80.5). Furthermore, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) projects that in Colombia total poverty will be 1.7% higher than 2021 due to inflation. Extreme poverty affects disproportionately ethnic minorities, including indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, usually located in former conflict zones with little state presence. About 7.3 million Colombian residents are estimated to have food security related humanitarian needs in 2022, while moderate and severe food insecurity is affecting 42% of

the resident population (21.4 million), with severe food insecurity having slightly improved since the end of 2021 (FAO-WFP). As of July 2022, 75.7% of Colombian households ate three meals a day compared to 85.5% before the COVID-19 pandemic (DANE); 23.2% of households ate twice a day (30% in July 2021) and 1.1% only once. Moreover, 10.8% of children under 5 years of age suffer from chronic malnutrition. In addition to Colombians, 60% of Venezuelan migrants and refugees (1.08 million) living in Colombia were estimated to be food insecure (FAO-WFP) in the first half of 2022. Food insecurity among migrants and refugees is aggravated by significant levels of internal displacement and accelerating food inflation. The data shows a slight improvement in the situation from two years ago, when 73% were food insecure; however, the price of hot meals has increased by 60% by August 2022 (WFP).

Due to the combined effect of inflation stemming from COVID-19 related restrictions and the crisis in Ukraine, food prices have increased by an average of 23.6% between February 2021 and June 2022 with an annual inflation of 9.7% and 139% increase of fertilizer prices (DANE). Colombia imports an estimated 75% of its fertilizer (approximately half from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine), and approximately 28% of its food commodities. Increasing food prices and shortages of agricultural inputs have a significant negative impact on low-income communities in the country, such as Venezuelan migrants and refugees.

### *Drivers*

Persistent violence among non-state armed groups and recurring natural disasters in Colombia continue to cause internal displacement and limit Colombians' ability to access crops, livelihoods, essential goods and services, thus exacerbating food insecurity and nutrition issues among vulnerable households. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic and related mitigation measures lead to reduced access to health and protection services, worsening food insecurity.

In addition, approximately 2.3 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees have sought refuge in Colombia, along with more than 980,000 Colombian returnees. These factors have strained local services and increased humanitarian needs, including food, health, livelihoods, nutrition, protection, shelter, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), not only among migrants, refugees and returnees, but also host communities in both rural and urban areas. Furthermore, other aggravating factors are worsening the current situation, such as loss of agricultural livelihoods and reduction of agricultural productive capacity due to the increase in the costs of production (15-35%).

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- DG ECHO interventions focus on the immediate risks of the most vulnerable and affected populations on prioritized sectors like protection, health, education in emergencies and nutrition. Those are sectors where DG ECHO has a real added value in complementarity and coordination to other donors. Food security interventions are prioritized under rapid response mechanisms.
- Over EUR 84 million has been allocated by DG ECHO to the Food Security Sector in Colombia between 1994 and 2022, representing 23% of total allocations. Food assistance remains greatly underfunded in both the HRP (funding gap 68%) and RMRP (funding gap 69%).

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Need to improve the triple nexus with EU Delegation and Member States for a more holistic response to the needs (from humanitarian protection, health, EiE response

to economic inclusion, support from social protection systems and documentation from development programs).

- Expanding food security and nutrition assessment to also include Colombian populations nationwide, also remote areas. The idea is to perform an IPC in Colombia in 2022 in order to have more precise figure about needs and priority area.
- Improve DG ECHO-funded project CASH response.

## **Haiti**

### *Situation and evolution*

According to CNSA (Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire), in February 2022, approximately 4.3 million people (44% of the population) were estimated in IPC Phase 3 or worse. The most recent estimations of June 2022 indicate that 14% of the population (approximately 1.34 million people) would be in IPC phase 4 and 33% (approximately 3.2 million people) in IPC phase 3. Thus 46% of the population are in need of humanitarian assistance.

Increasing insecurity and gangs 'territorial control' prevents household access to livelihood opportunities and markets. Haiti imports 70 percent of its food commodities. The increase in global food prices due to the war in Ukraine, the annual inflation standing at 29% (July 2022), the scarcity of fuel leading to higher transport costs and commodity prices and the depreciation of the Haitian national currency (nearly 22% in one year) will likely further diminish household purchasing power. The latest assessment by the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP) and UNICEF in the commune of Cité Soleil (one of the most affected by gang violence), concludes that approximately 20% of children under the age of five are suffering from severe or moderate acute malnutrition.

For over a year now, 3.5 million people living in Southern departments, still recovering from the effects of the August 2021 earthquake, are deeply impacted by the blockage of roads departing from Port-au-Prince by gangs. This prevents farmers to sell their production in the markets of the capital and to receive humanitarian assistance, forcing vulnerable households to adopt negative coping strategies to meet basic needs (OCHA).

### *Drivers*

The food insecurity situation is expected to deteriorate further in the coming months, due to a recurrent below-average production of coarse grains and beans, a poor coverage of acute needs during past food and nutrition crises, the rising food and fuel prices (linked to the war in Ukraine), the depreciation of the national currency, the political instability, and the gang violence (continuing to increase in 2022 compared to 2021) that is causing displacement, market disruptions, limit humanitarian access and exacerbate the economic crisis.


The country's level of structural vulnerability and the accumulation of stressors also explain why many households are extremely sensitive to shocks (climate hazards, rising prices, crop losses, etc.) and are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- The 2022 HIP first EUR 6 million allocation of Humanitarian assistance was devoted to respond to protection, health and education needs and priorities. In May 2022, a EUR 5 million top up was approved to provide emergency food assistance, such as the provision of cash for food, food vouchers, and in-kind food assistance to

communities under the most acute food needs (IPC 4). The strategy included response in urban areas and complemented the WFP's Social Protection program. The food crisis response is nevertheless severely underfunded. Given the increase in protection needs and violence, allocation of funds for food security activities has been so far significantly lower in 2022 than in 2021.



Source: *Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update*

### Other actors' main interventions

- Geographic concentration of the EU and Member States initiatives in Northwest and Grand Anse, (both classified in IPC 3 and 4) jointly respond to food insecurity and malnutrition due to the impact of drought and hurricane Matthew as well as last year's earthquake.

### Needs and opportunities

- Severely underfunded crisis (HRP 2022 only 14% funded as of August 2022). Additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Advocating with other services and donors for increased engagement in Haiti is necessary.
- Promote additional nutritional assessments to have sufficient information of the nutrition status of children under the age of 5.
- Concerns related to the accelerated devaluation of the currency against the dollar and the high cost of living have a great impact on the amount of cash transfers and it is therefore necessary to monitor the markets and adapt ECHO intervention in coordination with the Cash Working Group.
- Maximising Nexus with the EU Delegation under the upcoming EDF decommitted funds allocation to improve coordination via a joint analysis of needs to promote complementarities at geographical level, be support shock responsive, and ensure the implementation of social protection and anticipatory actions.

## Venezuela

### *Situation and evolution*

The estimated number of food insecure people ranges between 14.4 and 18.5 million, according to figures from HumVenezuela. 80.6% of households (23.1 million people) can't buy quality food and in sufficient quantities. 13.4 million people (46.7%) have lost their source of income and 5 million people (17.7%) exhausted their means of life. Venezuelan migrants and refugees displaced abroad amount to 6.1 million as of April 2022, with forecasts for 3.5 million in need of food assistance in 2022 (Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan, RMRP - Plataforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes, R4V – 2022). Venezuela is importing 75% of the food it needs and is therefore affected by shortages on the international market. Additionally, the World Bank assessment indicated that inflation stands at 155%. In 2021, the extreme poverty rate and the poverty rate were at 76.6% and 95.4% respectively (National Household Survey). There is a deficit of 95% of the minimum wage (USD 23) in relation to the basic basket of June 2022, which was USD 459.84, showing an increase of 5.05% compared to May 2022.

### *Drivers*

**Inflation coupled with low growth rates and poverty rates:** The war in Ukraine, added to pre-existing political and economic factors, that have weakened the lives and livelihoods of the population, exacerbates the crisis. In the period 2014-2020 the GDP shows an accumulated reduction of 74%, thus a significant decrease in potential production capacity and productivity in the country (ENCOVI). Moreover, the poverty and extreme poverty rate of the Venezuelan population is 95.4% and 76.6% respectively.

**Russian food imports dependency and fuel scarcity:** this affects 1.2 million tons of wheat, 80% of fertilizers imported, and a lack of financing and sufficient income and increased fuel prices. Access to seeds is also insufficient.

**Violence and conflicts:** Affected by the increasing of insecurity and violence due to the conflicts between armed groups and the dispute to control the territory.

**Climate change:** The extreme weather has increased flooding in recent years, resulting in loss of food crops. Climatic variations have also altered cycles, making it difficult to take advantage of rainy periods for irrigation and the water public service has severe deficiencies.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 20.15million allocated inside Venezuela in 2022 for all HIP priorities under the initial allocation and EUR 6 million under a second (Operational Reserve) allocation. DG ECHO is funding WFP operations implemented in schools in Venezuela which focus on food assistance. Other key partners such as NRC also work with schools in EiE complementing with food security interventions.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- In a true nexus approach, the EU continues to support food availability through the promotion of the development of associative schemes. Through a second project, they are also supporting family farming through the reinforcement of food production capacities.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- The funding received for the HRP Venezuela (in-country) 2021 only covered 37% of the required funds.
- The lack of official data to support the humanitarian crisis (particularly on the ongoing food and nutrition crisis) hinders the visibility of the situation and the access to funds to attend the needs of the most vulnerable population. Thus DG ECHO needs to make the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela visible and increase advocacy with donors, including in a nexus approach.
- The work of FAO on food production and support to family farming gives a real opportunity for nexus with ongoing DG ECHO funded EiE and food security response project throughout school feeding.
- The impossibility of developing cash interventions in Venezuela for a year and a half, prevents reaching a greater number of People in Need.

## 2.5.Asia and Pacific

### *Afghanistan*

#### *Situation and evolution*

Food security continues to deteriorate in Afghanistan. In May 2022, FAO and WFP have included Afghanistan in the list of twenty countries identified as hunger hotspots. All 34 provinces are facing crisis or emergency levels of acute food insecurity, with a total of 18.9 million people – nearly half of the population - currently acutely food insecure (IPC 3+), of which 13 million in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis), and 6 million in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) conditions affected approximately 20,000 people between March and May in the province of Ghor. Afghanistan has the highest prevalence of insufficient food consumption globally, with 92% of people experiencing insufficient food consumption for ten consecutive months. 60% of households are reported to employ crisis-level coping strategies such as selling assets, borrowing food, begging etc. Female headed households are struggling the most. Preparations for a new IPC assessment are ongoing.

19.4 million people have been reached with emergency food assistance this year (6.6 million in August 2022), while approx. 300,000 have received cash-based transfers. If no additional funding is secured WFP will have to reduce food rations and/or reduce coverage in IPC 3 areas. As of 7 October 2022, the OCHA Financial Tracking System indicates a total of USD 2.01billion, 45% of the total USD 4.4 billion required. Food Security and Agriculture has received USD 817 million out of a total requirement of USD 2,6 billion, therefore the sector is only 31% covered.

#### *Drivers*

Limited access to food is compounded by several factors: a devastating economic crisis (according to the World Bank the real GDP per capita may decline by around 34% between end-2020 and end-2022), depreciation of the Afghani currency and the irregular or non-payment of salaries of civil servants. Access to cash, for the population and for humanitarian actors, remain very difficult. International assistance, beyond humanitarian, is resuming is expected to resume at a very slow pace. Sanctions and frozen Afghan Central Bank assets are continuing to play a negative role. Prices of food commodities have increased - in particular vegetable oil, cereals, sugar, and pulses seem the most difficult products to obtain. The Ukrainian crisis impacts on the cost of humanitarian operations in the region, in particular in terms of food support. Severe droughts and floods (especially in the course of

the summer months ) are affecting the harvest and are, together with the contracting economy, reducing income generating opportunities.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- In the context of the Afghanistan pledging conference that took place on 31 March, Commissioner Lenarčič announced a total EU pledge of EUR 113 million (EUR 93 million for Afghanistan and the rest for the region) in new humanitarian funding.
- Breakdown per sectors: food assistance (32), health and nutrition (27%), Education in Emergencies (18%) and protection and mine action (15%), other humanitarian services (8%).
- As of 5 September, DG ECHO has deployed a total EUR 114 million, in the region. This includes the EUR 113 million humanitarian funding reported above plus EUR 1 million mobilised through the Acute Large Emergency Response Tool (ALERT) following the earthquake that struck the country on 22 June.
- In addition, since September 2021 and as of 12 October 2022, 24 Humanitarian Air Bridge flights departed from Europe to Afghanistan carrying approx. 775 tons of mainly medical and nutritional goods. . Two additional HABs are in the pipeline to be deployed by 10 December 2022. The EU is an important player in Afghanistan, it is one of the very few donors who has maintained a physical presence in the country. The DG ECHO field office has never interrupted its activities and continues to carry out monitoring missions across the country.

#### **Other actor's main interventions**


- USA is the first donor with USD 514,4 million which represents 27% of the overall funding response plan/appeal while the UK is the second donor, with USD 358,7 (18.1%) and the Asian Development Bank, the third one, with USD 300 million (15,7%). On 23 September 2022 the USA pledged an additional USD 327 million of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.
- At the time of the Pledging conference (31/03), the EU plus Member States pledged and equivalent to USD 586 million.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- To continue to be able to address the most urgent needs, WFP needs additional funding of USD 1.1 billion between August 2022 and January 2023. USD 172 million is needed to ensure the ability to preposition 151,000 Metric Tons by November 2022, and to cover emergency needs for 2.2 million people. USD 220 million per month are needed to sustain WFP operations.

FIGURE 22

**Numbers and share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, 2022**  
(includes IPC Phase 2 numbers, where available)



Source: FSIN, using IPC, FEWS NET (for Ukraine) and WFP CARI (Iraq, Syrian refugees in Jordan) data.

Source: *Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update*

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