# The Securitisation of European Union Civil Protection

Investigating the logics of securitisation and the development of European Union Civil Protection.

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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Economic Science in European Public Affairs & Law.

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Abbreviations

AFSJ:	Area of Freedom Security and Justice
CFSP :	Common Foreign and Security Strategy
CPM :	Civil Protection Mechanism
CoS:	Copenhagen School of Security Studies
DGECHO:	Directorate for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
DGHOME:	Directorate for Migration and Home Affairs
EEAS:	European External Action Service
EMC:	European Medical Corps
ERCC:	Emergency Response Centre
EU :	European Union
EUCP :	European Union Civil Protection
EUGS :	European Union Global Strategy
EU INTCEN:	EEAS Intelligence Analysis Centre
EU ISS:	European Union Internal Security Strategy
FEMA:	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FSC:	FRONTEX Situational Centre
NATO :	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
STAR :	Strategic Analysis and Response Centre
TFEU:	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN:	United Nations

Abstract

The security landscape of Europe is evolving. The changing nature of European governance, coupled with the experience of ever more complex internal and external crises that cross various boundaries and policy domains, has increased the European Union's (EU) role in providing for the safety and security of society, environment and infrastructure. The means which the EU deals with these crises, through European Union Civil Protection (EUCP) has therefore become a topical issue in the current political landscape. The broadening of these internal and external security requirements begs the question where Civil Protection now belongs within EU security.

The purpose of this study is to examine EUCP, its position within the EU security model and highlight the extent to which this policy area has now become an essential element in the security framework. The paper will examine traditional security theories and also include contemporary risk-security studies. As a research tool, the paper will develop a preferred framework of analysis, utilising both the logic of securitisation and the logic of risk. Through a qualitative examination of legislation, policy and practices the paper will aim to establish a correlation with either logic and better determine EUCP development and its position within the EU security framework.

The conclusions suggest that while both logics are evident in the analysis, there is increasing evidence of a creeping securitisation of the field. It is hoped this research can better inform the debate on contemporary security studies and contribute to the understanding of the security steering aspects and the position of EU interests in disaster and crisis management.

A. Introduction

1. Introduction

The security landscape in Europe has been dramatically transformed since the end of the Cold war. Security threats, previously conceptualised along military and geopolitical concerns, have now expanded to encompass the complexities of critical infrastructures, energy, environment and natural disasters. The broadening of these security concerns from the state to society inevitable leads the EU acquiring a more nuanced security role, becoming increasingly involved in providing for the safety and security of citizens and the environment. In this context, the EU has developed a set of frameworks and assets for increasing Europe's resilience to crises, disasters and structural risks that cross geographical and functional boundaries. This emerging protection-oriented policy space, also know as civil protection or civil security, is outside the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) and is not adequately covered by traditional terms such as internal security (Bossong & Hegemann 2015, p3)[1].

The 2010 - 2014 European Council Internal Security Strategy (ISS) defines contemporary EU civil security, and drafts how the EU should respond to existing and emerging threats to society and citizens. It argues the concept of internal security should be understood in a wide and comprehensive manner. It stresses the need to complement both internal and external aspects of EU security policies, aiming to improve co-ordination, policy and action through the development of a 'European Security model' (European Council, ISS 2010)[2]. This represented a considerable shift from the previous 2003 European Security Strategy. The ISS now links traditional internal security concerns of organised crime and terrorism with a broader set of of health, social and civil protection services (Leite 2015, p1)[3].

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[1] Bossong, R., Hegemann, H (2015) Chapter 1 *'European Civil Security Governance - Towards a New Comprehensive Policy Space?'* In Bossong, R., Hegemann, H (Ed.) European Civil Security Governance London: Palgrave Macmillan pp 1-23.

[2] European Council (2010), *Internal Security Strategy for the European Union, Towards a European Security Model,* General Secretariat of the Council, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

[3] Leite, C. (2015) *Cooperation in EU disaster response and security provision: circulating practices,* European Security, 24:4, 560-578.

The introduction of these security concerns and threats were highlighted by analysts (Shepard 2015)[4] and showed a trend within EU security strategies towards a mutual dependence between internal and external security. The importance of the stability and security of the 'near abroad' is highlighted by the current effects on member states to ongoing crises in North Africa and the Mediterranean, with EU internal security increasingly compelling action beyond EU borders and further considerations for EU foreign policy. Efforts to enhance this new security role for the EU therefore can be linked to the wider task of promoting peace and civil security both within and beyond its borders, with EUCP playing a more prominent role (Bremberg & Britz 2007)[5].

Broadly outlined, disaster management and civil protection appears not only as a specific policy area, but now as a distinct part of EU security provision. This increasingly complex picture has become a focus of security studies and this paper will attempt to combine these issues of security and the EUCP. The research question that then arises and which provides the basis and rationale for this study, is the extent to which this policy area, originally established as a protection policy space for civilian crisis and disaster management and initially separate from EU security discourse, has evolved to become an essential element in a modern advanced security system.

This research will aim to further inform the debate on securitisation, which is the process of the integration of an issue into a security framework, and how EUCP is viewed within this process. In order to understand the degree of securitisation that may have occurred and to draw on some viable conclusions, the paper will explore the governing logic for the field and test the hypothesis that EUCP has evolved and developed into a crucial feature of EU security and has therefore been successfully securitised.

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[4] Shepherd, A (2015) *The European Security Continuum and the EU as an International Security Provider,* Global Society, 29:2, 156-174.

[5] Bremberg, N & Britz, M (2009), *Uncovering the Diverging Institutional Logics of EU Civil Protection,* Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Associations , vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 288-308, London: Sage Publications.

The first section of this paper, the literature review, will reference the concept of the EU as a security provider, and key developments of EUCP. Once separate from EU security concerns, the changing landscape has caused this policy sector to become part of the wider security provision and will attempt to highlight the context of this shift. Through a critical reading of the securitisation literature, exploring securitisation theories and logics, an appropriate framework for analysis will be developed. The traditional discourse analysis of the Copenhagen School(CoS) will be examined along with the subsequent development of the utilisation of security practices. To further develop this framework, the theoretical foundation of risk - security will be introduced. Risk - security is oriented towards less than existential dangers, promoting long term precautionary governance as opposed to the implementation of exceptional measures (Corry, 2012)[6]. The inclusion of risk - security will aim to present a more refined framework for analysis of EUCP, its current configuration within the European security framework, and better address the research question and hypothesis proposed.

The research methodology is laid out in the second section. The research question and the theoretical frameworks will be outlined from the literature section leading to the formation of a testable hypothesis. The research strategy will also be defined, the sources of information and how the data should be interpreted and applied.

The third section of the paper will serve as the empirical research section and is compromised of a qualitative analysis of documents across a number of areas considered most appropriate to interrogate the intent and direction of the sector. Firstly, the legal frameworks will give evidence of the intent of the European Council and Commission for the sector, while the analysis of policies will give an overview on the direction of governance within these legal frameworks. Finally, the analysis of EUCP actions and practices can determine if the intent of the legal frameworks and policies are being realised.

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[6] Corry, O. (2012), *Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate Change*, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 235-258.

The final section, the analysis - conclusion section of the paper will consider and review the findings of the qualitative research. Reflecting on the theoretical framework and research will allow conclusions to be drawn and provide a basis to answer the research questions and proposed hypothesis. The paper will conclude that EUCP is subject to increasing securitisation, but not through the traditional securitising dynamics. The inclusion of security practices and the risk-security thesis will highlight the shortcomings of the security discourse logic. It will demonstrate how a policy area such as EUCP becomes an important element of the EU security framework and how the securitisation of a policy area can occur that otherwise may be missed.

B. Literature Review

1. Introduction

The literature review is considered a principle step and key tool in every research project. This literature section will aim to establish the background and map the substantive theoretical area for the nature of the research questions proposed. To create a context for the research, the paper will outline key elements of the concept of the EU as a security provider and as well as the emerging EUCP policy sector.

Securitisation theories and logics are a crucial analysis set for the paper and will provide a comprehensive background and framework for analysis. To establish the processes and logics of securitisation, the theoretical framework will first build upon the CoS theory of discursive processes, to identify a security grammar and then include the concept of security practices to establish any instruments of securitisation. To widen the scope of analysis, and enhance the theoretical framework further, the concept of the governance of risk-security, which can otherwise be described as riskification, will also be included. Instruments of riskification and a risk 'grammar' will also be established and identified. In applying the theory and creating this framework it is hoped to better consider the position of EUCP within the security nexus. This will address the research question by identifying any suggestion of securitisation and logics that underpin its development.

2. European Union Security landscape

The EU is seen as a *sui generis* actor on the international stage. EU power has been conceptualised of being along the lines of post - modern, normative and soft. This distinctive approach of the EU is increasingly viewed in terms of a 'Comprehensive Approach' (Barry 2012)[7], where the EU with its variety of capabilities has the potential to address security challenges holistically, something the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) cannot do and the United Nations (UN) currently struggles with (Shepard 2015, p2)[8]. Contemporary EU security policy is reflected through a number of broad policy documents. The recent 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) highlights the

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[7] Barry, L. (2010), *The EU's Comprehensive Approach* , European Security & Defence Series, IIEA , Dublin.

[8] Shepherd, A. (2015) *The European Security Continuum and the EU as an International Security Provider,* Global Society, 29:2, 156-174.

future strategy for the EU on the international stage, while the 2010 - 2014 Internal Security Strategy (ISS) strategy deals with concerns within EU borders. The changing nature and interlinked security threats are recognised by both policy documents. The EUGS states that internal and external security threats are "ever more intertwined" (EUGS, p14) [9], while the ISS states that internal security "cannot exist without the external dimension" and should be systematically addressed as part of EU external policies (EU ISS, p29)[10].

Boin et al (2006)[11] point to this shift towards a 'new' security thinking in the last two decades, based on the broadening of this definition of security along two dimensions.The first is the increased number of perceived threats and the second is the object requiring security has broadened from the state to society including citizens and critical systems that sustain functioning communities.

The 2010 ISS outlines it as follows:

The concept of Internal security must be understood as a wide and comprehensive concept which straddles multiple sectors in order to address these major threats and others which have a direct impact on the lives, safety and well-being of citizens, including natural and man-made disasters such as forest fires, earthquakes, floods and storms.

(European Council 2010, Internal Security Strategy for the European Union)[12]

Consequently, the EU moved from an implicit to an explicit provider of security for Member states, with societal or non-military security concerns emerging to the fore. With these concerns, the ISS identified five key strategic objectives to address;

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[9] European Council (2016) *European Union Global Strategy, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe,* pg 14.

[10] European Council (2010), *Internal Security Strategy for the European Union, Towards a European Security Model,* General Secretariat of the Council, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, pg 29.

[11] Rhinard M, Ekengren M & Boin A, (2006) *The European Union's Emerging Protection Space: Next Steps for Research and Practice,* Journal of European Integration, 28:5, 511-527.

[12] European Council (2010), *Internal Security Strategy for the European Union, Towards a European Security Model,* General Secretariat of the Council, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. pg 8.

1) International Crime Networks

2) Terrorism

3) Cybersecurity

4) Border Control

5) Resilience to crises and disasters

The ISS views the EUCP as a vital element of the desired European Security model in tacking these issues and refers to its importance:

In this day and age, civil protection systems represent an essential element of any modern and advanced security system..... we have chosen a security model which integrates action on law enforcement and judicial cooperation, border management and civil protection.

(European Council 2010, Internal Security Strategy for the European Union : 14,19)[13]

2.1 Definiton

It is important at this point to define and clarify this protection oriented policy area. The concept of civil protection embraces a broad and encompassing definition but is synonymous with security, defence and protection of citizens (Bossong & Hegemann 2015, p6)[14].

There is no formal EU definition of civil protection, however a European Council decision, states civil protection shall;

.... cover primarily people, but also the environment and property, including cultural heritage, against all kinds of natural and man-made disasters, including environmental disasters, marine pollution and acute health emergencies, occurring inside or outside the Union.

(European Council 2013 Council Decision 1313/2013/EU)[15]

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[13] European Council (2010), *Internal Security Strategy for the European Union, Towards a European Security Model,* General Secretariat of the Council, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

[14] Bossong, R., Hegemann, H (2015) Chapter 1 *'European Civil Security Governance - Towards a New Comprehensive Policy Space?'* In Bossong, R., Hegemann, H (Ed.) European Civil Security Governance London: Palgrave Macmillan pp 1-23.

[15] European Council (2013) *Council Decision 1313/2013/EU 17 December 2013,* Official Journal of the European Union.

Without a formal definition, some member states have advanced the concept of civil security to describe their ambitions to reform their crisis and disaster management systems. The Swedish Association of Civil Security define civil security as 'the ability of society to handle antagonistic or non-antagonistic threats with a significant impact on the functioning of society' (Swedish Association of Civil Security, 2016)[16], while the French Interior Ministry views civil security as taking place 'on all fronts' and for 'all types of disasters' (France Ministry of Interior, 2011)[17]. It is therefore argued that civil security can relate to the notions of risk management, governance and resilience that appear to have been developed as a universally applicable panacea for management of diverse crises and hazards (Bossong & Hegemann 2015, p7)[18]. With no agreement on the definition of these terms by policy makers, this paper will use the terms civil protection and civil security interchangeably.

It is important to delineate the concept of civil security from the EU's CFSP and the AFSJ. While the CFSP is the EU's foreign policy for security and defence diplomacy actions, the AFSJ deals with home affairs and justice ensuring security, rights and free movement. Civil security as previously outlined can be affiliated to both but does not adequately correlate to either. The debate that then arises around security in this area revolves around two perceptions; the desire to 'democratise' or 'civilise' the practices of security for societal benefits or it can be interpreted as another indicator of the securitisation of aspects of 'civil' life, with the resulting claims of the need for the political authority to provide protection (Bossong & Hegemony 2015, p4)[19].

This 'spillover' between these two concepts prompts the research questions for the paper and the extent to which a policy area originally separate from EU security discourse has evolved to become an essential element of a modern advanced security system. To understand where the EUCP policy sector belongs within this security nexus, it is important to briefly highlight some key developments in the following sections.

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[16] Swedish Association of Civil Security (2016). *Swedish Association of Civil Security.* (4 June 2016)

[17] France Ministry of Interior (2011).*The Ministry of Civil Security.* (4 June 2016)

[18] Bossong, R., Hegemann, H (2015) Chapter 1 *'European Civil Security Governance - Towards a New Comprehensive Policy Space?'* In Bossong, R., Hegemann, H (Ed.) European Civil Security Governance London: Palgrave Macmillan pp 1-23.

[19] ibid

3. European Civil Protection Policy Sector

3.1 Key Development Points

The foundation of EUCP cooperation started after a 1985 Rome environmental ministerial meeting agreed to investigate a community role for improving collective response to natural disasters (Rhinard 2015, p 259)[20]. Initially viewed as a liaison and co-operation forum between national experts, it stressed the need to improve mutual aid and assistance between member states in the event of natural or technological disasters (Morsut 2014)[21]. The initial EU Civil Protection Mechanism (CPM) was established in 2001. It developed previous practices into a more formal framework for cooperation, while promoting co-ordination among national civil protection authorities across Europe (ECHO 2016)[22].

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty amended the Treaty of Rome, known, in updated form as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)[23], finally recognised EUCP as a treaty based article, ART 196. It was established as an area of 'shared competence' between the EU and member states and subtly shifted the balance power to the European Commission. Subsequently, two main developments occurred; firstly, to improve synergies and coordination between policy areas of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, the Commission decided EUCP would merge with the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid, becoming the Directorate for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DGECHO) in 2010. Secondly, the Commission also enacted a new CPM in 2013. Changes in the new CPM provided for further integration of crisis management capabilities and now included a formal external response Article (European Council,1313/2013/EU)[24] allowing EUCP to formally engage on the international stage. This linked it to the wider task of promoting peace and civil security beyond EU borders.

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[20] Rhinard, M (2015) Chapter 12 'Who cares? The relevance of EU Crisis Cooperation for EU Scholars' In Bossong, R., Hegemann, H (Ed.) European Civil Security Governance London: Palgrave Macmillan pp 256-277.

[21] Morsut, C. (2014), The EU's Community Mechanism for Civil Protection: Analysing Its Development. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 22: 143–149.

[22] Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (2016) EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Brussels.

[23] European Council (2012) Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012/C 326/01, Official Journal of the European Union

[24] European Council (2013) Council Decision 1313/2013/EU 17 December 2013, Official Journal of the European Union.

As previously discussed, one of the key objectives of the ISS was to link resilience to crises and man made disasters with internal security. The 2013 *Second Report on the Implementation of the EU Internal Security Strategy* developed these into a concrete set of prescriptions and outlined three major issues relating to future EUCP development (COM (2013)179 final)[25]:

1) It highlighted the opening of DG ECHO's monitoring and information centre the Emergency Response Centre (ERCC) and the Migration and Home Affairs Directorate's (DG HOME), Strategic Analysis and Response Centre (STAR), encouraging new synergies for security assessments and practices to be established. This was the first time the two centres were linked in any official discourse.

2) It called for the first 'cross-sectoral EU overview of natural and man-made disasters', now linking ECHO and the ERCC to the spectrum of EU internal security providers.

3) It acknowledged the concerns of some member states in sharing national risk assessments and information, and advocated the establishment of a legal framework treating such information as *classified* and restricting public access.

The development of these issues was reiterated in the 2014 *Final Internal Security Strategy Implementation* report. The implementation of the *Solidarity Clause,* Art 222 of the Lisbon Treaty was jointly proposed by the EU Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), which became the new umbrella framework of response for member states who are the 'object of terrorist attack or the victim of man-made disasters' (JOIN (2012)39 final)[26].

From the key points highlighted, the development of EUCP and civil security has progressed into an essential component of EU security framework provision. Its role has

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[25] European Commission COM(2013)179 Final, *Second Report on the implementation of the EU Internal Security Strategy*, Brussels.

[26] European Commission JOIN(2012)39 Final, *Joint Proposal on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the Solidarity Clause*, Brussels.

also evolved beyond the EU's border, coordinating with Humanitarian Aid and the crisis management structures of the EEAS on military and civilian operations. The extent of this integration into the security framework is the main thesis of this paper. Before this can be empirically tested, it will be useful to explore the theories of securitisation.

4. Securitisation Theories

Security, regarded as a contested concept, is essentially about survival. Security analysis considers the actors involved in security processes, the existential threats and the designated referent objects, such as a state, territory or society (Buzan et al 1998)[27].

During the Cold War the military - political consensus prevailed in security studies as the legitimate objects of consideration. In this context of International Relations, security was seen as survival against military threats to citizens of a state or community of states in an anarchic international system (Milner 1991)[28]. With the end of the Cold War in 1989 this narrative lost its force and the narrow focus on military security needed revision (Huysmans 2006)[29]. Therefore, a new focus on security emerged, no longer on states but on society. A wider range of issues and referent objects were now considered as part of the field (Buzan 1993)[30]. This reconfiguration also led to wider discussions and implications relating to the processes of securitisation in both discursive and non-discursive practices.

The benchmark framework in securitisation research, was proposed by Waever and Buzan in collaboration with other researchers, collectively known as the Copenhagen School. They proposed that security depends more on the framing of security practices through discursive processes, rather than on the nature of the threat, and is guided mainly by the logic of exception. Academics such as Didier Bigo took an alternative approach to securitisation processes, arguing that discursive patterns were not sufficient enough to

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[27] Buzan, B., Waever, O. & Wilde, J (1998) *Security: a new framework for analysis,* Lynne Rienner Pub, Boulder, Colo;London, pg 21.

[28] Milner, H. (1991) T*he Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique.* Review of International Studies 17.1 (1991): 67-85.

[29] Huysmans, J. (2006) *The politics of insecurity: fear, migration and asylum in the EU,* Routledge, London.

[30] Buzan, B., (1993) *The changing security agenda in Europe.* In O. Wæver (Eds.) Identity, migration, and the new security agenda in Europe. London: Pinter Publishers, pp. 1-14.

understand how security operates. Bigo contended that to better understand the process, the conditions of security practices, the physical, technical and material routines should be considered(Balzacq et al 2010)[31]. These were identified as the logic of routines. It will be the approach of this paper to combine both of these perspectives, official discourses and policies on one hand and the practices and actions of EUCP on the other, to establish if differences exist between the official intent and the operational application.

5. Copenhagen School of Security Studies

5.1 Logic of exception

The CoS was one of the first groups to to draw attention to this concept of logics in the field of security. It argues that as a relative value, absolute security as unattainable, dependant on the vulnerability of the threatened and the intensity of the threat (Waever 1993)[32]. Accordingly, security is not treated as an objective but as a socially constructed event (Nieman 2014, Leonard 2010)[33]. Therefore researchers should study the processes through which an issue becomes socially constructed and recognised as a security threat.

Buzan *et al* suggest that security is not bound by an issue, but a logic :

We seek to find coherence not by confining security to the military sector but by exploring the logic of security itself to find out what differentiates security and the process of securitisation from what is merely political.

(Buzan et al 1998: 4-5)[34]

Accordingly, for the CoS general logic of securitisation, a securitising move comes into being through a fixed unit of analysis, a discursive process or 'speech act', through a

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[31] Balzacq T, Tugba B, Bigo D, Emmanuel-Pierre G and Olson C (2010) *Security Practices,* International Studies Encyclopedia Online. Denmark, Robert A. Blackwell Publishing.

[32] Waever, O. (1993) Identity, migration and the new security agenda in Europe, Pinter, London.

[33] Niemann A, Schmidthäussler N. (2014). *The Logic of EU Policy-Making on Migration: Securitisation or Risk?,* 2014/01. Paper No. 6. Mainz: Chair of International Relations, Johannes Gutenberg University.

Léonard, S. (2010) *EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitisation through practices,* European Security, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 231-254.

[34] Buzan, B., Waever, O. & Wilde, J (1998) *Security: a new framework for analysis,* Lynne Rienner Pub, Boulder, Colo;London.

securitising actor. The issue itself is not defined by uttering the word *security*, as the CoS proposes a 'grammar' of security: a securitising actor identifies, to an audience, an existential threat to a valued referent object. The issue only becomes fully securitised when the audience, to which the speech act is directed, accepts it as such.

The securitisation of an issue then allows the successful securitising actor to use emergency or exceptional measures and actions outside of the normal bounds of political procedure:

Security the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.

(Buzan et al 1998: 23)[35]

Thus the CoS understanding of securitisation is centred on the discourse. There are no security issues in themselves, only issues that have been securitised through securitising speech acts. But it leaves unanswered the question who may be the securitising actor.

However, by labelling the issue as a security issue, accepted by the relevant audience, the securitising actor can gain a number of advantages. It can move the issue into a special realm, legitimising exceptional measures to ensure survival and control, but it is also an effective means of drawing attention to that issue and prioritising it over other competing agendas. By combating existential threats by exceptional measures, it re-inscribes the threat in a different logic, the logic of exception (Aradau 2004)[36].

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[35] Buzan, B., Waever, O. & Wilde, J (1998) *Security: a new framework for analysis,* Lynne Rienner Pub, Boulder, Colo;London.

[36] Aradau, C. (2004) *Security and the democratic scene: desecuritization and emancipation.* Journal of International Relations and Development, 7(4), pp. 388-413.

5.2 Logic of Routine

The work of the CoS provoked much debate and comment as various academics further developed and refined this primary framework. Much of the critique of the CoS speech act processes is that it becomes too oriented towards discursive practices. It ignores context, and neglects the study of the conditions for the performances and effects of these narratives and the practices of actors involved (Balzacq et al 2010, p2)[37].

The development of this approach, with the emphasis on security practices, was led by scholars such as Didier Bigo. He argues that it is possible to securitise issues without speech or discourse as the practical work, discipline and expertise are as important as the forms of discourse. He views security as not necessarily about survival or urgency but as largely defined by bureaucratic decisions and practices. These can create a sense of insecurity and unease used by security professionals to increase the pressure for action (Bigo 2002)[38]. In security studies this became known as the logic of routine. This sees securitisation as a process of establishing and inscribing meaning through the process of governance. This occurs through a series of routinised and patterned practices carried out by bureaucrats and security professionals in which technology can also hold a prominent place (Bourbeau 2014, p190)[39].

In contrast to the CoS, Bigo's fixed units of analysis are the security professionals whose practices he studies. However he fails to clearly define or identify these actual securitising practices. This was taken up by Balzacq (2008)[40], who moves away from the term practices and uses the concept of an 'instrument' of securitisation.

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[37] Balzacq T, Tugba B, Bigo D, Emmanuel-Pierre G and Olson C (2010) *Security Practices,* International Studies Encyclopedia Online. Denmark, Robert A. Blackwell Publishing.

[38] Bigo, D. (2002) *Security and immigration: Toward a critique of the governmentality of unease,* Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 27, no. 1S, pp. S63.

[39] Bourbeau, P. (2014) *Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process,* Millennium - Journal of International Studies, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 187-206.

[40] Balzacq, T. (2008) *The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies,* JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 75-100.

Policy tools are viewed as powerful strategies for harmonising what otherwise remans highly disputed, both in terms of what is at stake and what ought to be done (Balzacq 2008, p78)[41]. He defines an instrument of securitisation as an identifiable social and technical *dispositif* or device embodying a specific threat image through which public action is configured in order to address a security issue and distinguishes four main features of a securitising instrument (Balzacq 2008, p79,80)[42]:

1) Security Instruments do not construct a threat but are built to curb an already existing threat.

2) The instrument has defining features that align it with others but design traits that can make it unique.

3) The instrument can reconfigure public action, the aim of which is to address issues identified as threats.

4) The instrument can embody a specific image of a threat and what should be done about it.

There is also a broader view to consider on instruments of securitisation. They are not only a technical solution to a problem but can also be political and symbolic actions. Security instruments have technical attributes. Why they are chosen, how they operate, evolve and their consequences, have political and symbolic attributes that inform citizens of the collective perceptions of the securitising actors (Balzacq 2011, p17)[43]. Therefore the key idea to draw from Balazcq's research is that securitising practices are activities that, by their very qualities, convey the idea to those that observe them that the issues being tackled are security threats. Applying this to the case of EUCP means that securitising practices can be defined as activities that convey the idea that natural or man-made disasters are now deemed a security threat to the EU.

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[41] ibid

[42] ibid

[43] Balzacq, T.(2011) *Securitization theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve,* Routledge, London.

Broadly speaking Balazcq relates security practices into two kinds of instruments; regulatory and capacity .

5.3 Regulatory Instruments

Regulatory Instruments, are often viewed as political and symbolic actions as they seek to normalise the behaviour of the target actors. They aim to influence the behaviour of these actors by permitting or prohibiting certain practices and can also promote certain perceptions of threat. Regulatory instruments relate to the processes of governance, but what makes them relevant is that they often provide the framework within which capacity instruments can operate.

5.4 Capacity Instruments

Capacity Instruments call for enablement of skills; that is, skills that allow individuals, groups, and agencies to make decisions and carry out activities which have a reasonable probability of success. They are instruments that impose external discipline upon groups and include things such as information, training, force or any necessary resource or system to attain the policy purpose.

In summary, the CoS security speech model, emphasises the creation not the construction of security issues. This understanding was further developed by Bigo and others, with security viewed as a performance practice, embedding securitisation in circumstances that actually then facilitates its realisation. There are many ways to consider the interactions and sequential understanding of these logics. We could postulate that security speech acts can initiate a securitisation process, while the practices 'lock in' a degree of securitisation. Alternatively security practices maybe implemented before security discourses, and the subsequent discourse legitimises any pre-existing situation. Bourbeau (2014, p195)[44] argues that highlighting the primacy of one logic over the other requires a constant demarcation between discourses and practices throughout analyses. He contends that given the social world of feedback and interaction, the logics interact with each other in a

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[44] Bourbeau, P. (2014) *Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process,* Millennium - Journal of International Studies, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 187-206.

complex and wide range of ways. Thus the logics should not be viewed separately but as reinforcing each other. Therefore, for a more clear and comprehensive picture, the empirical section of this paper will investigate both logics of exceptionalist discourse and routinised security practices to indicate the extent of any securitising processes that may be occurring.

6. Risk Security

6.1 Logic of Risk

The final framework of analysis for conceptualising the characteristics of EUCP will be applied through the logic of risk. Risk theorists such as Foucault and Bourdieu were some of the first to observe trends in western societies that supposed a constant state of everyday dangers as opposed to traditional singular existential threats. This concept of everyday dangers or risk gained momentum in several academic fields in the 1990s and years later gradually found its way into security studies (Beck 2006; Cory 2010)[45]. Corry (2010)[46] proposed that traditional western security threat - defence models were being steadily replaced by risk management models. He argues this represents a new security thinking, implying the previously applied CoS security 'grammar' may need revision.

Beck (2006, p 332)[47] argues that modern societies, which he terms as risk societies, are increasingly occupied with debating, preventing and managing risk that they themselves have produced. Although threats and insecurity have always been a feature of human existence the characteristics of risk have come to the fore due to modern politics, technologies and processes. Risk is then seen to act as a securitisation multiplier, activating processes and technologies in the face of uncertainty (Corry 2012 , p236)[48].

[45] Corry, O. (2010) *Securitzation and "Riskization": Two Grammars of Security.* In 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference.

Beck, U. (2006) *Living in the world risk society, Economy and Society,* vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 32

[46] Corry, O. (2010) *Securitzation and "Riskization": Two Grammars of Security.* In 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference.

[47] Beck, U. (2006) *Living in the world risk society, Economy and Society,* vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 32

[48] Corry, O. (2012), *Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate Change,* Millennium - Journal of International Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 235-258.

However, if risks and threats have qualitatively different logics, securitisation as theorised by the CoS would be transformed. This implies that risk is not an instance of securitisation but something with its own distinct advantages and dangers. Similarly to securitisation, riskification captures the idea of constructing issues politically, but in terms of risk. Distinguishing between risk and security this puts risk logic on an equal theoretical footing with the CoS rather than as supplementary version of security.

6.2 Risk Characteristics

The infusion of risk thinking into the security field has modified the question of survival that many security practices confront as threats. Although risks can be catastrophic, it loosens security from the level of existential threats. This makes the essential difference from securitisation theory, which centres around existential threats and survival. Risks are therefore seen as different to threats, because of their lack of immediacy.

For Beck the distinction between risk and catastrophe is the key to understanding of risk :

Risk does not mean catastrophe. Risk means the anticipation of catastrophe. They exist in a virtual state and area only topical to the extent that they are anticipated.

(Beck 2005, p 332)[49]

Consequently, risks refer to future events, developments that threaten in the future that maybe become real. The public accepts measures taken in anticipation of future events as long as they believe the risk is real. Risks by their nature cannot be eradicated but only managed. The emergency measures and exceptionality suggested by securitisation theory gives way to a precautionary element of rational management and control as an attempt to govern the ungovernable. Corry (2012, p245)[50] summarises risk-security as the decoupling of security from the idea of an existential threat and replacing the criteria of emergency and exceptional politics with a governmental policy of longer-term societal engineering.

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[49] Beck, U. (2006) *Living in the world risk society, Economy and Society,* vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 32

[50] Corry, O. (2012), *Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate Change,* Millennium - Journal of International Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 235-258.

Despite these differences with security logics, Corry (2012, p245)[51] highlights the presence of a precautionary risk *dispositif*. Similar to the previously outlined security *dispositif*, the risk *dispositif* identifies an issue with the characteristics of risk. These are primarily dealt with through routine bureaucratic and governance techniques but also through the use of force if required. Utilising Balazcq's technique on security instruments, four characteristics to a risk instrument can be inferred:

1) Risk Instruments do not construct a threat but are built to curb possible future threats.
2) The instrument has defining features that align it with others but design traits that can make it unique.
3) The instrument can reconfigure public action, the aim of which is to address issues identified as a risk.
4) The instrument can embody a specific image of a risk and what should be done about it.

Given these characteristics of risk-security, Corry (2012)[52] broadly adopts the CoS set of discursive rules for defining risk security which can help identify a distinct logic of a speech act that turns issues into questions of risk. The issue of riskificaiton is also not simply defined by proclaiming the words *risk,* but by a similar model of rules for risk 'grammar' which he argues helps distinguish between risks and threats.

Accordingly, in riskification, the would-be riskifying actor need not point to a specific or existing threat but to the existence of the possibility of future harmful events. The locus of security action then also changes. The plan with securitisation is to defend the referent object against a threat, whereas riskification implies a plan to govern the conditions of possibility for harm. The referent object itself becomes the target of governance rather than defence. The final element in the grammar of risk security concerns the political effects. Securitisation focus on direct causes, tending to urgency, short-termism and tackling external sources of danger. Risk security, however, is characterised by precautionary logic. This leads to preventive and pre-emptive strategies, promoting longer

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[51] ibid

[52] ibid

term thinking and investment in governance capabilities aimed at reducing vulnerabilities and improving capacities.

7. Summary

In summary, the CoS approach to securitisation processes privileges discourse, while the approach pioneered by Bigo emphasises the role of practices. As highlighted by Leonard (2011)[53], when considering a persistent or recurring threat, a singular focus on discourse will overlook the existence of any security dynamics which could potentially be revealed by the analysis of practices. Therefore it will be the approach of this paper to combine both, as this strategy should reveal any differences between official discourses and policies as against practices and routines. As the EUCP has been shaped by trends in development over time, this will be particularly relevant to the analysis within this paper. Even the CoS would also acknowledge that there are circumstances when a security logic is at play even though no formal discourse has occurred in the public arena (Buzan et al 1998, p28)[54]. This specifically occurs in the *sui generis* EU context. The unique political and institutional set up has no formal government or unique set of solely European citizens, and security discourses are rarely reported or discussed in public at an EU level.

It is therefore necessary to include the role of practices to adequately assess the extent of any securitisation of the area. The inclusion of risk - security theory increasingly reflects modern security practices revolving around prevention, probabilities and future scenarios rather then deterrence and defence against acute threats. This shift to risk - security reflects a post-modernist approach, supported in Beck's (2006)[55] risk society thesis, and is shaping contemporary strategies by which western governments seek to achieve security. At the same time, this shift does not yet appear to be reflected in the CoS theory concerning security and securitisation.

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[53] Léonard, S. (2010) *EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitisation through practices,* European Security, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 231-254.

[54] Buzan B, Waever O & Wilde J (1998) *Security: a new framework for analysis,* Lynne Rienner Pub, Boulder, Colo;London.

[55] Beck, U. (2006) *Living in the world risk society, Economy and Society,* vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 32

Corry (2012, p249)[56], further built on this concept and captured the debate in tabular form as shown.

Language game	Securitisation (security politics)	Riskification (risk politics)
Grammar	Construction of scenario of direct harm (an existential threat) to a valued referent object.	Construction of conditions of possibility of harm (a risk) to a governance-object.
Political imperative	Plan of action for defence against threat, that is external to referent object.	Plan of action to increase governance and resilient of referent object.
Performative effects	Legitimation of exceptional measures (secrecy, no-holds-barred action, no trade-offs with security) aiming for survival.	Legitimation of precautionary measures, i.e. inclusion of a safety margin.

Table 1 : Grammars of Security
Source : Olaf Corry : Securitisation and Riskification, 2012

With the continuing increase of this approach of governance through risk, the inclusion of risk security will better reflect the analysis of EUCP, drawing better comparisons and relevance to 'traditional' security analysis. This will be the focus of the next section on the paper.

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[56] Corry, O. (2012), *Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate Change*, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 235-258.

C. Theoretical Framework & Research Methodology

1. Introduction

This section serves as an overview of the research background to the paper. The rationale, research questions and hypothesis of the study will be defined. Based on the preceding literature review, the theoretical framework and research strategy for the empirical analysis will be outlined. Finally, the sources of information, and how the data should be interpreted and applied will also be noted.

2. Rationale / Research Questions

The rationale for the study is based on the following premises:

- With the emerging role of the EU and the hazards of an interdependent and networked world, transboundary crises are now widespread narratives at a national and EU level. The inevitable need for cooperative crisis management structures can be seen as a strong case for research and understanding in light of continuing EU cooperation (Rhinard 2015, p 274)[57].

- The EU is a unique security actor pursing a unique set of goals. Civil security now encompasses societal concerns and threats with a direct impact on citizens. This has seen a legitimisation of the EU as a security provider (Rhinard 2015, p267)[58]. Therefore the security steering aspects of the EU, and potential for securitisation of such issues requires exploration.

- The concept of Beck's (2006)[59] modern risk society, and the infusion of risk-security into modern security practices, challenges traditional security thinking and warrants its inclusion for the exploration and analysis of EUCP policies and activities.

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[57] Rhinard, M. (2015) Chapter 12 *'Who cares? The relevance of EU Crisis Cooperation for EU Scholars'* In Bossong, R., Hegemann, H (Ed.) European Civil Security Governance London: Palgrave Macmillan pp 256-277.

[58] ibid

[59] Beck, U. (2006) *Living in the world risk society, Economy and Society,* vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 32

- The basis on which cooperation occurs, and the institutional logics that underpin this area, need to be defined, in order that future implications for the EU and member states in Civil security is clear.

Following this rationale and utilising a security governance approach, the following research questions arise :

1. What is the extent, if any, of securitisation of the EUCP policy area?
2. What are the governing logics that underpin EUCP and its development?

A testable hypothesis can then be created to justify the purpose of this study and is founded on the proposition that *the evolving concept of security has enabled the successful securitisation of EUCP.*

3. Methodology and Research Design

The research methodology for the paper will use a qualitative approach, where the researcher takes a holistic view, analysing and reflecting to make sense of the evidence. Tracy (2013, p3)[60] highlights the core concepts of qualitative analysis as context and thick description. Accordingly, researchers should immerse themselves in the evidence being aware of the context and particular circumstances to allow a move towards grander statements and theories. However, they must also be aware of their own subjectivity in interpreting the evidence. This paper will also take an inductive approach to the research. The detection of patterns and meanings from the data of evidence and observations collated will enable a testing of the hypothesis and conclusions to be drawn.

To probe for the prevalence of patterns of securitisation or riskification a number of select areas and processes will be subject to this qualitative approach. Three main fields will be examined. Firstly, legal frameworks will be considered to reveal official intent and direction on behalf of the EU Council and EU Commission. Secondly, policy documents, official discourse and communication from relevant bodies will be included to show the

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[60] Tracy, S.J. (2013;2012) *Qualitative research methods: collecting evidence, crafting analysis, communicating impact,* edn, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, West Sussex, UK.

implementation of the official intent, into an operating policy framework. Finally, the actions will be examined to determine how the legal frameworks and policies are put into effect and how the EUCP effectively operates.

The system of analysis is based on the theoretical framework of the literature review and will also guide its selection. The central theme to the qualitative analysis within the documents will be the search for the logic of exception's 'grammar' code and the logic of routine's instruments that can distinguish either a security or risk logic.

From research, the reference points or indicators for the 'grammar' code will include the following; *threats, referent objects, threat management and anticipated consequences.*

- *Threat* indicator will look for unwanted danger. Specific, direct and existential perceptions will indicate a security logic, while a more vague, indirect and general danger will indicate a risk logic.

- *Referent object* will probe for the affected actor or subject of the highlighted *threat*. This is key to the security speech act. It will be considered that the involvement of a specific actor or subject such as an EU member state or grouping would suggest a security logic. Conversely, an absence or vague reference to such as 'the EU' would imply a risk logic (Niemann & Schmidthäussle 2014)[61].

- *Threat management* highlights the nature of measures taken in response to the *threat* indicator. A security logic views the *threat* as uncontrollable and should be eliminated. Measures, generally taken over the short term are exceptional or extraordinary actions which become legitimatised to deal with the *threat*. On the other hand the risk logic constructs *threats* as part of a governable process. This process is usually over a longer term, possibly with open ended operations that become institutionalised and part of the everyday governance process (Corry 2012)[62].

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[61] Niemann A, Schmidthäussler N. (2014). *The Logic of EU Policy-Making on Migration: Securitisation or Risk?*, 2014/01. Paper No. 6. Mainz: Chair of International Relations, Johannes Gutenberg University.

[62] Corry, O. (2012), *Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate Change*, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 235-258.

- *Anticipated consequences* can reveal the desired intent of the *threat management* actions. Security actions, constructed as reactive actions to existential *threats,* ultimately aim to maintain the status quo. Risk logic defines problems according to anticipated future consequences, regardless if they materialise. Therefore precautionary measures such as risk assessments and resource pooling are applied to manage potential future events of varying magnitude are indicative of a risk logic (Niemann & Schmidthäussler 2014)[63].

4. Sources and Data Evaluation

As the focus of research relies on official discourse and policy, the research material will be mix of both primary and secondary sources from official EU publications, reports and press releases. A total of 34 documents have been reviewed. The official Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection website provided the bulk of the content analysis of official texts, policy and strategy documents, including information on EUCP operational activities and actions. Relevant EU Council and EU Commission regulations and communications have also been collated for review and analysis.

Given the launch of the ISS in 2010 and the impetus and unfolding of policy in the intervening period, it seems an appropriate and reasonable time period from which to limit the analysis. Therefore the period of study will cover the time from the publication of the ISS in 2010 to the completion of the empirical analysis.

The official nature of the research material means reliability and validity can be assured. The material can be expected to reveal patterns and the 'grammar' code of securitisation and/or riskification, enabling an answer to the proposed research questions. Nonetheless, caution is required, as 'real world' information may be more ambiguous and inconsistent then expected. However, even within the limitations of this paper, the research findings should reveal the trends and bias towards a conclusion for either pattern.

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[63] Niemann A, Schmidthäussler N.(2014). *The Logic of EU Policy-Making on Migration: Securitisation or Risk?,* 2014/01. Paper No. 6. Mainz: Chair of International Relations, Johannes Gutenberg University.

D. Empirical Research (3341)

1. Introduction

The preceding section highlighted the indicators for the security and risk grammar code. This empirical research section will highlight the relevant characteristics under the relevant headings as drawn from official discourse and policy documents.

2. Indicators

2.1 *Threat*

This first indicator plays a distinctly negligible role in the documents. While acknowledging the 2010 ISS is a broad policy document, it outlines five common *threats* and challenges but in a high-level and non-specific context, identifying the areas of terrorism, organised crime, border management, cybercrime and natural and man-made disasters. Subsequent implementation and strategy reports do expand on the details of these anticipated dangers, but they are never presented in any direct or existential manner requiring elimination :

The EU is exposed to an array of potential crises and disasters, such as those associated with climate change and those caused by terrorist and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, hostile or accidental releases of disease agents and pathogens, sudden flu outbreaks and failures in infrastructure.

(European Commission COM(2010)673 Final, p13)[64]

In the documents reviewed, identifiable *threats* are a rare instance. However, those vague identifiable *threats,* are presented as governable dangers to be managed through improved cooperation and risk management. The lack of a clear, existential or specific *threat* can be attributed towards a risk logic.

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[64] European Commission COM(2010)673 Final, *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe,* Brussels.

The complexity and scope of these challenges require a comprehensive approach to the assessment of risks, preparation of forecasts, and prevention, preparedness and mitigation. This requires the joining up of the different policies, instruments and services available to the EU and Member States.

(European Commission COM(2011)790 Final, p8)[65]

The EU's main tool in Civil Protection operations, the CPM, is also particularly vague on direct identifiable *threats*. It briefly highlights the increase in the broad range of 'natural and man-made disasters, environmental, marine and acute health emergencies' (European Council,1313/2013/EU)[66]. Understandably, this allows the CPM to keep its operation and activation open to all type of crises, but places a clear emphasis on 'improving effectiveness of systems for preventing, preparing and responding for crises' (European Council,1313/2013/EU)[67]. This can be ascribed as a risk logic characteristic.

Two rare occasions of identifiable *threats* were noted as affecting societal security. Both climate change and contributing external factors, such as the current migration crisis, are highlighted as specific threats. They distinctly feature more prominently in documents from 2013 onwards, with the linking of internal with external security specifically noted in the proposed 2015 - 2020 Renewed Internal Security Strategy[68]. They are also recognised in Council Regulation (2016/369) *for the provision of emergency support within the union,* where direct impact on member states economies is noted:

The impact of both man-made and natural disasters within the Union is increasingly severe. This is linked to a number of factors, such as climate change, but also to other contributing external factors and circumstances which are unfolding in the Union's neighbourhood. The migration and refugee situation currently affecting the Union is a notable example of a situation where, despite the efforts undertaken by the Union to address the root causes located in third countries, the economic situation of Member States may be directly affected.

(European Council (EU) 2016/369)[69]

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[65] European Commission COM(2011)790 Final, *First Annual Report on the implementation of the EU Internal Security Strategy,* Brussels.

[66] European Council (2013) *Council Decision 1313/2013/EU 17 December 2013,* Official Journal of the European Union.

[67] ibid

[68] European Council (2014) *Development of a renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy,* Council Conclusions, General Secretariat of the Council, Press Office, 4 Dec 2014.

[69] European Council (2016) *Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369 March 2016,* Official Journal of the European Union.

In this case, a concrete *threat* has been identified and presented with the potential for a direct effect on member states economies. This was one of the only *threat* cases found supporting the logic of securitisation.

In summary, the documents revealed *threats* mainly in vague and non specific contexts. Climate change and external factors such as the migration situation were the rare direct occurrences remarked on requiring specific EU action. However, contrary to the security logic, no *threat* was presented as existential and immediate in nature, but as variables that should be integrated into a risk management process. In this regard the *threat* indicator is a clear risk logic.

2.2 Referent object

Reviewing for the *referent object* reveals a complete absence of this indicator from the security logic. The documents demonstrate broad references but no negative impact directed at a particular defined actor or object. These are not comparable for the directly affected object required by the security speech act. Despite broad references, there was an interesting categorisation of *referent objects* that could be deduced from the analysis. These groupings start at a state level, covering the EU and Member States, to the societal level of European citizens and societies and finally 'third countries' outside the EU who's stability and security feature more as an EU priority. This last point is illustrated by the CPM as it also covers 6 participating states from outside the EU including Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey. The following extracts draws some examples of the state and societal levels of these groupings:

Most Europeans are able to go about their daily lives in relative safety. At the same time, our societies are facing serious security threats that are growing in scale and sophistication.

(European Commission COM(2010)673 Final, p2)[70]

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[70]European Commission COM(2010)673 Final, *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe,* Brussels.

...the emerging and evolving threats and challenges to the internal security require a swift, flexible and operational approach, taking into account risks of any kind to the security of European citizens.

(European Council Conclusion Dec 2014 p2)[71]

The EU is exposed to an array of potential crises and disasters...

The solidarity clause in the Lisbon Treaty introduces a legal obligation on the EU and its Member States to assist each other when a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster.

(European Commission COM(2010)673 Final, p13)[72]

In these examples, EU and Member states are exposed to potential crises, while European citizens are exposed to risks to security and thus they can be identified as *referent objects.*

The security logic requires an existential threat to these *referent objects* whose survival would then be at stake, however this was found not to be the case in the research. The analysis showed that the EU, Member states and the citizens are not fundamentally threatened, but are subject to an array of potential, diffuse and future threats that may or may not occur. The *referent objects* are exposed to 'emerging and evolving threats' that are 'growing in scale and complexity' requiring 'prevention and preparedness' action. This does not display the existential nature of threats requiring immediate action on behalf of the *referent objects,* but rather a steady change in security concerns requiring continuous preventative and governance activity.

The most frequent referent objects found were the EU, the Member States and the European citizens but rarely anything more specific as required by the security logic speech act. Therefore, similarly to the threat indicator, the referent object also represents a risk logic.

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[71] European Council (2014) *Development of a renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy,* Council Conclusions, General Secretariat of the Council, Press Office, 4 Dec 2014.

[72] European Commission COM(2010)673 Final, *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe,* Brussels.

2.3 *Threat management*

Threat management plays a considerable role in the documents and the trend towards the risk logic continues to prevail. The *threats* previously outlined are multi - dimensional, and if the *sui generis* nature of the EU is included, it multiplies the effects of these *threats* in cross sectoral and transboundary natures. It is obvious the EU recognises this as it seeks to develop a comprehensive set of common approaches and actions in response:

These cross-sectoral threats call for improvements to long-standing crisis and disaster management practices in terms of efficiency and coherence. They require both solidarity in response, and responsibility in prevention and preparedness with an emphasis on better risk assessment and risk management at EU level of all potential hazards.

Actions :

1) Solidarity Clause in the Lisbon Treaty
2) Risk Management Policy - Linking threat and risk assessment
3) Link up situation awareness centres
4) Develop European Response Capacity

(European Commission COM(2010)673 Final, p13,14)[73]

Throughout the documents, the scope of improvements in capacity, preparedness, cooperation and solidarity appear continuous, becoming a governance task for agencies and Member states. Governance is also promoted and strengthened with projects and training financed by the EU through Article 20 of the CPM (European Council,1313/2013/EU)[74]. The design is to build resilience to crises and disasters as this became one of the five objectives in implementing the ISS, *Objective 5 - Increase Europe's resilience to crises and disasters* (COM(2010)673 final)[75]. The longer term precautionary nature of response, incorporation and promotion into everyday politics, including the resilience agenda through governance, is clearly an attributable risk logic and not the singular exceptional measures the security logic requires.

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[73] European Commission COM(2010)673 Final, *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe,* Brussels.

[74] European Council (2013) *Council Decision 1313/2013/EU 17 December 2013,* Official Journal of the European Union.

[75] European Commission COM(2010)673 Final, *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe,* Brussels.

One of the requirements of the *threat management* indicator for security is the exceptional measures and norm breaking that maybe required to deal with any proposed *threat.* In this context of compliance with fundamental laws and obligations, there was a complete absence of any exceptional measures proposed. In fact, the opposite proved to be the case. The 2010 ISS establishes security is in itself a basic right, but the common values and principles with which this is achieved, is through respecting fundamental rights, rule of law, privacy and through transparent and accountable security policies (European Council, ISS 2010)[76]. The strategy and agenda documents also commit the actions of the ISS to be based on the EU Charter of Fundamental rights.

The Internal Security Strategy in Action, and the tools and actions for implementing it must be based on common values including the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights as laid down in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

(European Commission COM(2015)185 Final, p3)[77]

Respecting fundamental rights in planning and implementing internal security policies and action has to be seen as a means of ensuring proportionality, and as a tool for gaining citizens' trust and participation. Promoting integration and social inclusion through improved knowledge and acceptance of EU fundamental rights and values should be encouraged.

(European Council Conclusion Dec 2014 p7)[78]

There was no indication of any exceptional measures or actions proposed to legitimise such a response, as the legal mechanisms and the rights of both Member States and individuals are to be enshrined and respected. There was also no sense of any unilateral action to be taken by the EU or a Member State, as one of the guiding principles in case of a crisis was the EU and Member States acting in accordance with the solidarity clause of Article 222 TFEU[79].

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[76] European Council (2010), *Internal Security Strategy for the European Union, Towards a European Security Model,* General Secretariat of the Council, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

[77] European Commission COM(2015)185 Final, *The European Agenda on Security,* Brussels.

[78] European Council (2014) *Development of a renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy,* Council Conclusions, General Secretariat of the Council, Press Office, 4 Dec 2014.

[79] European Council (2012) *Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,* 2012/C 326/01, Official Journal of the European Union.

This is complemented by a specific reference in the ISS and in the enabling legal framework of the CPM :

The Union Mechanism should also contribute to the implementation of Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), by making available its resources and capability as necessary.

(European Council 1313/2013/EU)[80]

The adherence to laws and obligations appears an integral part of actions in dealing with crises and this is done within the spirit of cooperation and solidarity while maintaining Member States and individuals rights. The conventional means of agreements, regulations and rule of law are part of everyday politics and governance and is a consistent theme throughout the documents. These are the characteristics that convey the logic of risk and not the exceptional language of security.

There was also no evidence of any *threat* proposed as being uncontrollable, requiring eradication or the rule of force. While there has been increased cooperation and missions with civilian and military co-ordination, this has been in line the EU's Comprehensive Approach to crises and disasters which ensures military actors understand the *modus operandi* of civil protection or humanitarian aid missions (COM(2015)406 final)[81]. While the EU acknowledges the complexity and severity of future *threats,* it approaches these through longer term governance strategies, resilience and the institutionalisation of practices while utilising the language of risk assessment, preparedness and capacity. These are remarkably strong risk logic characteristics and therefore risk is the dominant logic for *threat management.*

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[80] European Council (2013) *Council Decision 1313/2013/EU 17 December 2013,* Official Journal of the European Union.

[81] European Commission COM(2015)406 Final, *Annual Report on the European Union's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policies and their Implementation in 2014,* Brussels.

2.4 *Anticipated Consequences*

Although *threat management* indicated a risk logic, it was not as clear for the *anticipated consequences* indicator. The preparedness and preventative actions highlight the intent to anticipation of challenges rather than reacting to unfolding events. The development of a risk management policy linking future *threats* and risk assessments to decision making, while also requiring Member states to develop and implement similar subsidiary processes, shows a trend of the EU towards an institutionalised risk management approach at all levels.

In view of the planned establishment of a coherent risk management policy, linking threat and risk assessments to decision making, the Commission, together with Member States, has developed EU risk assessment and mapping guidelines for disaster management, based on a multi-hazard and multi-risk approach, covering in principle all natural and man-made disasters, including the consequences of terrorist acts. By the end of 2011, Member States should have developed national approaches to risk management, including risk analyses.

(First Report on the implementation of the EU Internal Strategy pg 25)[82]

Nonetheless, there were a limited number of recent cases where reactive measures were observed. Where reactive measures are required they can be linked to negative external influences and a presumed general need or exceptional circumstances (Niemann & Schmidthäussler 2014)[83]. The current migration and refugee crisis is a notable example of such a situation where the EU and Member states were not prepared and response capacities were overwhelmed. The reaction to the crisis led to activation of the CPM by 4 states in a short 3 month period (ECHO 2016)[84] but the consequences and scale of impact provoked a new emergency instrument, Council Regulation (2016/369)[85] *for the provision of emergency support within the union* to complement existing provisions.

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[82] European Commission COM(2011)790 Final, *First Annual Report on the implementation of the EU Internal Security Strategy,* Brussels.

[83] Niemann A, Schmidthäussler N.(2014). *The Logic of EU Policy-Making on Migration: Securitisation or Risk?,* 2014/01. Paper No. 6. Mainz: Chair of International Relations, Johannes Gutenberg University.

[84] Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (2016) *Policy Newsletter No. 4 April 2016.* Brussels.

[85] European Council (2016) *Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369 March 2016,* Official Journal of the European Union.

While mutual assistance can be offered under the CPM, it is based on voluntary contributions of resources from Member States. The subtle key change of the new instrument, allows the EU to become independent of contributions and for the first time, allows the Union, if approved by the Council, to react independently to a threatening or overwhelming disaster.

This Regulation should lay down the basis for providing financial support in the event of natural or man-made disasters in respect of which, in a spirit of solidarity, the Union would be better placed than Member States, acting alone and in an uncoordinated manner, to mobilise appropriate levels of financing and use them to implement operations of a potentially life-saving nature in an economic, efficient and effective manner, thereby allowing a more effective action by reason of its scale and complementarity.

(European Council (EU) 2016/369)[86]

Reactive measures were required due to the overwhelming migration crisis. It provoked the EU to create an instrument for emergency support for any exceptional occurrence, giving it any necessary reactive capabilities.

Risk analysis, planning and anticipation for future crises lies at the heart of EUCP. Although some reactive measures have been observed, this policy defines crises according to their future consequences. Therefore the *anticipated consequences* can be described as a risk logic but not completely dominant.

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[86] European Council (2016) *Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369 March 2016,* Official Journal of the European Union.

2.5 Practices

The following section will examine documents for the patterns and practices that convey the idea whether or not the issues being tackled are considered through the security or risk lens. They were investigated also for the existence of regulatory or capacity instruments, and the prominence of technology that could highlight any of these processes.

The resulting review of practices presented a more complicated and interesting contribution to this research. One of the main strategies of the 2010 ISS was to strengthen the EU's response capacity, resulting in three main achievements for the period.

Firstly, the adoption of the CPM legislation in 2014 is undoubtably a regulatory capacity instrument but demonstrates the clear characteristics of a risk instrument. The main design of the CPM as outlined in Article 3 is to curb and reduce the potential effects of future events and achieves this through risk management processes and addressing capacity gaps (European Council,1313/2013/EU)[87]. Another specific objective the CPM promotes is increased public awareness and preparedness, which exhibits another risk instrument characteristic for the reconfiguration of public action to address identified risks.

Despite the risk characteristics of the CPM, there is evidence of securitising practices at play. One of its main achievements was the improvement of the EU's preparedness and response structures. It led to the development of over 50 response modules and teams for intervention and support needs. The modules, designed according to function are required to be interoperable. Response operations are developed through training in scenario building, asset mapping and deployment plans. More recently, in the aftermath of the Ebola crisis, an additional European Medical Corps (EMC) was created with medical teams and resources ready to deploy both inside and outside the EU (ECHO 2016)[88].

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[87] European Council (2013) *Council Decision 1313/2013/EU 17 December 2013*, Official Journal of the European Union.

[88] Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (2016) *Policy Newsletter No. 4 April 2016.* Brussels.

In particular, modules should be capable of working self-sufficiently for a given period of time, be quick to deploy, and interoperable. In order to enhance the interoperability of modules, measures are needed at Union and Member State levels.

(European Council 2014/762/EU)[89]

It also enabled the set up of the Emergency Response Co-ordination Centre (ERCC) which has become the operational hub of the CPM. Operating 24 hours a day it collects information, monitors and deploys teams. It directly links with all participating states, while ensuring co-ordination with similar EU bodies, as it is linked with the situational centres of both border management FRONTEX (FSC) and the EEAS intelligence analysis centre (EU INTCEN). It maps developments based on the information and intelligence it can gather, including the use of EU Copernicus satellite service (COM(2015)406 final)[90]. It also utilises the concept of information security, allowing for the potential transfer of classified information.

Documents and information classified as 'EU CONFIDENTIAL' or higher, shall be transmitted pursuant to special arrangements between the originator and the recipient(s) as set out in Commission Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC.

(European Council 2014/762/EU)[91]

The implementation of the response modules and the ERCC were the other two achievements of the ISS and drastically improved EU capabilities. These are obvious capacity instruments, exhibiting all the hallmarks of securitisation. The concept of pre committed response modules and teams ready for deployment alongside an operational centre gathering situational information, is reminiscent of a framework developed along military structures, traditionally deployed to deal with security threats.

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[89] European Council (2014) *Council Decision 2014/762/EU 16 October 2014*, Official Journal of the European Union

[90] European Commission COM(2015)406 Final, *Annual Report on the European Union's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policies and their Implementation in 2014*, Brussels.

[91] European Council (2014) *Council Decision 2014/762/EU 16 October 2014*, Official Journal of the European Union

The concept of information security, classified information and the increasingly sophisticated technological structures to manage operations and information have only been previously developed to manage more traditional security threats. The linking of the ERCC to other more security oriented situational centres enables better sharing of information and joint threat and risk assessment reports and demonstrates the EU's appreciation of an inclusive networked approach towards the internal security framework.

There should also be consideration for the broader view of the political and symbolic actions by the actors involved in demonstrating the perceptions of the problems. Invoking the solidarity clause provision of Article 222 TFEU to assist Members states who are the victim of natural or man made disaster or terrorist attack, now imposes a legal obligation on the assistance of Members states and the response structures of the CPM. This concept of mandatory participation in an emergency situation is a mechanism reminiscent of another security practice, the solidarity clause of the North Atlantic treaty. EUCP is also involved as a member of the standing EU Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI). This high level group ensures effective operational cooperation and coordination on EU internal security matters and it includes officials from Member states, EURPOL, FRONTEX and the EEAS. The position of EUCP within such a framework shows the consideration it is now given within the internal security framework and seen as having as valid a contribution to EU Internal security as law enforcement and border control agencies.

Those main practices and activities identified were commonly used to address traditional security threats. There are few examples to draw comparisons to the high levels of sophistication, technology and coordination of operations aimed at dealing with such multi-state civil security issues. These practices and activities including the political and symbolic actions of EUCP, can be regarded as securitising practices. They convey the perception that the issues being tackled are considered security threats and have therefore contributed to a degree of securitisation of civil security in the EU.

E. Analysis - Conclusion

1. Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to answer two important questions. It firstly asked; what is the extent of securitisation of the EUCP policy area and secondly what are the governing logics that underpin its development. Based on these questions a testable hypothesis proposed that the evolving concept of security has led to a successful securitisation of EUCP. Both questions and hypothesis were empirically tested through the developed theoretical framework analysing security discourse and practices in the patterns and actions of EUCP. Based on the research in this paper the following conclusions can be drawn:

1) Securitisation focusing on discourse and the logic of exception does not fully capture the EU discourse on EUCP from 2010 onwards. Instead, the dominant pattern of discourse was found to correspond with the notion of risk.
2) Securitising practices through the logic of routine were found to be prevalent throughout the actions and activities of EUCP. These activities were found to contribute to an ongoing process of securitising EU civil security.
3) Subtle shifts in governance have been detected, with the EU taking a more central and proactive role in pursuing and driving a common EUCP agenda.
4) This research highlights challenges to traditional security theories assumptions and approaches. In the face of redefined security concepts, post-modern risk societies, and unique EU institutions, a singular focus on discourse is a limited analysis tool, overlooking other securitising dynamics which must now be considered.

The first research question asked the extent to which securitisation may have occurred. Discourse indicators were largely dominated by risk logic characteristics, while practices clearly demonstrated a securitising nature. With both logics present, it poses an obvious challenge to analysing which holds primacy for any valid conclusion. We should consider Bourbeau's (2014 , p195)[92] approach, that given the social world of feedback, interaction

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[92] Bourbeau, P. (2014) *Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process,* Millennium - Journal of International Studies, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 187-206.

and integration the logics should not be viewed separately, but as a reinforcement to each other. Corresponding with the redefinition of security, this leads to both the practices of risk and security becoming increasingly plural and heterogeneous. The CPM is a prime example, of a risk instrument which advances security practices. Neal (2009)[93] argues much of what is done in the name of security is quiet, technical and unspectacular. Practices become institutionalised through the formation of linkages between policy areas, technologies and security professionals. Huysmans (2006)[94] considers these linkages to constitute a security continuum rather than a separate sphere of security and it was evident in the research that EUCP is considered part of an EU security continuum. Therefore, it can be concluded that the main governance and approach of EUCP primarily operates through risk-security but a securitisation has occurred due to its functional aspects and interaction with other security oriented policy areas.

The second question concerned the logic that underpins EUCP development. The analysis revealed evidence that although EUCP is considered part of an EU security framework, the overall logic is preventive in nature. The strategy includes investment in governance capabilities and capacities, building resilience to future possible events, both within and outside EU borders. Therefore the logic underpinning its development is consistent with a Risk-security model.

In terms of the hypothesis, this paper is proposing that there has been an increasing securitisation of EUCP. By combining both the security discourse process with practices, the analysis has seen differing conclusions emerge. As outlined, critics of the CoS argue that a singular focus on discourse overlooks strategic actions or practices. Previously, security discourse was seen as legitimising the implementation of security practices, however as can be seen from this research, this is not a precondition anymore. Through the practices of EUCP, securitisation occurs not in the traditional sense, but behind a veil, without public justification and traditional dynamics.

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[93] Neal, A.W. (2009) *Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX,* Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 333.

[94] Huysmans, J. (2006) *The politics of insecurity: fear, migration and asylum in the EU,* Routledge, London.

Do these dynamics represent a new type of securitisation? Corry (2012)[95] argues that the infusion of the risk society thesis and governance through risk, into security studies has allowed risk-security measures to become more cumulative and permanent features, leading to Huysman's security continuum. Risk logics, through enabling practices have facilitated the increasing securitisation of policy areas, integrating more policy areas under direct control. Risk is then viewed not as separate to security but essentially as a multiplier of securitisation (Corry 2012 p, 245)[96], covering not just existential threats but all types of dangers, and therefore can be considered a type of 'pre-emptive' security.

It is important to consider the practical implications of these findings. The research has highlighted how EUCP, a civil security policy area, has become an element of the EU's security framework. To understand this, it tested those security approaches that emphasise the processes of securitisation and found challenges to the utility of this approach. It highlighted the importance of now considering security practices and the concept of risk-security as factors. By applying this to EUCP, it was able to determine the securitisation of the policy area that otherwise may have been overlooked.

An important outcome of this approach has been to add to the debate on the understanding on EU security steering aspects. Further research could also be undertaken on the other similar civil security bodies on the EU's COSI committee, such as FRONTEX, EURPOL and the DG HOME and establish if these patterns persist across other civil security units. To offer a more uniformed perspective, further research could also be undertaken on the United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the only other comparable Civil Protection framework and agency.

Much of this paper details happenings at the EU supranational level, however this also has implications for Member states and national decision makers. There is no doubt of the 'uploading' and 'downloading' pressures that can be implicitly or explicitly exerted by the EU. While the predominantly operational advances of EUCP are significant, there are also

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[95] Corry, O. (2012), *Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate Change*, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 235-258.

[96] ibid

notable legal and policy paths developing. How national executives and decision makers adapt national civil security systems in the wake of these developments and unforeseen future crises will require consideration. Understanding the directions and implications of this can allow for better informed decisions to be made.

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