



**DG ECHO**

## **Reports on food security**

Release n° 4 – February 2023

Directorate-General for European Civil  
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

*Civil Protection and  
Humanitarian Aid*



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**DG ECHO**

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## List of Organisations

DG ECHO	Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
DG INTPA	Directorate General for International Partnerships
DG NEAR	Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (UK)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM	International Office for Migration
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Program

## List of acronyms

CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
COHAFA	Council working party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid
CVA	Cash and Voucher Assistance
DREF	Disaster Response Emergency Fund
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EDF	European Development Fund
EiE	Education in Emergencies
ERP	Emergency Response Plan
FSL	Food Security and Livelihoods
GFD	General Food Distribution
GNFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
GRFC	Global Report on Food Crises

HIP	Humanitarian Implementation Plan
HDP	Humanitarian – Development – Peace nexus
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IPC/CH	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basked
MPCT	Multi-purpose Cash Transfer
MSNA	Multi-Sector Needs Assessment
PLW	Pregnant Lactating Women
RHD	Refugee Hosting District
RMRP	Refugee and Migrant Response Plan
RPCA	Food Crisis Prevention Network
RRM	Rapid Response Mechanism
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SMEB	Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket



## Executive summary

**Food security is deteriorating globally** according to recent analyses from the Global Network against Food Crises (GNFC)<sup>1</sup>. There are currently up to 205 million people acutely food insecure and in need of urgent food assistance (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent) across 45 countries, twice as many as in 2016<sup>2</sup>. Around 970 000 people worldwide are projected to face catastrophic conditions of food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2022. Specialised agencies warn that hunger is likely to further increase in the immediate future<sup>43</sup>.

In 2022, food insecurity was exacerbated by the **direct effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine** on the global economy, including on food prices, global supply of grains, as well as on the price of energy and fertilisers. These factors compounded food crises that were already raging due to conflicts, weather extremes (notably droughts and flooding resulting from climate change), and economic shocks due to the fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic.

Despite hunger being already on the rise for the past five years, **funding to address this has been lagging behind**<sup>4</sup>, and the appeals for the main food crises remain severely underfunded<sup>5</sup>. Furthermore, the humanitarian system overly relies on only a limited number of donors.

**Prospects for 2023 are dim**, with several facts indicating that global food security is unlikely to improve in the next months.

EU humanitarian assistance is funded through the European Commission's **Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid** (DG ECHO). It is designed and implemented in a nexus approach, whereby synergies between humanitarian, development and peace actions are actively pursued and absolutely necessary. DG ECHO has **reacted swiftly** and decisively to address the hunger crisis by substantially increasing funding for countries most at risk and stepping-up advocacy efforts.

**In 2022 alone, DG ECHO has allocated up to EUR 950 million for humanitarian food and nutrition assistance, 64% more than in 2021, and almost 90% more than in 2020.** In 2023, DG ECHO aims at increasing or at least maintaining appropriate levels of funding, and is working to mobilise additional funds.

Against this backdrop, the objectives of the present report are threefold. Firstly, to provide information on the situation in the countries and regions considered of maximum concern from a food security perspective. Secondly, to outline DG ECHO's interventions to meet rising humanitarian needs. And lastly, to identify critical needs and opportunities for coordinated action against food insecurity, with a view to scale-up assistance to the populations most in need.

The report encapsulates information collected from DG ECHO's field and geographical desks at the end of January 2023, and is intended to provide a more granular picture of the realities from a field perspective. This knowledge is further complemented with references to public sources of information.

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<sup>1</sup> Global Report on Food Crises mid-year update (13 September 2022) and Hunger Hotspots Report (21 September 2022).

<sup>2</sup> Figure from the latest update of the Global Report on Food Crises (published on 13 September). This figure underestimates the actual needs, as the update covers eight countries less than the previous report (covering 2021). If we add the 2021 figures for these eight countries, the total figure would be above 220 million people.

<sup>3</sup> Global Humanitarian Overview 2023.

<sup>4</sup> Financing Flows and Food Crises (GNFC).

<sup>5</sup> <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/overview/2022>.



This report provides detailed information about 28 countries. These include the six hunger hotspots as identified by the GNFC, namely **Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Nigeria**, as they all have populations facing or projected to face starvation (Catastrophe, IPC/CH Phase 5) and are facing additional stressors that may lead to a further deterioration. Recent IPC/CH analysis (November 2022) reveal the increase of populations in IPC/CH phase 5 in Burkina Faso, and also foresees cases in Mali. These countries may thus join the list of countries at risk of famine in the next edition of the Hunger Hotspots report.

In addition to these, the report covers the **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Sahel region (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad), Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Mozambique, Central America, Venezuela, Colombia, Myanmar and Pakistan, the latest two included for the first time in this report**, since the GNFC warns about the possible intensification of life-threatening conditions in the coming months.

Climate change and related weather extremes remain a key driver of food insecurity in many of the countries under analysis, **such as Kenya, Madagascar, and Somalia, where extreme droughts** are causing crops to deteriorate and harvests to fail. **Floods and irregular rains in Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe**, for example, are bringing about similar consequences.


Many countries are affected by high inflation, notably on food prices. Critical cases include, for instance, **Venezuela**, with an estimated inflation of 155%, **Burkina Faso**, where national average prices are 23% (rice) to 70% (sorghum) higher than the average for 2021 and the last 5 years, reaching up to 150 % in some conflict areas (the situation is similar in Mali), **and Lebanon**, where the currency has lost 94% of its value versus the USD.

Lastly, escalating internal and regional conflicts continue to have a disproportionate impact on food security (alongside its four pillars of availability, access, utilisation and stability), as well as on livelihoods, markets access, crop yields and the provision of essential services. This translates into the higher numbers of severely food insecure people. In this respect, countries like **Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Myanmar and Haiti** – among others – are severely affected.

Most of the countries under analysis are faced with multiple overlapping challenges at the same time: high food inflation, displacement, increasing insecurity, prolonged effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, structural poverty and lack of governance are only some of the additional causes contributing to the exacerbation of the global food crisis.

## 1. Global picture

On 12 September 2022, an update of the Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) was published, providing the most recent and detailed picture of the global food insecurity situation. This report estimates at 205 million the number of people in need of food assistance, compared to 193 million at the end of 2021. Despite the increase, this report does not provide a full picture, as it covers 45 countries only (compared to the 53 covered in the previous edition) due to the lack of recent analysis in some countries. The figure is estimated to reach up to **222 million people** in 53 countries if additional data – less recent - from the eight missing countries are added.




Source: Global Report on Food Crises, Sept 2022

This is the highest figure since the GRFC is published and confirms a daunting trend: the number of people in acute food insecurity has increased systematically since the first edition of the report (covering the year 2016), and the current figures are double those of 2016.


The most significant increases in food insecurity were observed in Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen. Ten countries recorded an increase of more than 50% in the numbers of people in food crisis. The largest crises in absolute terms are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Yemen.

### Seven countries/territories saw an increase of over 1 million people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above between 2021 and 2022




Source: Global Report on Food Crises, Sept 2022

## Numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent in 45 countries/territories in 2022



Source: *Global Report on Food Crises, Sept 2022*

Not only global numbers, but also the severity of hunger remains very high. Projections indicate that, at the end of 2022, around 45 million people reached emergency levels of food insecurity (IPC/CH phase 4, second highest in the scale). This includes 970 000 people projected to face catastrophic conditions (IPC/CH phase 5, highest in the scale).



### Population in IPC/CH phase 5

Source: *Global Report on Food Crises, Sept 2022*

In the September 2022 Hunger Hotspots report, six countries were considered to be at risk of famine: Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Somalia. In this last country, the Hunger Hotspots report actually projected the occurrence of a famine as of October, unless urgent action was taken. Humanitarian efforts were intensified and the declaration of a famine in Somalia has been averted so far. However, the risk of famine remains, and highly depends on the sustained provision of humanitarian assistance.


As mentioned above, new countries may join this list in the next edition, as famine-like conditions are increasing in e.g. the Sahel.

The drivers of food insecurity remain conflict, global and local economic shocks, and weather extremes, added to a background of poverty and inequality. In the last years, the successive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have accelerated the trend.

**Prospects for 2023 are dim.** Several facts indicate that food security is unlikely to improve globally in the next months. Even if food prices have been decreasing in the last months, they still remain very high in historical terms, and some key staple products (notably rice) still show upward trends. Furthermore, the increase of commodity prices, notably energy and fertilisers, contributes to soaring inflation, and puts many countries under serious debt stress (especially low-income food importing countries). With only a few exceptions (e.g. Chad), most food crises show deteriorating trends.

### 1.1. How the Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated the global food crisis

The ripple effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on global food security have been extensively discussed, and projections have been made by several organisations, but so far, they haven't been objectively measured. The picture provided by the GRFC update, despite being published in September, doesn't fully capture these effects, as many of the analyses on which it is based were carried out before these effects were fully visible. The next edition of the GRFC should provide a more precise estimation of this impact, which should also be associated with an analysis of the speculative mode of operation of international markets.



Source: FAO Food Price Index (FFPI)


The most obvious effect of the invasion has been the increase in global food prices. Before the invasion, these were already at a ten-year high due to the economic effects of Covid-19, as can be seen in the graph above. The invasion further increased prices, as both Russia and Ukraine were major food exporters, and together provided one third of global cereal supply, and 80% of global sunflower oil. February reached the highest level since its inception in 1990.

Food prices stabilised in the second quarter of the year and decreased to pre-invasion levels after the signature of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July, and have slightly decreased since.

However, the Initiative is unlikely to fully stabilise markets, as quantities exported from Ukraine remain below historical levels, the situation in the Black Sea remains fragile (as recent events testify), and global trade patterns have been significantly altered. Food prices are thus expected to remain volatile and high in the next couple of years.

Beyond food prices, the Russian invasion is also impacting food security through its negative effect on the prices of energy and fertiliser – which were already very high before the invasion. Fertiliser prices are two and half times their 2019 level, and affordability is at its lowest since 2008/09. While farmers in developed regions are likely to maintain high levels of fertiliser use, in poorer countries fertiliser use is expected to decline. As a consequence, global grain supplies are expected to tighten in 2023.

The combination of elevated commodity prices, increasing production costs, and persistent currency depreciations translate into higher domestic food price and considerable debt stress in many countries, especially low-income, food importing countries with macroeconomic difficulties and limited coping capacities. This includes many countries in the MENA region and Sub-Saharan Africa, some of which were already facing serious food crises.



Source: FAO, Trade Data Monitor (TDM), FAO calculations

Soaring food and fuel prices also compromise the ability of humanitarian actors to supply food to the areas with the direst needs, leading to a reduction of food assistance that is further aggravating some of the world's worst food crises.


The food crisis is expected to continue in 2023: fertiliser price increases, compounded by the decrease of Ukrainian exports and skyrocketing energy costs, will have a negative impact on agricultural productivity and global markets in the next months. The outlook of the worst food crises (see sections below) is generally negative, pointing at a global deterioration of food security.

## 1.2. Drought in the Horn of Africa and famine forecast in Somalia

On 5 September 2022, the Famine Review Committee forecasted that a famine would occur in two districts of Somalia as of October, unless urgent action was taken. A formal declaration was narrowly averted in late 2022, but is still projected for 2023, and will depend on a sustained provision of humanitarian aid. This is mainly the consequence of the persistent drought in the Horn of Africa, but also decades of conflict, severe economic shocks, and mass population displacement.

The drought in the Horn of Africa started in 2020 and has stretched over five rainy seasons, making it the most extensive and severe in four decades. It has caused a dramatic increase of acute food insecurity in the three countries, affecting up to 19-21 million people. It has also caused over 1.5 million displacements, and may lead to the first famine declaration in Somalia in six years.

The last rainy season (October – December 2022) was also below average in certain areas. Due to this, the number of people in need of urgent food assistance could increase to an estimated 23-26 million people, including more people in famine-like situation.





Source: IPC

### 1.3. Food crisis in the Sahel

The Sahel region, one of the poorest and most fragile regions in the world, is affected by a combination of protracted and recurrent major humanitarian crises with constantly increasing food insecurity, particularly since 2017-2018. The intensification and widening of conflicts cause further forced displacements (nearly 8.5 million in September 2022, 14% more than in 2021) who are mostly dependent on humanitarian aid for all their basic needs, in particular for food. Needs have become structural for former displaced persons who lost their livelihood. Other shocks (drought, flooding, economic shocks, epidemiological, political) are superimposing to the conflict as main cause of food insecurity.

In October-November 2022 the latest round of IPC/CH analysis showed a 25% increase of the number of people in acute food insecurity (30.6 million of people in IPC/CH phases 3 and above) in West Africa, compared to November 2021. Of particular concern are the projected increases in the highest IPC/CH phases: 103% increase in IPC/CH phase 4 by December 2022, and 88% increase of IPC/CH phase 5 for the 2023 lean season. Such increases are even more striking if put in a longer perspective: in the Sahel and Lake Chad countries, the number of people in food crisis has increased by 245% compared to the 2015-2019 average. These figures will be reassessed during the next March 2023 IPC/CH analyzes for all countries of west africa.






Source: ECHO

Conflicts are accompanied by an increase in violence against civilians, both by non-state armed groups (NSAG) and associated banditry, and sometimes by the army during their operations with the stigmatization of certain technical groups linked to NSAG. Humanitarian actors are also increasingly targeted by these NSAG, particularly in Nigeria, and access to areas of particularly acute food insecurity is increasingly limited both by insecurity and by national authorities (Nigeria, Niger, Burkina Faso). They are also accompanied by loss of agro-pastoral production and other means of subsistence, closure of markets, schools and health centers and communication networks.

Conflict<sup>6</sup>, insecurity, and forced displacement are the main drivers of acute food insecurity and other important humanitarian needs in the region. These are affecting mostly the central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) and the Lake Chad basin, and have aggravated in the last years, especially since 2019.


<sup>6</sup> See also: <https://acleddata.com/africa/regional-overview/>.







This conflict situation builds on a backdrop of poverty, poor access to basic services, chronic and acute structural malnutrition, as well as the recurrence of more extreme climatic shocks (droughts and floods) due to climate change. Indeed, Chad and Niger are among the ten countries most vulnerable to climate change worldwide, and Mauritania has suffered four consecutive years of drought. The region was also severely affected by the ripple effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global economy and trade. 2022 was marked by major floods in the sub-region (particularly in Nigeria, Chad, Niger and CAR), the strongest recorded for more than a decade in many countries (18 countries affected, 7 million people affected, including 2.7 million displaced people in the countries covered by ECHO). For comparison, in 2020, there were 16 countries and 2.4 million people affected by floods, and less than 120,000 displaced people.

Sahelian countries also count among the most affected by the current cost-of-living crisis. This concerns notably food prices, which are 80% higher than in 2021. In conflict areas, especially Burkina Faso, our field partners report shortages of staple foods in several markets and price increases of around 150%.





*Comparaison annuelle des principaux aliments de base  
(Septembre 2021 – Septembre 2022)*



*Comparaison sur 5 ans des principaux aliments de base  
(Septembre 2022 – 5 years average)*

## 2. Geographical focus

This section compiles intelligence about the main food crises from the DG ECHO field network and geographical units. For each country, highlights are provided regarding the status and evolution of food insecurity, the main underlying factors, and the main interventions of DG ECHO and other actors. Finally, some ideas for action are put forth, including opportunities for a reinforced HDP nexus.

Among these, increasing humanitarian funding and better targeting is suggested for most countries. Many opportunities for nexus are identified, including coordination with agricultural, livelihood and resilience activities; links with social protection schemes; etc.

Other recurrent recommendations relate to:

- Improving the efficiency of aid through, e.g. rapid or anticipatory action approaches, or through a wider use of cash transfers.
- Improving data and information systems and analyses (more integrated/common analyses).
- Reinforcing advocacy on a variety of issues (increased funding, respect of IHL, etc).

Examples of these are:

- In Burkina Faso, increase efforts and advocacy for more efficient emergency and post-emergency assistance, in a nexus perspective.
- In Mali and Mauritania, continue to play a leading role in coordination and advocacy for the respect of IHL, principled aid delivery and increased assistance.
- In Nigeria, improve the prioritisation of assistance and vulnerability assessment, ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups.
- In Madagascar, support shock-responsive mechanisms, resilience building and capacity strengthening.
- In Lebanon, advocate for an inclusive and needs-based social protection framework that allows the poorest households to access services.
- In Haiti, monitor markets and adapt ECHO cash interventions taking into account the evolution of the currency exchange rate and the cost of living.
- In Yemen, develop specific strategies to operate in a context of high inflation and depreciation (e.g., flexible programming, market monitoring and contingency planning).

More details are provided in the country fiches below.

NOTE: To describe the food insecurity status, these fiches use the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) scale, which is the most broadly used framework. This scale classifies food insecurity in five levels (see below). Expressions like “IPC/CH 3+” are frequently used, meaning “IPC/CH phase 3 and higher”.

In West African countries, IPC can be referred to as CH (Cadre Harmonisé). CH is an analogous system, considered fully compatible with IPC. Hence, CH and IPC/CH phases can be considered equivalent and are often referred to as the IPC/CH framework.

Qualifying Levels of Acute Food Insecurity Using the Reference Table for Area Classification

	Mild acute food insecurity		High acute food insecurity		Critical acute food insecurity
<b>Phase name and description</b>	<b>Phase 1 None/Minimal</b>  Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	<b>Phase 2 Stressed</b>  Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	<b>Phase 3 Crisis</b>  Households either: • Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition;  or • Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	<b>Phase 4 Emergency</b>  Households either: • Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality;  or • Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	<b>Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine</b>  Households have an extreme lack of food and/ or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident.  (For Famine Classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality)
<b>Priority response objectives</b>	Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction	Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods	<b>Urgent action required to:</b>  Protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps		
			Save lives and livelihoods		Revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods

Source : IPC


• West and Central Africa

**Burkina Faso**

*Situation and evolution*

Food security continues to deteriorate in Burkina Faso despite a good agro-pastoral season and an increase of production of cereals, tuber, cash crops (respectively +2.3%, +8.3% and +8.16% versus the 5-year average) and livestock fodder.

These trends should be put into perspective in conflict zones, given the difficulties of access to agricultural fields. Six regions recorded deficits of around 3% to 34%, notably in high insecure areas like Sahel (-34%), North (-15%), Center (-12%), East (-8%).




In the November 2022 IPC/CH exercise (harvest period), there is an increase of 59% of people in IPC/CH phase 3 and above (3.54 million people) compared to November 2021, with an increase of 192 % of the number of people in phase 4 (342 000 people in three provinces) and the identification of people in IPC/CH phase 5 (famine) for the first time since analyses are conducted. During the next lean season, this number could be multiplied by 10. These figures will be reassessed during the next March 2023 IPC/CH analyses for all countries of West Africa.






**Graphique 2 : Niveau du prix au consommateur du maïs sur le plan national**




Source : données SONAGESS

**Graphique 4 : Évolution du prix moyen au détail du sorgho sur le plan national**



Source : données SONAGESS

**Graphique 3 : Evolution des prix au consommateur du mil sur le plan national**




Source : données SONAGESS

The Minimum Food Expenditure Basket (MFEB) cost increased by over 27% since the beginning of 2022. The Government has put in place measures to limit the prices of local cereals and some basic necessities by reducing some taxes, without significant effect, nor respect by traders. It was expected to assist more than 3.3 million people.

In areas of very high insecurity or blockade (notably in the Sahel region), 21% of the people in acute food insecurity and in need of humanitarian assistance, with unprecedented severity levels. Food prices are higher than the national average and can reach increases of 67% to +100% for oil, 67% to 80% for millet and 70% to 80% for sugar. Our partners report a shortage of staple food in most markets in conflict-affected areas and price increases of around 150% on average, compared to the last five years.


Conflict intensified in recent months with an increase in towns and populations under blockade and without food (Djibo, Solan, etc.) due to both non-state armed groups' activism and government restrictions (more than 96 trucks were destroyed in a single attack last September). OCHA estimates that at least one million people reside in 13 blockaded areas. Increasingly, emergency assistance must be provided by expensive helicopter operations in a context of limited resources and access. Landlocked areas and areas outside state control represent 40% of the territory.

From October to December 2022, 80% of the planned caseload was assisted, but only 65% of displaced people received emergency food assistance. Access to people in need has deteriorated considerably in recent months: increase in areas under blockade by non-state armed groups; ban on cash assistance in the Sahel confirmed by the government and discussion for an extension to the whole territory; attempts to place WFP airborne operations (suspected of feeding the terrorists) under control by army.




Source: OCHA





Mapping of access constraints (FSC, December 2022)



The coverage of the rapid response to displaced people is working properly and the funding gaps were avoided thanks to a top-up in December 2022, which should cover the firsts 3 to 4 months of 2023, depending on the extent of the displacements. An end-of-year top-up (EDF) was also allocated to the WFP to front-load part of the response to the next lean season, while awaiting for the HIP 2023 funding (EUR 23.5 million of initial HIP allocation versus over EUR 58 million mobilized in 2022, despite prospects of a further deterioration of the humanitarian and security situations in 2023).

### *Drivers*

The high prices of basic food items, the intensification of conflict and insecurity with targeting of civilians, food and markets blockage by non-state armed groups using starvation as a weapon of war, the lack of humanitarian access, and internally displaced people (more than 1.8 million people) are the main direct and indirect drivers of the food and nutritional crisis, aggravated by political instability.

Other factors include the rise in national, sub-regional and international food prices (cf. FAO Food Price Index) since 2021. The price of hydrocarbons and transport have also increased, and more than doubled in blockaded areas. The war in Ukraine has exacerbated inflation and speculation. The high insecurity on the roads and destruction of infrastructure also led to a very strong negative impact on the markets and access to beneficiaries.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- Over EUR 58 million were mobilised in 2022 to support a multi-sectoral humanitarian response, including 6.5 million of food assistance from the European Development Fund, EUR 2 million from the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR), EUR 14.5 million from the Operational Reserve, the mobilisation of EUR 3 million under the Enhanced Humanitarian Response Capacity for a 3-month air bridge operation and of the Small-Scale Tool for displacements (EUR 0.3 million), plus a transfer of EUR 1 million from Luxembourg to DG ECHO.
- Food assistance, health and nutrition and protection are priority sectors. DG ECHO provides assistance mainly through cash and in-kind deliveries.
- EU is a leading actor in diplomacy and coordinated humanitarian advocacy. On 6 April 2022, DG ECHO co-hosted (with the Global Network Against Food Crises - GNFC, the OECD and the Club du Sahel) a high-level Panel during the Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) bi-annual meeting, where the food insecurity crisis and related drivers were emphasised along with the underfunded response. EUR 2.5 billion were mobilised for the sub-region including funds already planned/allocated and for non-humanitarian responses that do not target households in food crisis.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- EU delegation: FPI, PDU and Pasanad's (closing) programs
- USAID/BHA: USD 110 million including a USD 40 million top-up for food assistance in June-July 2022, plus support for WFP air operations.
- World Bank support to WFP and Ministry for Humanitarian Action with USD 388 million.
- GBP 33 million for 35 months from the FCDO/UK Sahel Regional Fund, starting in 2023.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- The triple crisis affecting Burkina Faso (conflict, food insecurity, political instability) requires scaling up the response to essential basic needs including minimum dietary requirements of vulnerable displaced and hosts communities, despite the operational constraints.
- Underfunded crisis: Additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Improve prioritisation of assistance ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups including new Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and refugees, but also general populations in landlocked areas.
- Increase the efforts and advocacy of the EU and other partners for more efficient emergency and post-emergency assistance of productive sectors and infrastructure in rural areas, in a nexus perspective.
- Operationalise the HDP nexus on EUR 150 million budget support reprogramming for resilience and the early recovery of IDP. Burkina Faso has been selected as one of the field research case studies for the study on operational recommendations for further putting into practice the HDP Nexus approach in Food Security in African partner countries.

## **Central African Republic (CAR)**

### *Situation and evolution*

Currently there are 484 335 IDPs recorded in the country, the vast majority (75%) staying with hosting families/relatives.

2.6 million people are currently in IPC/CH phase 3 and above over the period September 2022 to March 2023 (September 2022 IPC), which represents 44% of the total population analysed. The projected figure for the period of April to August 2023 is 3 million people, representing 49% of the total population. This represents an increase compared with the number of people in crisis or emergency reported in 2021 (2.3 million). However, this is partly due to an increase of the population analysed (from 4.9 million of people in April 2022 to 6.1 million people in September 2022), and due to an update of the demographic projections of the population released by ICASSES - the national institute of statistics. 19 sub-prefectures and 641 000 people are classified in IPC/CH Phase 4 (Emergency).

In 2022, the lean season took place in a particularly deteriorated economic context, due to the global impact of the Russian aggression in Ukraine. As result of the global inflation on food and fuel prices, the authorities have restricted cereal exports, there have been fuel shortages and confiscation by the authorities, and the cost of transporting foodstuffs has soared. Market prices of basic foodstuffs were impacted with significant increases between June and July 2022 for cassava (+20%), rice (+17%) and maize (+5%), which are the main staples. However, at the end of 2022, the price trend is dominated by a decline in local consumer products. At the national level, prices for maize (-28%), cassava (-9%), and groundnuts (-9%) in October 2022 were down from their August/September 2022 levels. However, the levels reached remain high compared to those of last year and to the average of the last five years. In contrast, prices for imported rice and meat have risen considerably from their August/September 2022 levels. The increased cost of fertilisers will also affect further the resilience of the affected populations, through lower agricultural output in the next agricultural season.

### *Drivers*

Protracted crisis and logistical challenges are major obstacles to the production and commercialisation / distribution of food.

Recurrent violence and resulting displacements continue to reduce the resilience and

livelihood opportunities of the communities affected by these fluid conflict dynamics. These long-term drivers are now being exacerbated by the ripple effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and of the reduction or suspension of development aid, especially budget support, owing to the political situation in CAR (concerns over the regime's reliance for security on Russia's private military contractor Wagner).

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 17 million were allocated under the HIP 2022.
- Actions mitigating food insecurity represent 24% (EUR 4 million of the ECHO portfolio), followed by Education in Emergencies (21%), health (11%) and Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM 10%).
- EDF funding to address the consequences of the war in Ukraine on global food insecurity has been confirmed. DG ECHO budget for emergency food assistance in CAR includes an additional EUR 4 million allocated to WFP (multi-country project).

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- In CAR, USAID/BHA is by far the largest humanitarian donor. So far in 2022, BHA contributed to the HRP with USD 181 million, of which 37.6% (USD 154 million) is for food security.
- The 2022 HRP for the food security sector has known an unprecedented level of funding with more than 100% of coverage, which shows the great engagement of the donor community to address emergency food needs in CAR.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Improve prioritisation of assistance ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups, through EDF funding for emergency assistance in the food sector in CAR.
- Ensure immediate support during the crop season to ensure a better agricultural production level and a rapid recovery.
- Support nexus initiatives, through joint financing and strong coordination including with the EU Delegation on the possible reprogramming of unspent budget support to redirect it to resilience and food security.

## **Chad**

### *Situation and evolution*

Around 810 000 people are still in IPC/CH Phase 3 and above in Chad during the post-harvest season (October to December), even if a very good rainy season has been recorded. Regarding the 2023 lean season projections, needs have decreased compared to 2022 lean season going from 2.1 million to 1.5 million people in Phase 3 and above. Although it represents an encouraging decrease, the situation remains very worrying with nearly 10% of the population requiring emergency food assistance.

The December 2022 National SMART survey show a Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) prevalence of 8.6%, including 1.5% of Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM). It decreased by 2.3 points compared to that observed in 2021, which was at 10.9%. However, GAM prevalences are above the WHO emergency threshold (15%) in the provinces of Wadi Fira (17.7%), Borkou (16.2%), and East Ennedi (15.7%). As for SAM, the provinces most affected are Bahr El Gazel (2.5%), Wadi Fira (2.5%), Sila (2.3%) and Salamat (2.2%).



In the Sahel belt region, food demand outweighs supply and is focused on own consumption. Food supply comes mainly from the Southern parts of the country, also in production deficit this year, which has a strong impact on price trends.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine affects basic food prices and generates a lack of access to agricultural inputs for the rural communities. This limits production capacities in 2022 and therefore the ability of vulnerable households to recover from this crisis.

As of 31 December 2022, UNHCR counted 1 080 568 people in forced displacement in Chad, including 592 769 refugees. The situation in the Lake Chad region is characterised by a significant number of internally displaced people, with 381 289 people in total. Insecurity has not decreased: 1 331 incidents were reported from January to August 2022. In total for 2022, OCHA recorded 41 cases of intercommunal conflict across the country. The overall toll was 550 deaths and more than 600 injuries.

Moreover, the unprecedented floods of the 2022 rainy season affected more than 1.4 million people in 18 provinces out of 23, including 250 000 people affected in the capital city N'Djamena. It is estimated that 79 000 homes have destroyed, along with 465 000 hectares of land and 19 400 heads of cattle. The Chadian government has put a contingency plan in place and is working with humanitarian actors to meet the needs of flood-affected populations. In addition to the multiple spontaneous relocation sites that have cropped up in N'Djamena and surrounding areas, three official camps have been set up in and around the capital.

The IPC/CH analysis done in October 2022 used very incomplete data regarding the impact of these unprecedented floods. Fluvial floods might continue to harm households' livelihoods for several weeks, destroying fields and livestock. Therefore, the IPC/CH analysis planned for March 2023 might depict a more severe situation after all the final evaluations have been conducted.

Chad was one of the initial 6 pilot countries of the EU triple nexus approach.

### *Drivers*

Persistent violence in Chad and in bordering countries continues to cause displacements. According to the latest Displacement Tracking Matrix and UNHCR data, Chad registers some 574 833 refugees (from Sudan, CAR, Cameroon, Nigeria), 381 289 IDPs, and 101 551 returnees.

The lack of rain in 2021 has significantly affected the agricultural and fodder production, aggravating the already critical food situation of the most vulnerable and the conflict-affected households. The most common coping strategies are the sale of livestock, the sale of productive and non-productive assets, and the migration of one or more household members. The 2022 rainy season has recorded historical above-average rainfalls, resulting in floods that affected 1 million people. This may affect the food security situation of thousands during the upcoming months. However, this also opens other opportunities such as counter-season Sorghum production along with gardening production.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 51.4 million allocated in 2022, with the main sectors being health and nutrition (23%), food assistance (34%) and Rapid Response Mechanism (13%). 43% of the RRM is allocated to food assistance, bringing total food assistance to around EUR 19 million (40%).
- DG ECHO is also supporting the Food Security Cluster at national and Lac Province level.
- Including the EDF de-committed funds, the DG ECHO budget for emergency food assistance in Chad is now EUR 7.5 million.

- ECHO has activated both DREF and ALERT (Activation Small Scale Tool) emergency response mechanisms to provide additional assistance to the flood-affected population.

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- FAO and WFP benefit from a EUR 44 million program (P2RSA) by DG INTPA in support of food security and nutrition (for example through the local production of fortified flours), social protection, as well as local governance and cohesion.
- USAID/BHA is the other main donor to fund emergency food assistance and has recently approved a significant top-up of USD 25 million to WFP to address the consequences of the food crisis.
- WFP has launched a USD 95 million appeal for emergency funding to assist Sudanese and Central African refugees for the next months. Additionally, WFP still needs USD 12.3 million to assist flood-affected populations in urgent need of food assistance.
- Other donors and pooled funds have confirmed their contributions to respond to the consequences of flooding: CERF, Start Fund, BHA, CDCS, GAC.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Continue to improve prioritisation of assistance, ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups.
- Also, as part of the nexus approach, advocate for immediate support to crop production to ensure a better agricultural production level and a rapid recovery, in complementarity with emergency food assistance.

## ***Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)***

### *Situation and evolution*

26.4 million people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are estimated to be acutely food insecure. This includes 3.8 million people at emergency level (IPC/CH phase 4). Even if the number of people classified as food insecure has decreased compared to the last analysis, the situation remains worrying, and the DRC still tops the ranking of countries with the largest number of people affected.

The humanitarian community warns that the food security situation continues to rapidly deteriorate in the North Kivu province of Eastern DRC, after military conflict between non-state armed actor "M23" and the national armed forces started again in 2022. Families fleeing the conflict live with host families or in makeshift shelters and face multiple needs, including food, healthcare, and shelter. OCHA estimates that 685 200 people need food and 257 400 people need appropriate nutritional care, of which 59 700 are malnourished children. WFP plans to scale up its response and is targeting 250 000 people with in-kind food and cash assistance for an initial six months, resources permitting. Food prices in the affected areas have gone up by almost 20%.

According to the last market price update from September 2022, the median cost of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) for all assessed territories is relatively high compared to August 2022 (+10%). Prices increased up to 24% compared to the previous month in the city of Goma, which is directly linked to the armed conflict in North Kivu and the "M23 crisis". The high cost of fuel, particularly following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and poor conditions of rural agricultural feeder roads, have produced an increase in transports cost with an impact on the prices of food products. (REACH ICSM - August 2022 and IPC/CH - July 2022).

## *Drivers*

Agricultural productivity is low in the DRC. Structural poverty and under-development, poor infrastructure and poor governance that limit agricultural and economic activities in rural areas, livestock, and agricultural pests, forced displacement due to conflict, weather conditions and climate change, as well as recurrent epidemics, contribute to the alarming food insecurity.

Armed and inter-community conflicts affect mainly five of the 26 provinces of the DRC. 5.53 million people are internally displaced (IDP) and over 96% of displacement is conflict-driven. This figure does not consider the newly displaced persons following the new inter-community conflict that broke out in July 2022 in the territory of Kwamouth (Mai-Ndombe province, western DRC), where thousands have become displaced and face significant food needs.

Insecurity does not allow farmers to till their land, access markets, etc. IDPs depend on host populations and humanitarian aid, including food assistance.

The DRC is severely under-developed, with all related consequences, including the absence or poor conditions of roads, which keeps many rural communities isolated, limiting their access to markets and essential social services. The DRC's human capital index stands at 0.37 – meaning a Congolese child born today can only hope to achieve 37% of its potential. The rate of stunting in the DRC is one of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, and malnutrition is the underlying cause of almost half of the deaths of children under five.

Three quarters of the Congolese population – 60 million people – live on less than USD 1 a day, according to the World Bank. Seven out of ten Congolese live in rural areas, mostly subsistence farmers in conditions of precariousness and poverty. Increases in food prices have further reduced the purchasing power of the Congolese population.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- Initial allocation of EUR 44 million in 2022, including one third on Food Security and Livelihoods (including Multipurpose Cash Transfers - MPCT, which accounts for the large majority) and 5.5% for nutrition. The final budget was almost EUR 82 million, partly delivered through DG ECHO-funded rapid response projects/mechanism. DG ECHO Humanitarian Food Assistance focuses on newly emerging needs linked to conflict and recent displacements. The EUR 14.5 million allocated to food security and livelihoods / MPCT represents 1.9% of the needs for the DRC, according to the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), and the EUR 2.5 million in nutrition less than 1 % of the nutrition needs described in the HRP.

### **Other actors**

- The US provided over USD 531 million, representing 58.5 % of all HRP funding in the DRC in 2022.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- The 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan for the DRC required USD 1.88 billion and was 52% funded by the end of the year, according to OCHA. WFP requested USD 151 million for its emergency response to cover the period September 2022 to February 2023. The total 2022 funding requirements were USD 645 million.



- There is a need to develop a clearer picture of nexus opportunities, and possible links with humanitarian interventions.


## Mali

### Situation and evolution

The food security situation seems to improve significantly, according to the latest IPC/CH analysis in October 2022. 632 000 people are in IPC/CH phase 3 and above, including around 15 000 in phase 4. This is respectively 46% and 64% lower than in November 2021.

However, these improvements need to be nuanced, in view of the abnormally high prices, insecurity, and absence of basic services (especially in the centre and North of the country). The situation is expected to deteriorate: 1 246 406 people could be in a situation of food crisis or worse during the 2023 lean season (i.e. 5.6% of the population). For the first time since data are collected, there will be a region in IPC/CH phase 4, and people in IPC/CH phase 5 (famine) expected in Ménaka. The food insecurity situation has deteriorated sharply in the regions of Sikasso, Gao, Ménaka and Bamako.




According to the 2023 HRP draft, 8.8 million people will need emergency humanitarian assistance in Mali (+16% compared to 7.5 in 2022); the partners plan to be able to assist 5.7 million people (compared to 5.3 million in 2022) knowing that HRP 2022 was only financed up to 38.5%.



Source: Cluster, Dec. 2022

According to the latest FAO DIEM (Data in Emergency Situations) bulletin (October), for 60.8% of households on average, the main difficulty was access to fertilisers, especially in Timbuktu (75%). The most important shock remains the high food prices (+32.3% on average), followed by the resurgence of illness or death of household members (29.9%), the price of fuel (+15.6%) and the incidence of insecurity (10.1% on average but 43% in Mopti).

Despite the good to very good agro-pastoral season, and the fall in the prices of several basic food products, the average prices remain much higher than in 2021 and the last 5-year average. Millet and sorghum are respectively 90% and 77% more expensive than 2021 and the last 5-year average. The increase in the value of the Minimum Expenditure Basket varies from +17% (national average) to +33% (insecure and conflict areas). Increased cost of fuel impacts food prices and cost of assistance.



2 500 000 people received emergency assistance, including 269 419 IDPs. Among these beneficiaries, 681 459 people received a “one shot” assistance for one month. Only 30% of the planned households received livelihood support. Nutritional responses have only targeted 13% and 34% of moderately and severely malnourished children respectively..

The exceptional flooding of the Niger River, during the last quarter of 2022 led to large-scale damage. More than 15 circles in the regions of Mopti, Ségou and Kayes have been affected, leading to both preventive and reactive displacements, the destruction of many homes, loss of crops and livestock. According to the FAO, nearly 79 000 people and more than 46 175 hectares have been affected, resulting in a loss of approximately 128 019 tonnes of crops.

The security and humanitarian situation have particularly worsened in the North and centre of the country, while insecurity keeps spreading further South, notably Sikasso. Threats and violence against civilian populations are increasing, leading to numerous forced displacements and growing protection incidents. In December 2022, the number of internally displaced was higher than in 2012, with over 412 000 individuals. The situation is very worrying in Gao with continuous arrivals from Ansongo, Talataye, Tessit and Menaka. Children represent 62% of the internally displaced population.





Figure 1- Displacement trends (source : Displacement Tracking Matrix Mali (IOM, Direction Nationale du Développement Social - DNDS) December 2022

Constraints on humanitarian access and people's access to their livelihoods and basic services are increasing. Attacks and threats against medical staff, health centres, as well as predation on medical equipment and drugs, is increasing.



Source: Food Security Cluster, October 2022

A significant increase in the prevalence of severe acute malnutrition has been reported in 2022 in many regions, notably those in conflict (Gao, Timbuktu, Taoudeini), compared to 2021, with a national average above the emergency threshold.

International partners have largely put their development cooperation with the government on hold, with negative effects on financial assistance for the poorest and most vulnerable populations. The latest cuts in French funding (decree of 29/11/2022) further reduce financial assistance, including for humanitarian actions.

### Drivers

Worsening conflict, violence against civilians, and extension of conflict-affected areas are the main drivers of food insecurity. This translates into limited access to markets for populations and providers, high and increasing insecurity, irregular controls on the main commercial roads, destruction of land, crops and livelihood by armed actors, restriction of access to land, etc.

The abnormally high prices of basic food at national, sub-regional and international levels (cf. FAO Index) since the end of 2021 has a significant impact. General inflation in 2022 is estimated at 7% by the World Bank.

The country is very dependent on imports (14% for cereals, 25% for fuel, 25% of fertilisers), and is severely affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 47.3 million allocated in 2022, including EUR 2 million contribution from Italy, EUR 6 million from the European Development Fund to alleviate the food crisis following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Rapid Multi-sectoral Response (44%) including food assistance, shelter, wash and non-food items; health/nutrition (28%); food assistance (12%); protection (5%); and education (6%). DG ECHO increasingly provides aid through cash and vouchers interventions.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- EU delegation: EUR 62.5 million including PDU<sup>7</sup> programs in rural areas in 2022.
- USAID/BHA: USD 75 million including 15-32 million top-up for food assistance in 2022.
- GBP 33 million for 35 months from the FCDO/UK Sahel Regional Fund (starting in 2023).

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Additional short and long-term financial support and scaling up of the response is required for more efficient emergency and post-emergency assistance: functionality of basic services, livelihood and productive support, infrastructure, durable solutions for long-term Internally Displaced Persons, etc.
- Continue to play a leading role in coordination and advocacy for the respect of IHL, principled aid delivery and increased assistance to Mali, and advocate with other services and donors for increased engagement in Mali.
- Opportunities for nexus are limited due to the political crisis and security environment, with the almost total suspension of development cooperation by EU and EU MS.





## **Mauritania**

### *Situation and evolution*

The first result of agricultural and pastoral campaigns shows an increase of cereal production (+33% versus last 5 years average, net surplus of 367 468 tonnes) and of livestock fodder. Despite this, the latest IPC/CH analysis (October 2022) shows that 10% of the population is still facing food crisis or worse (approx. 441 000 people). This is 27% more than last year's analysis, but 21% less than the last lean season. Six times more people (56 000) are in IPC/CH phase 4 compared to last year. 695 000 are expected to be in IPC/CH phase 3 and above during the next lean season, with 27% more people in IPC/CH phase 4 than last year.

The price of basic food products remains high, especially for imported products, on which Mauritania is highly dependent. Even if cereal they remained stable in the last quarter of 2022 (with the exception of small millet, +42%), they still remain very high compared to 2021 (+25% to +97% depending on the product) and to the average of the last 5 years (+20 to 110% higher):

<sup>7</sup> Programme de Développement d'Urgence



Source: WFP; Dec. 2022 (for all the figures above)




The government was not able to sustain fuel and gas subsidies, which led to a strong fuel price increase (+50%, after being stable for more than a decade) and associated social tensions.

The response to the food crisis is expected to cover almost 80% of the people in need. Assistance is delivered by the Government (62%), WFP (33%) and NGOs (5%). The food basket could not be revised upwards to take into account significant price increases, due to lack of funding. Coverage and duration of the assistance (4-month support) were prioritised over the level of assistance (about 36% of the food basket).

The food situation of the Malian refugees (about 90 000 people, mainly children) also keeps deteriorating, despite assistance from WFP and from the government. Social protection is intensifying with an increasing amount of regular quarterly transfers which aims to reach the level of assistance granted during the lean season by 2024. AFD is also making a significant contribution to this agenda, including the establishment of the National Food and Nutrition Crisis Response Fund (FNRCAN), as part of the new national device (DCAN)

The poor nutritional situation is also concerning: national average of 13.2% for GAM and 2.4% for SAM. Six Wilayas (Provinces) are in critical situation (MAG >15 and/or SAM >2%).



### Drivers

The persistence of a high level of basic food prices, of poverty and extreme poverty in rural areas, are the key drivers.

The limited access to food is aggravated by the high dependence of imports with high international food prices: Mauritania has a 70% dependence on food imports (nearly 10% of its GDP), with 50% of its imported wheat originating from Russia and Ukraine.

Mauritania is currently exposed to a high risk of debt distress and therefore has limited fiscal space to manage this situation effectively.

## Ongoing interventions

### ECHO interventions

- EUR 10.1 million in 2022: food assistance (40%), health and nutrition (24%), disaster preparedness (18%), education (15%), logistic support (3%). DG ECHO provides food assistance mainly through cash (100% of food ration through cash and local enriched flour in kind). This includes a EUR 1.5 million allocation from EDF to address emergency food needs (contracting ongoing).
- EU is a leading actor on diplomacy and coordinated humanitarian advocacy.

### Other actors' main interventions

- EU Delegation rural development program (Rimrap, Rimdir, Rimfil: EUR 46 million) in the closing phase – Top up of EUR 12 million considered with EDF leftover funds.
- USAID/BHA: USD 9 million, including USD 5 million top up for food assistance in 2022 June-July.
- World Bank: National social safety nets extension including Malian refugees of Mberra.

## Needs and opportunities

- Sustain coverage of the food needs and ensure better mechanisms to avoid exclusion of the most vulnerable, including refugees.
- Increase long-term financial support and investment to improve food security sustainably.
- Increase in the State budget for the agro-pastoral sector in accordance with the Maputo commitments<sup>8</sup>, while guaranteeing better effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure.
- Continue to ensure a leading role in coordination and advocacy for an increased interest in Mauritania ("forgotten" Sahelian country in West Africa).

## Niger

### Situation and evolution

The 2022 October IPC/CH analysis shows a quite significant improvement of food security: 2.04 million people in IPC/CH PHASE 3 and above, 21% and 35% less compared to those of November 2021 and 2022 lean seasons, respectively (which has been the worst food crisis since analyses began. For people in phase 4 (79 000 people), it's 47 and 63% less than last year and last 2022 lean season. 2.87 million people in food insecurity are expected for the next lean season.

In 2022 there was a significant pre-lean season response by government and international actors, as well as a government mobilisation for the 2022 emergency food response. In October, approximately 4 million of people (90% of the lean season caseload) were covered by humanitarian assistance. 1.4 million people should benefit from subsidised cereal prices in a non-targeted way. WFP announced a gap of USD 14.4 million for emergency response (including protracted IDPs) for the period from September 2022 to February 2023.

<sup>8</sup> Programme détaillé pour le développement de l'agriculture africaine (PDDAA), launched in 2003 in Maputo by Heads of State and Government under the auspices of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)






Figure 3 : Tendances de la malnutrition aigüe chez les enfants de 6 à 59 mois, du retard de croissance et de l'insuffisance pondérale chez les enfants de 0 à 59 mois (Réf OMS, 2006/Flag OMS).

In mid-January 2023, there is a downward trend in food prices, but they remain high compared to the average of the last 5 years: +21% for millet, +19% for sorghum, 21% for maize and +9% for imported rice, with very high variability between regions.

The security situation remains volatile, despite a slight decrease in the number of incidents during the last three months of 2022 compared to the previous period, with a cumulative total in December of 102 incidents, half of which committed by organized armed groups (GOA) and a quarter by the national Defense and Security Forces (FDS). Most incidents are concentrated on the border with Mali, Southwest of Niamey and Diffa (Lake Chad region).

As of November 30, 2022, around 715 044 people were in a situation of forced displacement (+ 1 000 people since the end of October 2022) including 376 809 internally displaced, 299 279 refugees and asylum seekers, as well as 38 956 other people under the mandate of the UNHCR. This number has doubled over the past three years in the three border areas and in the Lake Chad Basin, due to attacks by non-state armed groups. Among the refugees living in Niger, 63% come from Nigeria and 22% from Mali.

The first estimates of the agro-pastoral campaign forecast a production increase of cereals (+65% compared to 2021 and +9.9% compared to the average of the last 5 years) and cash crops (+19% and +15% respectively). On the other hand, an overall fodder deficit of around 12.5 million ton of dry matter is expected, with larger deficits in the Tillabery and Tahoua regions<sup>9</sup>. The agro-pastoral season should be put into perspective in conflict zones, given the difficulties of access the fields, the low yields in these zones and the dependence of IDPs on assistance.

According to OCHA, as of 9 December 2022, 44 735 people (6 926 households) in the municipalities of Gueskerou, Chetimari, Diffa and Toumour have been affected by flooding. The humanitarian response of many actors is underway in all sectors, even if gaps remain.

On 23-14 January 2023, a high-level conference on the Lake Chad crisis was held in Niamey; the Acting Director General of DG ECHO took part.

## Drivers

The main direct and indirect drivers are the consequences of the intensification of conflict in neighbouring countries: Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. In particular, there is a substantial deterioration of security and humanitarian access in the Tillabery area, and security concerns in Tahoua, North-West Nigeria and Maradi. The crisis is aggravated by the historic deficit of agro-pastoral production in 2021 (-36% compared with the 2020 campaign and the average of the last five years), as well as by the rise of national, sub-regional and international

<sup>9</sup> <https://sigsahel.info/index.php/2022/11/01/rapport-danalyse-de-production-de-biomasse-en-2022-sur-le-niger/>

food prices (cf. FAO Index) since 2021. The increase of price of diesel fuel (+24% at the beginning of August) and its shortages are additional negative factors.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- Close to EUR 52 million have been released to support a multi-sectoral humanitarian response notably by rapid response mechanisms. Food assistance (45%), rapid multi-sectoral response to IDPs (21%) and health (8%) are the most important sectors. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash (increasingly) and in-kind deliveries. This includes EUR 6 million from EDF, EUR 2 million from SEAR and 2 million from OR, being contracted.
- EU is a leading actor in diplomacy and humanitarian advocacy coordination. On 6 April 2022, DG ECHO co-hosted (with GNAFC, OECD, Club du Sahel) a Panel during the Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) bi-annual meeting, where the food insecurity crisis, related drivers and insufficient funding of the response were highlighted. EUR 2.5 billion (including funds already planned and development funding) have been mobilised for the sub-region targeting households in food crisis.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- EU delegation: FPI, Programme de Développement d'Urgence (résilience) in rural areas.
- USAID/BHA: USD 25 million top up for food assistance in 2022 June-July.
- Ongoing reallocation of resources from the World Bank and USD 5.3 million from the African Development Bank.
- GBP 33 million for 35 months from the FCDO/UK Sahel Regional Fund (starting in 2023).

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Need for more efficient and scaled-up response to essential basic needs and prioritisation of assistance to vulnerable households.
- Additional short and long-term financial support is required as well as more efficient emergency and post-emergency assistance of food assistance, of livelihood, of productive sectors and infrastructure in rural areas.
- Increase the funding efforts and advocacy of the EU and other partners.
- Accelerate the concrete operationalisation of the nexus and its monitoring and evaluation, for IDPs.

## **Nigeria**

### *Situation and evolution*

Nigeria is part of the 6 countries at the highest alert level, as there are populations facing starvation (Catastrophe, IPC/CH Phase 5) or at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, as they are already critically food insecure (Emergency, IPC/CH Phase 4) and are facing severe aggravating factors. 17 million people are in IPC/CH Phase 3 and above during the 2022 post-harvest season, which represents 8% of the analysed population in food crisis. Food needs remain very high especially in the Northeast (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States - BAY) and the North-West, where acute food needs have significantly increased over the years along with acute malnutrition.

Nearly 6 million children aged 0-59 months in Northwest and Northeast Nigeria are likely suffering and expected to suffer from acute malnutrition. This includes 1 623 130 Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) cases and 4 308 404 Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) cases. In the Northeast, the burden of acute malnutrition will likely increase by 16% compared to 2022 attributed to the impact of displacements, flooding, high levels of inequality, food insecurity, very low coverage of preventive interventions, while approximately 2 million children under 5 (including 696 000 severely malnourished) and 178 000 PLW will likely be acutely malnourished in 2023. From January to December, more than 195 000 severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) cases were admitted to the nutrition centre (against 135 000 SAM targeted in HRP 2022).

The Humanitarian Situation Monitoring of November 2022 in the *inaccessible areas* of the Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) states shows concerning food consumption deficits and limited diversity of diets. 43% of the households struggle to have sufficient food intake, and nearly 67.6% experienced a crisis or higher levels of food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) nger. 39% of the households rely on crisis coping strategies to meet their food needs. The levels of acute malnutrition among new arrivals from the inaccessible areas are serious with the overall Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate at 18.7% and Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) at 6.3%. Overall, both crude and under-five mortality rates (CMR and U5MR) were above the emergency threshold with values of 1.39 deaths/10 000 persons/day for CMR and 3.03 deaths/10 000 under-fives/day.

The ongoing local policy to close all IDP camps continues, reducing access to those in need. Through the second wave of camps closure, about 139 000 IDPs were relocated from several IDP camps in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (M.M.C.), Jere and Konduga Local Government Areas (LGAs) to other locations in Borno State. The Borno State Government-led camp closures and relocation, resettlement, and return has elicited significant concerns regarding IDPs' safety and dignity, and around the guiding principles of voluntariness and informed consent. Dire living conditions and limited access to basic services and assistance have also triggered secondary, or multiple, population movements into congested IDP camps. The uncoordinated resettlement and relocation of IDPs to inaccessible or hard-to-reach areas risks increasing food insecurity and malnutrition.

### *Drivers*

Insecurity linked to ongoing conflict between non-state armed groups (NSAG) and government security forces (Northeast), banditry (Northwest) and intercommunal clashes remain the key drivers of food insecurity. Farmers struggle to access their lands and cultivate their fields, while herders cannot move their livestock freely. Many local government areas remain completely or partially inaccessible for humanitarian assistance, and it is estimated that in 2022 that one million people were in areas inaccessible to international humanitarian actors.

Climate change also reduces the resilience of communities and fuels intercommunity violence on the use of natural resources. The elevated consumption gaps, malnutrition, mortality, are largely driven by the limited availability of food stocks, restricted access to functional markets and poor water, health, and sanitation services, which might heighten morbidity risk, and impact more negatively on households' ability to engage in labour for food or resource gathering. An additional factor is the unsustainable use of emergency coping strategies, which entails people spending their savings, borrow money and sell their assets/goods. Emergency coping strategies are begging or selling land or a house. Crisis strategies imply withdrawing children from school and selling productive assets or means of transport.

Severe floods caused by heavy rains and overflowing rivers have affected more than 4.4 million people across Nigeria since July, according to the latest update by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). The floods have displaced over 2.4 million people, destroyed more than 340 000 houses and left 1.9 million children displaced, according to UNICEF. This adds even more pressure on the food security status of millions of Nigerians.

The war against Ukraine has worsened the situation with skyrocketing prices, affecting basic food commodities and agricultural inputs, affecting the production capacities of farmers. Moreover, the Naira has depreciated on the parallel market by 33% (year-on-year). The ongoing devaluation of the Naira will continue to exert pressure on food prices throughout Nigeria. Nigeria's annual inflation rate increased for the 10th consecutive month to 21.47% in November 2022, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), as fuel shortages drove transport costs higher and affected the supply of goods and commodities. Prices of staple food remained stable in November compared to October, due to harvests. However, the year-on-year increase for key staples is significant, over 25%.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- DG ECHO allocated over EUR 60 million to respond to the urgent needs of conflict-affected population in Nigeria in 2022. This includes EUR 9 million from the European Development Fund to address the food crisis following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.
- Sectors: food assistance (23%), health and nutrition (16%), protection (16%) and WASH/Shelter (16%) are priority sectors. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash, vouchers, and in-kind deliveries.
- Advocacy: EU/DG ECHO is a leading voice in humanitarian advocacy in the Northeast.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- USAID/BHA, and to some extent FCDO, focus on emergency food assistance programming.
- USAID/BHA has recently validated a significant top-up of USD 38 million to WFP to address the consequences of the food crisis, bringing their total budget to WFP to USD 338 million.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Improve prioritisation of assistance and vulnerability assessment, ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups, including through the de-committed EDF funds for food emergency assistance.
- Assist forcibly displaced people from the Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) and Jere camp closure.
- Leverage funding to assist all vulnerable IDPs in the garrison towns' camps who do not have access to long-term sustainable livelihood opportunities.
- Where feasible, immediately support agriculture in this the crop season to ensure

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better agricultural production.

- **East and Southern Africa**

## **Ethiopia**

### *Situation and evolution*

The severity of food insecurity in Ethiopia remains one of the worst in the world owing to the impacts of ongoing conflict, violence, and climatic shocks, such as prolonged droughts and seasonal floods.

The number of people in need of immediate emergency food assistance has increased from 20.4 million (HNO July 2022) to 21.5 million (HNO January 2023), including some 11.8 million drought-affected people in pastoral south and south-eastern parts of the country. Other areas experiencing drought and food insecurity include southern, central and north-western Afar, East Hararghe and the central Rift valley areas.

Conflict and displacement remain a key driver to food insecurity in northern Ethiopia, including Tigray, Amhara and Afar. The agreement signed on 2 November 2022 between the Federal Government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) to cease hostilities has led to improvements in the security and humanitarian access situation in the zone. Improvements in market prices of food commodities is reported by WFP Market Watch, however food and nutrition needs remain high and acute malnutrition has been reported to be increasing. The lack of adequate health services, most of which were damaged during the conflict, will likely further deteriorate the health of the population.

In addition, 896 000 refugees rely on humanitarian food assistance in the country.

High inflation in the country aggravated the overall food insecurity. The General Inflation in relation to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in Ethiopia increased by 32.2% between January and December 2022, this has sustained high food prices limiting household food and basic needs purchasing power. There is limited information on the food security situation of western Oromia and Beneshangul Gumuz due to insecurity-related access constraints, but there are increasing concerns that food insecurity might be deteriorating.

Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) outcomes will likely increase in several areas of the country. Existing outlooks (FEWS Net) indicate that Tigray remains the highest concern until May 2023, but likely to continue beyond. The latest WFP Food Security Assessment in Tigray in June 2022 found that 89% of the households were food insecure and 47% severely food insecure (of a population of 6 million). Despite the positive developments since the signing of the agreement, there are still important bottlenecks preventing unfettered access.

The southern Part of Somali Region, as well as Bale, East Bale, Borena and South Omo, are also in IPC/CH Phase 4 throughout the outlook period (until May 2023).

Since October 2021, the Somali regional government estimates that 4.5 million livestock have died, while most of the livestock in the drought-affected areas are weak and at risk of death. As forecasted, the 2022 October to December season in the southern pastoral areas performed below normal. The next rainy season, which is the main rainfall period in those areas, will be from March to May. Nevertheless, meteorological forecasts predict a below-normal rainfall condition, potentially making it the sixth consecutive drought season.

Consistent increase in malnutrition is reported across the country. People in need of nutrition support are estimated to be 7.3 million – including Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) and Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM), U5 and Pregnant Lactating Women (PLW). There is a widespread shortage of F-75 in the country and irregular availability of SC+ and MAM commodities affecting the nutritional treatment.



## Drivers

**Conflict** in the northern part of the country is affecting three regional states directly (Tigray, Afar and Amhara) and generating displacement. Other parts of the country are also impacted by localised conflicts, which challenge the food and nutrition security of the affected populations and impede humanitarian access. Overall, about 4.7 million people are internally displaced in camps or out of camps (HNO draft).

**Drought** is reported in the East, South, and southeastern and central Rift valley areas. It is currently affecting Afar, Somali Regional State, southern Oromia, West Arsi Zone of Oromia, southern and rift valley areas of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region.

**The crisis in Ukraine and macro-economic issues** have affected food imports and market prices. In June 2022, inflation across the country reached the highest rate in Eastern Africa (34%). Only during the first half of 2022, food prices increased by 26% and the cost of the food basket by 33% (65.2% in one year). Despite price control measures, petrol prices showed a marked increase compared with pre-war levels (+16%). Between June 2021 and June 2022, Ethiopia recorded one of the highest year-on-year depreciations of local currency, down by 194% against the USD.

**Access constraints**, due to insecurity and major bureaucratic impediments, is reducing the capacity of humanitarian agencies to deliver in western Oromia, Beneshangul Gumuz and parts of Tigray, despite the cessation of hostilities agreement.

## Ongoing interventions

### DG ECHO interventions

- EUR 85.5 million allocated in 2022.
- Food assistance (16%), WASH (7%), health (11%), nutrition (18%), shelter and non-food items (4%), protection (7%), DRR/DP (15%), coordination (4%), logistics (6%) education (6%) and cash (7%).


### Other actors' main interventions

- The Ethiopian Humanitarian Country Team (EHCT) produced a dedicated drought response plan (USD 1.66 billion) to which contributions have been made, mainly by the US (over USD 400 million). Currently the plan is largely under-funded. The HNO and the HRP for 2023 are delayed: the 2023 HNO is at draft level and expected to be released in the coming weeks.
- The Ethiopia Safety Net programme has a crisis/shock response capacity besides its routine response covering over 8 million people.

## Needs and opportunities

- Scaling up of the response is urgently needed.

- Need to produce more comprehensive specific and tangible data and specific analyses to support targeted responses. The restoration of the IPC process in Ethiopia is a priority.
- Need to enhance support from development actors to build further resilience of affected communities.



Source: Fewsnet

## Kenya

### Situation and evolution

The October to December (OND) rainy season has been characterised by late onset, sporadic, and poor spatial and temporal distribution of rains. Nine counties are currently in alarm phase and 13 in alert phase. Humanitarian partners estimate that there are 5.8 million people in need of humanitarian food assistance in early 2023 in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) region, including 5.2 million Kenyans and 602 000 refugees.

In the absence of humanitarian food assistance, FEWSNET is warning some households in Turkana and Marsabit are likely to fall into catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). 942 000 children below five years require treatment for acute malnutrition, compared to 884 464 in August 2022. 134 000 pregnant and lactating women require treatment for acute malnutrition. An estimated 2 500 000 livestock deaths have been reported in the ASAL counties. Most open water sources have dried up, increasing trekking distance to water sources. 65% of crop failure has been registered in marginal agricultural areas.

In the education sector, absenteeism is raising and retention declining, as families turn to different coping mechanisms, resulting in increased child labour. On 21 October, the UN, together with the government of Kenya, have launched the 2023 Kenya Drought Response Plan worth USD 472.6 million.

With more than 2 000 newcomers every week, UNHCR faces the emergency influx of refugees in Turkana (Kakuma and Kalobeyei camps) and Garissa (Dadaab complex). Over 80 000 new arrivals came from Somalia in the last two years - 45 000 of them in 2022. In June 2022, UNHCR launched an appeal for USD 42.6 million to respond to the needs of 1.52 million people with specific needs affected by the drought in the region (Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia). Only 45% of the required funds have been raised to date.

The drought has contributed to create a conducive environment for a cholera outbreak, which since October 2022 has led to 4 295 cases confirmed and 82 deaths (fatality rate of 1.9%).

The drought-induced decline in crop production and the related reduced availability of cereals on markets has increased food prices. The fallout of Ukraine's war adds onto this, as increased production costs (fuel and inputs) are also contributing to the price spikes. Due to reduced availability, food inflation is exceeding annual inflation in Kenya, with food price increases almost doubling the annual inflation (13.8% vs. 7.9%). Over the last year, the price of the local food basket has increased particularly for maize, flour, and wheat/grains (up to 123%), thus leading to a significant increase of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (up to 35% in Turkana County).

### *Drivers*

Limited access to food is compounded by several factors. **Climatic shocks** are an important one: five consecutive poor rainy seasons have led to severe droughts.

**High fuel prices** are pushing up the inflation rate, including food inflation rates, leading to a significant increase in the overall cost of living.

The country is affected by **localised population movements linked to resource-based tensions**. Local conflicts have emerged over resources (among the ASAL pastoral communities), and cross-border displacement has increased, induced by the drought (with reports of over 45 000 individuals newly arrived in Dadaab refugee camp alone).

The worsening **economic crisis** is lowering incomes, and the Kenyan shilling is strongly depreciating against the US dollar.

The **Russian invasion of Ukraine** is contributing to the increase of food prices on local market, particularly for wheat, further highlighting the dependency on imported goods such as fertilisers, fuel, and wheat.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**



- Total funding HIP 2022: EUR 16.4 million.
- Ratio/percentage of allocation for priority sectors: food assistance (WFP EUR 4 million + Kenya Cash Consortium EUR 1.5 million for multi-purpose cash assistance), health and nutrition (IRC EUR 2.4 million + UNICEF EUR 1 million). From the EDF top-up: EUR 1.5 million for food assistance for encamped refugees (WFP) and EUR 0.5 million for provision of Ready to Use Therapeutic Food – RUTF (UNICEF).
- Total funding HIP 2023: EUR 12.5 million. The very limited funding and the emergency situation related to the refugees' new arrivals is not allowing for allocation of funding to the drought in the ASAL.

## Other actors' main interventions

- The USD 290 million Kenya Drought Appeal launched by OCHA in 2022 has been financed with USD 154 million only (or 54% of the appeal). There is no data available for the coverage of the October 2022 revised appeal.
- Following the August 2022 support from the US government worth USD 310.9 million, the USA is the first responder to the drought with approximately 71% of the funding received, followed by Germany (7%), the CERF (6%), ECHO (4%) and Canada (2%).

## Needs and opportunities

- Funding gap: additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Improve prioritisation of assistance for the most vulnerable groups.
- Explore nexus possibilities with the EDF de-committed funds (ECHO EUR 2.55 million for humanitarian food assistance in Kenya and Djibouti, and INTPA EUR 10 million for food production).
- Advocate with other services and donors for increased engagement in Kenya.



Source: *Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update*

## Madagascar

### Situation and evolution

According to the latest IPC analysis published on 4 January 2023, due to the persisting drought in the Grand Sud and after-effects of the cyclones in the Grand Sud-Est, more than two million people are expected to face high levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) in these areas, including 252 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), during the lean season (November 2022 - March 2023).

Overall, food insecurity is expected to deteriorate, with 19 out of 21 analysed districts being in IPC Phase 3 during the lean season. The most affected districts remain Ikongo and Bekily (Grand Sud), with 15% of their population in IPC Phase 3 (Emergency), followed by Befotaka and Ampanihy. A slow recovery is expected in the cyclone-affected

areas in the Grand Sud-Est due to low levels of food assistance and livelihood restoration, while favourable weather conditions in the Grand Sud could bring an improvement in projected food security in the April – July 2023 period.

Commodity prices remain higher than both last year and the 5-year average (rice and cassava prices in Madagascar are over 200% higher than the five-year average according to FEWSNET), demonstrating the rising cost of living for households. Rising gasoline prices are expected to contribute to continued increases in food prices, especially in the Grand Sud, where markets are dependent on staples either imported or brought from other regions.

### *Drivers*

The food insecurity currently experienced in Madagascar is driven by several factors.

Southern Madagascar continues to experience its worst drought in 40 years, leaving part of the population fighting for survival. More than 3 years of consecutive severe drought have wiped out harvests and hampered access to food in the Grand Sud;

Between January and April 2022, six tropical cyclones and storms hit Madagascar. The 2021/2022 cyclonic season affected more than 960 000 people in the North and Southern part of the country. Floods affected about 60 000 hectares of rice fields, which resulted in a below-average harvest in May, undermining both farmers' livelihoods and food supply in country;

The government's actions in raising gasoline prices in July by 43%, while the price of diesel increased by 44%. Price shocks within the COVID-19 context and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, combined crop losses, have the potential to transform the creeping inflation rate into galloping inflation; and

Insecurity related to banditry in the Grand Sud restricts people's movements and affects livelihoods, amplifying food insecurity.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- In 2022, EU humanitarian assistance amounted to nearly EUR 20 million to respond to the food insecurity and nutrition emergency needs, and to reinforce early warning systems to drought in Grand Sud, along a nexus approach. This amount also includes the EUR 4.25 million allocated to support the scale-up of food and nutrition assistance and last-mile delivery, further undermined by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its impact of global food prices.
- Priority sectors: Food Assistance and nutrition integrating protection (EUR 14.5 million or 72.5% for WFP, UNICEF and ACF), disaster preparedness (EUR 4.1 million for UNDP and IFRC), logistics, health and shelter.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- The flash appeal launched on 18 January 2021 was further extended until December 2022, with an additional funding requirement of USD 158.6 million for the period May - December 2022, including USD 114.8 million for the Food Security sector. USA, Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and SIDA were the main contributors in 2022.
- Total funding received from all donors (including DG ECHO) for food security in 2022 was USD 67 177 021.



## *Needs and opportunities*

- Need to remain vigilant and engaged in supporting the most vulnerable populations still confronted to the impact of the drought/climate change.
- The mechanisms in place are not sufficiently shock-responsive. More investments on resilience building and capacity strengthening activities to support affected communities' livelihood in areas recurrently affected by climate shocks is critical. The system relies on structures that are overwhelmed, and organisations are not quick in putting in place emergency measures.
- The EU development cooperation programming for the next period includes structuring long-term activity in the Grand Sud. The EU's development programme in Madagascar (country-wide) amounts to EUR 325 million for the 2021-2024 period, with three priority areas: governance and human development, sustainable growth and jobs, and Green Deal.
- NEXUS: The EDF de-committed funds allocation to DG INTPA provisionally earmarked EUR 10 million for boosting agricultural production in Madagascar (expected duration: 7.5 years).

## **Mozambique**

### *Situation and evolution*

Between April and September 2022, 1.4 million people (10% of the population) were projected to face Crisis or worse conditions (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above), including approximately 24 000 in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). Out of these, 1.1 million people in Crisis or worse, including 23 000 in Emergency, were in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia. This is an 18% year-on-year increase.

However, preliminary data on the new IPC analysis presented at the Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster (IPC report still to be endorsed by the Government of Mozambique) confirm 2.4 million people in IPC/CH Phase 3 and above (these figures exclude Cabo Delgado Province). The number of people in crisis phase in Cabo Delgado is estimated to range between 1.1 and 1.2 million, with an expected 60% increase of people in Emergency phase, due to additional displacements and food prices increase.

Beyond conflict-affected areas of northern Mozambique, Crisis conditions are likely to persist in drought-affected areas of southern and central Mozambique, as well as in cyclone/storm affected areas in the Nampula province, following a significantly below-average 2022 harvest.

The rise in global food and non-food costs is resulting in higher living costs in Mozambique. In August, the year-on-year inflation rate increased to 12.1%, the highest value in over 4 years. Compared to the 5-year average, maize grain prices in September are 11% to 47% above the 5-year average in most monitored markets. The above-average trend in maize grain prices in most markets across the country is likely driven by the cumulative effect of successive price increases over the past 4 years, following multiple production shocks including cyclones, floods, and below-average rainfall. High transportation costs and increased demand for non-wheat products (maize, cassava, sweet potato) are also keeping food prices high.

WFP is in the process to roll out the vulnerability-based targeting (VBT) and biometric beneficiaries' enrolment to prioritise assistance according to vulnerability status instead of displacement, including a review of their current beneficiary lists. The VBT system is expected to be fully adopted in March 2023.

## Drivers

The **armed conflict** in Cabo Delgado province, according to IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of November 2022, has displaced 1 028 743 people in Northern Mozambique.

The country has been affected by **shortage of rainfall** or irregular rains in parts of Nampula, Tete, Manica, Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo provinces;

Increasing **food prices** have also played a role, aggravated by the consequences of the **crisis in Ukraine**, as wheat supplies from the Russian Federation and Ukraine accounted for an average of 38% of the total wheat imported by the country. The supply disruption and subsequent increase in global prices has resulted in a spike in the prices of basic commodities. In the last quarter of the year, the price of three basic food commodities increased compared to August with percentages ranging from +4.3% for cassava to +33% for vegetable oil.

At the beginning of 2022, the northern provinces were hit by two severe **extreme weather events**, which left more than 700 000 people in need of food and shelter. The southern regions on the other hand, were adversely affected by a lack of rainfall during the same period, which resulted in moderately drier than average conditions.

Mozambique currently imports almost 20% of fertilisers from Russia. High global **fertiliser prices** are a source of concern, as reduced availability/accessibility may result in lower food production in Mozambique, which in turn would result in higher food import needs at a time when global food prices are rising steeply.

## Ongoing interventions

### ECHO interventions

- EUR 28.25 million allocated to Mozambique in 2022. This amount includes the EUR 8.25 million EDF funds allocated to support the scale-up of food and nutrition assistance and last-mile delivery, to alleviate the consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
- Sectors supported: food Assistance (42.5%), nutrition (3.5%) and multi-purpose cash transfers (5%). DG ECHO provides aid mainly through in-kind and in-cash deliveries.
- EUR 9 million are allocated to Mozambique under the HIP 2023 (Pillar 1 Emergency Response), with food assistance as one of the priorities. A top-up for Mozambique is currently under discussion.

### Other actors' main interventions

- OCHA draft HRP 2023 in Northern Mozambique (Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa) targets a total of 1 108 955 people under the chapter on Food Security and Livelihoods, of which 78% will be Internally Displaced People. Under the Nutrition chapter, the draft HRP 2023 aims to target 338 586 people (65% IDPs) out of which 98% will be Under-5 children.
- EU NutriNorte (AAP 22) allocates EUR 30 million on Nutrition for a duration of 5 years (2022-2027) targeting the provinces of Zambezia, Nampula and Cabo Delgado.
- US/BHA funding for Humanitarian Food Assistance is likely to drop in 2023 to USD 41 million, with a possibility of a top-up of USD 7 million at a later stage.

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## *Needs and opportunities*

- In 2023, at least 2 million people are in need of life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian assistance in Northern Mozambique and it is estimated that USD 512.9 million are required to assist the most vulnerable. This represents a 33% and 32% year-on-year increase respectively.
- Improved prioritisation of assistance by employing a vulnerability-based targeting approach as well as biometric registration of beneficiaries.

## **Somalia**

### *Situation and evolution*

The latest IPC/CH analysis, published in December 2022, projects an increase in the number of people facing IPC/CH phase 3 or worse, from 6.7 million between October and December 2022 to 8.3 million between March and June 2023.

The efforts of national and local authorities and the scale-up of humanitarian assistance to respond to the impact of the longest and most severe drought in Somalia's recent history has prevented famine thresholds from being surpassed at the time of the report. The situation remains extremely serious, and famine is a strong possibility from April to June 2023 and beyond if assistance is not sustained and if the 2023 April to June rains underperform as current forecasts indicate.

Two districts (Burhakaba and Baidoa) and the IDPs based in Mogadishu, representing close to 500 000 people, are projected to be facing famine conditions during that projected period, with additional 230 000 people at risk of famine elsewhere in the country. This unprecedented level of need is driven by the impacts of five consecutive seasons of poor rainfall, a likely sixth season of below-average rainfall from March to June 2023, and exceptionally high food prices, exacerbated by concurrent conflict/insecurity and disease outbreaks.

In terms of nutrition, the results of past integrated surveys conducted between May and July 2022 and subsequent IPC acute malnutrition analysis conducted in August remain valid, with the total estimated acute malnutrition burden in Somalia reaching approximately 1.8 million children, including 513 550 children who are likely to be severely malnourished, through July 2023.

Current funding for humanitarian food assistance allows for sustained support for 5.8 million people per month until March 2023. With humanitarian food assistance being the main buffer against further worsening of food insecurity and malnutrition, reducing or halting such assistance by end of March 2023 would exacerbate the risk of famine.

The number of people displaced by the extreme drought in Somalia since January 2021 reached 1.37 million in total at the end of December 2022. The upscale of the conflict between Al Shabaab and several clans backed by the Somali National Army is forcing people to displace, compounding the negative effects.

### *Drivers*

Climatic changes remain the primary drivers of the unprecedented and prolonged extreme drought, which is now the longest in recorded history to affect the Horn of Africa. The cumulative impacts of consecutive seasons of poor rainfall and persistent drought are expected to lead to a worsening of the humanitarian situation. The Deyr (October to December) rainy season has seen rainfalls ranging from 25 to 55 percent below average across most parts of Somalia, representing the fifth consecutive failed rainy season. This is estimated to lead to a cereal harvest in southern Somalia 40-60% below the 1995-2021 average. Given the likelihood of a below-average April to June 2023 Gu season rainfall,

the 2023 Gu season harvest is also estimated to be 40-60% below the 1995-2022 average. Consecutive poor-to-failed harvests, the loss of agricultural income among farmers and the continued loss of livestock among pastoralists are contributing to worsening food security and nutrition outcomes and pushing poor and vulnerable communities to the brink of starvation.

Other drivers of acute food insecurity and malnutrition in Somalia include high food prices, conflict/insecurity and disease outbreaks (measles, cholera and acute watery diarrhoea).

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- ECHO has allocated close to EUR 100 million since December 2021 to the drought response, with EUR 79.5 million allocated in 2022, and plans to allocate EUR 57 million in early 2023.
- ECHO also launched a Humanitarian Air Bridge to deliver emergency supplies to hard-to-reach areas. 37 flights transported over 211 metric tonnes of life-saving nutrition and health commodities to underserved and hard-to-reach locations.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**


- In August 2022, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator announced a system-wide scale-up of the response. In October 2022, the Humanitarian Response Plan funding requirement was revised to USD 2.26 billion, an increase of 54% from the original, to duly reflect the severity of the humanitarian situation. The overall population targeted by humanitarian assistance has been revised to 7.6 million people from 5.5 million originally.
- The current funding by donors represents 66% of the HRP requirement, the lowest coverage in several years, with the main donors being USAID (55.3% of the total funding), EU (4.8%), EU member states (around 7.4%), and UK (4.3%).
- An Integrated Response Framework, which aims at responding in a holistic way to newly displaced people and critically underserved people living in areas most hit by the drought, has been developed by the Humanitarian Country Team, to improve the efficiency of the response. It has been implemented in six hard-to-reach areas and has been activated six times for newly displaced populations, reaching overall close to 85 000 individuals in December and January. This response is also aiming at a better inclusion of chronically underserved marginalised groups in their access to humanitarian aid.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Most of the funding was given in 2022 and ultimately helped to avoid a famine at the end of the year, but sustained funding is necessary as the crisis continues into 2023. Frontloading this funding is essential to maintain lifesaving assistance, especially given the anticipated low funding levels in January and February.
- Improved prioritisation of assistance, fully implementing the use of the Integrated Response Framework, to ensure a better coverage of populations most in need.
- Urgent scale up of the health, water, sanitation, hygiene and nutrition services as those sectors have been identified as the main drivers of excess mortality.
- Support the system-wide scale-up to operationalise plans and deliver at scale, in particular by implementing inter-operable registration and assistance systems between

major responders (WFP and IOM).

- Advocate with other services and donors for increased engagement on Somalia through additional funding or reorientation of existing ones.



Source: IPC analysis – 12<sup>th</sup> December 2022

## South Sudan

### Situation and evolution

About 6.6 million people, over half of South Sudan's population (54%), have been experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity, classified in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) or worse, between October and November. Of those, 2.2 million people have been experiencing Emergency conditions (IPC/CH Phase 4), and an estimated 61 000 people Catastrophe/Famine conditions (IPC/CH Phase 5) in Fangak, Canal/Pigi and Akobo in Jonglei State, and Pibor County in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area.

Whilst the food security situation in December-March was projected to improve, this is unlikely in reason of renewed inter-ethnic clashes in various hotspots, continued high food prices and drought conditions in the Eastern Equatoria. In the lean season projection period of April to July 2023, 47 counties will likely be in Emergency food insecurity and 29 counties will likely be in Crisis food insecurity. Between July 2022 and June 2023, an estimated 1.4 million children under five are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition.

Given the high levels of severe acute food insecurity in South Sudan, there is a need for immediate scale-up of multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance to save lives and prevent the total collapse of livelihoods in the affected counties, particularly those with a high share of populations in Emergency and Catastrophe phases.

The highly food insecure populations are in locations with chronic vulnerabilities worsened by frequent climate-related shocks (severe flooding and dry spells), the macro-economic crisis, conflict and insecurity, and low agricultural production.

South Sudan continues to grapple with persistent food and nutrition insecurity, stemming largely from a combination of multiyear climate shocks, conflict, and socio-economic insecurity. This has eroded household capacity to access food and income. In addition, persistent flooding, combined with pockets of drought, is likely to reduce production in the



subsistence farming during the upcoming harvest season. The overall cereal production deficit in 2022 is estimated at around 541 000 tonnes, representing 40% of South Sudan's cereal needs, an increase by 16% compared to the 2021 deficit and the five-year average (2017–2021). Persistent macroeconomic shocks leading to hyperinflation have led to market price volatility. Impacts of both COVID-19 and Russian invasion of Ukraine make the situation worse. Between mid-2021 and mid-2022, the fuel prices in the country increased by 43% (UNHAS).

Conflict is likely to rise again and peak early 2023 during the dry season. Seasonal increases in conflict are likely at the end of 2022 due to worsening socioeconomic pressures, including the devaluation of the South Sudanese pound, coupled with high prices for food and essential non-food goods.

### *Drivers*

South Sudan's economy is experiencing a **macroeconomic crisis** caused by the depreciation of the local currency and the global impacts of the conflict in Ukraine.

The country is prone to **climatic shocks**, particularly floods and dry spells that affect agriculture, disrupt livelihoods, and hamper humanitarian access.

Persisting **conflict** is disrupting livelihoods and leading to **displacements** and the loss of productive assets. They also disrupt humanitarian delivery.

**Low agricultural production** is exacerbated by drier-than-average conditions and severe rainfall deficits, resulting in high humanitarian needs.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- As of October 2022, the ECHO HIP is worth EUR 79.8 million. The funding is divided between food and nutrition (32%), health (17%), protection (9%), WASH (8%), Cash/Multi-Purpose Cash Transfers (5%), Camp Coordination and Camp Management (5%), Education in Emergencies (4%) and coordination/logistics (18%).
- Programmatic Partnerships: UNICEF is contracted for nutrition (EUR 5 million); IFRC for disaster preparedness (EUR 2 million) including MPCT; and Concern for nutrition and health (EUR 2 million).
- Under the HIP modification, in addition, an amount of EUR 5.5 million is available to support the following priorities: (1) an immediate scale-up of life-saving emergency/rapid multi-sectoral assistance in areas with IPC/CH phase 3 and above, including health, protection, WASH, and nutrition, supporting the food security outcomes; (2) WASH and shelter non-food items (SNFI) pipeline in the country.
- ECHO finances emergency food assistance in IPC/CH phases 4 and 5 areas. Agricultural production and road feeders' rehabilitation are also funded in a nexus approach.

#### **Other actor's main interventions**


- Key donors (USAID, FCDO) dedicate large part of their funding to food assistance and nutrition, the most critical lifesaving sectors in the country together with health.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- The South Sudan crisis is underfunded, with deteriorating food security and nutrition situation. The 2022 HRP is 54% funded only as of October 2022.

- The Food, Security and Livelihoods (FSL) cluster is also underfunded but better funded than other sectors.
- Pursue coordination efforts with WFP and FSL actors to increase cash modality wherever feasible and reinforce coordination with development donors to scale-up long-term investments on agriculture, basic services, and infrastructures.
- Monitor malnutrition closely (21% SAM increase in 2022 compared to 2021).
- Activate collective diplomatic advocacy towards the Government of South Sudan to enforce law and reduce violence.

### FIRST PROJECTED SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (DEC 2022 - MAR 2023)




IPC Map, Nov 2022

## Uganda


### Situation and evolution

A new IPC/CH analysis was released on 25 November 2022, showing an improvement in the situation in Karamoja. Compared to May 2022, the number of people in urgent need of food assistance has decreased from 518 000 to 315 000. It was expected to decrease further to 308 000 by end of January 2023: 276 000 people in IPC/CH phase 3, compared to 428 000 individuals in May 2022, and about 38 000 in IPC/CH 4, compared to almost 90 000 in May. Nutrition surveys for Karamoja have not been updated or undertaken, but admission rates for severely acutely malnourished children have drastically reduced to the long-term-average in October 2022.



Source: Regional Food Security and Nutrition Working Group, November 2022

In October 2022, the average monthly price of the local food basket was 45% higher than in October 2021, which is a slight improvement from September where the food basket was 53% higher than the previous year.




Source: WFP Uganda National Market Monitor

All food commodities continue to show a stabilising trend since July 2022, especially foods Ugandans are heavily dependent on, such as Matoke, Millet, Maize, Sorghum. The exception to this is vegetable oil, which has shown a downward trend since July, while still being 30 % above 2021.

In refugee settlements, out of the 1.46 million refugees and asylum seekers, approximately 92% rely on continuous food assistance (either in-kind or in-cash). For refugees the Minimum Expenditure Package (MEB) continues to increase.

Food consumption scores (FCS) for refugees and host populations shows differences with host populations generally having better food consumption.



Source: WFP: 2022 Refugees and Host community; FSNA Results; 28/10/2022


UNHCR's requirement for 2022 is USD 343.4 million, and as of 21 October 2022 is only 43% funded (USD 148.6 million). The Country Refugee Response Plan Emergency Appeal was extended from April to December 2022 and increased from USD 48 million to USD 68 million, but is only 24% funded. Due to critical underfunding, WFP has implemented ration cuts since November 2021. With no new resources, WFP assistance are facing critical breaks for cash by end 2022 / early 2023 and for in-kind end January / early February 2023.

## Drivers

**Conflict** in neighbouring countries causes a regular influx of refugees from South Sudan and DRC (almost 130 000 new refugees in 2022). In Karamoja, there is localised conflict and insecurity.

**Climate shocks and hazards** often affect the country, such as poor rainfall performance, frequent flash floods with corresponding waterlogging and occasional devastating landslides.

**Acute Malnutrition** is prevalent, due to inadequate food and water access, poor dietary



diversity, structural poverty, low value livelihood options, as well as poor hygiene and sanitation. Very poor levels of food consumption are registered among children of 6-23 months, with only 4% of the children consuming a minimum acceptable diet.

**Economic factors**, exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine limit household income sources, . The headline inflation rate increased to 10.7% in October 2022, up from 7.9% in July, the highest level since July 2012. Inflation in the cost of food is twice as high, at 22.2%. Transport cost has stabilised with fuel prices decreasing.

## Ongoing interventions

### ECHO interventions

- As of end of October, the total HIP 2022 for Uganda stood at EUR 34.5 million, up from EUR 30,0 million at the beginning of the year
- Sectors: food assistance 18%; protection 30%; EiE 21%; health 9%; MPCT 12%; coordination 1%; disaster preparedness 10%.
- In addition, for Disaster Response, three DREF operations (total EUR 450 000) were supported, including for Ebola preparedness, as well as the Programmatic Partnership with IFRC for EUR 2.6 million. An Ebola epidemic response package of EUR 3 million has been finalised and financed under the DG ECHO epidemics tool.

### Other actors' main interventions

- Design and feasibility for the Kagera Water Supply Pipeline, including branches to refugee settlements in Isingiro Refugee Hosting District, is ongoing. The concept note by the EU delegation to access funding from the Flexible Mechanism to support the

response in Southwest is being finalised.

- In September, the US provided an additional support of USD 82 million: USD 21 million for USAID and USD 61 million for the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) with USD 41 million for UNHCR and USD 20 million for other programs.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- UNHCR alone needs USD 195 million for their operations for the rest of 2022. An overview for the full Uganda Refugee Response Plan (RRP) was compiled at the end of the third quarter of 2022; the Uganda RRP remained at USD 804 million with 45% funded at end of September. No additional funding was available for the last month of 2022. UNHCR issued also an Ebola appeal of USD 14.8 million but has so far not received any contributions.
- Recurrent and continuous shortfalls of resources call for extending the donor base, operationalising the needs-based approach through better targeting, and looking for more sustainable and resilient solutions in the context of a protracted refugee crisis.

## **Zimbabwe**

### *Situation and evolution*

According to Rural Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) 2022 findings, nearly a third of the urban (1.63 million people) and 3.82 million of the rural populations are facing severe food insecurity. Zimbabwe was included in the Global Network list of Hunger Hotspots in June 2022 due to an erratic rainfall season and consequent drop in crop production. An urban ZimVAC exercise is planned for the first quarter of 2023 to obtain an updated understanding of urban populations food insecurity levels.

The cost of living for a family of six in Zimbabwe increased by 14.2% in December compared to November, according to the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe (CCZ). The price shock during the holiday season is reportedly influenced by the rise in cost of goods by producers and suppliers, stemming from a reported increase in disposable income in December. Parallel market exchange rates increased by nearly 15% in December from November, likely due to increasing demand for the Zimbabwean Dollar (ZWL) and increased foreign currency inflows as the festive season began.

Additionally, widespread and prolonged national power cuts are negatively impacting most sectors of the economy, increasing the cost of production and reducing engagement in income-generating activities, thereby limiting household purchasing power and income.

Across the country, poorer households are increasingly engaging in agricultural and off-farm labour activities with the start of the agricultural season. However, labour rates remain below normal, especially in deficit-producing areas and other communal farming areas, due to limited liquidity by better-off households to pay in-cash or in-kind.

Widespread rains persisted in December, and planting has continued throughout the country.

The SMART survey (yet to be published) conducted by the Nutrition Cluster under the lead of UNICEF in 6 districts in October/ November 2022 confirmed an increased prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM), notably in Mudzi where the prevalence of combined GAM has reached 11.9%.

### *Drivers*


The Zimbabwe current food crisis is driven by the impact of the **below-average 2021/22 crop production**, with severe food insecurity in many areas in which households have already



depleted stocks from their own production. Climatic events affecting crop production and other livelihoods have contributed to this situation.

A protracted **economic crisis**, characterised by high inflation rates, has sharply eroded the households' purchasing power.

Foreign currency exchange rates are soaring in the parallel market, rapidly increasing inflation. Maize meal and bread prices in ZWL increased by approximately 50% and 30% respectively, between March and April 2022.



Source: Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update

Selected basic commodities disappeared mostly in formal markets and there are fears of shortages for some commodities as the macro-economic situation deteriorates.

### Ongoing interventions

#### ECHO interventions

- In 2022 DG ECHO-funded interventions in Zimbabwe - excluding regional actions – amounted to EUR 6.8 million. This included the EUR 4 million allocated for food assistance (through cash in urban settings) to support the scale-up of food and nutrition assistance delivery, undermined by the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine.
- Sectors: food assistance (EUR 4 million) Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) /Disaster Preparedness (DP) (EUR 2 million) and reinforcement of the roll-out of COVID19 vaccination campaigns (EUR 0.8 million top-up).

#### Other actors' main interventions

- The African Development Fund has approved a grant of around USD 25.65 million to help enhance domestic food production and supply by distributing certified seeds and fertiliser.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Since the beginning of the pandemic, approximately 500 000 Zimbabwean migrants have returned to Zimbabwe, fearing issues related to their personal safety due to a rise in xenophobia and tough migration policies in South Africa. The situation of Zimbabwean returning migrants from South Africa increases the pressure on urban communities already significantly affected by protracted crises, unemployment and insufficient social services.
- The politicisation of humanitarian assistance is expected to further increase in the run-up to the 2023 national elections. Of particular concern is the shrinking of democratic space, the lack of access for humanitarian organisations to people in need, and the capacity to operate in accordance with humanitarian principles.
- In this challenging operating environment, the lack of data is a major constraint to fully understand the severity and scale of a crisis. More transparency is required from all stakeholders. Coordination amongst donors and between (humanitarian and development) partners requires more attention to better target people in need.

## *Sudan*

### *Situation and evolution*

Progress has been made with the signature of a political framework agreement on 5 December 2022, supported by the UN-AU-IGAD and the broader international community. The final phase was launched on 8 January 2023, and is expected to be completed by March 2023.

Intertribal conflict continued in the Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile states. There were nearly 140 000 internally displaced people in the last quarter of 2022 alone, bringing the total number of more than 400 000 new IDPs in 2022.

Renewed conflict in the Upper Nile State of South Sudan resulted in South Sudanese refugees fleeing into Sudan – about 6 000 in White Nile and 2 000 in South Kordofan. The total number of refugees arrived in Sudan in 2022 is 52 000.

The ongoing harvest is improving households' access to food from production and in-kind labour payments, while declining market prices are improving household purchasing power. Despite this, many poor households continue to face Crisis conditions (IPC Phase 3) in Darfur, Blue Nile, Kordofan, Kassala, and Red Sea states, as food prices remain well above last year, along with the impact of inter-communal clashes disrupting access to income earning opportunities and food. The harvest in the 2022 season covered 65% of the estimated Sudan requirements.

The national average prices of local food basket remained high, with slight decrease in relation to the previous month. The minimum expenditure basket slightly reduced from SDG 24 944 in November to SDG 22 456 in December 2022.

The SDG/USD exchange rate remained high throughout 2022. The January 2023 rate is twelve times above the January 2021 rate. Inflation rates remained high, averaging 164.2 percent in 2022 and reaching 87.3 percent in December 2022. GDP growth is estimated at 10% of what was projected before 25 October 2021 (0.3% in 2022). Extreme poverty (below USD 2.15 a day PPP) increased to 27% in 2021 from 24.6% in 2020, and was projected to increase to 29% in 2022.

### *Drivers*

The country experiences persistent political instability and intensified localised conflict.

Staple food prices have significantly increased, coupled with a worsening macro-economic

situation.

This food crisis suffers from a severe funding gap, including a suspension of donor funding for programmes that involve government entities.

The 2022 harvest was below-average, due to climate shocks and a shortage of agricultural inputs.

The country is highly dependent on wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine – 60% of the total wheat import. External dependence is likely to reach 80-85 % in 2023 due to the 100% increase in fertiliser prices.

The price of all agricultural inputs (fertilisers, labour, transportation) has increased. Compounded with the lack of agricultural financing, this is likely to result in average to below-average production in the next harvests.

Widespread flooding increased the risk of contracting vector-borne and waterborne diseases, resulting in an increase in dengue fever, hepatitis E, and malaria cases.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- DG ECHO considerably stepped up its support to Sudan, with EUR 88 million in humanitarian aid mobilised in 2022. This includes the recent reinforcement of EUR 38 million to address the current food security crisis aggravated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. EUR 74 million have been allocated for food security and cash assistance projects through HIP 2021 and 2022.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- FAO received USD 15 million from Norway to support smallholders' farmers and agro-pastoralists value chains in the face of climate change.
- World Bank assistance is ongoing, WFP registered 1 million people through the SCOPE platform, about 1.97 million reached with cash and 158 000 with in-kind assistance.
- USAID/BHA delivered approximately 45 000 metric tons of sorghum to support the response of the WFP in the country through April 2023.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- The 2023 Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan puts a strong emphasis on prioritisation to ensure an inclusive and dignified humanitarian response to the needs of the most vulnerable people.
- The FSL sector needs USD 437.5 million to target 8.2 out of 11.7 million people in need in 2023.
- WFP: USD 400 million is urgently required for emergency food assistance. No resources available from mid-January onwards to deliver cash assistance to IDPs and refugees.
- Additional progress on the framework agreement and inclusion of all parties and resistance committees.
- The African Development Bank Group on 9 December 2022 approved USD 73.81 million to finance the Sudan Emergency Wheat Production Project under the Bank's African Emergency Food Production Facility, to mitigate the impact of the war in Ukraine on food security, and help Sudan achieve self-sufficiency in wheat production. WFP will implement the project (selected due to logistical capacity).

- Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

## **Lebanon**

### *Situation and evolution*

The 2022 Global Report on Food Crises indicated that in 2021, Lebanon ranked third globally among food-crisis countries hosting the highest numbers of refugees/asylum seekers.

The first results of an IPC/CH exercise covering the Lebanese and Syrian refugee population was published in December 2022 and indicated that 37% (1.99 million) of the population were facing acute food insecurity (IPC/CH phase 3 and above) between September and December 2022. This comprises 33% (1.29 million) of the Lebanese and 46% (0.69 million) of the Syrian refugee population in IPC/CH phase 3 and above. A total of 307 000 people (6%) are experiencing emergency levels (IPC/CH phase 4) of acute food insecurity. Severe economic, political, and social crisis, compounded by high dependency on food imports (80%), currency depreciation, Russia's war against Ukraine, and a global increase in food and fuel prices, are adding to the already dire situation in Lebanon.

The food security outlook for 2023 remains grim, the initial IPC/CH analysis projects that an additional 275 000 people will fall into IPC/CH phase 3+ between January to April 2023. This translates into 2.26 million people (42%) in IPC/CH phase 3+ out of which 354.000 (7%) are projected in the emergency phase (phase 4). In 2023, 3.1 million Lebanese, refugees (Syrian refugees, Palestinian refugees from Syria and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon) and migrants are expected to be in need of food assistance<sup>10</sup>.


The potential drivers informing the bleak outlook include limited political progress to ensure macro-economic reforms, increasing inflation, which will further limit access to food and basic needs, continued currency volatility - the exchange rate reached a high of 63,000 LBP in February 2023, with continued currency volatility and high inflation projected for the rest of the year.

With diminishing trends in food consumption patterns in 2022 (e.g. only 38.6% of Syrian refugees had acceptable food consumption scores in November), the majority of the population will continue to experience diminished access to food and nutritious diets and other basic needs in addition to disruption of agricultural production and livelihoods. The real value of humanitarian assistance is expected to further decline impacting the purchasing power, of the refugees in particular. In addition, the level of assistance towards the Syrian refugees is projected to reduce by up to 20% due to shrinking aid budgets.


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<sup>10</sup> Food security sector estimates.

### Lebanon Current Acute Food Insecurity (Sept-Dec 2022)




### Lebanon Projected Acute Food Insecurity (January-April 2023)






Recent vulnerability assessment reports show that 90% of Syrian refugees, 53% of Lebanese households and 73% of Palestinian refugees need assistance to meet their basic needs. Over 90% of Syrian and Lebanese households have adopted at least one food-based coping strategy, the most prominent being reduced portion size of meals. This reflects increasing levels of food insecurity across the board.

Currency depreciation, inflation and the removal of subsidies from key commodities (including medicines and medical supplies or fuel), have translated into an exponential increase in the cost of food and other basic goods and services (rent, transport, education, health, household utilities). A 12% increase in the cost of the survival minimum expenditure basket (SMEB) was registered between November to December 2022, along with a 7% increase in the consumer price index during that same period.



Source: WFP

The cost of the food SMEB has been steadily rising, recording a 7% increase between November and December and 2,043% since October 2019 that is 21 times increase. According to the Mercy Corps October Crisis Update, the cost of the food SMEB was far less than the average public salary, implying the need to earn an additional USD 184 in order to afford the food basket.



Source: WFP

94% of Syrian refugee households continued to incur debt to survive, mostly to buy food (93%) and pay rent (49%).

The response framework is mainly split between the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), jointly drafted with the Lebanese Government, and the OCHA-led Emergency Response Plan (ERP), targeting Lebanese, Palestinians, and migrants. The food Security sector under the ERP 2022 was 72% funded (approx. USD 48 million out of USD 66.5 million) as per FTS data. LCRP coverage for Food Security in the first quarter of 2022 was 14% (USD 138 million out of USD 975 million), while the coverage level for the Basic Assistance sector in the second quarter of 2022 was 18.2% (USD 96.3 million out of USD 530 million). Cash transfers are used to cover food, often at the expense of meeting other types of needs. WFP has a funding requirement for the period August 2022-January 2023 of USD 422 million. For 2023, the funding horizon looks very bleak, the MPCT programme being cut by at least a quarter due to decreasing funds.

### *Drivers*

The impact of the severe financial and economic crisis has resulted in the downgrading of the country from upper middle-income to lower middle-income country. Low foreign currency reserves have reduced food imports, impacting the replenishment of supplies, as the country depends on imports for 80% of its food needs.

Food imports have suffered continued decrease in 2022 registering an annual percentage decrease in December of 12% compared to December 2021. Recovery to pre October-2019 or pre-Russian war levels will not be realised in the context of the complex economic crisis.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 74.8 million have been allocated to Lebanon in 2022, including a EUR 5 million top-up to address the consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular to the food security sector. EUR 43 million are used to fund direct multi-purpose cash transfers (MPCT) for Syrian refugees and Lebanese households who are not included in the Government's social safety net.
- DG ECHO allocated EUR 100 000 to the 2022 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA), implemented by REACH/IMPACT.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- The European Union, Germany, and the United States of America are the most significant donors to WFP in Lebanon.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Improve targeting and review the transfer value addressing the need to reduce caseload, without jeopardising support to the most vulnerable and potentially increasing the transfer value (at present set at only 67% of the minimal survival basket).
- Advocate for an inclusive and needs-based social protection framework that allows for the poorest (and often illiterate) households to access services, including the stateless.

## Syria

### *Situation and evolution*

After 12 years of conflict, Syrians have exhausted their savings. Humanitarian assistance has never been so critical to help families who are being forced to choose between buying food, fuel and medicine.

As for the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) 2023 the food security in Syria has worsened since last year. It is estimated that in 2023, 15 million people, 68% of the total population, will need some form of food assistance versus 64% in 2022. At least 12.1 million people are estimated to be food insecure including 2 million people living in camps, who are considered fully dependent on humanitarian assistance. Additionally, 2.9 million people are at risk of sliding into food insecurity if the crisis continues to worsen. While food needs were found to be widespread across all governorates of Syria, the prevalence of food insecurity was found to be highest in Idlib (74 %), Quneitra and Al-Raqqa (68%), Aleppo (61 per cent), Deir Ezzor (56 %), Al-Hasakeh and Hama (53%).

In October 2022 food prices in Syria were 52% higher than at the beginning of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and 91% higher compared to the same time last year. In April 2022, The World Food Programme (WFP) was forced to reduce food rations to 995 kcal. The crisis remains underfunded. The 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for the Food Security and Agriculture cluster was funded at 61%, leaving more than USD 660 million gap.

South-central Syria and Government of Syria (GoS) controlled areas (GCA) rely on Russia for their wheat supply. The depreciation of the local currency on the parallel market by 36 % in 12 months has contributed to the food prices staying high. As a result, the Syrian pound has fallen by 50 % in one year, 60% in two years, and nearly 90% in three years. The price of the standard reference food basket has increased fourteen-fold since November 2019. Combined with several other economic stressors such as fuel and electricity shortages, this depreciation has resulted in a significant and noticeable socio-economic decline. Additional devaluation this year will likely further raise food prices due to a direct correlation between exchange rates and food prices, and as other key fundamentals (such as low agricultural production levels) remain unchanged. Surging food prices are taking a toll on vulnerable households as food accounts for a significant proportion of their spending while the increase in commodity prices is limiting the fiscal space for government transfers on food and energy.

In Northwest Syria (NWS), some 1.4 million people rely on WFP food assistance delivered cross-border, that is heavily dependent on imports transiting through Turkey, many of which originate from Ukraine or Russia. The UN Security Council resolution mandating cross-border assistance has been extended only for six months until July 2023 limiting the capacity of partners to plan long term procurements. The continuation of the WFP and of the humanitarian response needs a sustainable solution independent of the UN Security Council resolutions.

### *Drivers*

Political conflict, economic collapse, the Lebanon financial crisis, war in Ukraine, the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change resulting in severe drought, water scarcity and historic low yields are the key drivers of food insecurity.

Syria is currently facing one of its worst water crises, severely impacting the population's access to both drinking and irrigation water directly impacting food security. Wheat production in the last two year was around 1.045 million tonnes per year, down from 2.8 million tonnes in 2020 and from 4.1 million tonnes before 2011. It is expected that the Syrian Pound will continue to depreciate. In NWS, price increases, insufficient reserves, and the inability of the de-facto authorities to set up and implement a fully-fledged food security policy will continue to have adverse effects.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 150 million were allocated in 2022, with EUR 24 million allocated to the WFP to address the rising food insecurity. Approximately 51% of the total budget is contributing directly to food security: in-kind food-basket distributions, cash assistance, livelihoods, and approximately 20% of ECHO budget allocated to early recovery activities.
- DG ECHO has been advocating with the Government of Syria and the Central Bank of Syria to introduce an adjustable preferential rate for INGOs and UN agencies in order to compensate for the depreciation of the Syrian pound and hyperinflation.
- DG ECHO organised an event on food assistance and food security in the margin of the 6<sup>th</sup> Brussels conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region, trying to mobilise donor support for a better coordinated response.


### **Other actors' main interventions**

- DG NEAR: additional allocation of EUR 10 million for food/livelihoods is being negotiated with selected INGOs partners in close coordination with DG ECHO.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Prioritise funding of immediate lifesaving response to vulnerable Syrians, with focus on food and nutrition assistance as well as early recovery interventions.
- Advocate with other EU services and donors for increased engagement on Syria for integrated programming that boosts ability of people to earn a living. Livelihoods programmes, including agricultural projects, market strengthening, job creation and restoration of basic services.
- Develop strategies to operate in context of high inflation and currency depreciation supporting hybrid modalities balancing cash and in-kind assistance.
- Strengthen humanitarian cash and shock responsive mechanisms.


Syria's compounded economic crisis (2019-2022)



Source: Whole of Syria Food Security Sector

Exchange rates (formal (official) and informal) and food price trends

Source: WFP Syria, October 2022





## Yemen

### *Situation and evolution*

IPC/CH updated analysis indicates that for the period October to December 2022, approximately 17 million people or over half of the population analysed in Yemen, will experience high levels of Acute Food Insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). The primary concern is the 6.1 million people classified in IPC/CH Phase 4, one Phase away from starvation. This analysis update indicates a slight improvement in the food security situation compared with the previous projection (June to December 2022), where over 19 million (60%) people were expected to be highly food insecure, including over 160.000 classified in IPC/CH Phase 5, Catastrophe. The updated analysis shows that while IPC/CH Phase 5, Catastrophe has been reversed and prevented, more than half of the population remains acutely food insecure – with over 6 million people still classified in IPC/CH Phase 4, Emergency. When comparing current number of people facing acute food insecurity between January-May 2022 of 17.4 million to the updated projection of 17 million, it can be considered that very limited change of the food security situation will occur by the beginning of 2023 compared to the end of 2022.

Yemen remains one of the most food insecure countries in the world. For nearly a decade – even before the war – more than half of the population has consistently been food insecure, mainly driven by structural instability aggravated by human-induced factors and climate change. This analysis, therefore, emphasises that the slight improvement is a temporary reprieve and further efforts need to be put in place to sustain and completely reverse this trend that has been persistent for over a decade.

Prior to the conflict in Ukraine, the national average price of wheat had already risen by 246.7% from 122 Yemeni Rials (YER) per kilo in 2014 to 423 YER per kilo in September 2021. Between January and October 2022, wheat flour prices have increased by another 67% in the Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) area, while it has increased by 12% in the Houthis controlled areas. Since November 2022, there was a slight decrease in the cost of the majority of the items of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) in the IRG area, leading to a slight decrease by -4% in the MEB. As the wheat imports continue, ACAPS reported that the import data and the monitoring of local market dynamics indicate that there are sufficient wheat supplies in Yemen. Therefore, the problem is not availability but affordability of wheat.

The Yemen crisis is still significantly underfunded, with the 2022 appeal funded 51.3% only, the lowest coverage of a Yemen appeal since the start of the crisis. Out of USD 4.27 billion required, USD 2.19 billion were provided. In 2023, the HRP needs USD 4.34 billion for implementation, an increase of 1.7%. For food the food security sector however, the request has increased with close to 5% to USD 2.2 billion.

The funding gap is forcing the World Food Programme (WFP) to further cut food rations. Despite the important amount of funding received in 2022 and the efforts to prioritise assistance to the populations facing the highest needs, WFP is still constrained to distribute reduced rations equivalent to 65 percent of the standard food basket, providing around 1 100 kilocalories per person per day.

Reduced rations and suspension of assistance are dangerously becoming the new norm. The Food Security actors will inevitably no longer meet the standards of humanitarian food assistance. The result could be malnutrition and further impoverishment.

## *Drivers*

The economic crisis (effects of low incomes, depreciation of the Yemeni currency and irregular or non-payment of salaries of civil servants), persistence of pockets of conflict, reduced access to basic services and low humanitarian food assistance are the key drivers of food insecurity. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is also contributing to the deterioration of the food security situation in Yemen. Yemen is 90% dependent on food imports, with 46% of wheat coming from Russia and Ukraine.

Restrictions and obstructions of access to services and assistance are major aggravating factors for the functioning of the humanitarian response and the private sector hampered by limited volumes of imports. The UN-brokered truce (started on 2 April 2022 and renewed until 2 October 2022) has led to a reduction of hostilities and a temporary increase of fuel imports allowed into the north of Yemen. Fortunately, the expiration of the truce agreement in early October did not affect the fuel supply into Yemen. The flow of imported fuel through Red Sea ports in November 2022 was nearly thirteen times the level of imports reported in November 2021, and the total volume of imported fuel since the beginning of 2022 (Jan-Nov 2022) is 281 percent higher than fuel imports during the same period in 2021.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 170 million were allocated in 2022, including additional allocation of EUR 35 million mobilised through the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR), to address the food security crisis. This means that approx. 80% of the budget contributed directly (Food Security 34%) and indirectly (health and nutrition 21%, basic needs/Multipurpose Cash Assistance (MPCA) 16%, WASH 6% and DRR 3.5%) to food security outcomes. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash and in-kind deliveries.
- The EU is a leading actor on diplomacy and coordinated humanitarian advocacy. On 23 June 2022, DG ECHO co-hosted the fourth humanitarian Senior Official Meeting jointly with Sweden (SOM process), where the food insecurity crisis and related drivers were emphasised and action points for collective action identified. Another SOM could be organised in 2023, to be confirmed.

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- USAID/BHA: slightly over USD 950 million was allocated in 2022 alone (including a significant part of food in-kind). This is already above 2021 (USD 800 million) and 2020 (USD 600 million). However, the support allocated in 2023 is very likely to decrease.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Improve prioritisation of assistance ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups.
- Continue to play a leading role in coordination and advocacy for the respect of IHL, principled aid delivery and increased assistance to Yemen.
- Advocate both internally to other Commission services and externally to donors for increased engagement on Yemen.
- Develop specific strategies to operate in context of high inflation and depreciation (e.g., flexible programming, market monitoring and contingency planning).
- Strengthen the humanitarian cash and shock responsive social protection (SRSP) nexus as well as livelihood support and diversification, inter-sectoral programming and monitoring and early warning systems.

- Latin America and Caribbean

**Central America**


*Situation and evolution*

The ripple effects from the war in Ukraine, climate extremes events, conflict, violence, economic shocks, COVID-19 impacts are the main drivers of food insecurity in the LAC region. As reported by WFP (June 2022), “overall number of people in food insecurity (IPC/CH phase 3 and above) are around 70 million “, but the more concerning the severe food insecurity situation as “the number of severely food insecure people increased from 8.7 million (Jan. 2022) to 9.8 million (May 2022)”. Adding the last estimation about food insecurity in Venezuela, this regional number pass to 85 million of people in food crisis (more than 12.87% of the total population).

Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras countries of highest concern, with the highest percentage (more than 11 million) of people food insecure (IPC3 or above). The most vulnerable population in those countries are the most exposed to shocks that further aggravate their conditions during the 2022 hurricane season and ongoing impact of la Nina. Special concerns about availability of accurate data remain for Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela where social and economic conditions continue to deteriorate (but Governments do not allow food security surveys) and particularly due to global inflation and the ripple effect of the war in Ukraine.

The COVID 19 pandemic and the Ukraine crisis have heavily impacted livelihood conditions of households in South America, changing the traditional LAC food crisis Hotspots (Corridor Seco, Haiti and Venezuela) to integrate countries like Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia where more than 82 % of the 3.5 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees in need of food assistance in 2022 (RMRP, R4V,2022). Last WFP surveys report more than a total of 6 million people severely food insecure (migrants and host communities). The need to realize more robust (like IPC) food security and nutrition analysis in those countries remains (particularly in the fast-changing global context).

In this context, DG ECHO continue to support families most in need by allocating for the period from 2020 to 2022, more than EUR 85 million to respond to the ongoing food crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean.



*ECHO LAC funding by sector from 2020 to 2022*

## Guatemala

### *Situation and evolution*

The situation in Guatemala is particularly worrisome as food insecurity has known a 6-fold increase since 2013, with 24 % of it's the population food insecure. In addition, around 47% of children under 5 are being affected by chronic malnutrition (UNICEF) and 16 611 cases of acute malnutrition and 46 deaths in children under five from January to September 2022 (Ministry of Health, October 2022). This is the highest rate in Latin America and the Caribbean and is the 6th highest rate of chronic malnutrition or stunting in the world (WFP, August 2022).

According to IPC/CH, the number of people experiencing high level of acute food insecurity (IPC3 or above) and in need of assistance is estimated at 3.2 million people (30% decrease form September 2022) for the period leading up to February 2023. WFP estimates that more than 100 000 Guatemalans suffer from severe food insecurity, IPC4 (WFP, October 2022). Children are particularly vulnerable. The different projection didn't take into account the impact of meteorological hazard as from April to mid-October 2022 where more than 4.8 million people have been affected by consecutive rains (Some 851 000 people in Guatemala have been affected by Tropical Storm Julia).

The main drivers are high food and transport prices, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine causing high prices in fertilisers (an increase of 85% since 2021), the depletion of basic grain reserves, the loss of jobs and income and the COVID-19 pandemic consequences.

The purchasing power of households continues to be negatively affected by international trends. In June 2022, the highest year-on-year inflation in eleven years (7.5%) was reported. The inflationary trend is even higher in Alta and Baja Verapaz, with 9.7%, and in Huehuetenango and Quiché, with 9.2%. The prices of white corn, black beans and rice are the highest recorded since 1998 (Ministry of Agriculture). Basic Food Basket data reveal that the price of edible oil increased 31.4%, compared to the previous year. The National Statistics Institute (INE) indicates that a family of five needs USD 427.90 per month to purchase the Basic Food Basket, while the average minimum wage is USD 267. 40% of the households spent more than 50% of their income on food.

## Honduras

### *Situation and evolution*

According to IPC, over 2.6 million people (28% of the population analysed) are in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), requiring urgent action. Of these people, at least 1.9 million are in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) and 353 000 in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4).

According to ACH's forecasting system, PREDISAN, 14% of Honduras' population were in a zone of concern of very high food security and up to 71% in a high zone, between June and September 2022.

Inflation has caused a deterioration in the purchasing power of the population, which currently depends mainly on purchases due to the annual lean season. Food prices increased with 6.3% and transport with 3.6%. The price of the Basic Food Basket increased with 5% since December 2021, with a 68% increase of maize, 23% of beans and 15% of oil.

With a seasonal decline in employment options in rural areas, access to food has been reduced, especially for the poorest households. They are reducing the number of daily meals, increasing the use of credit or third-party food support, and selling productive assets, increasing the possibility that they will be classified in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3).

### *Drivers*

Food insecurity is stemming from structural and systemic deficiencies, causing increasing

poverty rates, linked to violence and climate change (26% population is at high climate risk). The connection between food insecurity, climate, and violence on the one side and (forced) migration on the other has been highlighted by some stakeholders in the region.

Indeed, the aggravated food insecurity is mainly caused by an accumulation of impacts and simultaneous shocks, including El Niño, consecutive droughts, hurricanes Eta and Iota, coffee rust, socio-economic impact of COVID-19, ongoing inflation, violence, and the impact of the war on Ukraine.

Atypically high prices are worsening the impact of the ongoing lean season. These prices, according to Fewsnet, will limit seasonal improvements in food availability, purchasing power, and access to food for very poor households who have yet to recover from the economic and climatic events of recent years. Poor households are expected to experience Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) outcomes, while very poor households, in the Dry Corridor and areas affected by hurricanes in 2022, face Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) outcomes.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- Since 1994, DG ECHO has allocated EUR 281 million to Central America, of which EUR 45 million were allocated to food security and nutrition, and EUR 91 million were allocated to Disaster Preparedness.
- In its current projects, DG ECHO focusses on the Dry Corridor, and particularly the areas mostly affected by the recent hurricanes. It provides food assistance and short to medium-term livelihood recovery, while helping to build resilience within relevant nexus strategies. At the same time DG ECHO raises awareness on the prevailing food crisis through FSN information systems and a coordinated response.
- At the end of 2022, EUR 5 million has been allocated from operational reserve to Central America in order to respond to the current crisis.
- Due to the rapid degradation of nutritional situation, nutritional data collection, surveillance and response will be also supported through new actions.
- The food assistance interventions target households in IPC/CH phase 4 (Emergency) and households in IPC/CH phase 3 (Crisis) that have additional constraints, like being a single parent household or having a poor food-consumption and asset base, having a high number of dependents, being displaced, etc. A special focus is given to children under five and pregnant women. DG ECHO supported 187 546 beneficiaries in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua with direct cash transfer, vouchers, and in-kind assistance.

#### **Other actors' main interventions:**

The **European Union** is funding several development projects at regional level, which are related to food insecurity and resilience building in the sector:

- For EUR 6 million, the Information Systems Program for the Resilience of Food and Nutrition Security in the SICA Region (PROGRESAN-SICA), generating information for the development of public strategies and policies, with a focus on resilience of food and nutrition security (SAN). It is currently funded under the Climate Resilience of rural households in the Dry Corridor and managed as a component of the national programme in Nicaragua and ends in October 2023.
- For EUR 6 million, the AGRO-INNOVA for the adaptability of agro-forestry systems in the Central American Dry Corridor, aims to enhance capacities of 3 000 producers and 12 organisations in 6 countries on water harvest, bio-supplies production, forestry nurseries, planting nutrition and provision of drought-resistant varieties. Its activities will end in November 2023.



The European Union is funding several food related projects in Nicaragua:

- The European Union is funding the Boosting Rural and urban Economy in Times of Crisis and Beyond (BOOST) programme, providing incentives to sustain value chains related to the School Meals Programme in the context of a protracted socio-political crisis. It is aiming to contribute to reducing poverty and fostering the economic empowerment of women for EUR 15 million. Its activities will end in January 2024.
- The EU is also funding the Climate Resilience of Rural Households in the Dry Corridor (Dry Corridor), by strengthening of the policy framework on climate change adaptation at the regional level (in particular, within the SICA system) and shock responsiveness mechanism and inclusive adaptability of safety nets with a focus on climate change, food and nutrition security and women's empowerment for EUR 13 million. These activities will end in August 2024.

The European Union is funding three food related projects in Guatemala:

- It funds an integral approach to build resilience in communities, vulnerable to food insecurity and climate shocks, called PRO-RESILIENCE, implemented by WFP for EUR 15 million. Its activities will end in 2025.
- It funds a comprehensive strategy to fight chronic malnutrition, through the support of the National Strategy for Prevention of Chronic Malnutrition, implemented by UNICEF for EUR 15 million. Its activities will end at the end of May 2024.
- Finally, it funds support to the Primary Health System to fight Chronic Malnutrition in Guatemala, implemented by PAHO for EUR 20 million. Its activities will end in November 2023.

In addition, the EU will adopt a new program with a total budget of EUR 14 million, aiming at strengthening budgetary execution at institutional level and public policy implementation capacities of the Ministries who are responsible for the fight against malnutrition. It will also strengthen the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Finance which supports them. Furthermore, the EU will strengthen food security in the most vulnerable regions of Guatemala and promote income generation, through the development of sustainable and climate-resilient agriculture, as well as alternative economic activities in rural areas.

**WFP** signed an agreement with the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES) to strengthen the Ministry's actions in food and nutrition security.

**USAID** announced funding to address food security and resilience in the LAC region.


- In Fiscal Year 2022, USD 21.8 million dedicated for USAID/BHA food assistance operations in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Activities include emergency food assistance, via cash transfers and multipurpose cash assistance, agricultural interventions, and livelihood support. Partners include WFP (El Salvador), World Vision and CRS (Guatemala), ADRA and CRS in Honduras.
- At the same time, nearly USD 92 million of emergency food assistance and related humanitarian programming, such as nutrition, health, and protection, as well as water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions has been announced for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (of which USD 87.5 million in emergency funding and USD 4.3 million in early recovery, risk reduction and resilience).
- USD 95 million of FY 2021 Feed the Future funds that will help smallholder farmers in Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Peru improve productivity of high-value horticulture crops, increase incomes, and bolster farmers' capacity to withstand shocks like higher fertiliser prices and impacts of climate change.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- The food security crisis in Central America remains severely underfunded. WFP reports

a funding gap of 43% for its operations in Guatemala and 69% for Honduras, particularly after the different floods during the 2022 hurricane season.

- Partners are requested to further prioritise and target the most vulnerable individuals.
- Continue to advocate with other services and donors for an increased engagement in Central America's Dry Corridor.
- The Food security and Nutrition Information system support in Central America was recently finalised. No new support from the EU and other donors is foreseen for the moment, and this in a significantly changing context due to political and violent crises and the ongoing impact of the conflict in Ukraine.
- To improve the operationalisation of the nexus for Shock responsive social Protection and Anticipatory action, as well as the coordination between DP programs, Euroclima and resilience building programs.



Source: GUATEMALA: IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot | March 2022 - February 2020<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Guatemala\\_AcuteFoodInsec\\_2022Mar2023Feb\\_Snapshot\\_English.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Guatemala_AcuteFoodInsec_2022Mar2023Feb_Snapshot_English.pdf)

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[https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Honduras\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insec\\_2021Dec2022\\_Aug\\_Snapshot\\_English.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Honduras_Acute_Food_Insec_2021Dec2022_Aug_Snapshot_English.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Honduras\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insec\\_2021Dec2022\\_Aug\\_Snapshot\\_English.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Honduras_Acute_Food_Insec_2021Dec2022_Aug_Snapshot_English.pdf)

## Colombia

### *Situation and evolution*

In 2021, 39.3% of Colombians (19.6 million people) were below the monetary poverty line with a monthly income per capita of only 354 000 Colombian pesos (EUR 80.5). Furthermore, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) projects that in Colombia total poverty will be 1.7% higher than 2021 due to inflation. Extreme poverty affects disproportionately ethnic minorities, including indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, usually located in former conflict zones with little state presence. About 7.3 million Colombian residents were estimated to have food security related humanitarian needs in 2022, while moderate and severe food insecurity has been affecting 42% of the resident population (21.4 million), with severe food insecurity having slightly improved since the end of 2021 (FAO-WFP).

As of July 2022, 75.7% of Colombian households ate three meals a day compared to 85.5% before the COVID-19 pandemic (DANE); 23.2% of households ate twice a day (30% in July 2021) and 1.1% only once. Moreover, 10.8% of children under 5 years of age suffer from chronic malnutrition. In addition to Colombians, nearly 1.3 million Venezuelan migrants (out of 2.3 million) are food insecure. Food insecurity among migrants and refugees is aggravated by significant levels of internal displacement and accelerating food inflation.

Due to the combined effect of inflation stemming from COVID-19 related restrictions and the crisis in Ukraine, as of November 2022, prices were nearly 50% higher compared to last year, as indicated by the official annual inflation rate of food and non-alcoholic beverages, estimated at 27%. Colombia imports an estimated 75% of its fertiliser (approximately half from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine), and approximately 28% of its food commodities. Increasing food prices and shortages of agricultural inputs have a significant negative impact on low-income communities in the country, such as Venezuelan migrants and refugees.

### *Drivers*

Persistent violence among non-state armed groups and recurring natural disasters in Colombia (554 500 people have been affected by 3 700 events of natural disasters as of November 2022) continue to cause internal displacement and limit Colombians' ability to access crops, livelihoods, essential goods, and services, thus exacerbating food insecurity and nutrition issues among vulnerable households. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic and related mitigation measures lead to reduced access to health and protection services, worsening an already dire food insecurity situation.

In addition, approximately 2.3 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees have sought refuge in Colombia, along with more than 980 000 Colombian returnees. These factors have strained local services and increased humanitarian needs, including food, health, livelihoods, nutrition, protection, shelter, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), not only among migrants, refugees, and returnees, but also host communities in both rural and urban areas. Furthermore, other aggravating factors are worsening the current situation, such as loss of agricultural livelihoods and reduction of agricultural productive capacity due to the increase in the costs of production (15-35%).


## Ongoing interventions

### ECHO interventions

- DG ECHO interventions focus on the immediate risks of the most vulnerable and affected populations on prioritised sectors like protection, health, education in emergencies and nutrition. Those are sectors where DG ECHO has a real added value in complementarity and coordination to other donors. Food security interventions are prioritised under rapid response mechanisms.
- Over EUR 84 million has been allocated by DG ECHO to the Food Security Sector in Colombia between 1994 and 2022, representing 23% of total allocations. Food assistance remains greatly underfunded in both the HRP (funding gap 68%) and RMRP (funding gap 69%).

### Needs and opportunities

- Need to improve the triple nexus with EU Delegation and Member States for a more holistic response to the needs (from humanitarian protection, health, EiE response to economic inclusion, support from social protection systems and documentation from development programs).
- Expanding food security and nutrition assessment to also include Colombian populations nationwide, also remote areas. The idea is to perform an IPC/CH in Colombia in 2022 in order to have more precise figure about needs and priority area.
- Improve DG ECHO-funded project CASH response.



Food insecurity levels (%) by population group (WFP, Oct. 2022)

## Haiti

### *Situation and evolution*

In Haiti, the last IPC/CH data (October 2022) shows a considerable deterioration of the food security situation. Regarding the number of people in need of assistance (IPC/CH phase 3 and above), the number of 4.33 million recorded in 2021 increased to 4.7 million in 2022 (i.e., nearly half of the population is experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity) representing an increase of 8.5%. For households classified in emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4), the number increased from 1.33 million to 1.77 million, an increase of 33% also the number of areas classified in the said phase (Phase 4 of the IPC) increased from five in September 2021 to fifteen in September 2022. The situation is particularly worrying due to the registration of approximately 0.3% of households (i.e., 19 200 people) in phase 5 of the IPC/CH (Catastrophe) in Cite Soleil.

Increasing insecurity and gangs 'territorial control' prevents household access to livelihood opportunities and markets. Haiti imports 70 % of its food commodities. The increase in global food prices due to the war in Ukraine, the annual inflation standing at 29% (July 2022), the scarcity of fuel leading to higher transport costs and commodity prices and the depreciation of the Haitian national currency (nearly 22% in one year) will likely further diminish household purchasing power. The latest assessment by the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP) and UNICEF in the commune of Cité Soleil (one of the most affected by gang violence), concludes that approximately 20% of children under the age of five are suffering from severe or moderate acute malnutrition.

The Food Security cluster in Haiti appeals for an urgent mobilization of efforts and resources in the face of the rapid deterioration of food security in the country and a funding gap of USD 105 million (i.e. 50% of the required budget). The food basket has increased for all the products that make up the basket, including wheat flour, corn, vegetable oil and rice. This increase was driven by the continued depreciation of the gourde against the US dollar, increased insecurity limiting market supply, rising prices and the persistence of fuel scarcity, as well as the poor performance of the agricultural season.

According to the CNSA (Coordination National de la Sécurité Alimentaire), the average nominal cost of the food basket in November 2022 is approximately 5 332 Gourdes per person per month, or 26 660 Gourdes for a family of five, compared to 4 782 Gourdes in October 2022, which represents a monthly increase of 12% and an annual increase of 98%.

### *Drivers*


The food insecurity situation is expected to deteriorate further in the coming months, due to the water deficit during the spring agricultural campaign, a poor coverage of acute needs during past food and nutrition crises, the rising food and fuel prices (linked to the war in Ukraine), the depreciation of the national currency, the political instability, the cholera epidemic, the impacts of the 2021 earthquake and the gang violence, that have continued to increase in 2022 and is causing displacement, market disruptions, limit humanitarian access and exacerbating the economic crisis.

The country's level of structural vulnerability and the accumulation of stressors also explain why many households are extremely sensitive to shocks (climate hazards, rising prices, crop losses, etc.) and are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity.



## Percentage change in cost of a food basket

April–June 2022 average versus five-year average for that period



Source: Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update


### Ongoing interventions

#### ECHO interventions

- The 2022 HIP first EUR 6 million allocation of Humanitarian assistance was mainly devoted to respond to protection, health and education needs and priorities. In May 2022, a EUR 5 million top up was approved to provide emergency food assistance, such as the provision of cash for food, food vouchers, and in-kind food assistance to communities under the most acute food needs (IPC/CH 4). The strategy included response in urban areas and complemented the WFP's Social Protection program.
- In October 2022, an EUR 6.5 million package has been allocated to Haiti, from the de-committed funds of the European Development Fund for humanitarian food assistance in the most vulnerable countries in Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific. The actions are focusing on areas with identified population on IPC/CH 5 and high concentration of population in IPC/CH 4 in order to prevent further deterioration of the food crisis.

### Needs and opportunities

- Underfunded crisis (HRP 2022 only 42% funded as of December 2022). Additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Advocating with other services and donors for increased engagement in Haiti is necessary.
- Promote additional nutritional assessments to have sufficient information of the nutrition status of children under the age of 5.
- Concerns related to the accelerated devaluation of the currency against the dollar and the high cost of living have a great impact on the amount of cash transfers and it is therefore necessary to monitor the markets and adapt ECHO intervention in coordination with the Cash Working Group.
- Maximising Nexus with the EU Delegation to improve coordination via a joint analysis of needs to promote complementarities at geographical level, be support shock responsive, and ensure the implementation of social protection and anticipatory actions.



Source: IPC, October 2022

## Venezuela

### Situation and evolution

The estimated number of food insecure people ranges between 14.4 and 18.5 million, according to figures from HumVenezuela. 80.6% of households (23.1 million people) can't buy quality food in sufficient quantities. 13.4 million people (46.7%) have lost their source of income and 5 million people (17.7%) exhausted their means of life.

Venezuelan migrants and refugees displaced abroad amount to 6.1 million as of April 2022, with forecasts for 3.5 million in need of food assistance in 2022 (Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan, RMRP - Plataforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes, R4V – 2022).

Venezuela is importing 75% of the food it needs and is therefore affected by shortages on the international market. Additionally, the World Bank assessment indicated that inflation stands at 155%. In 2021, the extreme poverty rate and the poverty rate were at 76.6% and 95.4% respectively (National Household Survey). There is a deficit of 95% of the minimum wage (USD 23) in relation to the basic basket of June 2022, which was USD 459.84, showing an increase of 5.05% compared to May 2022. Around USD 15 are needed per day to cover food costs, while the minimum salary is estimated at USD 16 per month.

### Drivers

The war in Ukraine, added to pre-existing political and economic factors, that have weakened the lives and livelihoods of the population, exacerbates the crisis. In the period 2014-2020 the GDP shows an accumulated reduction of 74%, thus a significant decrease in potential production capacity and productivity in the country (ENCOVI). Moreover, the poverty and extreme poverty rate of the Venezuelan population is 95.4% and 76.6% respectively.

Russian food imports dependency and fuel scarcity affected 1.2 million tonnes of wheat, 80% of fertilisers imported. Lack of financing and sufficient income and increased fuel prices, as well as limited access to seeds also have an impact.

Increasing insecurity and violence due to the conflicts between armed groups and the dispute to control the territory continue to affect food insecurity in the country. Lastly, extreme weather has increased flooding in recent years, resulting in loss of food crops. Climatic variations have also altered cycles, making it difficult to take advantage of rainy periods for irrigation and the water public service has severe deficiencies.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 20.15 million allocated inside Venezuela in 2022 for all HIP priorities under the initial allocation, EUR 6 million under a second (Operational Reserve) allocation and EUR 30 million (new funds allocated, to respond to basic needs inside Venezuela and to Venezuelan migrants' acute needs outside Venezuela). DG ECHO is funding WFP operations implemented in schools in Venezuela which focus on food assistance. Other key partners such as NRC also work with schools in EiE complementing with food security interventions.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- In a true nexus approach, the EU continues to support food availability through the promotion of the development of associative schemes. Through a second project, they are also supporting family farming through the reinforcement of food production capacities.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- The funding received for the HRP Venezuela (in-country) 2021 only covered 37% of the required funds.
- The lack of official data to support the humanitarian crisis (particularly on the ongoing food and nutrition crisis) hinders the visibility of the situation and the access to funds to attend the needs of the most vulnerable population. Thus, DG ECHO needs to make the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela visible and increase advocacy with donors, including in a nexus approach.
- The work of FAO on food production and support to family farming gives a real opportunity for nexus with ongoing DG ECHO funded EiE and food security response project throughout school feeding.
- The impossibility of developing cash interventions in Venezuela for a year and a half, prevents reaching a greater number of people in need.

- **Asia and Pacific**

### ***Afghanistan***

#### *Situation and evolution*

Food security continues to remain at critical levels in Afghanistan. The Sept. 2022 Global Network against Food Crisis (GNFC) Hunger Hotspots report includes Afghanistan amongst the highest concern hotspots with catastrophic conditions. The severity of food insecurity suggests that significant loss of life may already be occurring as nearly 6 million people are expected to be in Emergency.

According to the latest IPC/CH analysis concluded in October 2022, Afghanistan has one of the highest figures of food insecurity worldwide. Deterioration is expected in the first quarter of 2023 due to the simultaneous effects of winter and the lean season, sustained high food prices, reduced income and unemployment and continued economic decline. 19.9 million people will be in IPC/CH phase 3 and above during November 2022 – March 2023, representing 46% of the population. All 34 provinces remain in IPC/CH phase 3 and above, with 14 in IPC phase 4.

42% of rural households and 38% of urban households have poor food consumption. The massive scaling-up of humanitarian assistance has permitted a stabilisation of the number of food-insecure people compared with the same period of previous year. However, the situation remains alarming, requiring the highest engagement to sustain the humanitarian effort. Winter, difficult access, natural hazard induced disasters and conflicts require to be vigilant on possible localised famine situation.

The next round of IPC analysis is planned in March 2023. A more granular analysis and continuous monitoring of areas in IPC phase 4 are needed.

The Humanitarian Need Overview (HNO) for 2023 estimates that 28.3 million people (two thirds of the 43.2 million Afghanistan's population) will need urgent humanitarian assistance, of which 21.2 million will require humanitarian food assistance (HFA) or support to recover agriculture / livelihood activities.

The number of people in need (PiN) in 2023 suffered a 16% increase from 24.4 million in 2022 and a 54% increase from 18.4 million in 2021.

As of January 2023, the OCHA Financial Tracking System (OCHA FTS) indicates a total of USD 2.623 billion, 59% of the total USD 4.44 billion required. Food Security and Agriculture has received USD 1 126 million out of a total requirement of USD 2.7 billion, therefore the sector is only 37% covered.

### *Drivers*

The HNO highlights that while in previous years, humanitarian needs have been largely driven by conflict and COVID-19, in 2022 there was a change in the drivers of humanitarian needs, as household shocks shifted to drought and the economic crisis, which is a major cause of limited access to food. According to the World Bank the real GDP per capita may decline by around 34% between end-2020 and end-2022 – declined by 21% in 2021 alone. The most recent UNDP economic report showed that the Afghan economy has lost up to USD 5 billion in since August 2021, equivalent to ten years of economic growth.

After months of high volatility, the exchange rate of AFG is stabilising during the last quarter of 2022 regaining in December 2022 the same levels of September 2021 (87 AFN = 1 USD).

Access to cash, for the population and for humanitarian actors, remain very difficult. International assistance, beyond humanitarian, is resuming at a very slow pace. Sanctions and frozen Afghan Central Bank assets are continuing to play a negative role. More expensive financial services from hawala system, MoneyGram, and Western Union.

According to FEWSNET, remittances inflow, that in 2020 represented USD 787 million, 4% of the GDP and a source of income for 10% of Afghan households, have resumed and expected to be above average. Remittances from Iran, however, are significantly lower than in recent years. Payment of salaries of civil servants are also irregular.

Employment opportunities and daily wages have contracted. According to the December 2022 WFP price bulletin, the casual labour wage term of trade has reduced by 24% YoY.

Despite a stabilization of prices during the last quarter of 2022, inflation continues to affect household capacity to meet basic needs. In December 2022, the average price of a litre of diesel was 71% higher than two years previously. The food basket is 52% higher compared to 2 years ago and the price of DAP and UREA fertilisers is 33% and 13% higher compared to last year.

High-levels of unemployment and sustained inflation have driven the average household's debt to increase six-fold since 2019, and by 44% for urban households since 2021 (HNO).

The Ukrainian crisis impacts on the cost of humanitarian operations in the region, in particular in terms of food support.

The World Meteorological Organisation and to the latest NOAA Advisory (by the International Research Institute for Climate and Society), predicts that due to persistent La Niña conditions during winter 2022-23, cumulative precipitation in Afghanistan's 2022/23 winter wet season (October 2022 to February 2023) and spring (March to May 2023) is most likely to be below average. The 2022/23 wet season has started off well below average and as of mid-October, most of the country had not received any precipitation. Exceptions are areas bordering Pakistan that received above-average rainfall during the dry season. These unfavourable conditions at the initial stage of the season will further aggravate the production capacity of farmers after two consecutive dry seasons since 2020 and limited access to fertilisers and inputs.

Due to poor pasture conditions and high fodder prices, livestock owners' fodder stocks are likely below normal. Livestock body conditions and losses has been aggravated by exceptional cold waves during the month of January 2023 and difficult access to fodder.

According to estimates from Afghanistan's National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA) and Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), wheat production in the recently concluded 2021/22 season was 5% below the previous season and around 15% lower than the five-year average. According to MAIL estimates, Afghanistan's wheat deficit for the 2022/23 marketing year stands at 2.6 million MT. This compares to 2.3 million MT in the prior year.

Afghanistan has an INFORM Risk Index of 8.1, making it the fourth most at-risk country for humanitarian crises and disasters.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- As of end of November 2022, DG ECHO has deployed a total EUR 189 million, in the region. This includes a recently allocated EUR 75 million in October 2022 and EUR 1 million mobilised through the Acute Large Emergency Response Tool (ALERT) following the earthquake that struck the country on 22 June. Almost one third of the funding has been allocated to food assistance.
- In addition, since September 2021 and as of 12 October 2022, 24 Humanitarian Air Bridge flights departed from Europe to Afghanistan carrying approx. 775 tonnes of mainly medical and nutritional goods. Two additional HABs are in the pipeline to be deployed by 10 December 2022. The EU is an important player in Afghanistan, it is one of the very few donors who has maintained a physical presence in the country. The DG ECHO field office has never interrupted its activities and continues to carry out monitoring missions across the country.



## Other actor's main interventions

- As of January 2023, OCHA FTS, USA is the first donor with USD 615.5 million, which represents 21% of the overall funding response plan/appeal while the UK is the second donor, with USD 424.5 million (14.5%) and the Asian Development Bank, the third one, with USD 380 million (13%). The EU is the fifth biggest donor, with USD 225 million (7.7%). At the time of the Pledging Conference (31/03), the EU plus Member States pledged and equivalent to USD 586 million.

## Needs and opportunities

- Keep on securing both physical and humanitarian access during winter months remains the major challenge for the delivery of humanitarian food assistance.
- USD 2.59 billion are needed in 2023 to support food assistance and livelihood recovery (HRP).
- To continue to be able to address the most urgent needs in 2023, WFP needs USD 2 billion with a gap of USD 959 million between January and June 2023.
- Alongside humanitarian food assistance, continuing the support small holder farmers and herders in rural areas and destitute households in urban areas remains a fundamental pillar of DG-ECHO funding priorities in 2023.

## Myanmar

### Situation and evolution

In Myanmar, reliable data and analysis has always been limited by restrictions imposed by authorities on the implementation of food security and nutrition assessments. Post Distributions Monitoring (PDM) and records from health facilities have been the only source of information. After the coup, with large part of the country inaccessible and tightened restrictions on humanitarian operations, outreach and assessments have become practically impossible. However, from 2022, analysis has been benefiting from additional sources like REACH, the Multi-Sector Needs Analysis (MSNA) and joint Food Security and Livelihood Assessment (FSLA) by FAO-WFP.

While not identified as hunger hotspot because of insufficient data and assessments done according to standard methodology, the Global Network Against Food Crisis (GNAFS) outlook - September 2022 consider Myanmar's food- security situation of very high concern and includes Myanmar amongst the countries meriting close monitoring due to the deterioration a multi-faced protracted crisis. The economic crisis is showing signs of continued deterioration, with on-going devaluation of the currency and increasing inflation. Furthermore, the armed conflict, more recently in west (Rakhine) but also in the northwest, northeast (Kachin, Shan) and southeast areas of the country, has been escalating in 2022.

According to UNHCR's Myanmar Displacement Overview on January 23, about 1.25 million people have been internally displaced due to conflict and insecurity since the military takeover, bringing the total number on IDPs to 1.57 million, many of them becoming protracted with limited assistance, if any. HNO expects that the number of IDPs will almost double during 2023, reaching 2.7 million during the fourth quarter. The overwhelming majority of the 17.6 million of people in need (PIN) identified by the HNO need food assistance (86% - 15.2 million).

The FAO GIEWS Crop prospect and food situation quarterly report - December 2022, lists Myanmar among the countries requiring external assistance for severe localized food insecurity.

In August – September 2022 FAO-WFP conducted a Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) using the “r-CARI” framework (Remote Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security), which warned about deteriorating trend with 15.2 million people food insecure (severe and moderate) – a sharp increase from 13.2 million in HNO 2022.

The FSLA also highlight that the use of emergency coping strategies (high risk jobs, migration, selling last working animals, mortgaged/sold house or land) increased from 15% to 21%.

Food consumption scores deteriorated from 19% of household experiencing insufficient food consumption in Aug/Sep 2021 to 24% in Aug/Sep 2022. The proportion of households with insufficient diets increased from 24% in Aug/Sep 2021 to 26% in Aug/Sep 2022 in rural areas, and from 9% to 19% in urban areas.

### *Drivers*

Conflict, insecurity, displacement. Conflict remains the main driver of food insecurity and lack of access to basic needs to services and protection concerns. Since the military takeover on 1 February 2021, additional 1.25 million new IDPs are estimated in new conflict affected area particularly in the Northwest and in the Southeast. These new IDPs are in addition to the estimated 330 400 IDPs including 130 000 Rohingya IDPs in central Rakhine prior to the coup and the 600 000 highly vulnerable stateless Rohingya (both in confined camps or villages) fully dependent on external assistance.

Access to food and basic needs is particularly critical for both new and protracted IDPs. While needs have increased 14-fold from 2020 to 2022 because of conflicts and displacements, humanitarian funding has only increased by 51% over the same period and 22% from 2021 to 2022.

Domestic agriculture production decline. The FAO GIEWS Crop prospect and food situation of December 2022 indicates that the total 2022 rice production is forecast at 23.7 [\[1\]](#) million tonnes, about 10% below the five-year average level, mostly due to:

- Limited use of agricultural inputs. Fertilizers prices July 2022 were between 91% and 75% higher compared to July 2021.
- Disturbance of input and output supply chain. Despite low farm-gate prices, retail prices increased affecting particularly the net consumers in urban areas.
- decreased planted areas (FAO-WFP Shocks, agricultural livelihoods and food security Monitoring report - June 2022) indicates that half of the interviewed farmers reduced the area planted. Retrenchment slightly more pronounced among rice and cash crop producers.
- Transport and logistic constraints due to high costs of fuel and road insecurity.

The unavailability and high cost of animal feeds may have a potential knock-on effect of grain substitution in livestock feed including broken rice with possible implications on domestic broken rice prices.

Inflation. As of November 2022, the Kyat has depreciated by 54% against USD YoY. Retail food prices have risen steeply since the coup, influenced by the global economic crisis and due to disruption of transportation routes, insecurity, markets non-functionality, restrictions and high fee of financial services and cost of fuel that has increased between 110% and 160% YoY (August 2022).

The FAO GIEWS Food price monitoring and analysis bulletin - December 2022 warns that prices of rice are at record levels with the prices of “Emata” variety at 50% higher YoY despite the arrival of the 2022 main season harvest in markets. According to WFP market price update - August 2022, other items, more dependent from import, have seen even sharper increases. (E.g., palm and mixed vegetable oils have seen an 130% increase YoY).

WFP’s September 2022 market monitoring indicates that the average cost of the food basket has increased by 64% since September 2021. WFP also observed very high differences between States, influenced by local transport and security conditions.

ILO estimates that in 2021, 1.6 million jobs were lost. After a partial recovery, in July 2022, there were still 1.1 million lost jobs compared to 2020. WB observe a movement of labour away from service and industries into agriculture and internal migration from cities to rural areas as coping mechanism to deal with job loss.

The WB indicates that the impacts of COVID-19 and the aftermath of the military coup have erased nearly a decade of poverty reduction progress with about 25 million people (40% of the population) now living below the national poverty line matching levels of poverty a decade ago.

The WB outlook on economy remains weak. On one hand garment and construction sectors show signs of recovery and businesses in main cities return to a relative normality. But internal demand cannot rebound due eroded household spending capacity. Global commodity prices, Kyat depreciation, increasing transport costs, electricity outages and internet disruptions remains a major challenge. Public finances are marked by revenue decline inhibiting spending in social services. The overall balance-of-payments situation is of growing concern, with foreign exchange shortages likely to continue to limit the availability of several imported items, including fuel and cooking oils

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- In 2022, DG ECHO has allocated EUR 28.16 million including an External Assigned Revenue (ExAR) contribution of EUR 960 000 from Luxembourg and three HIP top up’s, the first in February 2022 (EUR 10 million), the second in May 2022 (EUR 5 million) and the last in September (EUR 0.7 million). As funds were limited and had to address multi-sector needs (shelter, WASH, protection and emergency response to conflict affected populations), DG-ECHO contribution to food assistance has been limited if compared to the needs, mainly through support of WFP operations (EUR 6.5 million).
- The planning figures for the HIP 2023 is around EUR 19 million.

#### **Other actor’s main interventions**

- The food security sector of HRP 2022 was the largest targeting 4 million people with a funding requirement of USD 286 million (incl. urban assistance). According to OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS) the 2022 HRP is funded with only 35% of requirements received as of December. DG-ECHO with USD 28.16 million is the fourth major contributor after USA, Japan and Germany. This illustrates the drastic aggravation of the crisis in terms of scale and actual needs, along with a dramatically low needs coverage.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Significant humanitarian needs will continue throughout 2023 including support to critical food needs of both protracted IDPs and newly displaced populations. For these two categories, food needs are only a component of their uncovered basic needs and services. Food assistance will have to be integrated and considered as part of a basic need approach, which poses significant coordination issues among major actors.
- Urban poor population, and rural poor who depend on markets and assistance to meet their basic needs are also paying a heavy toll from the economic crisis. ECHO / INTPA are actively involved in advocating for the definition by all relevant actors of an urban strategy to rationalise the use of scarce resource and increase dedicated funding, not to the detriment of already poorly covered traditional humanitarian needs. The co-funded EU Nexus Response Mechanism (NRM) is the vessel used to that end. The strategy drafting by WFP, UNICEF and UNOPS is progressing

## *Pakistan*

### *Situation and evolution*

The September 2022 Global Network Against Food Crisis (GNAFS) outlook includes Pakistan amongst the very high concern hotspots with the impact of the catastrophic floods during the 2022 monsoon season compounding the deterioration of the macroeconomic situation.

The flooding has affected almost one third of the country (116 districts) of which 72 districts were declared calamity- hit by the government. According to FAO GIS geospatial analysis, around 9.4 million of standing crops of the main “kharif” season were submerged of which over 5.7 million acres of cotton, sugarcane, and rice were destroyed. FAO Crop prospects and food situation (Dec. 2022) reports that floods caused significant losses of the 2022 “Kharif” cereal crops and the output is expected to decrease sharply year-on-year from 52.4 million MT in 2021 to 47.6 million MT (-9.2%). More than one million livestock have died.

These losses are likely to have dire consequences on the agropastoral livelihood of rural families for which animals is a collateral asset to access credit and a source of income (off-springs and dairy products) and agriculture casual labour is the main source of revenue. Cost of inputs and damages caused by the floods to agriculture infrastructures compromise the next agriculture seasons and pose serious challenges to food security in flooded areas.

Floods have driven up the number of food insecure people. As of 31 December 2022, according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis of 28 districts of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Sindh that are traditionally a high prevalence of food insecurity, malnutrition, and poverty, the estimated population in IPC Phase 3 and 4 increased from 5.96 million in pre-flooding situation to 8.62 million in September-December 2022. In 18 flood affected districts of Sindh and Balochistan, IPC phases 3 and 4 population increased from 3.54 million in pre-flooding situation to 5.74 million (3.82 million in IPC Phase 3 and around 1.92 million in IPC Phase 4) post flooding (Sep-Dec 2022).

Out of the total 154 districts of Pakistan, the IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis covers only 25 rural districts - 9 of Balochistan, 7 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (PK) and 9 of Sindh comprising around 8.6% of Pakistan’s population. Following the disastrous floods during spring-summer 2022 and recognizing the need for more systematic and wider coverage of food security situation, the Food Security and Agriculture Working Group (FSAWG) is planning a Crop Food Security and Livelihood Assessment (CFSLA) and expand the IPC analysis to 45 most affected districts in early 2023.

### *Drivers*

The flooding has come on top of a two-year macroeconomic deterioration with the

unsustainable expansion of the fiscal and current- account deficit driven by the prolonged impact of COVID- 19 and the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine. Pakistan imports about 75% of wheat from the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The upsurge in international commodity prices in 2022 impacted the import bills resulting in a decline of the foreign reserves and high inflation on major basic commodities.

The floods had a substantial impact on inflation. While from January to May 2022 the YoY increase of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) has been between +13% and 13.8%, starting from June the CPI spiked reaching its peak in August (+27.2%) and stabilizing toward the end of 2022 with a +24.5% in December 2022. Food and energy commodities recorded even higher increases. Compared to a year ago, in December 2022, prices of wheat were +55%, chicken +52%, eggs and pulse gram +51%, basmati rice +35% and cooking oil +33%; after reaching a peak in July 2022, fuel prices have stabilised during the second part of 2022, yet recording 228 PKR/lt in December 2022 compared to 140 PKR/lt in December 2021. The approaching of Ramadhan and increased demand of food commodities is a source of concern and impact on inflation.

Overall increase in price of fertilizers of Urea (+25.5%) and DAP (+25.1%) from January 2022.

### *Ongoing interventions*

DG ECHO interventions

- As of end of 2022, DG ECHO has allocated EUR 30.83 million additional funding to assist the flood affected population in Pakistan including DREF, SST, ALERT, HIP 2022 top up and repurposed activities under the ongoing HIP 2021-22 grants. An additional EUR 10 million is allocated to the initial HIP 2023 to respond to the critical humanitarian gaps that continue to persist among affected communities.
- At the peak of the flooding, the European Commission's Copernicus Emergency Management Service was activated (EMSR629) to provide satellite maps on the areas. Nine EU Member States and one UCPM Participating State (i.e., Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, France, Austria, Greece, Slovenia, Germany and Malta) have offered assistance to Pakistan under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM).

### **Other actor's main interventions**

- On 4 October 2022, UN OCHA, and the Government of Pakistan presented in Geneva the [revised Flash appeal](#) for an amount of USD 816 million, aiming to provide relief to 9.5 million people. The food security and agriculture sector amounts at USD 269.4 million targeting 4 out of 14.5 million people in need of food assistance .
- As of January 2023, the Food Security and Agriculture Working group (FSAWG) reports that partners have reached around 7.57 million beneficiaries with food assistance and livelihood / agriculture support.
- The Government of Pakistan has reached to 2.7 million flood affected households with PKR 25 000 cash assistance through Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP).

### *Needs and opportunities*

- As water has receded in most of affected areas, millions of Pakistanees could return to their homes. However, basic services cannot be provided at full capacity and households are facing with the task of recovering their livelihood and assets.
- Significant humanitarian needs will continue throughout 2023 requiring an update and



prolonged funding of the Flood response Plan (FRP) ending in May 2023. The FSAWG reports a funding gap of USD 121 million or 45% for the food assistance and agriculture sectors of the Flood Response Plan (FRP).

- In addition to meet humanitarian needs, the Government of Pakistan faces the challenge of financing the post-floods recovery in a difficult economic context. The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) estimates that over USD 16 billion will be required for reconstruction over the next 3 to 5 years (about 5% of GDP). A 'Resilient Recovery, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Framework' (4RF) is being developed with assistance from the World Bank (WB), the UNDP, the Asia Development Bank (ADB) and the EU.
- On 9 January 2023, UNSG Guterres and Pakistan's Prime Minister Sharif co-hosted an international conference in Geneva to discuss the needs and seek support for recovery from the international community. Total pledge is USD 9 billion to support a structured process of recovery, including monitor implementation and ensure transparency through an International Partners Support Group.
- Despite critical issues on the targeting, limited fiscal space for shock responsiveness and dependence on external financial support (WB), BISP has proven to be capable to deliver first line assistance to millions of Pakistanis.
- Exploring on how DG-ECHO can support a process for enhanced shock responsiveness could be explored in coordination with other donors and within the current Disaster Preparedness country strategy. Similarly, given the critical gaps and needs the additional resources allocated to the HIP 2023 will foresee to respond to meet some of the critical gaps.

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