Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Final Report
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO)
Directorate B – Europe, Eastern Neighbourhood and Middle East
Unit B2 — Emergency Support Inside EU
Contact: Henrike Trautmann
E-mail: Henrike.Trautmann@ec.europa.eu
European Commission
B-1049 Brussels
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Final Report

Evaluation team:

- ICF: Petra van Nierop (Project Director), Melanie Dubuis (Project Manager), Christina Dziewanska-Stringer, Inga Pavlovaite, Anna Manoudi, Martina Morosi, Vittorio Furci, Laurence Bedoret, Kamr Hussein, Rocio N. Sandalio, Maria Zhitkov, Fleur Nash.

- Independent experts: Dr Danielle Deboutte, Alejandro del Castillo Sanchez (NUndoing S.L.), Panagiotis Christodoulou.

Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

November, 2018
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union.

Freephone number (*):

00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11

(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).

LEGAL NOTICE

This document has been prepared for the European Commission however it reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.


Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018
DOI 10.2795/182651
© European Union, 2018
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Table of Contents

List of acronyms ................................................................................................................................. i
Executive summary ................................................................................................................................. iii

1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1
  1.1 Objective and scope of the evaluation .......................................................................................... 1
  1.2 Methodological approach ............................................................................................................. 1
  1.3 The structure of the report .......................................................................................................... 5

2 Context and rationale for the Emergency Support Instrument ......................................................... 6
  2.1 The influx of refugees and migrants in Greece ............................................................................. 8
  2.2 The international response .......................................................................................................... 16
  2.3 The Emergency Support Instrument ......................................................................................... 19
  2.4 The Emergency Support Instrument interventions in Greece ............................................... 20
  2.5 Theory of change and Intervention Logic .................................................................................. 26

3 Evaluation findings ............................................................................................................................. 30
  3.1 Relevance .................................................................................................................................... 30
  3.2 Coherence and complementarity ............................................................................................... 46
  3.3 Effectiveness ............................................................................................................................... 57
  3.4 Efficiency .................................................................................................................................... 78
  3.5 EU Added Value ........................................................................................................................ 88
  3.6 Sustainability ............................................................................................................................... 92

4 Recommendations ............................................................................................................................... 102

Annexes ................................................................................................................................................ 106
Annex 1. Methodological note ............................................................................................................. 107
Annex 2. Additional evaluative evidence ............................................................................................. 115
Annex 3. Mini Mobile Survey analysis ................................................................................................ 133
Annex 4. Field visit 1 ........................................................................................................................... 148
Annex 5. Field visit 2 ........................................................................................................................... 148
Annex 6. Focus groups on education – analysis of responses ............................................................. 148
List of acronyms

AMIF  Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
ASB  Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland
CA  Caritas Athens
CH  Caritas Hellas
CRS  Catholic Relief Services
DG ECHO  Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DG HOME  Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
DG REGIO  Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy
DRC  Danish Refugee Council
EMAS  Emergency Assistance Grant Scheme
ERDF  European Regional Development Fund
ESF  European Social Fund
ESI  Emergency Support Instrument
ESOP  Emergency Support Operational Priorities
ESOPs  Operational Priorities
ESTIA  Support to Integration & Accommodation
EUSF  European Union Solidarity Fund
FAFA  Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement
FCE  Final consumption expenditure
FEAD  Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived
FPA  Framework Partnership Agreement
FTS  Financial Tracking System
GAS  Greek Asylum Service
GCA  Greek Cash Alliance
GMI  Guaranteed Minimum Income
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs  Internally displaced persons
IFRC  International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IO  International Organisation
IOM  International Organization for Migration
IRC  International Rescue Committee
ISF  Internal Security Fund
ISM - RMS  Rapid Mobility Solution
MCE  Mercy Corps
MDM  Médecins du Monde
MoE  Ministry of Education
MoH  Ministry of Health
MoL  Ministry of Labour
MoMP  Ministry of Migration Policy
MPCT  Multipurpose Cash Transfer
MSF  Médecins Sans Frontières
NFI  Non-Food Items
NGOs  Non-governmental organisations
NRC  Norwegian Refugee Council
OCAVRR II  Open Centre of Migrants Registered for Assisted Voluntary Return
PLW  Pregnant and Lactating Women
PoC  Persons of Concern
RIC  Reception and Identification Centre
RIS  Reception and Identification Service
SGBV  Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SRSS  Structural Support Service
SSI  Greek Social Solidarity System
StC  Save the Children
TdH  Terre des Hommes
ToR  Terms of Reference
UAM  Unaccompanied Minor
UCPM  Union Civil Protection Mechanism
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
VAT  Value-Added Taxes
Executive summary

Objective and scope of the evaluation

The main objectives of the Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union, 2016-2018 were to:

- Provide a comprehensive and independent evaluation of the Regulation and to assess the extent to which the Regulation is fit-for-purpose, covering the period since its entry into force on 16 March 2016;
- Assess the relevance, effectiveness, coherence, efficiency, EU added value and sustainability of the Emergency Support Instrument (ESI) funded actions; and,
- Provide a series of recommendations to improve the design and implementation of the ESI if the instrument were to be activated again in the future.

The scope of the evaluation covers all humanitarian actions funded by the ESI in Greece, from the activation of the ESI in 2016 to 2018 (up to 15 October 2018), in the sectors of shelter; water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); food assistance; non-food items (NFIs); healthcare, including psychosocial support; protection, including for unaccompanied minors (UAMs); as well as education.

Methodological approach and validity of the evaluation results

The evaluation approaches were informed by a series of research tools specifically developed and tailored for the purpose of this evaluation to build a rich and comprehensive evidence base for this evaluation covering a wide range of stakeholders. The research tools included:

- Review of DG ECHO internal evaluation including the main findings reported in the draft report and underpinning sources of evidence (i.e. survey of framework partners and local implementing partners and 30 Key Informant Interviews);
- Literature review: 35 publicly available documents were reviewed;
- ESI documentation review: 166 documents were reviewed, including programming documents, mission reports, minutes of meetings, beneficiary surveys of framework partners, etc.;
- ESI portfolio analysis: data extracted from DG ECHO EVA and HOPE databases were analysed;
- ESI project mapping: all 29 ESI projects were reviewed through a mapping of information extracted from DG ECHO SingleForms and FichOps;
- ESI Dashboard analysis: decisions and reasons for proposals’ approval or refusal were analysed and a typology of projects accepted or rejected was created;
- Mini mobile survey of beneficiaries: a survey focusing on the ESI support and more specifically on cash and accommodation under the Support to Integration & Accommodation (ESTIA) programme was distributed to 6,803 beneficiary households (response rate of 19%);
- Field visits: two field visits were conducted with a specific thematic and evaluative focus (i.e. accommodation and health). As part of the field visits a total of 26 interviews and ten focus groups were undertaken, including three focus groups on health, two on accommodation, one on cash assistance and four with minors on the topic of education; and,
- Key Informant Interviews: 17 interviews were organised with EU officials, Greek authorities, framework partners and local implementing partners, and other humanitarian actors.

Complementary research methods were used to enhance the reliability and validity of the data collected and to provide the basis for cross-verification, corroboration and
triangulation of the evaluation results. The vested interests of different stakeholder groups were considered to address potential bias and to ensure objectivity.

**Context and rationale for the Emergency Support Instrument**

In 2015 and during the first three months of 2016, close to 1.4 million persons in need of international protection and migrants made their way to the European Union via the Eastern and Central Mediterranean route, placing a huge strain on the concerned Member States and leading to the temporary introduction of border controls both at the internal and the external EU borders, creating a humanitarian emergency within the EU.

The unprecedented number of arrivals in 2015, coupled with the difficult socio-economic situation in the country, put Greece under tremendous pressure from that year onwards. The national authorities were not prepared for the sheer number of arrivals. With the closure of the borders and following the EU-Turkey Statement, many refugees and migrants found themselves stranded in Greece. Also, the shift from being a transit country to being a country of destination added critical challenges.

While support to Member States experiencing the mass influx was being provided through a series of EU instrument (UCPM, AMIF, ISF, EUSF, ESF, and ERDF), none of these were fully suitable to address the wide-ranging humanitarian needs within the Union. As a result, on 19 February 2016, the European Council called the European Commission to put in place the capacity for the EU to provide humanitarian assistance internally. On 2 March 2016, the European Commission adopted its Proposal for a Council Regulation on the provision of emergency support within the Union.\(^1\) Subsequently, the Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369 was adopted by the Council on 15 March 2016.\(^2\)

The ESI was set up with the objective of providing faster and needs-based emergency humanitarian support, complementing the response of the affected Member States overwhelmed as a result of a disaster. The ESI was activated for the first time - and for a period of three years - on 16 March 2019 for the management of the humanitarian impact of the refugee and migration crisis. In 2016, Greece was the only Member State that met the two ‘eligibility’ conditions set out in the Regulation. Therefore, all the actions funded by the ESI were exclusively aimed at tackling the humanitarian situation in Greece.

From 2016 to 2018, **29 projects were funded under the ESI in Greece for a total amount of €644.5 million** (Figure I). Eighteen framework partners received the ESI funding to implement projects in Greece. UN agencies received around 70% of the ESI funding, most of which was allocated to UNCHR (57%, €369 million) followed by IOM (9%, €56 million).

---


Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Figure I. DG ECHO contribution to projects implemented in Greece

Total ECHO contribution: €644.5 M
Number of projects: 29

Source: ICF. 2018. Data provided by DG ECHO. Total contribution figures are based on contracted amount provided by DG ECHO while other data are based on extraction from HOPE/EVA databases on 15.10.2018.

In order to provide a wide support, DG ECHO took a multi-sectoral approach that included all sectors of intervention provided within the ESI Regulation’s specific objectives (Figure II).

Figure II. The ESI funding per sector, 2016-2018

Source: ICF. 2018. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases on 15.10.2018

The shelter & settlement (including rental accommodation) sector was allocated most funding, receiving 42% (€273 million) of the ESI budget over the evaluation period. It was the most costly sector, given the high influx of refugees and migrants arriving, spread over different parts of the country, with no shelter readily available to house them in many areas. Basic needs assistance through multipurpose cash transfers (MPCT) was the second sector receiving most funding (€122 million). At the beginning of the implementation of the ESI, all assistance was provided in kind (food rations, NFIs) by several actors funded under different ESI projects. As of July 2016, the ESI started funding actions to build up a multi-purpose cash scheme in Greece via several framework partners later streamlined to one partner, UNHCR. The 'Emergency Support to Integration & Accommodation' (ESTIA) programme, run by UNHCR, was subsequently created as a flagship imitative to help refugees and their families rent urbanaccommodation, and provides them with cash assistance.

Other major sector included protection (child-friendly spaces, access to information and legal support, family tracing, identification and assistance to SGBV victims), health (primary healthcare, specialised healthcare, psycho-social support and referral to hospital), education (supporting the Ministry of Education by providing transportation, training of teachers, promoting enrolment) and coordination (support to working
groups). Site management support activities were also provided across the different sectors e.g. shelter & settlement, NFI, WASH, coordination and protection.

The ESI projects were implemented in all 13 administrative regions in Greece, as illustrated in Figure III. As of 2017, in agreement with the national authorities, support on the islands was funded by DG HOME with the exception of the cash and rental accommodation schemes (ESTIA).

**Figure III. Geographical coverage of the ESI funded projects**

![Geographical coverage of the ESI funded projects](source: ICF. 2018. Based on DG ECHO internal documentation.)

**Main findings of the evaluation**

The evaluation was based on 17 evaluation questions from the Terms of Reference. These questions were organised around the five main evaluation criteria presented in the Better Regulation guidelines. The findings linked to each of these criteria are presented below.

**Relevance**

**Extent to which the ESI was relevant as a tool for emergency response within the Union**

The evaluation concluded that the ESI was the most relevant tool to deliver an emergency response of this nature and scale within the Union. In particular, the ESI was evaluated as a highly relevant tool for an emergency situation such as the one faced by Greece, mainly because of: its swift activation (it took 19 days to activate the Regulation and a further three weeks for framework partner contracts to be signed); its ability to timely mobilise a large amount of funding; its capacity to rapidly implement actions through established humanitarian actors on the ground; and the diversity of actions that could be undertaken.

---

3 See for more information: https://ec.europa.eu/info/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en
Throughout this evaluation, all stakeholders confirmed that DG ECHO’s contribution through the ESI was in line with its mandate and relevant to an emergency response within the EU. Although other EU funds were available (in Greece this included EUSAF, AMIF, ISF and FEAD), none specifically targeted large evolving humanitarian needs, and these funds primarily relied on the administrative and operational capacities of governments, which as recognised by the ESI Regulation could already be under stress in financial and economic terms.\(^4\)

**Extent to which the ESI intervention was appropriate when considering Greece’s particular situation and needs, and extent to which the assumptions of the ESI intervention in Greece were correct**

The evaluation concluded that the ESI was appropriate and timely to support national authorities, whose capacity to respond to such emergency at that time was very limited. DG ECHO’s expertise in responding to sudden onset emergencies and placing emphasis on increasing local capacity was highlighted as particularly relevant in this context.

The assumptions of the ESI intervention in Greece were overall correct. They were informed by needs assessments at central level and at the level of the actions funded resulting in good coverage of all the main sectors and the majority of beneficiary types. Although the number of beneficiaries reached by the ESI actions was high, slight discrepancies were found between UNHCR data on people of concern in the region and the numbers reached by the ESI. This, however, can be explained by the continuous fluctuations in arrivals and internal movements of people.

The evaluation found that the ESI funding was overall consistent with priority needs (e.g. shelter/accommodation, protection, basic needs). At the same time, the evaluation pointed that a few other needs could have benefited from additional support, in particular in relation to specific vulnerable groups (e.g. persons with mental health issues and trauma-related problems), the situation of beneficiaries on the islands, and the link between emergency support and integration (the latter, however, falling outside of the ESI and DG ECHO’s remit).

**Extent to which the legal framework was flexible enough to appropriately adapt the operational response to the changing conditions and needs in the Member State concerned, and extent to which the Instrument’s flexibility would be applicable in any given Member State**

The ESI legal framework was highly flexible, allowing for the ESI funded actions to adapt to evolving and rapidly changing needs on the ground, as demonstrated through various provisions in place for the reallocation of funding, modification requests and contingency planning developed over the course of the activation.

The flexibility was initially somewhat hampered by several issues that arose in the start-up phase, namely around the collaboration between the EU, national authorities, local organisations and other relevant stakeholders, which had a knock-on effect on the operational response as a whole, leading to delays in service provision on the ground. However, over time, these issues were mitigated because of the degree of flexibility provided in the original legal framework.

**Extent to which the method of working (channelling aid through framework partners) was relevant to address the humanitarian consequences of the refugee and migration crisis within the EU**

\(^4\) Preamble 4, Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369
The fact that funding for humanitarian aid could be channelled through framework partners directly was relevant, as it allowed the latter to take swift action to address the most urgent humanitarian needs, especially given the strain on capacities of the national authorities and civil society actors at the time of the emergency.

The specific method of working however implied that national and local NGOs, in particular in the initial phases of the ESI activation, were less involved while they could have brought added value to understanding the local context as well as needs and implementing activities. This was largely corrected, in the course of the evaluation period. First, framework partners increasingly made use of local implementing partners. Second, three Greek NGOs became DG ECHO framework partners and could receive funding directly.

Stakeholders valued DG ECHO’s role in coordination, in particular in achieving an effective method of working between the various donors and implementing agencies, both at EU level and on the ground between national authorities and framework partners. The coordination worked well overall and also has positively evolved over time, as the implementation of the ESI matured. However, the tight structure meant that most decisions were taken at a rather central level, which meant that valuable information from local implementing partners and on the ground may have been lost, which could have brought added value to the implementation of actions. This improved in time, when it became possible for some national NGOs to implement the ESI actions directly, and through the increased use by framework partners of local implementing partners, which helped understanding the local context and needs.

**Coherence and complementarity**

**Extent to which the ESI actions adhered to the humanitarian principles**

The evaluation found that the ESI funded actions were designed and implemented in respect of the humanitarian principles. Humanitarian principles were anchored in the ESI legal framework (ESI Legislative Act, Commission Decision on the financing of emergency support, financial decisions and operational guidelines). Furthermore, DG ECHO ensured assessment of compliance with the humanitarian principles throughout the project lifespan (i.e. project design, implementation and monitoring). Stakeholders gave positive examples in this regard, e.g. no discrimination of beneficiaries, solid track record of framework partners on applying humanitarian principles, exit strategies and handover arrangement to the national and local authorities included capacity building on humanitarian principles.

During the implementation phase, nonetheless, challenges in applying the principles of independence and neutrality were highlighted, as in the view of framework partners, the national authorities had on some occasions taken decisions on the delivery of humanitarian aid which were not strictly needs based. The ESI being a new instrument, activated for the first time, meant that the traditional humanitarian aid actors had to learn how to work with the national authorities of an EU Member State, and vice versa. Most framework partners consulted, at least during the initial activation phase, struggled with these requirements, also considering the lack of clarity as to who was expected to do what and the initially insufficient capacity of the national authorities to provide a well-defined strategy and timely inputs.

Another challenge related to the islands, where the situation was worse than on the mainland and kept deteriorating. The use of the ESI funds for the islands was limited to the ESTIA programme (covering cash and rental accommodation) as a result of an agreement with the national authorities to have a clear split of responsibilities between the funding instruments. While it is not possible to determine at this stage whether the use of another funding stream would have made a material difference to outcomes, this demonstrates the importance of future decisions of this type to be unambiguously based...
on needs rather than other considerations in order to avoid the real or perceived risk of breaching the principle of humanity.

**Extent to which the ESI is complementary to other related EU instruments**

The ESI funded actions overall complemented the actions implemented/ funded under other EU or national instruments, due to the unique aims, scope and implementation method of ESI. When refugee and migrant flows into Greece started to significantly increase in 2015, there was a gap to be filled in order to rapidly and flexibly address the emerging and specific needs that resulted from this influx. By channelling funding through an instrument aimed at serving exclusively a humanitarian purpose, the ESI was able to respond fast, in a timely manner and to operate complementing the other available instruments on the ground.

A few overlaps were identified with the EMAS instrument managed by DG HOME as regard the scope, mandate and implementation method. Whilst the mandate of EMAS was to provide emergency support to the asylum system and structures, as well as to the organisations implementing the system, it did not relate specifically to the provision of humanitarian aid directly to the affected people in need within the EU (which was the specific aim of ESI). In practice, the line drawn between the mandates of the ESI and EMAS was not always clear.

To mitigate the risk of overlaps, a series of coordination mechanisms were established to ensure coherence between the ESI and other EU funding instruments, and aspects of complementarity and duplication were also addressed in a range of practices and processes around the design and implementation of the ESI projects, such as an assessment of the ESI proposals for duplication, and discussions with framework partners about possible complementarities in (proposed) activities. As a result, synergies over time have improved. In addition, the evaluation concluded that proposed activities did not overlap with activities funded by other donors.

At national level, overall coordination was provided by the SRSS while DG ECHO organised regular coordination meetings with DG HOME, the national authorities and framework partners. In addition, DG ECHO took part in the UNHCR sectoral working groups (aimed at better coordinating the activities across the different sectors and geographical areas). The coordination required significant resources from all parties, comprising a range of regular meetings at different levels, but it proved an essential tool to avoid duplication. Coordination also improved over time as the implementation of the ESI projects matured. The presence of DG ECHO staff in Greece throughout the activation period, as well as regular monitoring missions from headquarters and the field staff, has proven a key factor of the improvements in coordination and results over time.

**Effectiveness**

The majority of the ESI projects achieved and surpassed their output targets and addressed the identified humanitarian needs on the ground, with many reaching a higher number of beneficiaries than planned. The main achievements of the ESI actions were reaching a high number of people in need of such and improving their situation compared to the starting point in 2016. The ESI actions achieved an upgrade of people’s living conditions in terms of shelter, WASH, immediate living conditions, and their access to cash, although some areas for future improvement were also identified.

The ESI actions also demonstrated positive achievements on the Key Result Indicators, with again most activities surpassing the targets set in terms of beneficiaries reached, the number of services provided, the number of sites built or improved, etc. Comparatively the best results were achieved in the protection sector, where the activities have on average reached over twice as many targets. Beneficiary satisfaction with the various services was however comparably lower. On average, across the services received, 50% of beneficiaries surveyed in the evaluation were either very
happy or happy with the services received. However, to be noted are the varying degree of satisfaction with the different types of support of received, with high approval ratings for services in the education, protection assistance and shelter/ accommodation and lower ratings for cash services and food. Furthermore, the beneficiaries’ lower satisfaction levels could also be linked to uncertainty they face with respect to their future.

At the organisational and systemic level, the ESI’s outcomes and impacts have been achieved partially. Positive effects have been noted in relation to complementing the response of the national authorities and civil society initiatives, whose preparedness and resilience have been increased. Positive examples also include successful handovers of activities as part of the ESI actions exit strategies and improved pre-conditions for the integration into the host society of beneficiaries being granted an international protection or humanitarian status. At the same time, some areas could have been improved, e.g. the beneficiary’s overall situation (in terms of living conditions, better health, feeling of safety).

DG ECHO provided a good level of technical support, monitoring and other support to the ESI financed actions, by closely monitoring the situation and evolution of needs in the different sites therefore ensuring that framework partners were effectively covering those needs, where possible. The close presence and extensive follow-up by DG ECHO was considered to be instrumental in the effectiveness of the ESI overall.

**Particular factors influencing the achievement of the ESI objectives**

A range of success factors were identified which supported the achievement of the ESI objectives. These related to the flexibility of the ESI as a tool, the holistic approach of the ESI actions to addressing the needs of beneficiaries, and their engagement in the delivery of assistance. The positive effects of developing constructive relationships with the competent authorities in Greece as well as local NGOs, local authorities and other partners at the local level were also noted.

At the same time, the evaluation also identified several obstacles at the strategic and operational level. At a strategic level, the lack of a clear plan or strategy of the Greek government to respond to the large influx of migrants negatively influenced the effectiveness of the ESI projects. This was further exacerbated by the limited experience and resources at the national level, especially in the first phase of the ESI activation, to steer the emergency support activities in a consistent manner. At the operational level, obstacles related to a lack of reliable consolidated data about the rapidly changing situation of people in need, procedural and administrative issues and a lack of security management in the camps by the national authorities. Several of these obstacles were gradually addressed as coordination improved and the capacity of the national authorities was enhanced.

**Extent to which ESI-funded actions’ implementation method (i.e. channelling aid through framework partners) allow to effectively address the humanitarian needs**

The use of framework partners, which in turn contracted local implementing partners for part of the aid delivery, contributed to the effectiveness of the ESI actions. The majority of the ESI actions, which have been completed, have fully achieved their results. The quality of framework partners and their local implementing partners has been a contributing factor to this.

In order to also enable national NGOs with appropriate capacity to become framework partners, DG ECHO facilitated a selection procedure to allow their direct access to the ESI funding. Local organisations were also involved in the ESI delivery as local implementing partners. This allowed for their experience and knowledge of the Greek context and legal framework to be used, and achieve a lasting impact of their involvement, as they could...
increase their capacity and take over the activities once ESI activation ceases. The use of local implementing partners also contributed to the increased effectiveness of implementation for end beneficiaries.

The implementation method chosen was also pertinent considering the challenges faced by the national authorities to provide a coordinated response to the emergency. On the one hand, this confirms the appropriateness of the implementation method as allocating emergency funding directly to national authorities would not have been as effective. On the other hand, the implementation method was also challenging, as neither the framework partners nor the national authorities had worked together following this specific method. This required a learning process and the creation of appropriate coordination structures, clarification of roles and responsibilities, as well as new modes of engagement and interaction.

Regarding the timeline for the implementation of actions, the ESI response in Greece was faster compared to other mechanisms. The timeline shows that, almost half of the total 29 ESI projects were launched and 38% of the total ESI funding (€644.5 million) was allocated within the first eight months of the ESI activation, which is faster than other emergency assistance mechanisms such as the EMAS, which are slowed down by the need to publish calls and launch public procurement processes. The fact that the ESI assistance was activated within a short period is a key indicator of its timely response.

**Extent to which ESI-funded operations achieved EU visibility as set out by the Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union-funded Humanitarian Aid Actions**

Framework partners applied the visibility guidelines (including the Manual) extensively, with many also organising additional activities going beyond the mandatory visibility requirements. A variety of communication channels were used in the projects, with social media and audio-visual products being most used. Despite that, the evaluation also found some initial challenges due to confusion over the (many) different EU funds operating in Greece security concerns and an overall negative public perception.

**Efficiency**

**Extent to which the ESI-funded actions were implemented in a timely and cost-effective way, taking account of the specific conditions of the emergency operations in Greece**

The planning of the ESI took place prior to the establishment of the EU Turkey Statement (with its activation only a few days prior to the latter). Hence, the ESI budget was elaborated on assumptions which changed in the course of the activation period. Nevertheless, the global budget allocation was not reassessed afterwards. Yet, DG ECHO adopted a flexible approach, keeping the response adapted to the evolving needs. Eventually, the total budget was fully utilised and enabled to meet the ESI targets set by framework partners.

As it was the first time the ESI was activated in the EU, no comparison could be made with previous actions in other Member States. Instead, a comparative analysis was carried to assess the efficiency of the ESI with respect to other similar DG ECHO responses, but in third-countries. The results indicate that the ESI funded actions in

---

5 Four countries which were supported by DG ECHO during the Syria crisis were selected as comparators to assess the cost-effectiveness of ESI, namely Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey.
certain sectors have achieved strong efficiencies. Nonetheless, some gaps remained in certain sectors, and more efficiency could have been achieved in others. The evidence suggests that the Protection sector was relatively less cost-effective, and some needs remained unaddressed. The Health sector for its part was overall cost-effective, yet, some gaps were uncovered (e.g. mental health, mainly due to an overall lack of capacity in the country). The Shelter and Settlements sector was relatively more expensive than in other third countries, however, this was mostly due to factors beyond ESI and DG ECHO’s control. The analysis of the costs indicated that the ESI was less cost-effective in 2016 due to the higher support costs needed to start the activities in Greece. However, after kick-starting the activities and following enhanced coordination between the various stakeholders, the share of support costs decreased in 2017 and 2018, making the ESI funded actions, on average, as efficient as most other comparators in third countries.

The Food Security and Livelihoods and the Basic Needs Assistance (through) Multi-Purpose Cash Transfers have been implemented at a relatively low cost per beneficiary, making the ESI funded activities in these sectors at least as cost effective as similar activities in third countries. In addition, both sectors have demonstrated improvements in efficiency over time.

Furthermore, DG ECHO and the framework partners endeavoured to adopt cost-effective approaches in the design and implementation of the ESI projects for instance by employing local staff, using volunteers, working with local partners, regular monitoring on the ground, close coordination with different stakeholders, and the use of innovative method and new technologies.

Several external factors affecting the efficiency of the ESI actions were also identified, including a lack of a well-defined national strategy, Greece’s specific contextual and legal framework, the dispersion of camps, and the absence, at the beginning of the response, of infrastructures and services to welcome refugees and migrants. Over time, the ESI gained in efficiency as partners learned to work in the ‘new’ environment and basic structures were established.

**EU Added Value**

**EU added value of the ESI activation in Greece and specific EU added value of the ESI operations and working method**

The evaluation found that the ESI demonstrated clear EU added value given the operational response provided in Greece, and also when compared to other national instruments and EU funding mechanisms in place.

The ESI’s activation in Greece was overall successful as it addressed the main needs identified and was flexible enough to adapt to a dynamic environment during the three years of its activation. Although other EU funding instruments and tools present in the region (AMIF/ EMAS, UCPM) contributed to addressing the emergency, the ESI provided timely support to large-scale actions that addressed the basic needs of beneficiaries in an emergency context, and allowed for experienced framework partners, along with their local implementing partners, to provide a holistic response. Furthermore, at the time of activation, national authorities and civil society partners did not have enough capacity to respond to an emergency of such scale and nature, in particular to address the variety of humanitarian needs emerging.

These countries all welcomed large numbers of refugees from the Middle East and faced some similar challenges as those encountered by Greece in terms of having to create new structures and services. The different levels of economic development were taken into consideration through final consumption expenditure (FCE) per capita and GDP per capita.
The evaluation identified a series of specific characteristics that boosted the added value of the ESI actions, notably: the flexibility of the instrument to adapt to evolving needs; the speed by which the ESI was activated and actions then implemented; DG ECHO’s strong field presence, expertise, technical assistance and direct monitoring of the ESI projects; framework partners experience and; the transfer of knowledge as well as the capacity building component included in most ESI actions.

The evaluation further found that the EU added value could be further increased i. if the ESI would have been able to ensure a greater involvement of Greek NGOs from the set up; and ii. if more emphasis would have been placed on future EU exit strategies.

**Sustainability**

*Extent to which actions currently funded under the ESI can continue after the end of the three-year activation on the basis of national funding, and relying on the national programmes under AMIF and ISF, or other sources of funding such*

The ESI was activated for a period of three years and is due to end in March 2019. While some ESI actions have been handed over to the national authorities, the transition process is still ongoing. Therefore, it was not possible to assess the full extent of the transition and it is too early to determine whether the ESI actions will be sustained after the end of ESI. It is also important to note that sustainability was not the primary objective of ESI interventions. Nevertheless, in the context ESI’s specific objective to support Member States which are ‘overwhelmed’ by an emergency but which ultimately have to take back full control once the crisis is ending, and in light of the important investments made through DG ECHO and partners, sustainability should be a key consideration.

While sustainability and exit strategies were not formally referred to in the ESI Regulation, these were formally included in the 2018 ESI annual strategy (i.e. the ESOP). Nonetheless, several measures were taken by DG ECHO and framework partners to ensure sustainability throughout the ESI activation period. This included considering sustainability as part of the coordination mechanisms (involving other European Commission services and national authorities) and taking steps towards integration by supporting existing public services, favouring permanent structures, and/or streamlining activities. At project level, all framework partners did consider sustainability in the design of their actions, particularly through working with local implementing partners, training and capacity building of local authorities, and capacity building of beneficiaries. In particular, the design of the ESTIA programme allowed for a smooth handover between the EU funding sources.

Regarding short-term sustainability, on the basis of the information available, the evaluation concluded that the short-term sustainability of most ESI actions was guaranteed as activities were being handed over to authorities, local NGOs or INGOs as part of other EU instruments (mainly DG HOME, through AMIF) until the end of 2019. This is also consistent with the nexus approach where emergency assistance, funded through the EU humanitarian aid budget, is handed over to other EU instruments to ensure longer-term sustainability.

However, the above discussions and activities did not result in a common strategy or framework which identified those ESI actions which had to be continued and considered handover options to ensure their longer-term sustainability, after expiry of the instrument’s activation period, which would have been beneficial for all parties involved (national authorities, donors, implementing agencies, etc.). The evaluation found several challenges related to the ongoing handover process, including the lack of a well-defined national strategy, the lack of a formal agreement between framework partners and national authorities, and the differences in terms of resources, capacity, and working methods between framework partners and the national authorities. Nonetheless, several
good practices were identified in order to facilitate the handover process, such as planning for transition early on, using local implementing partners, and coordinating with authorities. Similar practices are expected to be increasingly applied as ESI partners are completing their actions this and next year. This, however, is not unusual as regard nexus approaches in humanitarian aid settings shows that ensuring sustainability in humanitarian and emergency operations is challenging due to limitations in the capacity of local state and civil society structures, absence of other funding instruments to take over operations and limited transfer of knowledge to local implementing partners.

In view of the above, the activation of the ESI for Greece has shown progress on each of these aspects: the capacity of the national authorities as well as coordination with them has improved over the three-year period, not the least by having DG ECHO staff based in Athens; continued funding for the majority of ESI-funded operations will be ensured by DG HOME, and some local civil society organisations received direct EU funding for the first time, allowing them to build long-term capacity. This provides interesting lessons learned for nexus approaches elsewhere in the world.

**Recommendations**

The five strategic recommendations identified based on the findings of this evaluation target areas where the EU is suggested to introduce improvements to the ESI’s legal framework and functioning following a future activation.

---

**The activation of the ESI should be accompanied by an obligation to develop an organisational framework outlining roles and responsibilities, tailored to each country of activation**

A future ESI activation, in a comparable context, should trigger an obligation to develop, at the early stage of the activation, an organisational framework, setting out the roles of all stakeholders, their mandate to act, and the responsibilities attached to each role. Such a framework could encompass: the definition of main stakeholders and organisational mapping; an outline of the mandate of each stakeholder for the duration of the intervention; and, a clear division of responsibility per stakeholder and the interlinkages between various stakeholders. The lead DG could take the lead developing a draft template for completing the information required on the organisational framework. The template should, following an activation in a Member State, be completed by relevant stakeholders, including national authorities, relevant agencies, Commission services, etc.

---

**The ESI should include an explicit requirement for the development of an overall exit strategy as well as specific exit strategies at sector and at action levels**

In the case of a future ESI activation, an overall exit strategy should be developed from the very start and framework partners should also be required to include exit strategies in their proposals. Relevant stakeholders (Commission services, framework partners, national authorities and other relevant national agencies) should liaise to plan for specific sectoral strategies. Such strategies should include information on timelines, roles and responsibilities.

At the operational level, elements to be considered to ensure the sustainability of the ESI actions and enhance the transition process, include: a specific reference to sustainability in the ESI’s legal framework, references in every ESOP, requiring framework partners to elaborate an exit strategy in the SingleForm, and planning a transitional period in the final year of the ESI activation based on transition plans prepared by framework partners. Sustainability and exit should also be on the agenda during the coordination meetings, in view of developing and adapting a coordinated approach.
Further synergies with other funding mechanisms to complement emergency activities with longer-term projects should be sought systematically as part of any future activation

In the case of a future ESI activation, the following activities, most of which were implemented in Greece, should be systematically undertaken to improve synergies and avoid duplication of effort:

- A mapping of different funding streams, objectives and programmes active in addressing the specific emergency within the given Member State;
- Conducting joint needs assessments, monitoring visits and develop joint programming; and,
- Allocating responsibilities based on the needs on the ground and mandate given to each stakeholder.

The ESI should continue, more systematically, to aim for cost-effectiveness

In case of a future ESI activation, the Commission (and relevant stakeholders) should carefully review the financial envelope at regular intervals, including:

- Close monitoring of the financial implementation on the ground (as done in the case of Greece);
- Improving cost-effectiveness within sectors; and,
- Seeking further economies of scale: framework partners implementing similar activities could work together and benefit from economies of scale through harmonising their activities and engaging in joint procurement.

Local partners should be more systematically involved in future ESI activations

In the case of a future activation, the following is recommended:

- The relevant Commission services, with the help of national authorities and other relevant stakeholders, should make national and local NGOs aware that they can apply to become framework partners, from the start of the activation of the ESI.
- More systematic efforts should be made to involve, at an early stage, those local organisations who would not have the required capacity to become framework partners. This could include undertaking an initial mapping of these organisations with the support of national authorities or other relevant stakeholders; encouraging framework partners to contract local organisations (as happened in Greece); organising a consultative forum to introduce the ESI; encouraging UN or other humanitarian agencies, when acting as coordinators, to also include local organisations in their meetings, etc.
1 Introduction

This is the Final Report for the Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union covering the period 2016-2018. The evaluation work started in July 2018. The work was undertaken by ICF with inputs from experts in the fields of humanitarian assistance (i.e. shelter, protection, education, health) and evaluation and complemented an internal evaluation conducted by the Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO).

Findings from the internal evaluation conducted by DG ECHO and ICF external evaluation were combined to create the present report.

The Final Report provides a synthesis of the evidence collected within the framework of this evaluation and sets out the detailed findings and conclusions emerging from this evidence. The evaluation also provides a series of recommendations to improve the design and implementation of the Emergency Support Instrument (ESI) if the instrument were to be activated again in the future.

1.1 Objective and scope of the evaluation

The main objective of the Evaluation of the operation on the provision of emergency support in the Union is to provide a comprehensive and independent evaluation of the Regulation and to assess the extent to which the Regulation is fit-for-purpose, covering the period since its entry into force on 16 March 2016. The evaluation assesses the relevance, effectiveness, coherence, efficiency, EU added value and sustainability of the ESI funded actions.

The scope of the evaluation covers all humanitarian actions funded by the ESI in Greece, from the activation of the ESI in 2016 to 2018 (up to 15 October 2018), in the sectors of shelter; water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); food assistance; non-food items (NFIs); healthcare, including psychosocial support; protection, including for unaccompanied minors (UAMs); as well as education.

1.2 Methodological approach

The evaluation was designed to respond to a specific set of evaluation issues and questions, as articulated in the Terms of Reference (ToR). A variety of data sources were used to build a rich and comprehensive evidence base for this evaluation covering a wide range of stakeholders. Overall, ICF has reviewed approximately 200 documents and databases and write-ups of 30 interviews undertaken by DG ECHO. In addition, ICF has undertaken 43 Key Informant Interviews and engaged with beneficiaries through ten focus groups, nine interviews and a mini mobile survey (Figure 1). This section summarises the methodology utilised.

Figure 1. Overview of ICF approach to the evaluation

Source: ICF. 2018.
1.2.1 Internal evaluation review and gap analysis
As part of an internal exercise, DG ECHO conducted an internal evaluation of the ESI Regulation covering the period 2016-2017. As a first step, the ICF evaluation team reviewed the internal evaluation including the main findings reported in the draft report and underpinning data and information. The primary sources of information conducted as part of the internal evaluation and used in the present report include:

- **Survey of framework partners and local implementing partners**: all DG ECHO framework partners and their local implementing partners having carried out the ESI funded actions in Greece in 2016 and/or 2017 were contacted to participate in the online survey. Out of a total of 67 organisations contacted, 38 responses to the survey were received (57% response rate).

- **Key Informant Interviews**: 30 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with a range of stakeholders either face-to-face or by telephone. These are referred to **First round of Key Informant Interviews** in the present report.

This task has been critical to ICF understanding of the information which is already available to the evaluation and avoiding the duplication of effort in the external evaluation.

1.2.2 Documentary and literature review
As part of the desk review, the evaluation team looked at a range of secondary sources of evidence. The majority of documents were provided by DG ECHO or framework partners, while some were publicly available and found online.

- **Literature review**: 35 publicly available documents were reviewed to capture information gathered by third parties such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and other Commissions services. In addition, databases from UNHCR, IOM and the Greek authorities were explored and used for this analysis.

- **ESI documentation review**: 166 documents were reviewed as part of this evaluation, these include regulatory documents, Operational Priorities (ESOPs), Financial Decisions and plans, DG ECHO mission reports, audit reports, meeting minutes, communication and visibility plans, and beneficiary surveys.

- **ESI portfolio analysis**: data extracted from DG ECHO EVA and HOPE databases were analysed to create a series of tables and charts that are presented throughout this report. The analysis focused on elements such as Resilience marker, Gender/Age marker, beneficiaries, sectors, transfer modalities, project duration, location, and costs.

---

6 EVA and HOPE are DG ECHO interactive dashboards that provide information about each action financed by a contract signed by the partner.
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

- **ESI project mapping**: all 29 ESI projects were reviewed through a mapping of information extracted from DG ECHO SingleForms\(^7\) and operation sheet (FichOps)\(^8\).
- **ESI Dashboard analysis**: decisions and reasons for proposals’ approval or refusal were analysed and a typology of projects accepted or rejected was created.

### 1.2.3 Stakeholder consultation

As part of the consultation stage a mini mobile survey, field visits and Key Informant Interviews were undertaken in parallel to engage with a maximum of stakeholders.

- **Mini mobile survey of beneficiaries**: a survey focusing on the ESI support and more specifically on Cash and Accommodation under the Support to Integration & Accommodation (ESTIA) programme, was created in English and translated into French, Arabic, Farsi and Kurmanji to cover the majority of the beneficiaries (81%)\(^9\). The survey link was sent to 10,901 households (i.e. head of the household) of the ESTIA programmes covering the five languages of the survey through UNHCR.\(^10\) 6,803 households received it (63%) and 1,788 responded to the survey. After cleaning the data and removing duplicates, 1,316 responses were considered valid representing a response rate of 19%. Further information on the sample and respondent characteristics as well as the analysis of the survey responses are presented in Annex 3. In addition, one focus group and four beneficiary interviews were conducted to gather additional qualitative information on Cash;

- **Field visits**: two field visits were conducted with a specific thematic and evaluative focus. The first visit, called “The handover of the ESI health projects to National Authorities” focused on the transition of the health activities from DG ECHO to the national authorities, which is primarily linked to the evaluation criteria of coherence and sustainability. The second visit, called “ESI accommodation projects under the ESTIA programme – working with local NGOs and municipalities” focused on the accommodation component of the ESTIA programme, and the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. For each field visit, ICF evaluation team engaged with a wide range of stakeholders (26 interviews were undertaken), including beneficiaries (five focus groups and five interviews were conducted)\(^11\) and visited several sites. Findings from the field visit can be found in Annex 4 and Annex 5. In addition, four focus groups were conducted with 23 children to discuss the education component of ESI’s operations. Findings are presented in Annex 6.

- **Key Informant Interviews**: 17 additional interviews were organised to complement the interviews conducted as part of the internal evaluation and the field visits. Interviews were conducted with EU officials, Greek authorities,

---

\(^7\) Main instrument of Framework Partnership Agreement used by framework partners to submit requests, modification requests, interim reports and final reports.

\(^8\) Communication and recording tool that captures the main aspects of the operational analysis and follow-up made by Field Experts, Desk Officers, Desk Assistants and Financial Officers on the humanitarian actions all along the action’s cycle.

\(^9\) UNHCR. 2018. Data on languages spoken.

\(^10\) A sample of 10,901 cases were contacted by UNHCR out of 25,000 registered cases. The sample was selected on the basis of the availability of the contact details and the language spoken.

\(^11\) Two focus groups and three interviews with beneficiaries were conducted as part of the accommodation case study and three focus groups and one interview with beneficiaries were conducted as part of the health case study.
framework partners and local implementing partners. In the present report, these will be referred to as Second round of Key Informant Interviews. Table 8 in Annex 1 provides the list of stakeholders contacted and consulted.

1.2.4 Validity of findings

Complementary research methods were used to enhance the reliability and validity of the data collected and to provide the basis for cross-verification, corroboration and triangulation of the evaluation results. The vested interests of different stakeholder groups were taken into account to address potential bias and to ensure objectivity. However, as with any evaluation, there were limitations to the methodologies applied, which are summarised in Table 1 below. Given these methodological caveats and limitations, caution was exercised when interpreting data and producing findings.

Table 1. Limitations to methodologies applied

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Issues encountered</th>
<th>Steps taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESI documentation</td>
<td>Incomplete financial information.</td>
<td>Additional information requested directly to DG ECHO, DG HOME and framework partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of clarity on whether the information relates to DG ECHO or DG HOME.</td>
<td>Information mapped into excel templates to allow for comparison.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uneven provision of detail in the different reports.</td>
<td>Data used with caution and triangulated with other data sources (interviews, field visits).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No clear structure of documents (e.g. meeting minutes, mission reports).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio analysis</td>
<td>Limitations with beneficiary data (i.e. double counting).</td>
<td>Several other external sources were used to corroborate the data (UNHCR, Greek Asylum services).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incomplete information for projects where the final report is not yet available.</td>
<td>The quantitative analysis was supported by qualitative information from other data sources (interviews, field visits).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project mapping</td>
<td>Inconsistencies in type and amount of information available in partner reports.</td>
<td>Data used with caution and triangulated with other data sources (interviews, field visits).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data mainly at output-level, less at outcome level.</td>
<td>Quantitative information corroborated with Portfolio analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited data to inform cost-effectiveness and efficiency assessments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mini mobile survey</td>
<td>Coverage based on the languages spoken and availability of contact details.</td>
<td>Focus groups with women were conducted while in the field to capture women’s perspective on cash.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overrepresentation of men.</td>
<td>Duplicates were removed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several beneficiaries completed the survey more than once.</td>
<td>The base taken for analysis is the number of respondents to each question, therefore it varies greatly between questions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of valid responses vary greatly by question.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>Few sites visited, as the camps are scattered throughout Greece.</td>
<td>Sites that were not visited were discussed during the interviews with framework partners and local implementing partners. Information was</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
organisation of the site visits including focus groups. triangulated with project documentation and literature review. In sites, the team requested the support of the ESI SMS partners to organise the focus groups.

| Key Informant Interviews | Diversity of interviewees consulted (DG ECHO, framework partners, local implementing partners, National Authorities etc.) with more or less informed knowledge of the ESI interventions and some vested interests. Specific topic guides were developed for the different stakeholder’s groups consulted. During the analysis, the information collected was contextualised; the differences in the contexts and views were factored in. Data was cross-checked with other data sources. |

1.3 The structure of the report

The remainder of this report is structured as follows:

- Section 2 provides the context and rational for the ESI interventions and describes the ESI projects;
- Section 3 presents the findings per evaluation question; and,
- Section 4 provides the draft conclusion and recommendations.

This report is accompanied by a series of Annexes including:

- Annex 1: Methodological note;
- Annex 2: Additional evidence supporting the analysis;
- Annex 3: Mini Mobile Survey analysis;
- Annex 4: Field visit 1: The handover of the ESI health projects to National Authorities;
- Annex 5: Field visit 2: The ESI accommodation projects under the ESTIA programme – working with local NGOs and municipalities; and,
- Annex 6: Findings from the focus groups on education.
2  Context and rationale for the Emergency Support Instrument

Figure 2. Timeline of event 2015-2016

EU
- Special Meeting of European Council
- European Agenda on Migration
- First implementation package of the ECA
- JHA Council
- German government will implement an operation that will lead to a resolution of the overwhelming majority of asylum applications
- Proposal for EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan
- The EU has agreed to support the EU’s response to the migration/refugee situation
- European Commission proposes to launch EU-Turkey Border Management Cutoff or TPS (Temporary Protection Status) for persons in need of protection

Europe
- Council of the European Union
- Including the Member States
- Declaration on the need for a European Agency for Asylum
- European Commission publishes a communication on a European Agency for Asylum
- Communication for a strengthened framework for external borders of the EU

Greece
- First Greek hot spot centre in Vathy
- Over 1,500 refugees from Pakistan, Morocco and Iraq are stuck in Moria
- Geographical relocation initiatives
- Law 4717/2019 on multinational protection: the Greek government has established the Legal Protection Office for Refugees
- The memorandum was submitted and has been canceled

Malta
- Malta supports Greek national efforts to improve reception capacities

The EIT, ESF, CSF, ERF, FCAS and the Health Programmes also had dedicated funding for Greece (2014-2020)

November, 2018 6
Figure 3. Timeline of events 2017-2018

Source: ICF based on desk research
2.1 The influx of refugees and migrants in Greece

In 2015 and during the first three months of 2016, close to 1.4 million persons in need of international protection and migrants made their way to the European Union (EU) via the Eastern and Central Mediterranean route. Within that timespan, it was estimated that around one million persons had arrived in Europe through the Eastern Mediterranean route while around 400,000 persons have reached Italy via the Central Mediterranean. On the Eastern Mediterranean route, this massive influx of refugees and migrants making their way from Greece to Western Europe, through the Western Balkans, placed a huge strain on the concerned Member States, leading to the temporary introduction of border controls at both the internal and the external EU borders, thus creating a humanitarian emergency within the EU.

In Greece, the number of people arriving by sea during 2015 was more than twenty times higher than the number of sea arrivals during the previous year. Figure 4 shows the evolution in the number of persons arriving in Greece for the period 2014-2018.

Figure 4. Number of persons arriving in Greece by sea between 2014 and 2018

The majority of the new comers arrived in the Greek islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos (at the sea border with Turkey).12 Syrian, Afghani and Iraqi were the main nationalities arriving in Greece by sea between 2015 and 2018.13 The large majority of the new arrivals over the period 2015-2018 were men (reaching a climax of 73% in 2015). Minors also represented a significant share of the new arrivals (around 37% for the period 2016 to 2018).14

12 UNHCR. Operational Portal, Refugees Situation, Mediterranean Situation. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179
Greece has for a long time played a significant role as transit country in the European migration scenario. During the 1980s, Greece shifted from being one of the main emigration countries (after the Second World War) to a transit country for migrants coming mostly from the Middle East, Africa and Eastern European countries. After the collapsed of the Soviet Regime in the 1990s, Greece started to see an increase in the number of migrants and refugees from Eastern European countries. Throughout the years, the number of migrants and refugees arriving in Greece by land (mostly at the Greek land border with Turkey) and by sea has considerably increased and Greece soon became one of the main gateways for those willing to cross into the EU. In 2011, the European Court of Justice found that 90 percent of all irregular crossings into the European Union happened via Greece.

Regardless of Greece's traditional position as one of the main transit countries in the EU, the unprecedented number of arrivals in 2015, coupled with the difficult economic situation in the country, put Greece under tremendous pressure from that year onwards. In 2015 alone, more than 856,000 people arrived in Greece by sea compared to 41,000 in the previous year (see Figure 4). In October 2015, more than 211,000 people arrived into the country by sea (an average of 8,735 persons a day). Despite the fact that the overall Mediterranean arrivals slowed down over the winter, in December 2015, an average of 3,000 people were still arriving on a daily basis in Greece.

The national authorities were not prepared for the sheer number of arrivals and had a limited capacity to adequately response to the needs of the newcomers. For instance, Greece did not have a dedicated department dealing with migration issues (i.e. the Ministry of Migration Policy (MoMP) was established in October 2016) and there was a lack of coordination among the different ministries with competences in that area.

As a response to the increase in arrivals in the summer of 2015, apart from the official reception system managed by the National Centre for Social Solidarity, several temporary accommodation facilities were set up by national authorities to host refugees and migrants (the blue box below presents the different type of sites in Greece over the period 2015-2018). However, the capacity of the national authorities to provide accommodation to the newcomers proved to be insufficient and it was reported that...

---

15 IOM. IOM in Greece. Available at: https://www.iom.int/countries/greece
16 IOM. IOM in Greece. Available at: https://www.iom.int/countries/greece
17 IOM. IOM in Greece. Available at: https://www.iom.int/countries/greece
18 UNHCR. Operational Portal, Refugees Situation, Mediterranean Situation. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179
some of the newly established temporary facilities entailed high risks for the security, the hygiene and the mental health of new arrivals. Water and sanitation facilities were insufficient, and several hazards were documented, affecting the living conditions of the beneficiaries. The humanitarian situation was exacerbated by the absence of legal aid and translation services to asylum seekers, or protection to vulnerable groups, such as women, children and unaccompanied minors. In support to the national authorities, several national and international NGOs and groups of volunteers started to provide assistance to refugees and migrants arriving in Greece filling the gap left by the national authorities.25

As part of the European Agenda on Migration of April 2015, the European Commission introduced the concept of “hotspot” as a way to help frontline Member States (Italy and Greece) cope with the massive arrivals of migrants and refugees. In Greece, the first hotspot was set up in October 2015 under the legal form of First Reception Centre – currently Reception and Identification Centres (RIC) – to assist the Greek authorities with the reception, identification, registration and fingerprinting of migrants and asylum seekers arriving in the Greek islands.26

### Types of reception facilities and accommodation in Greece

#### Reception and Identification Centres

In total there are seven Reception and Identification Centres (RICs) in Greece. At the end of 2015 and in the first half of 2016, Greece set up the so called ‘hotspots’ using these RICs in five Eastern Aegean islands, namely Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos. In addition, a RIC was also located in the mainland, in the Evros region in Fylakio, close to the Greek-Turkish land border.

RICs on the islands operate as registration centres as well as de facto open accommodation sites for asylum seekers and persons under the return/readmission procedure hosting refugees and migrants beyond 25 days and until the finalisation of the asylum and readmission procedures. The RIC in Fylakio at the land border of Evros is the only one that operates as a closed facility for the purpose of registration for up to 25 days.26 This means that newly arrived persons are firstly refrained from leaving the RICs, under the so-called geographical restriction. They are subject to a 3-day ‘restriction of freedom within the premises of the centre’, which can be further extended by a maximum of 25 days if reception and identification procedures have not been completed. This restriction of freedom entails ‘the prohibition to leave the Centre and the obligation to remain in it’, for the first 3 days to 25 days.27

Some EU agencies, including EASO, Frontex and Europol, provide operational support for the hotspots, while the main operators are the Greek Asylum Service (GAS) and other Greek authorities such as the army.

#### Open Reception Facilities

The majority of refugee centres in Greece are so-called ‘Open Reception Facilities’, with 28 centres in mainland Greece and on the islands (as of July 2018). Most are camp-like facilities with housing units (containers), while some are in buildings. A few have been officially established under the Reception and Identification Service (RIS) according to the legal framework which foresees that RIS can operate Open Facilities for the Temporary Reception of Asylum Seekers/O Open Facilities for the Temporary Accommodation of Third Country Nationals who are exempted from the return procedure/ or whose removal has been

---

25Stefania Kalogeraki. 2018. Volunteering for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Greece. Available at: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-73335-7_7


27 Asylum in Europe (by AIDA/ECRE), Reception and Identification Procedure Greece, 2018http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/asylum-procedure/access-procedure-and-registration/reception-and
postponed. However, these official forms of centres do not operate in practise, as most temporary accommodation centres and emergency facilities are set up without a prior Ministerial Decision and without following the legal requirements. In the open centres, residents are free to leave the centres at their will.

**UNHCR Rental Scheme**

In November 2015, UNHCR started implementing an accommodation scheme mostly for refugees eligible for relocation through its own funds. Following a Delegation Agreement signed between the European Commission and UNHCR in December 2015, the project was continued and UNHCR committed to gradually establishing 20,000 places in open accommodation, funded by the European Commission (DG HOME) and primarily dedicated to applicants for international protection eligible for relocation. In July 2017, as announced by the European Commission, the accommodation scheme was included in the ESTIA programme funded by DG ECHO, aiming to provide urban accommodation and cash assistance. Most of the accommodation places offered by UNHCR are in apartments (91%) the remaining places are in either buildings (10%). As of the 31st August 2018, UNHCR offers over 25,000 accommodation places.

**Unofficial sites**

At the height of the refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016, numerous unofficial refugee settlements also sprung up throughout Greece. Especially after the closing of the Balkan route that led to Western Europe, informal camps sprung up along the border of Greece and Balkan countries, with the most notorious informal camp being set up in Idomeni by the Greek-Macedonian border. Following the activation of ESI, in May 2016, the camp was evacuated, and its residents were brought to official refugee camps. Another example is that of the informal camp at Piraeus, Athens’ main port, where around 5,000 refugees were staying until April 2016, when authorities cleared the port. The informal settlement on the outskirts of Athens, Elliniko, was also cleared in May 2017, and its 800 inhabitants were brought to official camps or accommodated in the UNHCR rental scheme. The same happened with most of the informal camps throughout Greece as efforts were made to improve the housing situation for migrants. However, even today there are still many refugees and migrants who are not in camps nor in ESTIA.

The situation in Greece radically changed due to the closure of borders along the Western Balkans route in February/March 2016 and the activation of the EU-Turkey Statement on 20 March 2016. Following the EU-Turkey Statement, the RICs in the islands effectively became detention centres in order to prevent asylum seekers to move on to the mainland. However, after several weeks, it became clear that that measure would not meet the requirements of Art. 43 (2) Asylum Procedures Directive

---

29 Asylum in Europe (by AIDA/ECRE), Types of Accommodation, 2018 [http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/reception-conditions/housing/types-accommodation](http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/reception-conditions/housing/types-accommodation)
30 Asylum in Europe (by AIDA/ECRE), Types of Accommodation, 2018 [http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/reception-conditions/housing/types-accommodation](http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/reception-conditions/housing/types-accommodation)
35 Medium, ‘A week later, Elliniko refugee camp is empty’, 2/06/2017, [https://medium.com/athenslivegr/a-week-later-elliniko-refugee-camp-is-empty-b18409405f82](https://medium.com/athenslivegr/a-week-later-elliniko-refugee-camp-is-empty-b18409405f82)
and the detention in the hotspots was abandoned. Instead, a geographical restriction\(^{36}\) was introduced, preventing asylum seekers from moving to the mainland.\(^{37}\) That limitation in their freedom of movement effectively confined asylum seekers to the RICs, due to a lack of access to material reception conditions outside of the centres.\(^{38}\) Thus, the RICs which had initially been planned to be used for the initial treatment of new arrivals in Greece, became \textit{de facto} accommodation centres.\(^{39}\)

Despite a decrease in the number of arrivals in 2016 (see Figure 4 above), the \textbf{geographical restrictions} imposed on people arriving in the islands after the EU-Turkey Statement left more than 13,000 persons of concern (PoC)\(^{40}\) stranded in the Greek islands\(^{41}\) and rendered the available reception facilities heavily overcrowded.\(^{42}\) Moreover, the \textbf{closure of borders along the Western Balkans route left over 46,000 PoC stranded in mainland Greece},\(^{43}\) with little hope to continue their trips onward to other EU Member States.\(^{44}\) Despite Greece’s efforts to relocate and accommodate migrants and refugees, the Greek accommodation capacity was insufficient. As of April 2016, there were 31 temporary accommodation sites in the mainland with a maximum capacity to accommodate a little more than 33,000 individuals.\(^{45}\)

\(^{36}\) With the exception of persons exempt from the Fast-Track Border Procedure, asylum seekers are required to remain on the island until the end of the asylum procedure.

\(^{37}\) The geographical restrictions applied to the islands of Lesvos, Rhodes, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos.


\(^{39}\) As of July 2018, the RIC in Fylakio at the land border of Evros is the only one that operates as a closed facility for the purpose of registration for up to 25 days.

\(^{40}\) UNHCR considers persons of concern various groups of people including refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), stateless persons and returnees (returned refugees and IDPs).

\(^{41}\) Solidarity Now. 2018. Geographical restrictions of asylum seekers in the Greek islands: What is the impact of the recent Greek Council of State’s decision? Available at: https://www.solidaritynow.org/en/geographical_restriction/

\(^{42}\) Following the EU-Turkey Statement, people arriving in the islands were under a geographical restriction meaning that they could NOT leave the Greek islands before their case is processed. Thus, only people who received a positive first or second instance decision on their asylum application could move to the mainland. This was not applicable to asylum seekers who were subject to the Border Procedure (see Article 60 Law 4375/2016).


\(^{44}\) Data from 28/02/2017, according to Greek authorities: http://mindigital.gr/index.php/προσφυγικό-ζήτημαrefugee-crisis/1009-summary-statement-of-refugee-flows-03-03-2017

\(^{45}\) UNHCR. 2016. Sites in Greece. Available at: http://rrsesmi.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=d5f377f7f6f2418b8ebadaae638df2e1
This shift from being a transit country to a country of destination added critical challenges to a system already struggling with a very difficult socio-economic situation. Greece’s reception system has long been deemed inadequate and the European Court of Human Rights found that Greece was in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights for failing to provide asylum seeker with adequate living conditions. Moreover, Greece had little previous experience in the integration of asylum seekers and refugees, and by becoming a destination country, the national authorities had to deal not only with the most urgent humanitarian needs of the new arrivals, but also with the needs of those who were going to stay in Greece. The latter entails the need to move from temporary accommodation to a more long-term housing as well as to address the health and education needs of refugee and migrant children and the access to the labour market for the adults.

### Situation of refugees and migrants in Greece in March 2016

**Situation in the mainland**

- Insufficient accommodation capacity and lack of basic humanitarian services (i.e. food, water and sanitation facilities).
- The adequacy of the sites varied from one location to another. While some facilities were reported to be adequate for short-term accommodation, other sites like the one in Elliniko were substandard even for a few days stay. Overall, there was a lack of long-term accommodation facilities.
- The vast majority of the camps were located outside urban areas, often far from service providers and with difficult access to public transport.
- In a number of camps, there was no official management of the site leading to a lack of registration of refugees and migrants what prevented them from accessing certain services in the site (e.g. cash).

---


47 ECRE. Greece. Type of Accommodations. http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/reception-conditions/housing/types-accommodation#footnote21_zt9pdr


52 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/62216.pdf

53 ECRE. Greece. Conditions in reception facilities. Available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/reception-conditions/housing/conditions-reception-facilities
• There was also a lack of special shelters for vulnerable people including unaccompanied children, elderly, victims of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) and individuals suffering from serious mental health disorders.54
• The lack of security in the camps was highlighted by several national and international NGOs. Violence incidents, including SGBV were reported in several sites.55
• The lack of systematic provision of information to refugees and migrants on their rights and obligations was also observed by some NGOs on the ground.56
• Despite a lack of funding to address the needs of the newcomers, in March 2016, there had been no calls for applications to funds under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF).57

Situation in the islands

• Some organisations claimed that the poor living conditions of refugees and migrants in the islands reached the level of inhuman and degrading treatment.58
• In the islands, there was a significant lack of accommodation capacity and refugees and migrants were sleeping in tents unsuitable for the winter. Access to food and water was also reported to be insufficient and there were several instances of violence and tensions among the refugee population in the hotspots.59

During 2017, the number of sea arrivals considerably decreased mostly as a consequence of the EU-Turkey Statement (see Figure 4). Notwithstanding the decrease in the number of arrivals, in February 2017 there were more than 60,000 PoC still stranded in Greece due to the border closure.60

During 2018, the number of sea arrivals was considerably lower than in the previous years. However, the total number of arrivals in the first nine months of 2018 (including both land and sea arrivals) were approximately 40% higher than the total number of people arriving in Greece during the same period in 2017.61 This increase in the number of arrivals in 2018 was mostly due to a significant increase in the land arrivals. The number of people arriving by land in Greece has progressively increased with 3,300

---

55 ECRE. Greece. Conditions in reception facilities. Available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/reception-conditions/housing/conditions-reception-facilities
58 ECRE. Greece. Conditions in reception facilities. Available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/reception-conditions/housing/conditions-reception-facilities
59 ECRE. Conditions in reception facilities. Available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/reception-conditions/housing/conditions-reception-facilities
60 Data from 28/02/2017, according to Greek authorities: http://mindigital.gr/index.php/προσφυγικό-ζήτημαrefugee-crisis/1009-summary-statement-of-refugee-flows-03-03-2017
migrants arriving through the Greek-Turkish border in 2016, 5,700 persons in 2017 and already a record number of 9,800 in the first seven months of 2018.\textsuperscript{62}

In the spring of 2018, the number of people crossing into Greece through the Greek-Turkish land border in the Evros region significantly increased. According to UNHCR, it was the first time in the last few years that the number of land arrivals surpassed the sea arrivals. In the first six months of 2018, the number of people who crossed into Greece through Evros was around 7,200 compared to approximately 5,600 for the whole 2017.\textsuperscript{63} The increase in the number of arrivals in Northern Greece stretched the reception capacity of the RIC at Fylakio in northern Evros,\textsuperscript{64} which soon became very overcrowded and unsuitable for the reception of more asylum seekers and migrants.\textsuperscript{65} Those crossing the border were mostly Syrian Kurds and Iraqis.\textsuperscript{66} Since May 2018, the number of arrivals in Evros have been decreasing easing the pressure on the reception system.\textsuperscript{67}

As of July 2018, there were a total of 26 open reception facilities in the mainland Greece and two in the islands hosting more than 16,000 and 1,200 people, respectively.\textsuperscript{68} In addition to the open reception facilities, the RICs in the islands were accommodating more than 12,000 individuals and the only RIC in the mainland was hosting around 258 individuals. In August 2018, the Moria camp in Lesvos was hosting more than 7,000 asylum seekers and migrants in shelters that were originally planned for accommodating 2,000 people. Similarly, the RICs on the islands of Chios and Kos were also operating at double their capacity.\textsuperscript{69} According to UNHCR, the levels of overcrowding reached in the summer 2018 were very close to the situation in March 2016 when the daily arrivals were considerably higher.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{68} UNHCR. 2018. Site Profiles, July 2018. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/65334
2.2 The international response

In order to address the needs of refugees and migrants stranded in Greece, an Inter-Agency response plan\(^{71}\) was developed and published by UNHCR in 2016\(^{72}\) aiming at improving their life conditions by keeping protection as the heart of the response and ensuring access to dignified and safe reception conditions. Investing in peaceful coexistence as well as in building local support to refugees and migrants and addressing the needs of the most vulnerable groups were key elements of the UNHCR’s strategy in Greece.\(^{73}\) The 2016 response was divided in seven sectors including protection, education, site management support, health and nutrition, food security, shelter/ NFIs items and WASH thus covering all the sectors with the highest reported needs.\(^{74}\) The 2017 response targeted the same sectors but taking into consideration the new contextual developments and emerging needs. For instance, the provision of basic assistance including food, NFIs and cash was set as a priority for 2017 in both the islands and the mainland (Figure 5).\(^ {75}\)

As Figure 5 shows, in 2016, the main needs were identified in the sector of protection ($220 million) followed by shelter and access to NFIs ($123 million).\(^75\) In 2017, the sector of protection still experienced significant needs but the provision of basic assistance became one of the main uncovered areas.

---


\(^{72}\) Note that the Regional refugee and migrant response plan was published before the EU-Turkey Statement


\(^{75}\) UNHCR. 2016. Regional refugee and migrant response plan for Europe January to December 2017. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/52619

\(^{76}\) It is to be noted that the needs were assessed before the EU-Turkey Statement.
Figure 5. **UNHCR estimation of needs (US$) per sector and per year**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logistics, Telecommunications and Logistics</td>
<td>$467 M</td>
<td>$262 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>$123 M</td>
<td>$47 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>$220 M</td>
<td>$197 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Nutrition</td>
<td>$171 M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site Management Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter and NPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Assistance (Food, Non Food Items and Cash Assistance)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ICF based on UNHCR 2016 & 2017 Regional refugee and migrant response plan for Europe.\(^{77}\)

In response to the identified needs in Greece, several EU financial instruments were used (see Table 9 in Annex 2 for further information on the instruments) for the provision of assistance prior (and during) the ESI activation, including:

- The Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM);\(^{78}\)
- The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF);
- The Internal Security Fund (ISF);\(^{79}\)
- The European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF);\(^{80}\)
- The European Social Fund (ESF),

---


Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

- The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF);¹
- The Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD);² and,
- The Health Programme.³

Despite all the efforts to address the situation in Greece and to respond to the existing needs, none of the EU instruments activated before the ESI was set up were fully suitable to address wide-ranging humanitarian needs.⁴ There was a growing need to confer on the EU the capacity to provide humanitarian aid in the context of the refugee and migration situation in Greece. As a result, on 19 February 2016, the European Council called the European Commission to “put in place the capacity for the EU to provide humanitarian assistance internally, in cooperation with organisations such as UNHCR, to support countries facing large numbers of refugees and migrants, building on the experience of the EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department”.⁵ On 2 March 2016, the European Commission adopted its Proposal for a Council Regulation on the provision of emergency support within the Union.⁶ Subsequently, the Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369 was adopted by the Council on 15 March 2016.⁷

Among all the donors who provided support to the migration situation in Greece, the European Commission was the main contributor to the provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees and migrants. As Figure 6 shows, the European Commission provided 86% of the funding received by Greece over the period 2016-2018 (including funding under ESI) and represented the main source of funding for 2018.

---

⁴ More information on ESIs complementarity with other EU instruments is further provided in Section 5.2.
Section 2.3 describes the aim, characteristics and functioning of the ESI.

2.3 The Emergency Support Instrument

The ESI was set up with the intention of reducing the burden of the humanitarian assistance on the affected Member States and filling a gap in the assistance that could not be provided by other existing EU or national instruments.89

The ESI can only be activated upon request from the European Commission, by the Council, for a specific duration, in case of natural or man-made disaster situations of exceptional scale and likely to cause severe wide-ranging humanitarian consequences in one or several Member States. The general objective of the instrument is to provide faster and needs-based emergency humanitarian support, complementing the response of the affected Member States that is overwhelmed as a result of the disaster. The specific objective of the Regulation for the current activation was to meet the basic needs of refugees and migrants in the Union through the provision of multi-sectorial support (i.e. Food assistance, Distribution of NFIs, shelter, healthcare, WASH, protection and education) (see also Section 2.4).

In case of activation, a Commission Financial Decision is adopted, setting out the maximum amount of funding that can be granted under the ESI for each activation year/period. The Financing Decisions are accompanied by the Emergency Support Operational Priorities (ESOP) by which the funding for the ESI actions is organised and structured, to provide the annual programming of ESI’s funded actions and to serve as a guidance and information tool for DG ECHO framework partners in the preparation of their proposals.

The selected humanitarian aid actions shall be carried out by the European Commission or by partner organisations selected by the European Commission (i.e. International agencies, NGOs, specialised services of Member States) which fall within the scope of the

88 The figure does not display all funding allocated to Greece as the FTS database only includes financial allocations to humanitarian assistance operations.
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (‘FAFA’) or have concluded a Framework Partnership Agreement (‘FPA’) with the European Commission.\(^9\)

Any emergency support granted under the ESI must take into consideration and be implemented in compliance with the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.

According to Article 1(2) of the Regulation, the emergency support to be provided is in support of, and complementary to, the actions of the affected Member State. Actions shall therefore be implemented in close cooperation and consultation with that Member State. The European Commission and its partners should therefore cooperate and consult with the national authorities regarding the implementation and funding of the actions, so that these operate in line with the planning of the national authorities.

In addition, synergies and complementarity must also be sought with other Union instruments under which some form of emergency assistance may be offered. In the case of humanitarian operations in Greece, this related primarily to voluntary in-kind contributions provided under the UCPM and emergency assistance under AMIF and ISF. It is important to keep in mind that, emergency support under the ESI will only be provided in exceptional circumstances where no other instrument available to Member States and to the Union is sufficient.

Moreover, considering that ESI-funded actions are implemented by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations and United Nations agencies and that these organisations might in turn work with several local implementing partners, coordination between all the involved organisations is also key for the effective, efficient and coherent implementation of the humanitarian actions.

Section 2.4 analyses ESI’s activation in Greece by providing an overview of the intervention in the different sectors, the type of actions funded, the number of projects, geographical coverage, and the financial contribution.

### 2.4 The Emergency Support Instrument interventions in Greece

The ESI was activated for the first time and for a period of three years, concurrently with the adoption of the Regulation. Since its activation, the Commission developed a Financial Decision, which provided a maximum amount of funding that could be granted under the ESI for each of the periods. The 2016 Financing Decision\(^9\) set the maximum contribution of the EU for the provision of emergency support at €300 million, however

---

the budgetary authority ultimately allocated €250 million. The 2017\textsuperscript{92} and 2018\textsuperscript{93} Financing Decisions set the maximum contribution of the European Union for the provision of emergency support at €200 million for each year. Three annual ESOPs were launched for the 2016, 2017 and 2018 years- corresponding to the three-year activation period of the Instrument.

Following the ESOPs and the Financing Decisions, the national authorities, in cooperation with other Commission services, developed Financial Plans for the 2017 and 2018 funding periods.\textsuperscript{94} These plans provided an overview of the main elements of the approach to be implemented during each financial year, including the main needs and areas to be covered as indicated and requested by the national authorities, an indicative budget breakdown per relevant actor and per EU funding instrument, as well as the Guiding Principles for all the actions funded in Greece. Figure 7 summarises the ESI’s implementation process in Greece.

\textit{Figure 7. The ESI implementation process}

![Financial Plans 2017 & 2018](image)

Source: ICF. 2018. Based on desk research.


\textsuperscript{93} European Commission. 2018. Commission Decision on the financing of emergency support in favour of the affected Member States in response to the current influx of refugees and migrants into the Union to be financed from the 2018 general budget of the European Union (ECHO/-EU/BUD/2018/01000), C(2017)763, Brussels.

\textsuperscript{94} Note: Given the short time-frame and the emergency of the situation, no Financial Plan was developed for the implementation of ESI’s actions in 2016. The allocations made by DG ECHO under the 2016 Financing Decision were therefore decided in the absence of an agreed governmental response plan until February 2017.
Although the scope of the ESI aimed to cover any affected Member State provided the latter met the ESI conditions,\textsuperscript{95} Greece was the only Member State that fully met the 'eligibility' conditions set out in the Regulation. Hence, the emergency support was so far only provided in Greece, and specifically targeted by the 2016-2018 ESOPs. However, in 2017, two proposals for funding under ESI were received for actions in Bulgaria. Since the needs in that country were already being covered by other EU funding instruments (in particular by AMIF under DG HOME), it was eventually decided not to activate the ESI in Bulgaria.

In order to receive ESI funding, framework partners were required to be present in Greece in compliance with the national registration requirements.\textsuperscript{96}

In the \textbf{assessment and selection of proposals}, one of the main elements taken into consideration by DG ECHO was whether the proposed actions were in line with the ESOPs and the financing decisions for each of the years.\textsuperscript{97}

Despite the fact that each of the ESOPs and more specifically, each of the assessment rounds established slightly different criteria for the assessment of proposals, overall, during the actions’ selection process, DG ECHO looked at: the quality of the needs assessment carried out by the applicants, the relevance of the intervention (i.e. geographical, sector coverage and number of beneficiaries), the feasibility of the proposed actions, as well as the applicant’s implementation capacity (including the capacity of potential implementing partners) and experience with humanitarian operations. In this line, an important factor taken into consideration for the awarding of funding under the ESI was the organisations’ operational capacity in Greece and their knowledge of the country.

Additionally, some other elements like security, coordination (i.e. risk of duplication and overlapping), the use of local implementing partners, access arrangements, the quality of the monitoring systems and cost-effectiveness were also taken into consideration when making a decision on whether to fund a specific action. Compliance with DG ECHO visibility requirements and with the humanitarian principles were also an important requirement for receiving funding.

For the proposals received under the financial decisions for 2017 and 2018, DG ECHO also looked at whether the proposed actions were in line with the Greek Financial plans and requirements. Moreover, for the proposals received under the 2018 financing decision, DG ECHO also examined whether the proposed actions were in line with the handover strategy.\textsuperscript{98}

From 2016 to 2018, \textbf{29 projects were funded under the ESI in Greece for a total amount of €644.5 million} (Figure 8). Under the first ESOP, 17 projects were funded for a total amount of €247.5 million. Nine Projects were funded under the second ESOP (2017) for an amount of €198 million, of which five were financings made to new projects, the others were top ups. To date, under the 2018 ESOP, seven projects amounting to €199 million funding have been approved by DG ECHO.

---


\textsuperscript{96} DG ECHO. 2016. Emergency Support Financing Decision Operational Priorities (ESOP 2016).

\textsuperscript{97} See Single form guidelines.
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Figure 8. DG ECHO contribution to projects implemented in Greece

Total ECHO contribution: € 644.5 M
Number of projects: 29

Source: ICF. 2018. Based on data provided by DG ECHO. Total contribution figures are based on contracted amounts provided by DG ECHO, which take account of some recent contract modifications, while other figures in the report are based on data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases on 15.10.2018.

Over the three-year period, 18 framework partners received the ESI funding to implement projects in Greece (Figure 9). UN agencies received around 70% of the ESI funding, most of which was allocated to UNCHR (57%, €369 million) followed by IOM (9%, €56 million). Twelve NGOs were allocated 26% of the budget (€169 million), with the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) constituting the major recipients of funding. Of the 12 partner NGOs, three are Greek.

International Organisation (IO, i.e. the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, IFRC/FICR) received 4% (€23 million) of the ESI budget.

Figure 9. ESI funding allocation to the main recipients over the period 2016-2018

Source: ICF. 2018. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases on 15.10.2018

ESI projects were implemented in all 13 administrative regions in Greece, as illustrated in Figure 10. The majority of the ESI projects were implemented in Central Macedonia (21) and Attica (21) followed by Epirus (12) and Aegean Islands (11).
Figure 10. Geographical coverage of the ESI funded projects

Source: ICF. 2018. Based on DG ECHO internal documentation.

Despite the ESI’s focus on the mainland, several ESI activities were also implemented in the islands up to mid-2017 (e.g. health, protection). Nonetheless, under the agreement of the national authorities, the ESI reduced its support in the islands to cash and rental accommodation schemes, leaving the remainder of the response to actions funded by DG HOME.

In order to provide a wide support, **DG ECHO took a multi-sectoral approach** that included all sectors of intervention as provided within the ESI Regulation’s specific objectives (see Section 2.3). The sectors covered under the ESI include:

- Provision of shelter;
- Distribution of food and NFIs;
- Protection services;
- Healthcare, including psychosocial support;
- Education; and,
- Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH);

Figure 11 provides an overview of the total amounts allocated from the ESI funding per sector for the period 2016-2018.
The ESI allocated €273 million to framework partners (i.e. UNHCR, IOM, Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland - ASB, Norwegian Refugee Council - NRC, DRC, Oxfam, IFRC/FICR, Care and IRC) providing shelter and accommodation (S&S) for PoC in Greece (42% of the total funding) representing the highest share of ESI funding. The type of accommodation granted included both places in sites and rental accommodation scheme (i.e. places in apartments). It is important to note that at the time of activation, no shelters were readily available to house refugees and migrants and sites had to be set up from scratch. Moreover, on top of the funding granted to actions in the area of shelter and accommodation, the ESI also funded actions that aimed at providing and maintaining WASH facilities in accommodation places such as sites/camps and/or in buildings. A total of €21 million from the ESI budget was used to fund WASH actions during the period 2016-2018 (see Figure 11).

As part of the negotiation of the 2017 Financial Plan, the national authorities decided for a gradual transition of beneficiaries from temporary reception facilities (sites) to urban rental accommodation. Internally, the European Commission services decided that the DG HOME funded rental accommodation scheme (in the mainland and island) would be handed over to the ESI, changing its main purpose from being a functional tool of the relocation policy, to a vulnerability-based reception system. UNHCR was identified as the most suitable framework partner to run such an operation, labelled as the “ESTIA programme“, with a provision of €155 million in 2018. As a consequence of the progressive transfer of refugees and migrants from sites to apartments in urban areas, and thus the lesser focus on the provision and maintenance of WASH infrastructure in sites, the 2018 ESOP did not include WASH as a priority.

Cash assistance provided to PoC in Greece between 2016 and 2018 amounted to €122 million. At the beginning of the implementation of the ESI, all assistance was provided in kind (food rations, NFIs) by several actors funded under different ESI projects. As of July 2016, the ESI started funding actions to build up a multi-purpose cash scheme in Greece via several framework partners (i.e. Oxfam, IFRC/FICR, IRC, Mercy Corps - MCE, and Care).99 One of the goals of the 2017 ESOP was to ensure access to basic services, basic food and NFIs through the establishment of a single delivery cash-based assistance, through which a full coverage of needs of the refugee and migrant population in Greece,

---

99 The multipurpose cash scheme was introduced in April 2017 and fully implemented nationwide in May 2017. The total allocation (between 2017-2018) amounts to €122 million. Before the scheme was introduced, a total of €22 million was allocated to different activities involving cash transfers in 2016.
both in the mainland and on the islands, could be ensured. A phased transition from the provision of in-kind food rations (catering) to an increased multi-purpose cash amount was implemented nationwide from May 2017.

The **protection sector** was the third largest area receiving the ESI funding. Between 2016 and 2018, €109 million were allocated to framework partners operating in the protection sector (i.e. UNHCR, IRC, UNICEF, Save the Children - StC, DRC, ASB, IOM, Terre des Hommes - TdH, Oxfam, IFRC/FICR, CARE, The Smile of the Child, METAdrasi and MCE). The actions funded in this area included activities such as the creation of child-friendly spaces, ensuring access to information and legal support, family tracing, identification and assistance to SGBV victims, as well as care for UAMs. UAMs were indeed one of the main groups benefiting from funding allocated to protection activities. By July 2017, the ESI was providing financial support to cover the management of approximately 1,000 places for UAMs in dedicated shelters in Greece. From August 2017, responsibility for the provision of financial support to continue the management of these shelters was transferred to the national authorities, supported through the use of funds available under the Greek AMIF national programme.

The **health sector** was also funded under ESI. A total of €32 million were allocated to actions related to healthcare between 2016 and 2018. Healthcare services provided under the ESI funding included primary healthcare, specialised healthcare (including mental health to a limited extent), psycho-social support and referral to hospital for people located in camps (both on mainland and islands) as well as referral and translation support in the urban context of Athens.

ESI funding was also used to support access to **education**, including formal and non-formal education. Approximately €25 million were allocated to framework partners working on the field of education (i.e. IOM, UNICEF, StC, NRC, DRC, TdH and METAdrasi). The ESI was used, *inter alia*, to support the Ministry of Education (MoE) in ensuring access to formal education for migrant and refugee children by transporting children living in sites to schools, promoting the enrolment of children in the public system, providing training to teachers, and supporting the Education Sector Working Group. Non-formal education activities such as basic maths and literacy lessons, and classes in Greek and English and mother tongue languages (both in sites and urban areas) were also provided under the ESI funding by several framework and local implementing partners.

Apart from the different sectors mentioned above, the ESI also funded **coordination activities** such as the organisation of working groups and the production of information material. Approximately €25 million were allocated to three framework partners (UNHCR, DRC and Oxfam) for coordination activities. In addition, site management support activities were also provided across the different sectors e.g. shelter & settlement, NFI, WASH, coordination and protection.

### 2.5 Theory of change and Intervention Logic

Based on the intervention logic included in the proposal and the one prepared internally by DG ECHO for the purpose of the internal evaluation, an updated version is presented in Figure 12 overleaf, which also includes the underlying assumptions and considerations as to their validity.

100 The ESI continued to provide financial support to the running of ten temporary safe zones of unaccompanied minors in camps.

101 Following an agreement with the Greek authorities, health services funded by the ESI on the Islands ended in July 2017.
With regard to the rationale for intervention, the overall assumption for activating the ESI was that no other EU/ national instrument was available to provide the emergency support needed, at that scale, and that a 'no action' approach would have had severe negative consequences not only on Greece but in the EU as a whole. The rationale in Greece was related to the nearly one million arrivals in the Member State between 2015 and 2016, the gradual closure of the Western Balkan borders, transforming the country into a point of reception, and the insufficient capacity at national level to address the basic needs of the newly arrived, who were spread over the islands and the mainland. The evaluation has confirmed that indeed no other EU/ national instrument was able to deliver the same, fast emergency support at such scale, although some other emergency mechanisms, such as the Emergency Assistance Instrument (EMAS), were, once properly established, able to address a large part of the needs on the islands.

As to the inputs, the total amount allocated as part of the ESI amounted to 650 million euro, spread over three years. Considering that the ESI is specifically geared towards ‘life-saving’ emergency support, it was assumed that the surrounding procedures, in terms of making funds available and selecting project proposals by framework partners, would also be accelerated. In addition, as DG ECHO already delivered humanitarian aid outside the EU as part of the Humanitarian Aid Regulation, it was also assumed that DG ECHO would have the required in-house experience to manage and follow-up actions, albeit in a ‘new’ geography. The evaluation has confirmed that ESI’s implementation period indeed allowed for the immediate delivery of a response, although at the initial stage of the ESI activation problems were encountered with regard to coordination with national authorities and other donors.

The main activities undertaken on the basis of the inputs consisted of a total of 29 projects implemented by 18 framework partners, prioritising the sectors in which support was most urgently needed, and realised in coordination with national authorities, other donors (other EU instruments), framework partners, local implementing partners and other organisations involved (including the armed forces). The main assumptions for launching these activities successfully were that framework partners with appropriate expertise were available on the ground or ready to be deployed quickly, and that responses were timely and, more importantly, based on needs assessments. The evaluation has validated this assumption, while also emphasising the important role played by local implementing partners, which the framework partners overall engaged with successfully.

When considering the outputs, the 29 actions together reached a cumulative total of over 146 thousand persons by early 2018, through activities related to protection, shelter and settlement, food security and livelihoods (FSL), education, health, coordination, WASH and MPCT for basic needs assistance. It was assumed that, in order to achieve the desired outputs, DG ECHO framework partners would, collectively, be able to cover all sectors in which actions were required and that they would be supported by local implementing partners with a better understanding of the local context. Local structures would further need to be receptive to ESI’s actions and, in order to achieve complementarity and avoid duplication, other donors and implementing agencies would be willing to engage in intense coordination and cooperation processes. This evaluation has identified some difficulties in relation to the coordination and cooperation processes, at least initially, with national authorities lacking the ability to provide the required strategic leadership and some local authorities unwilling to engage in the response. However, coordination and cooperation improved over time.

In terms of outcomes, the activities implemented were expected to address the most urgent needs in terms of food, shelter and healthcare, as well as to overall improve access to different services and forms of support, including accommodation protection measures and education for children. This in turn would create a safer environment for in particular vulnerable beneficiaries as well as greater dignity to all. Other important outcomes relate to the complementary nature of ESI’s actions to the response by the national authorities and civil society, which would stimulate capacity building and resilience, as well as lead to a successful handover of the ESI-funded response. To achieve this, it was assumed that indeed possibilities to link ESI actions to national and local activities were available, that authorities and NGOs were willing to take over or take back certain activities and that this was based on a well-thought exit strategy. The evaluation has identified some important shortcomings in this regard, including a lack of a clear exit strategy to support a successful handover and ensure sustainability of actions. Nevertheless, it also noted that progress is being made towards this, albeit later than what would have been desirable.

Finally, with regard to the expected impacts, the ESI was expected to reduce the impact of the emergency on human life, enhance human dignity and create improved opportunities for integration, by supporting policy measures in this area and creating the pre-conditions for integration with beneficiaries. The actions were also expected to enhance overall preparedness in Greece. The main underlying assumptions related to the availability of an integration framework in the host society and the willingness of national authorities to maintain a certain level of preparedness. The evaluation draws attention to the absence of a well-developed national integration framework, which, in combination with the lack of an exit strategy, has affected the extent to which beneficiaries can make a smooth transition from receiving emergency support and starting their integration into the new host society.
Figure 12. ESI 2016-2018 activation intervention logic

Rationale for Intervention
- Large sudden influx in the eastern Mediterranean route (nearly 857,723 refugees and migrants arriving in Greece in 2015, 33,450 in 2016)
- Lack of national capacity to address the basic needs of migrants and asylum seekers
- Lack of sufficient reception facilities
- Insufficient shortage of food, water and sanitation in some parts of the territory
- People living in camps not meeting the minimum standards
- Main basic needs not fully met: food, non-food items, protection, healthcare, WASH, education and shelter

Objectives
- To address the immediate humanitarian needs of the disaster-stricken people
- To contribute to reducing the economic impact of the emergency in Greece
- To prevent further severe humanitarian consequences

Inputs
- €270m allocated to the period 2016-2018:
  - €300m in 2016, €200m in 2017, €700m in 2018
- Human resources (DG ECHO support and expertise)
- Other national financial and human resources from Greek authorities and civil society initiatives
- Other EU Instruments: ADR, ISF, FEAD, UCPRM, ESI, ERDF, Health programme

Activities
- 29 actions implemented by 17 framework partners by 2018
- €644 million or 92% committed by early 2018
- ESI priorities: shelter, multi-purpose cash assistance, protection, health
- Coordination with other EU instruments, national authorities, humanitarian partners

Outputs
- 29 ESI actions reaching over 146,000 people by October 2018 through activities in the following sectors:
  - Shelter and accommodation (part of ESF/AI programme)
  - Basic needs assistance: roll-out of emergency programme (part of ESF/AI programme)
  - Protection: unaccompanied minors, MSF, support to the asylum procedure, family tracing and reunification, documentation
  - Health: primary and secondary health, psychosocial support, medical supplies
  - Food security and livelihoods: food distribution, conditional and unconditional cash and in-kind assistance
  - Education: non-formal education and support to formal education, safe learning environments
  - Coordination: site management support

Outcomes
- Improved access to shelter (sites and rental accommodation), healthcare, protection and education available to refugees and migrants, including the most vulnerable
- Greater dignity experienced by people in need and a safer environment for vulnerable persons
- ESI activities complementing the response of Greek authorities and civil society initiatives whose capacity and future resilience is increased
- Successful handover of the response to national authorities as part of the exit strategy

Assumptions
- The emergency is of an exceptional scale and impact, with severe consequences
- The Member State is overwhelmed, not having the capacity and adequacy to respond to the emergency
- No other EU financial instruments (directly) available to provide support (e.g., the Member State’s capacity to absorb and implement)
- Fast release of funds
- Quick project selection
- DG ECHO staff has required expertise and capabilities
- Useful intervention ‘leads’ provided by Greek authorities
- Consultations on financing decisions with Greek authorities, other donors & their implementation agencies

External factors
- Availability of framework partners with relevant expertise
- Timely response based on needs assessments
- Coordination structures in place

Scope
- All EU Member States affected by man-made or natural disaster of an exceptional scale and impact, with severe wide-reaching humanitarian consequences, where no other instrument available to MS and to the Union is sufficient

The activation of ESI in Greece constituted the first time delivery of emergency support through the new instrument

18 Framework partners
- ADR
- CARE
- RED CROSS
- DRC
- IRPC/IFRC
- IRC
- IRC
- ICRC
- MDME
- DEMOS
- MITADHMSI
- NIKOS
- OXFAM
- STC
- TDH
- THE SMILE OF THE CHILD
- UNHCR
- UNICEF

Source: ICF. 2018.
3 Evaluation findings

3.1 Relevance

3.1.1 EQ1: To what extent is the ESI relevant as a tool for emergency response within the Union?

Judgment criteria:

- JC1.1 The ESI is necessary to provide the capacity for the Union to address wide-ranging emerging humanitarian needs resulting from natural or manmade disasters

Key findings:

- The ESI was confirmed as key to provide capacity in addressing the wide-ranging and emerging humanitarian needs within the EU.
- DG ECHO’s contribution through the ESI was in line with its mandate and relevant to an emergency response within the EU.
- The ESI was activated in a very short time period, which was seen as vital in such a humanitarian context.
- Channelling funds through DG ECHO’s established framework partners added to the speed of the ESI response and was broadly seen as appropriate by stakeholders.
- Given the Greek context (capacities, other economic and social issues), the ESI was appropriate and timely, as national funding was not available and other funding could, to a large extent, only be delivered through the national authorities, which however lacked capacity to respond to the emergency in a timely manner.

The ESI is necessary to provide additional capacity to address wide-ranging and emerging humanitarian needs within the EU

Although not without shortcomings, the ESI swift activation time, the ability to mobilise a large proportion of funding through established framework partners on the ground, and the diversity of funded actions, made it a highly relevant tool to be used in an emergency situation such as the one faced by Greece.

The ESI is activated only when the scale of a natural or man-made disaster within the EU is “exceptional”, and when current instruments available to Member States are insufficient or these have been exhausted (see section 2.3). So far, Greece was the only Member State that met the ‘eligibility’ conditions of the Regulation, mainly: i. the exceptional scale and impact of the disaster giving rise to severe wide-ranging humanitarian consequences in one or more Member States; and ii. no other instrument available to Member States and to the Union being sufficient. The ESI has therefore provided support in Greece, with the specific objective of meeting “the basic needs of persons adversely affected by the current influx of refugees and migrants into the Union,”

---

103 Report from the Commission to the Council on the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support within the Union: COM (2017) 131 Final
in Greece and in any other Union Member State affected, through the provision of multi-sectoral support”. In line with this, DG ECHO’s overall mandate is to save and preserve life, to reduce or prevent suffering to safeguard the integrity and dignity of people affected by humanitarian crises by providing relief and protection. All stakeholders consulted throughout this evaluation agreed that DG ECHO’s contribution through the ESI activation was in line with its mandate and relevant to an emergency response within the EU. This is further confirmed by Key Informant Interviews, whereby the decision-making process of designing ESI, and the subsequent activation, was seen as a collective response to a collective crisis, demonstrating both EU solidarity and acknowledgment of the need for such emergency response, for the first time, within the EU.

As mentioned in section 2.1, the shift from being a transit country to a destination country added critical challenges to a national system already struggling with a difficult socio-economic and employment situation. Furthermore, Greece had little pre-existing experience in the reception and integration of asylum seekers and refugees, and by becoming a host country, the national authorities had to deal not only with the most urgent humanitarian needs of the new arrivals, but also with the needs of those who were going to remain in Greece. Against this backdrop, findings from this evaluation conclude that the ESI was the most relevant tool to deliver an emergency response of this nature and scale within the Union, and, in particular for, the situation in Greece. This is further corroborated by the results from DG ECHO’s survey of framework partners and local implementing partners, which shows that most respondents (80%) considered the use of the ESI to have been relevant to respond to the humanitarian needs spurred by the sudden mixed influx of refugees and migrants into the EU, with 75% stating it was relevant for the specific situation in Greece (Figure 13). The speed with which the ESI was activated, once the situation was deemed a humanitarian emergency, and the breadth of actions it was able to fund were seen as the main distinguishing factors of the ESI.

Figure 13. Relevance of the ESI to respond to emerging humanitarian needs in Greece, and in the EU

Relevant to the particular situation in the Member State (i.e. Greece)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat relevant</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat irrelevant</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relevant to support the emerging humanitarian needs in the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat relevant</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat irrelevant</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The ESI was activated in a very short time period, with the swift political agreement on the establishing Regulation, the development of the 2016 ESOP and accompanying Financing Decision: overall, it took 19 days to activate, and within the subsequent three weeks the first framework partner contracts were signed, and funding released. The ability to commit funds, using DG ECHO’s specific implementation method, directly

---

104 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369 of 15 March 2016 on the provision of emergency support within the Union.
106 ICF desk research 2018. ICF Key informant interviews 2018.
through its framework partners (and beyond that to local implementing partners already operating on the ground), as opposed to through national/ regional authorities, in addition to DG ECHO’s longstanding experience in addressing humanitarian emergencies, added to the rapid response time of the ESI. However, some questions were raised in relation to the relevance of using this working method within the EU territory - as addressed in section 3.1.4.

Although the ESI activation was seen as highly appropriate, a number of local implementing partners questioned the initial timeframe for activation. They underlined that, prior to the ESI being established, the EU was slow to respond to the unfolding refugee and migrant emergency, as the first mass influx was already reported in late 2015, and the ESI only being established in March 2016. This meant that local stakeholders were already having to deal with the unfolding emergency, with little financial support from existing EU funds on the ground. Interviews with EU officials, however, maintained that although the response time was started relatively late, the swift activation of the ESI meant that the humanitarian consequences of the emergency on the ground were quickly countered.

As noted during the Key Informant Interviews, and based on desk research, the ESI was set up as a generic instrument (i.e. to address any natural or man-made crisis in the EU), not as a specific tool to address migration. Although no formal impact assessment, nor in-depth stakeholder consultation took place prior to the creation of the ESI, a rapid needs assessment of existing EU funds was done to minimise duplication, and increase the relevance of the ESI within the context of Greece. This evaluation found that although numerous funds were available within Greece (such as the EUSAF, AMIF, ISF, FEAD), none targeted specifically the evolving large humanitarian needs. More importantly, such funds primarily relied on the “administrative and operational capacities of governments, who may already be under stress in financial and economic terms”.108

More specifically, the limited national capacity to respond was, in addition to Greece’s insufficient national financial resources, mostly ‘organisational’ in nature, linked to the national authorities’ insufficient capacity to set up, organise, absorb and follow the available EU funding streams (mostly AMIF and its emergency component EMAS) at the time of the emergency. The ESI, as an instrument, was therefore appropriate and timely, as national funding was not available and other (EU) funding could, to a large extent, only be delivered through the national authorities, which lacked capacity to respond to the emergency in a timely manner. To illustrate this, Key Informant Interviews highlighted that although funds were available through AMIF as part of the national programmes, and EMAS, Greece was already ‘historically’ facing some issues regarding the absorption of these funds, and the length of time it took to select and launch projects, making the decision to fund activities through the ESI relevant. Desk research conducted also compared the response to this refugee emergency between Greece (using the ESI) and Bulgaria (using EMAS) and found that the response in Bulgaria was slower and less flexible than the response in Greece via the ESI. This is further explored under section 3.3.3.109

3.1.2 EQ2: To what extent was the ESI intervention appropriate when considering Greece’s particular situation and needs and EQ5: To what extent were the assumptions of the ESI intervention in Greece correct?

Judgment criteria:

109 ICF. 2018. Literature mapping. Further detailed under the effectiveness section 3.3.3.
JC2.1 The intervention under the instrument was appropriate for the Member State’s situation, as the latter had already exhausted all available capacity/resources
JC2.2 The ESI actions were appropriate and took into account the emerging needs in the Member State (Greece) and targeted the relevant beneficiaries
JC2.3 Partners’ needs assessments have correctly analysed the needs of the target beneficiaries (addressed under EQ3)
JC2.4 Budget allocations have taken account of the partners’ needs assessments
JC5.1 The majority of the assumptions at the start of the ESI operations at the operational level leading to funding the individual projects were correct: the type and scale of needs, the assessment of capacities (of the national authorities and the framework and local implementing partners) and the anticipated number of beneficiaries were assessed mostly appropriately
JC5.2 At the project level, the target beneficiaries outlined in the Single Forms align with other (official, high quality) needs assessments
JC5.3 Projects provided a clear definition of the target group, their level of vulnerability, and a rationale for targeting the population
JC5.4 The needs identified in the majority of ESI actions align appropriately with the needs described by beneficiaries (addressed in EQ9)

Key findings:

- The ESI intervention was confirmed as highly relevant and appropriate when considering Greece’s situation and the needs on the ground.
- The ESI was seen as an appropriate tool to swiftly support the national authorities, whose capacity at the time was very limited; however, the scale of this limited capacity may not have been fully captured in DG ECHO’s and partner’s needs assessments at the time.
- The ESI was informed by needs assessments at central level and at the level of the actions funded; these contributed to an overall strong coverage of the main needs identified.
- The ESI covered all the main sectors of need and the majority of beneficiary types over the time period evaluated, covering the main needs of the beneficiaries.
- The assumptions of the ESI intervention in Greece were overall correct given the type and scale of needs, and the insufficient capacity at the national/regional level.
- Although the number of beneficiaries reached by the ESI actions is high, slight discrepancies were found between UNHCR data on people of concern in the region and the numbers reached by the ESI. The target beneficiaries of funded actions align well with both DG ECHO needs assessments and UNHCR data.
- A few needs identified on the ground during the implementation, in particular those of specific vulnerable groups and of beneficiaries on the islands, were insufficiently addressed.

Throughout this evaluation, all stakeholders involved confirmed that the ESI intervention was appropriate and highly valuable considering the situation in Greece, characterised by insufficient national capacity to respond in a timely manner, and mostly addressed needs identified on the ground.
The results of this evaluation show that all the main stakeholders consulted firmly confirmed the relevance of the ESI, considering the emergency situation in Greece. DG ECHO’s survey\textsuperscript{110} of partners concluded that 75% of respondents indicated that the ESI had been a relevant tool to respond to the situation in Greece. Out of these respondents, 53% agreed that the ESI’s specific objectives were relevant, or at least somewhat relevant, to the needs in Greece, with 63% of them considering the objectives to be relevant to the specific needs of the target group identified.

Figure 14. Relevance of the ESI to emerging needs of the Member State and of the target group

The ESI was also seen as an appropriate tool to swiftly support the national authorities, whose capacity at the time was very limited. The main issues the Greek authorities faced were linked to ongoing national challenges such as economic incapacities, rising unemployment concerns and institutional reforms, but also ongoing reported challenges with regard to the asylum system and procedure (see section 2.1). The latter mainly related to understaffing, lack of interpretation services, resources and other administrative challenges. It can therefore be concluded that both the sudden increase in the number of asylum seekers and migrants and institutional/administrative challenges faced by the national authorities, corroborate with findings from interviews and field visits, showing that the ESI intervention was indispensable given the context in which the emergency evolved.

To support Greece’s overwhelmed capacity, DG ECHO’s expertise in responding to sudden onset emergencies and placing emphasis on increasing local capacity was highlighted as particularly relevant in this context

In terms of capacities to respond, and the appropriateness of the ESI intervention, a key distinguishing factor was DG ECHO’s longstanding expertise in responding to sudden onset emergencies, and the emphasis placed on local capacity building. Framework partners interviewed during this evaluation confirmed that, although other EU funding instruments were present and addressing cross cutting migration issues (discussed under section 3.2.2), several actions, such as the organisation and management of accommodation, or provision of primary health services, could not have been implemented to the same scale and with the same expertise as through the ESI. In addition, national authorities confirmed this finding, in particular given the substantial emphasis placed on capacity building and training of local staff through the funded actions.

The ESI was informed by needs assessments conducted at a central level and at level of the actions funded, meaning that the amount, consistency over the years and main sectors were overall well covered

As specified in section 2.4, over the period 2016-2018, ESI funded 29 projects in Greece (mostly in the mainland and with some specific actions on the islands), amounting to €644.5M (Figure 8). Under the first ESOP, 17 actions were funded for a total amount of €247.5 million. Five actions were funded under the second ESOP (2017) for an amount of €198 million. To date, under the 2018 ESOP, seven actions amounting to €199 million funding have been approved. Funding has been therefore considered as relatively consistent, with the majority of funding (and projects) allocated in 2016 - in line with the highest influx of refugees and migrants into Greek territory - followed by steady allocations in 2017 and 2018, although the number of projects decreased over time. This decrease follows DG ECHO strategy to streamline activities to facilitate handover (see section 3.6).

At a sectoral level, as included in each of the ESOPs (2016, 2017, 2018), funding was consistent over the intervention time period, with S&S, food assistance and protection identified recurrently as top needs. The S&S111 sector received most ESI funding, i.e. €271 million, followed by €111 million provided to Basic Needs Assistance (through the MPCT modality), and Protection receiving €106 million (Figure 11 in section 2.4). This varies slightly in comparison to UNHCR data on the estimation of needs, where Protection was indicated as the highest need ($220 million estimated in 2016, $171 million in 2017), followed by “Shelter and NFIs”.112 However, evidence collected as part of this evaluation suggests that S&S was one of the most costly sectors to invest in, given the high influx of refugees and migrants arriving, spread over different parts of the country, with no shelter readily available to house them in many areas (see section 3.4.1). Beneficiaries responding to a mini mobile survey conducted as part of this evaluation further confirmed the relevance of funding attributed to in particular the S&S, protection and MCP, as in Figure 15 below.

Figure 15. What were your main needs when you arrived in Greece?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needs</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shelter/accommodation</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection-related services</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services and medicines</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents could select multiple responses, therefore the numbers do not add up to 100%.

111 This includes the accommodation scheme under ESTIA.
The response in relation to the sectoral needs was also confirmed as remaining broadly relevant to the changing needs on the ground. The 2016 response was divided into seven sectors (see section 2.2) and covered all sectors with the highest reported needs. The 2017 response targeted the same sectors\textsuperscript{113} that were covered by the 2016 plan while taking into consideration the new contextual developments and emerging needs.

As a general policy DG ECHO endeavours to increase cash-based interventions in the interests of cost efficiency and effectiveness. This has been well reflected in the case of this emergency, as basic needs assistance through MPCT was the second highest funded sector (€111 million) during the implementation of the ESI. Based on the project mapping and desk review, the majority of MPCT was provided to beneficiaries for food assistance and clothing.

At DG ECHO level, needs assessments were conducted mainly through field missions and dialogue with relevant stakeholders at governmental level, the results of which were fed into the ESOPs. Each of the ESOPs contained a clear analysis of needs, conducted jointly by the European Commission, national authorities and framework partner organisations. In addition to the needs assessments, the ESOPs contained a risk assessment, identifying potential constraints and limitations, which were to be taken into consideration when implementing projects on the ground. Framework partners in the field confirmed the relevance of the needs and risk assessments, however when drawing these up for the first time to underpin the 2016 ESOP, it was not clear to them how such assessments were undertaken, and to what extent national authorities and local NGOs already operating on the ground would be involved. Key Informant Interviews confirmed that there was very little time for a detailed discussion on the needs, as a response had to be rapidly implemented in view of the growing emergency in Greece. Literature reviewed, and Key Informant Interviews confirmed however, that the process of conducting needs assessments improved in the subsequent years, with greater clarity on the process and links between such assessments and funding allocations.

\textbf{In addition to the ESI intervention being appropriate, the assumptions of the ESI intervention in Greece were also overall correct, given the rapid evolving nature of the emergency on the ground, and changing needs of the target beneficiaries}

The majority of stakeholders consulted during this evaluation noted that, in a scenario in which the national authorities did not have the capacity to respond, nor to absorb available EU funding to respond to the emergency, there was a clear rationale for the ESI and its specific implementation modality. However, the constantly changing situation on the ground meant that monitoring and keeping track of arrivals and movements of different groups of beneficiaries, posed an underlying challenge to correctly and accurately assess the needs, capacities and numbers of beneficiaries. In particular for 2016, evidence shows that there were some mismatches between funding allocated and the changing needs on the ground (e.g. protection see section 3.4.1). Furthermore, framework and local implementing partners responded to a DG ECHO survey stating that 50% considered ESI funding to have been relevant, and 38% considering it as somewhat relevant, to their own needs assessments and appropriate given the identified needs. A

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Identified emergency support needs: Shelter, site planning and site management; Food, Protection and Education.
\end{itemize}
review of all the ESOPs (2016, 2017, 2018)\textsuperscript{114} suggests that all the main needs were correctly identified at the start, covering the main sectors of concern.

At project level,\textsuperscript{115} a mapping of projects funded through the ESI showed that all 29 projects have conducted needs assessments, with the majority involving beneficiaries through focus group discussions, interviews, surveys and meetings with local stakeholders. However, methods to conduct such assessments varied from primary data collection such as focus groups and site visits, to secondary data analysis such as information from project databases and reports already implemented in the affected area. Such variations may have influenced the degree and accuracy of the needs assessments conducted. The needs assessments conducted at project level also considered the local capacity (national authorities) to meet the needs. Based on project mapping, insufficient shelter and accommodation, lack of site management (in particular at the start of the ESI intervention, however partners confirm this has improved in 2018), and overstretched healthcare services were the most frequently cited gaps in capacity provided by the Greek authorities, both in the mainland and on the islands. Other capacity gaps included education for refugee and migrant children, and integration issues between the beneficiaries and host population.

Based on publicly available data, there is a slight discrepancy between the number of people of concern (as noted in UNHCR data) and the number of beneficiaries reached by DG ECHO (based on the MPCT programme registrations). In 2017, the number of PoC amounted to 83,418, with 58,725 reached by DG ECHO (Figure 16). Similarly, in 2018, recent data show the number of people of concern totalling 60,967 with DG ECHO’s beneficiary count amounting to 45,000. These data must, however be treated with caution, as it does not represent fully the total number of beneficiaries directly, or indirectly reached. It is important to note that exact numbers of PoC are difficult to determine, given the type of emergency and highly fluctuating number of arrivals/departures to and from Greece.

\textit{Figure 16. Number of people of concern and DG ECHO beneficiaries, per year}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure16.png}
\caption{Number of people of concern and DG ECHO beneficiaries, per year}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{114} ICF 2018. Review of ESOPs.
\textsuperscript{115} ICF. 2018. ESI project mapping (29 projects).

Furthermore, the analysis of the average number of beneficiaries reached per the ESI project per age group shows that over 53% of beneficiaries reached by ESI actions in 2016-18 were adults and 44% were infants and children (the remaining 4% were elderly, see Figure 17). This proportion was consistent over 2016-2018 period. Comparing this with the UNHCR data on the overall people in need of assistance in Greece shows a very similar profile (60% adults and 40% children), indicating that ESI projects reached appropriately the intended beneficiaries.

Figure 17. Average number of beneficiaries reached per project, per age group


Although the relevance of the ESI and ESI actions in Greece was clear, this evaluation found that some areas could have received more attention, to increase the relevance and improve the outcomes of the overall response

Shortcomings were identified in particular with regard to:

- Addressing the needs of vulnerable groups;
- The decision to reduce the ESI actions on the islands;
- The insufficient link between emergency support and assistance to integration; and,
- Adequately capturing the capacity of the national authorities.

Each of these is briefly discussed below.

Based on EVA data gathered, 62 out of 130 results\(^\text{116}\) concern specific vulnerable groups: Children, Disabled, Elderly, Female, Infants and young children, Males and Pregnant lactating women (PLW) and each includes children as a specific target group. This is broadly in line with the main vulnerable groups identified during needs assessments, however, field visits conducted as part of this evaluation highlight that specific sub-

\(^{116}\) ICF. 2018. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases.
populations of vulnerable groups, such as those with mental health issues and trauma-related problems, were not sufficiently covered (see blue box below).

**Field visits: areas identified on the ground**

Both field visits conducted confirmed the relevance of the ESI intervention in Greece. At the same time, by speaking to stakeholders in the field, a few areas were identified in which needs were not fully addressed.

**Understanding the needs of vulnerable populations (and sub-populations):**

- A reasonable proportion of the target group is composed of a high number of vulnerable people, having serious mental issues, disabilities or complex diseases. However, the most vulnerable were found not to eligible for the accommodation programme. Indeed, the participation in the accommodation programme requires self-sufficiency of the beneficiaries (be able to live on their own) or that they have a carer. Professional 24h/day carers are indeed not provided through the programme, as it would be too costly within the available budget. These individuals are sent to specialised healthcare facilities within the Greek healthcare system, when available;

- Similarly, during the health focused field visit, although framework partners supported childhood vaccination and provided treatment for common minor diseases in children, there was an identified shortage of specialist services for child and adolescent mental health.

- Likewise, important needs related to sexual and gender-based violence were reported, with limitations in the capacity to respond. It was reported that some hospital doctors declined to perform abortions on women from the population concerned.

**Cross cutting language and cultural barriers hindered the outcomes:**

- The health field visit found a shortage of cultural mediators and interpreters for specific languages, as well as staff proficient in medical terminology, was a major limitation and not sufficiently considered by DG ECHO or the framework partners at the needs assessment stage. Appropriate selection according to defined criteria, and further training of accepted candidates were recommended.

- Psycho-social services and mental healthcare were recognised as important needs. However, the capacity to address mental health issues was low.

- Means of transport were the main factors limiting access to healthcare.

**Source:** ICF. 2018. Field visit 2: The ESI accommodation projects under the ESTIA programme – working with local NGOs and municipalities and ICF. 2018. Field visit 1: The handover of the ESI health projects to National Authorities

Related to the target groups and beneficiaries, framework partners reported challenges in assessing the number of beneficiaries due to the ongoing movement of refugees and migrants and the changing situation on the ground.117

More broadly, a number of framework partners highlighted that there were insufficient actions tackling protection needs in terms of legal assistance and access to psycho-social support, mainly due to the highly administrative nature of such activities and the interplay between those and the Greek asylum procedure. Mental health services were also lacking, mainly due to an overall limited capacity in the country (both at the national authorities and NGO level) to provide such services. A lack of interpretation and cultural mediation services were identified during project documentation review, interviews and field visits, which had an impact on project outcomes and the views of beneficiaries on

---

the ground. DG ECHO did identify the abovementioned areas in the 2017 and 2018 ESOPs, but was confronted with an absence of proposals which included a sufficient scale of relevant activities, and framework partners unable to scale up also due to logistical issues.

Another area identified in all three ESOPs (2016, 2017, 2018), and not fully addressed by the ESI, related to the identified needs and the humanitarian gap on the islands. The needs identified by the ESOPs related explicitly to shelter, provision of healthcare, access to NFIs, food aid and education. Under the premise that the emergency was under control, the national authorities (in their 2017 Financial Plan) decided on a distribution of tasks which led to limited use of ESI support on the islands (focussing on MPCT and rental accommodation). The role of DG HOME expanded to cover all other activities through EMAS. The sectoral needs remained consistent throughout this time period: the 2017 and 2018 ESOPs noted the deteriorating living situation of refugees and migrants on the islands, indicating that the conditions were not improving, and that there was a need for action. The majority of stakeholders working in the field (framework partners and local implementing partners) criticised the distribution of tasks/ geographies between the ESI and EMAS, indicating that it was not needs based but rather a ‘political’ compromise. They considered that the situation on the islands, or at least on some of them, should still be considered an emergency and that it could have benefited from the ESI funding and its implementation method. It is however not possible to determine at this stage whether the use of another funding stream would have made a material difference, given the many external challenges encountered on the islands.

Although the issue of integration of refugees and migrants surpasses the ESI and DG ECHO’s mandate, and should be part of the national policy framework of a Member State, this area was identified by the majority of framework and local implementing partners as a horizontal issue not sufficiently considered by the ESI intervention. The need to integrate refugees and migrants into the receiving society could have been better taken into account during the ESI’s actions. This was, in particular, raised during discussions regarding the sustainability and phasing out of the ESI in Greece- as currently there is no national programme or strategy in place to implement integration activities (livelihood programmes, relocation schemes, see section 3.6).

The ESI required close collaboration with the national authorities to address the refugee emergency and build the capacity of local stakeholders, through funding actions that were in line with the national authorities’ plans to address the basic needs of newly arrived refugees, migrants and asylum seekers, which otherwise could not have been fully covered. However, the very limited national and local capacities were not fully captured in DG ECHO’s and partner’s needs assessments at the time. Furthermore, the collaboration between the Commission and the Greek authorities was seen as challenging,118 in particular at the start of the ESI activation, with numerous stakeholders pointing to difficulties around decision-making and cooperation. Framework and local implementing partners felt that at times it was unclear who the decision maker was, and would welcome, for future ESI interventions, a clearer structure. As part of DG ECHO’s needs assessment, more focus could have been placed on better understanding the capacities of national and local authorities to engage with the actions, both at the level of organisation and implementation, highlighting potential risks in the ESOP.

---

118 ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with DG ECHO staff, framework partners.
3.1.3 EQ3: To what extent has the legal framework demonstrated to be flexible enough to appropriately adapt the operational response to the changing conditions and needs in the Member State concerned? and EQ6: To what extent has the legal framework shown to be flexible enough to allow for appropriately adapting the operational response to the changing conditions on the ground? Is the Instrument’s flexibility applicable in any given Member State?

Judgment criteria:

- JC3.1 ESI’s legal framework has shown sufficient flexibility and allowed for the optimal implementation of the actions, and remained relevant throughout the changing conditions and needs in the Member State
- JC3.3 The features allowing the flexibility of the ESI instrument were maximised by DG ECHO partners and national authorities in Greece across the projects examined (i.e. quick response time)
- JC6.3 The flexibility of the ESI instrument allows it to be easily transferred to other Member States
- JC3.2 The ESI implemented actions were relevant to the ESI objectives
- JC6.4 Individual ESI action approaches are easily transferred to other Member States

Key findings:

- The ESI Legal Framework was highly flexible, allowing for the ESI funded actions to adapt to evolving and rapidly changing needs on the ground, demonstrated mainly through the number and types of modification requests submitted by framework partners, and the swiftness in implementing such actions.
- The flexibility was hampered by several issues that arose, namely around the collaboration between EU, national actors and local implementing partners, which had knock-on effects on the operational response as a whole, leading to delays in service provision on the ground. However, over time, these issues were mitigated because of the degree of flexibility provided in the original legal framework.
- More broadly, the ESI Legal Framework would benefit from a reference to the need, from the moment of its activation, for the development of a clear coordination and management structure, division of responsibilities and better involvement of local implementing partners from the start.
- Given the results of the ESI in Greece, the flexibility demonstrated and results achieved, the Legal Framework could be applied to, and activated in, other Member States.

The ESI Legal Framework was appropriate and highly flexible for such an operational response in Greece, given the nature of the emergency and the ever-changing needs on the ground. This flexibility can be attributed to the framework (design and implementation) but also to the ESI working methods.

Within the existing legal framework, very high flexibility has been demonstrated, mainly through various provisions in place for the reallocation of funding, modification requests and contingency planning developed over the course of the activation:

- The inclusion of provisions for the reallocation of funding (of up to 20% of the total amount of the financing decision), and the recognition of a frequently
changing situation on the ground. This was particularly praised by framework and local implementing partners, who confirmed that it would have been more challenging to obtain/find such flexibility within the Greek administrative and procurement procedures- or at the very least it would not have been as timely as that of the ESI.

- The ESOPs and the corresponding Financial Decisions demonstrate sufficient flexibility to take into consideration the frequently changing situation on the ground. The legal framework allowed for modifications to be introduced, with the majority of framework partners introducing such requests, mainly concerning strategic operations (50 modifications), time extensions and changes to the budget. This shows that where needs were not being met (or no longer), or where assumptions were not accurate (or no longer valid), actions could be modified in a timely manner. Building on this, the ESOPs contained a detailed needs assessment, to which framework partners contributed to. By ensuring such an assessment was conducted prior to interventions being implemented, the relevance of funded actions was high in response to emerging needs and changing developments on the ground.

- Furthermore, the ESOPs recognise the changing conditions on the ground, with Contingency Plans prepared for the Member States in the region potentially most affected by the refugee and migrants influx. These were developed in close consultation between the European Commission, the affected Member States authorities, UNHCR and IOM. In addition to this, DG ECHO carried out risk assessments in Greece to further investigate the situation on the ground, in particular as regards the influx/decrease of new arrivals, any coordination issues between framework partners and the local authorities, the economic crisis in Greece and its effect on implementation and any tensions inside refugee sites. Both national authorities and the framework partners agreed that the existing framework allowed actions to be adapted according to such changing needs.

At the implementation level, project reports assessed as part of this evaluation also point towards such a flexible approach, where framework partners and DG ECHO included contingency planning and modification of intended objectives to be in line with the changing needs on the ground. For example, based on the project mapping conducted, DG ECHO requested projects to move away from using mobile teams, which had been put in place in the early months of the response, to fixed service delivery in sites, in response to the population’s transition to a more static situation (e.g. residing in fixed accommodation, serviced by local organisations providing health care, food, WASH, etc.) which required a more consistent delivery of basic services to the beneficiaries.

Building on this, the flexibility of the ESI was reflected in the number of modification requests submitted by the framework partners, with, on average, each partner having introduced three modification requests per action. Such flexibility was described as essential when considering that the ESI funded actions were originally supposed to last one year, although some are into the third year of implementation, the fact that numbers

---

119 Commission Decision on the financing of emergency support in favour of the affected Member States in response to the current influx of refugees and migrants into the Union to be financed from the 2017 general budget of the European Union (ECHO/EU/BUD/2017/01000), C(2017)763.
120 ICF. 2018. ESI project mapping (29 projects).
121 ICF. 2018. ESI project mapping (29 projects).
of arrivals were highly fluctuating- also changing specific needs, as well as the reported changing requests of the national authorities.

Finally, when analysing the portfolio of projects implemented through the ESI intervention in Greece, multi-sector projects continued to receive the majority of funding. This is in line with the emphasis placed on implementing multi-sector projects in view of increased relevance (synergies between sectors) and effectiveness (providing a holistic response and considering the cross-overs between many sectors). Such an approach can be easily transferred to other Member States, ensuring a certain level of effectiveness between the various sectors funded.

The appropriateness was however challenged by several issues that arose during implementation around the collaboration between EU, national actors and local implementing partners

It is important to note, while the number of final beneficiaries has fluctuated as a result of different factors (including the EU-Turkey Statement), the changing requests introduced by the national authorities was highlighted by the framework partners and local implementing partners as an indication that a concrete, long term strategy from the national authorities to address the emergency was missing. Linked to this, the challenges encountered with regard to cooperating with national authorities more broadly and ensuring coordination between the various actors in the field, in particular at the earlier stages of the ESI implementation, had a knock-on effect on the operational response as a whole, leading to delays in service provision on the ground. The main factors identified included discussions on determining site locations, numbers of refugees and migrants within each site and unexpected changes to site planning.

While overall, ESI’s Legal Framework and implementation method was considered as appropriate, it was repeatedly highlighted that traditionally, it was designed for third countries and may not be fully adapted to the EU context, and, more importantly, the administrative and political context of a Member State government. While in third countries framework partners may not always be able to cooperate, or even liaise with national authorities, the ESI includes a specific obligation for national authorities to be involved. Also, the ESI may have insufficiently taken into account the need to work within the well-established existing legal frameworks of the EU Member States, not only in terms of administrative and procedural requirements, tax obligations, etc.

Considering the above, the legal framework of the ESI is in principle applicable in other Member States facing a similar crisis, although there is room for improvement in terms of better involvement of local organisations before (i.e. as part of the needs assessment process) and during an ESI intervention, and a clear division of responsibilities between the various stakeholders involved in an ESI activation (EU, national and local).

As demonstrated above, the high degree of flexibility provided for within the ESI legal framework contributed significantly to the appropriateness and overall success of the activation in Greece. Such an approach is a strong basis for transferability and usability of the ESI in another Member State facing a similar emergency. Furthermore, and in this context, each of the annual ESOPs laid down the possibility of funding being used to address humanitarian needs where necessary in another affected Member State. They further underline that “in case of a shift in the migratory route, assistance could potentially be provided in other EU Member States concerned, if their administrations do not have the financial and operational capacity to cope with the situation”.

---

122 ICF. 2018. ESI project mapping (29 projects).
demonstrates flexibility in appropriately adapting the ESI’s operational response to other Member States, should the need arise.

The legal framework also lays down the ESI working method, which focuses on channelling funds through established framework partners. As further discussed in section 3.1.5 below, there is also broad consensus that the working method is the most appropriate way to respond to a fast-changing emergency of this scale and kind, within the EU, and therefore could remain a valid approach should another emergency arise within another Member State.

However, for the ESI legal framework to be fully flexible for use in other Member States facing a similar emergency, several issues could be further considered:

- **A clear structure, with division of roles and responsibilities and principles** of ‘shared’ management should be set up from the start of the activation. In many cases during this evaluation, stakeholders highlighted a level of misunderstanding, or lack of communication, concerning the roles of DG ECHO, other EU DG’s, the national and local authorities.

- Building on this, the ESI should take better into account the individual Member State administrative and legal frameworks already present at national level, noting that in most cases these cannot be modified.

- The ESI could further optimise engagement with local partners, for example by encouraging them to become certified framework partners, or, when this is not a feasible option (e.g. because the organisation is too small or not interested), to engage with them in the design and promote their involvement as implementing partners in the activation phases of the ESI.

### 3.1.4 EQ4: To what extent is the method of working (channelling aid through framework partners) relevant to address the humanitarian consequences of the refugee and migration crisis within the EU?

**Judgment criteria:**

- JC4.1 Channelling the actions through the FPA has ensured a timely and tailored response to the emerging humanitarian needs of the targeted beneficiaries

**Key findings:**

- Channelling aid through framework partners in this context and emergency was relevant, and allowed the ESI to meet the humanitarian needs of the beneficiaries targeted. The working method was overall appropriate also given the lack of an alternative option at the time and the limited capacities of the national authorities.

- DG ECHO played an important role in coordination, both at EU level and on the ground between national authorities and framework partners. However, the tight structure meant that most decisions were taken at a rather central level, which meant that valuable information from local implementing partners and on the ground may have been lost, which could have brought added value to the implementation of actions.

- By facilitating some selection criteria to become framework partners, it was possible for some national NGOs to implement ESI actions directly, which benefited the appropriateness of the response. Most framework partners also made use of local implementing partners, which helped understanding the local context and needs.
Channelling aid through framework partners, allowing them to work with local organisations on the ground, is relevant and has proved to be effective.\(^{124}\)

The survey of framework partners and local implementing partners\(^{125}\) showed that 91% of respondents considered the ESI working method to be relevant or somewhat relevant to address needs, and none considered it as irrelevant (Figure 18). However, opinions on the possibility of working directly with national authorities were divided, with 48% of respondents indicating that it would have been relevant or somewhat relevant to implement ESI actions through the Member State authorities and 43% considering it somewhat irrelevant or irrelevant. In addition, Key Informant Interviews\(^{126}\) with a range of stakeholders, highlighted the limited capacity of national authorities to implement directly ESI funded actions, and confirmed that the ESI’s current method of working was highly relevant.

**Figure 18. Stakeholder survey results: Extent to which having ESI actions implemented by Member State authorities vs DG ECHO framework partners would be relevant to addressing emerging needs**

| Channeling the actions through MS authorities | 25% | 23% | 23% | 20% | 10% |
| Channeling the actions through ECHO FPA/partners | 63% | 26% | 3% |

Relevant | Somewhat relevant | Somewhat irrelevant | Irrelevant | I do not know / no opinion


Furthermore, during Key Informant Interviews\(^ {127}\) and the review of project documentation, it was highlighted that the oversight by DG ECHO, and the coordination role it played, were instrumental in achieving an effective method of working between the various donors and implementing agencies. In particular, the coordination structures established (led by the Structural Support Service (SRSS) and involving DG ECHO, DG HOME, and national authorities, and also between DG ECHO and framework partners) worked well overall. Evidence also suggests that this has evolved positively over time, as the implementation of the ESI matured. One challenge noted was that the tight coordination structure between the main actors involved meant that most decisions were taken at that (rather central) level, meaning that non-DG ECHO framework partners and other local stakeholders were less involved in decision making on the ground.

A few challenges were brought to the forefront however, mainly linked to the initial exclusion of national/local NGOs from being directly funded, as well as a lack of a coherent structure in place setting out roles and responsibilities.

---

\(^{124}\) This is discussed further in section 3.3.3.


\(^{126}\) ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with framework and local implementing partners; DG ECHO staff, national authorities.

\(^{127}\) ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with framework and local implementing partners.
Although one of the main advantages of the ESI working method was the longstanding experience in humanitarian operations that the framework partners brought to the field (leading to a swift response), findings from interviews and field visits with the national authorities and local NGOs, suggest that it would have been more relevant for certain activities to be implemented directly by Greek national or local organisations, due to their proximity to the ground and oversight of existing administrative and political structures. Furthermore, by initially restricting direct participation in the ESI to framework partners of DG ECHO, discussions emerging from interviews and field visits highlight that some Greek national/ local organisations which would have had the capacity, and, more importantly the local knowledge to manage actions, could not meet certain criteria to become framework partner and thus were excluded from 2016 actions.\textsuperscript{128} It is important to note that as of 2017, DG ECHO adapted the criteria, for example by not requiring experience outside the EU, nor imposing the same stringent financial criteria to new ESI framework partners. As a result, four local NGOs applied and three became framework partners. In addition, in all ESI actions (other than those implemented directly by Greek NGOs), framework partners made use of local implementing partners, thus benefiting from their local networks and insights.

The project mapping conducted shows that the majority of funded actions have fully achieved their results (see section 3.3.1). This can be considered as an indicator of relevance also in relation to the method of working, given the difficult context in which the emergency support was provided. Evidence suggests an appropriate selection of local implementing partners by the framework partners, using local organisations for the delivery of services in the affected areas. Several interviewees\textsuperscript{129} highlighted the positive impact of the ESI and its method of working with framework partners who, in turn, made good use of the local knowledge and expertise of their local implementing partners and other local stakeholders, their experience of the national legislative and administrative frameworks, and the context within which projects need to be implemented.

However, there were also some limitations in the framework partners’ capacity and understanding to deliver actions in a timely manner, as well as issues encountered with regard to the management of actions. Issues were cited in six project documentation reports (FichOps)\textsuperscript{130} by DG ECHO, and also raised by a number of stakeholders during Key Informant Interviews. In particular, it was considered that some framework partners did not adjust their working methods to an EU-context, and did not engage enough with national/regional authorities and local NGOs.

### 3.2 Coherence and complementarity

#### 3.2.1 EQ7: To what extent have the ESI projects adhered to the humanitarian principles (humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence)?

**Judgment criteria:**

- JC7.1 The ESIs funded actions match (or do not contradict) the humanitarian principles
- JC7.2 At proposal stage, the actions have been designed to adhere to the humanitarian principles and the selection of actions identified and addressed any possible concerns beforehand

---

\textsuperscript{128} Most were unable to prove capacity in third countries.

\textsuperscript{129} ICF. 2018. Scoping interviews with DG ECHO.

\textsuperscript{130} ICF. 2018. ESI project mapping (29 projects).
**Key findings:**

- The ESI funded actions were implemented in respect of the humanitarian principles, although some tensions arose during the implementation phase.
- Compliance with the humanitarian principles was ensured in the ESI legal basis, project design, monitoring and implementation phases.
- The ESI Regulation requires close cooperation and coordination of the ESI actions with the national authorities, but this was perceived as challenging the principle of neutrality and independence by some stakeholders.

**The ESI funded actions were designed and implemented in respect of the humanitarian principles**

This was demonstrated through multiple sources of evaluation evidence, although some tensions arose during the implementation phase.

The strict adherence to the humanitarian principles is anchored through explicit references in the key legal framework documentation underpinning the ESI and the monitoring activities, such as the ESI Legislative Act,\(^{131}\) Commission Decision on the financing of emergency support,\(^{132}\) financial decisions,\(^{133}\) and operational guidelines since 2016.\(^{134}\) The need for the respect for humanitarian principles was clearly stated in the strategic and operational priorities and reviewed throughout the ESI monitoring activities. Such compliance with humanitarian principles was monitored by DG ECHO staff through meetings, reporting, office and on-site monitoring visits.

At the proposal stage, the adherence of proposed actions to the humanitarian principles was assessed by DG ECHO by ensuring that the proposed project designs complied with the key humanitarian principles. DG ECHO officials interviewed confirmed that proposals which were found to be not adhering to such principles would not have been accepted for ESI funding.

In the implementation phase, the evidence also indicates that the ESI funded actions adhered to the humanitarian principles. The majority of stakeholders surveyed as part of the first round of key informant interviews, considered that indeed the ESI funded interventions respected the fundamental humanitarian principles.\(^{135}\)

---

\(^{131}\) Article 3 of the Regulation 2016/369 requires that "Emergency support under this Regulation shall be granted and implemented in compliance with the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence".

\(^{132}\) Referring to the Regulation which "provides that all operations financed under its auspices should comply with internationally agreed humanitarian principles".

\(^{133}\) They have stipulated the requirement that "Whenever funding is granted to NGOs, it is necessary to verify whether those NGOs are able to provide emergency support in accordance with the humanitarian principles".

\(^{134}\) For example, ESOPs 2017 and 2018 included the requirement that "In the design of their operation, DG ECHO partners need to take into account DG ECHO policies and guidelines. The humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, in line with the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, and strict adherence to the "do no harm" approach remain paramount".

\(^{135}\) A large majority of respondents (86%) agreed that ESI-funded actions adhere to Humanitarian Principles.
view expressed by the majority of stakeholders consulted who highlighted that a number of positive aspects in the ESI actions:

- There has been no discrimination among the beneficiaries in regard to their race, origin or gender, or because of their asylum status or any other characteristics. Essentially, anybody who was seeking asylum in Greece was eligible for ESI funded assistance.

- The framework partners implementing the ESI actions all have a solid track record of applying the humanitarian principles, as they have undergone a robust certification process to become the framework partners. Interviews with the framework partners showed that they chose the local implementing partners (i.e. Greek NGOs) reflecting their previous experience and reputation in providing assistance and awareness of the humanitarian principles.

- Exit strategies and handover arrangements to the national and local authorities in several projects included capacity building activities with explicit reference to the humanitarian principles (e.g. training activities, developing a set of materials to inform future activities).

However, several stakeholders interviewed also highlighted the challenges of applying the principles of independence and neutrality. These principles, they argued, were compromised by the involvement of the national authorities, when on some occasions, in their view, the latter had taken decisions which were not needs based, for example with regard to the location of camps and the purchasing of equipment.

The ESI actions had to be implemented in a context where the EU Member State government had overall responsibility for handling the emergency and the ESI legal framework requires framework partners to cooperate with and support the national government (similarly to other contexts of DG ECHO in where the states are functioning well and not an involved as a conflict party). However, most framework partners consulted, at least initially, struggled with these requirements, also considering the lack of clarity as to who was expected to do what and the initial limited capacity of the national authorities to cope with the situation in a timely manner. Other stakeholders consulted, however, found coordination with the national authorities appropriate, in the context of an EU Member State, as indeed specified and expected in the ESI regulation.\(^{136}\) The close cooperation with national authorities was also necessary to ensure the sustainability of the ESI support (see section 3.6). To some extent, the tension is reflective of the fact that the ESI was a new instrument, activated for the first time. This meant that the traditional humanitarian aid actors had to learn how to work with the national authorities of an EU Member State, and vice versa, that national authorities had to learn how to work with framework partners.

Another issue raised by some stakeholders was that the limited involvement (through the provision of rental accommodation and cash assistance) of the ESI on the islands, where the situation was worse than on the mainland, compromised the principle of humanity as the ESI was not used to address the most urgent needs (DG HOME funding was used instead). While it was not within the scope of this evaluation to determine whether the use of a certain funding stream influenced the effectiveness of the actions, this episode does confirm the importance of future decisions of this kind to carefully consider the pros and cons of each funding choice. This issue is further discussed in section 3.1.2.

\(^{136}\) Article 1 Regulation 2016/369 specifies that "Emergency support provided under this Regulation shall be in support of, and complementary to, the actions of the affected Member State. To this end, close cooperation and consultation with the affected Member State shall be ensured."
3.2.2 EQ8: To what extent is the Emergency Support Instrument complementary to other related EU instruments, and are there any overlaps?

**Judgment criteria:**

- JC8.1 The funded actions do not overlap with actions implemented/funded under other EU or national instruments
- JC8.2 The implementation of the ESI actions had not had any direct negative consequence on actions implemented through other EU and national instruments
- JC8.3 ESI’s budget allocation also considered the funding provided by other EU and/or national instruments
- JC8.4 Coordination mechanisms have been established to coordinate the intervention/ operations between the main actors. i.e. DG ECHO, DG HOME, framework partners and national authorities

**Key findings:**

- The ESI funded actions complemented the actions implemented/ funded under other EU or national instruments, however, a number of tensions arose, especially with the EMAS instrument managed by DG HOME, with some overlaps in the scope, mandate and implementation method.
- A series of coordination mechanisms were established to ensure coherence between the ESI and other EU funding instruments. Coordination improved over time as the implementation of the ESI projects matured.
- Local implementing partners interviewed do not necessarily have a good awareness of all EU instruments available to them.

The ESI funded actions complemented the actions implemented/ funded under other EU or national instruments, but a number of tensions arose due to some overlaps in the scope, mandate and implementation method

The ESI legal basis in the Article 6 of the ESI Regulation established that the ESI should be complementary to other existing Union instruments, especially those which provide a form of the emergency assistance. Table 9 in Annex 2 provides an overview of the different EU instruments the ESI should complement, as identified in the Article 6 of the Regulation.

When analysing the extent to which these EU instruments either overlap or complement the ESI, it is noted that the Humanitarian Aid (Council Regulation 1257/96) and the UCPM (Decision No 1313/2013/EU) instruments are very similar to the ESI in relation to their aims and objectives, which all focus on the provision of relief to most affected by cases of man-made and/or natural disasters. However, the Humanitarian Aid Regulation limits assistance to regions and countries outside of the Union only, which excludes the possibility of using the instrument within a Member State, and thus within Greece.

Regarding the UCPM, the assistance provided depends on Member States’ voluntary contributions and consists of the provision of in-kind assistance and/or human resources (deployment of specially-equipped expert teams to deal with the consequences of a disaster, or assessment and coordination by such experts) directly from Member States to the affected country. The UCPM assistance has to be requested by the affected country, and it is delivered by specialised Member State agencies (not humanitarian aid organisations). This makes the UCPM a ‘targeted’ instrument, which is used to address a set of specific consequences of an emergency. As shown in Annex 2, the UCPM assistance to the migrant and refugee crisis was activated by Greece twice in 2015 and 2016 with
over 200,000 in-kind donations of relief items and equipment from over 20 other EU Member States. Furthermore, the EUSF (Council Regulation 2012/2002) targets natural disasters only, thus excluding man-made ones such as the heavy flow of refugees and migrants experienced in Greece since 2015, and for which the ESI was activated in March 2016. The FEAD (Regulation (EU) 223/2014) focuses on reducing poverty in the Member States through structural and operational measures but is not aimed at providing emergency response to specific crises such as the Greek migration crisis. The third EU Health Programme (2014-2020) also supported actions to address the migrant health issues in Greece, amongst other countries. Finally, AMIF (Regulation (EU) No 516/2014) and the ISF (Regulation EU 513/2014 and Regulation EU 515/2014) do not particularly focus on the provision of humanitarian aid, emergency relief or poverty-reduction assistance. Instead, AMIF’s goal is to support the management of migration flows and to strengthen a common European approach to asylum and immigration, mostly through support to the development of structures, systems and organisational capacities. The ISF on the other hand aims to enhance security within the EU by both strengthening police cooperation and combating crime, as well as supporting integrated border management and a common visa policy.

However, in Greece, some of AMIF and ISF’s funding has been provided through EMAS, which goes beyond the AMIF mandate focused on assisting the structural and organisational changes in the management of migration flows. The mandate of EMAS is defined as providing additional emergency support to address urgent and specific needs arising, inter alia, also from “heavy migratory pressure in one or more Member States characterised by a large and disproportionate inflow of third-country nationals, which places significant and urgent demands on their reception and detention facilities, asylum systems and procedures”. The nature of the emergency support to be provided by EMAS is not specifically outlined in its legal base. However, judging from the overall purpose and focus of AMIF on supporting the necessary structural and organisational changes, it can be deduced that the mandate of EMAS was to provide emergency support to the asylum system and structures, to the organisations implementing the system, and did not relate specifically to the provision of humanitarian aid directly to the affected people in need within the EU. In practice, the line drawn between the mandates of the ESI and EMAS was not always clear, as was also reported by several framework and local implementing partners consulted. This is especially so, as although most of the EMAS funds contributed to furthering the instruments’ goals stated above – supporting the management of migration flows and enhancing security – in the Greek territory, some have also served to assist vulnerable refugees and migrants in Greece. For example, a total of €165.7 million of EMAS funding were allocated to this purpose in 2016 (whereas ESI became available towards the

137 The mid-evaluation of Health programme found a complementarity with the ESI insofar as “The expertise and funding available under [the Third EU Health Programme (2014-2020)] complements the other dimensions of the EU’s response to the migrant crisis supported by DG HOME (and ECHO in Greece only) and focuses on the longer-term impact of the action” (p. 83). Source: https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/programme/docs/2014-2020_evaluation_study_en.pdf
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

November, 2018

middle of 2016) and 2017. A significant proportion of the EMAS funding in the 2015-2017 period went directly to the national authorities (around 45%, with the remaining 55% allocated to International Organisations). An important distinction of EMAS was also that it could not directly fund NGOs, and the Red Cross family organisations. The ESI, on the contrary, channelled 100% of its funding to its framework partners, including international governmental organisations, national and international NGOs, very similarly to the way in which EU Humanitarian Aid funding is channelled in third countries. This was a key element of ESI complementarity, as the instrument provided access to and for organisations, which could not be rapidly activated through other mechanisms.

Another key aspect in this respect was the decision to divide responsibilities of assistance between DG ECHO and DG HOME, with DG ECHO primarily concentrating on the provision of emergency assistance on the mainland of Greece and DG HOME providing assistance through EMAS in the island territories, where the migration hotspots were concentrated. Whilst this division of institutional responsibilities reflected to some extent the different mandates of the instruments managed by the two DGs, it was criticised by a number of framework and local implementing partners interviewed. They repeatedly pointed at the persisting humanitarian needs on the islands and the limited coordinated response to meet these needs in a rapid manner. Hence by some, limiting the ESI’s intervention in the islands was perceived as not meeting the core mandate of providing emergency assistance to those most in need. Looking forward, the need for such divisions of roles and responsibilities between different streams of EU funding are likely to arise again in case of an ESI activation and need to be better coordinated and communicated to the key players.

The analysis of previously existing EU instruments and their characteristics shows that, when refugee and migrant flows into Greece started to significantly increase in 2015, there was a gap to be filled in order to rapidly and flexibly address the emerging and specific needs that resulted from this influx. By channelling funding through an instrument aimed at serving exclusively a humanitarian purpose, the ESI was able to respond fast and in a timely manner and operate on the ground, therefore contributing to and complementing the other EU instruments mentioned in Article 6 of the Regulation.

The added value of the ESI (discussed in section 3.5) such as the fastness of response, the availability of DG ECHO field expertise and close involvement and follow-up of activities on the ground, as well as the involvement of experienced international NGOs, also added to complementarity of the ESI with other instruments. However, also looking forward, it is clear that wherever ESI funding could be spent within a Member State, a number of other EU funding mechanisms more likely would already be operating, hence, there could be a risk of overlapping assistance. This, as already mentioned above, requires, as was the case in the ESI activation in Greece, a clear coordination mechanism.

140 Such as the UN family organisations, UNHCR, IOM.
141 Migration hotspots refer to the particular migration flow situation in Greece, where the majority of migrants entered the country’s territory via the sea route and were thus concentrated in the islands in the eastern Mediterranean, see further details in section 2.1.
and strong awareness between the key stakeholders at the EU and national levels of the different institutional and financial roles and mandates.

The aspects of coordination and coherence were reflected to some extent in the ESI project design and implementation phases

During the project application stage, applicants for the ESI funding had to demonstrate in their project proposals that their proposed activities did not overlap with activities funded by other donors (see section 2.4), in particular by the EU, and that coordination with other stakeholders, mainly with the national authorities and other humanitarian actors, was included (as indicated in the ESOP analysis). Although framework partners included some information on other actors and how they intended to cooperate with them, the proposals did not always include a clear mapping of other actors present in the camp/site where they intend to work (including Government, Greek NGOs, other INGOs, UN Agencies, volunteer associations and charities, etc.) and activities conducted by each actor, to ensure appropriate funding distribution in all sites/camp. This was identified by interviewed framework partners and confirmed by the analysis of project proposals (Table 2). Only in four out of 54 project proposals, the applicants were assessed as having identified complementarity and planned coordination with existing activities on the ground and this has improved over years.

Table 2. ESI project proposals: to what extent they were complementary with other existing activities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of proposals</th>
<th>Selected</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>On hold</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ICF. 2018. ESI Dashboard analysis. This represents DG ECHO’s assessment of the application’s strength in relation to the aspect considered. N/a means the feature was not present in the proposal.

When considering the proposals for the ESI funding, DG ECHO refused proposals where a risk of overlap existed. Across the 55 proposals received for the ESI funding (0), the majority were assessed as not having the risk of duplication with other funded activities. Several interviewed framework partners also referred to close coordination especially with DG HOME in the application assessment stage, to ensure that the activities funded did not overlap and were not double-funded. This indicates an operational application of the division of roles between the different EU instruments on the ground.

---

143 This was confirmed in the interviews with DG ECHO officials.
144 Examples mentioned included reviewing HOME proposals and ECHO proposals and bilateral consultations on the proposals to check for any overlaps. DG ECHO also was present as an observed in DG HOME evaluation committee.
Table 3. ESI project proposals: to what extent they posed a risk of duplication?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of proposals</th>
<th>Selected</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>On hold</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ICF. 2018. ESI Dashboard analysis. This represents DG ECHO’s assessment of the application’s strength in relation to the aspect considered. N/a means the feature was not present in the proposal.

Aspects of complementarity and duplication were also addressed in other practices and processes around the design and implementation of ESI projects. These included: discussions with framework partners over the proposals, requesting partners to submit new versions of the proposals, partners submitting modification requests (where many related to avoiding overlaps with other initiatives or covering gaps from other instruments), as well as the monthly mapping of the actions by sector to check the overlap/coordination undertaken by DG ECHO and the coordination mechanisms of UNHCR. Importantly, information on funding decisions was also shared with the national authorities, which coordinated the response.

Coordination with other EU instruments at the EU and national levels ensured coherence

One of the key factors ensuring coherence between the ESI and other EU funding instruments were a series of coordination mechanisms established to coordinate the different funding streams between the main actors, i.e. the Commission DGs (DG ECHO, DG HOME, SRSS), the framework partners and national authorities. The coordination required investment of significant resources and was time consuming, requiring a range of regular meetings at different levels.

Coordination at the EU-central level

In terms of intra-European Commission coordination structures at the central level, overall coordination was provided by the SRSS focusing on the implementation of the financial plan. This involved regular meetings of all Commission services providing assistance in Greece. The coordination at the DG level also involved regular (firstly weekly later monthly) coordination meetings between DG ECHO and DG HOME at different levels of hierarchy (including senior, middle level managers and other officials) as well as exchanges with other DGs for the provision of social services (funded by ESIF) –DG EMPL and DG REGIO in particular. The review of the documentation from the coordination structures provides insights into the breadth and depth of the implementation issues discussed, focusing on very concrete issues and coordination challenges on the ground. The meetings’ notes in particular show that these indeed discussed a wide range of coordination issues on a continuous basis, both at a more strategic and operational levels (Table 4). This included for example:

- The discussions and decisions on best ways to avoid overlaps between the funding EU Instruments (e.g. DG ECHO and DG HOME funding) through sharing and exchange of information on the focus of assistance in the strategic and programming documents, feedback on the project proposals submitted by framework partners to DG ECHO and DG HOME, DG ECHO serving as an observer

145 Based on the review of coordination meeting outputs and interviews with key stakeholders.
with the possibility to comment on the proposals on DG HOME evaluation committees;

- The changing evolution of needs of beneficiaries;
- Exchange of information on the DGS’ missions to the field;
- Observations on the performance of the framework partners and follow-up actions resulting from this and; and,
- The arising operational challenges in the communication with the national authorities (e.g. joint reactions to the Emergency Response Plan from Greece).

Taking this into account, the ESI budget allocations also considered funding provided by other EU and/ or national instruments (in particular the joint financial planning was helpful in this regard).

**Table 4. Coordination meetings between DG ECHO and DG HOME: a wide range of topics covered**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects discussed in the meeting</th>
<th>Number of meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feedback on project proposals, financial plans, funding focus and operational modalities</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of evolution of needs on the ground (e.g. numbers arriving, types of needs, camp locations, types of services provided)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation, results and follow-up of both DG missions to Greece</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination and interaction with national authorities</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships with the framework partners and key humanitarian actors, their actions in the field and follow-up</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolving situation in other Member States</td>
<td>Bulgaria: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy: 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ICF. 2018. Analysis of coordination meetings. N=31. The analysis should be treated with caution as allocation of topics discussed to the categories is subject to interpretation.*

The majority of interviewed framework partners agreed that the coordination structures established, between the Commission services (i.e. DG ECHO, DG HOME and the SRSS) and between their framework partners, and the national authorities, were operational and have improved over time as the implementation of the ESI projects matured.

At the field level, close coordination occurred between the local SRSS office, DG ECHO field staff and the national authorities, to build trust and support the coordination between the different EU and national stakeholders involved through the use of the Financial Plans.

**Coordination at the national level**

At the national level, overall coordination was provided by the SRSS at the institutional level. DG ECHO organised regular coordination meetings with the national authorities and different line Ministries, such as the Ministry of Economy and the newly established MoMP as well as with the Steering Group meetings with the ESI framework partners. For example, a coordination meeting took place every month, in which all involved parties participated, and detailed weekly updates on the availability of spaces in camps and the rental scheme were sent to all actors involved.
In addition, DG ECHO participated in the UNHCR-led working groups which were organised by sector (e.g. education, shelter, health) and by geographic area (in some regions and/ or key camps) and also involved, at least to some extent, the relevant national authorities and the NGOs providing assistance (both the ESI funded and others, including local NGOs). Through continuous communication, DG ECHO and the UNHCR encouraged the national authorities to take a more pro-active role in the coordination of the overall response. Even so, DG ECHO has also financially supported some of these groups, for example the education sector through a contract with UNICEF.

Results from the implementing and framework partners survey showed that most stakeholders who knew about the other EU instruments also considered that the ESI complemented the other EU instruments implemented in Greece. For instance, 33% of respondents indicated that they either agreed or strongly agreed that ESI actions account of the funding provided by other EU instruments, while 13% indicated that they either disagreed or strongly disagreed with that statement. When enquiring the type of EU instruments potentially overlapping with the ESI, respondents mentioned the AMIF and EUSF. Finally, more than half of the respondents (53%) considered that ESI’s funding allocations had sufficiently taken into account the actions of other donors (Figure 19).

**Figure 19. Coherence with other EU instruments and donors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>There were no overlaps between ESI funded actions and other EU instruments funded activities</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neither disagree nor agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESI funding intervention has taken into account the funding provided by other EU instruments</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neither disagree nor agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good mechanisms were developed to ensure a good level of coherence and coordination with other similar EU instruments</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neither disagree nor agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESI funded actions could have been implemented through other EU instrument</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neither disagree nor agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESI’s funding allocations have sufficiently taken into account the actions of other donors</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neither disagree nor agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESI funded actions adhere to the Humanitarian Principles</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Neither disagree nor agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Stakeholders interviewed also largely maintained that the ESI was largely coherent with other EU instruments. However, a large share of survey respondents indicated to have insufficient knowledge of other potential EU Instruments that could have complemented or overlapped the ESI: a combined 56% of survey respondents, indicated that they either had a neutral opinion or no opinion on whether ESI’s funding intervention had taken into account the funding provided by other EU instruments. This might at least be partly explained by a lack of awareness and/ or knowledge on the part of some respondents (especially local implementing partners) of EU instruments other than the ESI. A similar lack of awareness of other EU instruments was also reported in several stakeholder interviews.

---

146 See [http://www.unhcr.org/gr/](http://www.unhcr.org/gr/)
Coordination with the different EU instruments at the project level varied among framework partners

At the project level, the review of ESI project documentation shows that a significant number of projects, (13 out of 29 total) included evidence of collaboration between the ESI actions and other EU instruments. An underlying theme of such collaboration was the need to combine the available EU instruments, to both provide a comprehensive assistance approach also covering the integration and follow-up of needs (beyond the immediate relief provided by the ESI); and the use of different EU instruments to fill the financial and operational gaps in the provision of assistance, which could not be funded by a single EU instrument. The framework partners of such actions tended to also implement activities in Greece, funded by other EU instruments, hence, they had an organisational link and awareness of other EU instruments.

A minority of the mapped projects (five out of 29 total projects) posed a risk of overlap with other EU instruments such as those of DG HOME. All projects mapped mentioned coordinating with national and local authorities, particularly the MoE (e.g. integrating refugees and migrants into the national education system), the MoMP (e.g. accommodation and site management), and the MoH (e.g. continuation of health services). Twenty-seven out of the 29 projects mapped included coordination and collaboration with authorities and other humanitarian actors, e.g. participation of actors in various working groups (majority run by UNHCR) and complementing other actors in the field and handover/takeover of services.

The effectiveness of coordination mechanisms at the project level was also confirmed in the field visits undertaken for this evaluation (see Box below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination mechanisms working well in providing accommodation assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The coordination mechanisms put in place by UNHCR (monthly accommodation coordination meetings in Athens, plus emergency meetings when needed) have resulted in positive and productive collaborations between the NGOs (local implementing partners) and municipalities. Capacity building activities, training on the job, sharing of good practices have become common good practices where NGOs are providing training to municipalities; or capacity building has been organised between the municipalities (e.g. the more experienced municipality staff trains another municipality’ staff). Municipalities are starting to organise coordination meetings with other municipalities to exchange their experiences, knowledge and technical capacity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ICF. 2018. Field visit 2: The ESI accommodation projects under the ESTIA programme – working with local NGOs and municipalities.

The project mapping exercise showed that at the start of the ESI operations in 2016, some partners raised the issue of duplication of activities undertaken by different actors, including both the ESI and non-ESI funded organisations. For example, some partners identified both some overlaps and gaps in the provision of support (e.g. available support did not include shelter/WASH interventions within sites, which was considered a gap). From 2017 onwards, duplication was avoided through regular coordination meetings between the main EU donors and regular consultations with the national authorities. The absence of an overall national strategic plan, especially initially in 2015/2016, made such coordination meetings highly necessary. The field consultations with the national authorities also showed how the coordination and strategic planning from the national authorities’ side improved over time with the newly established MoMP taking increasing ownership and strategic leadership of the overall national response to the crisis.
The key challenges noted to further improving the coordination at the EU, national and project levels related to\(^\text{148}\):

- The **need for a nationally developed and led comprehensive plan/strategy for coordination** and communication between the different stakeholders, which would serve as a basis. This would support the development of a joint and shared understanding of the different EU instruments operating on the territory and the role of the national authorities between all the key players providing assistance, including the European Commission, national authorities, other humanitarian actors and the framework partners.

- The **limited effective and consistent participation of the national authorities in some of the coordination structures** (e.g. within the sectorial working groups of the framework partners). In some instances, the information presented by the national authorities was not always sufficiently detailed, or information was rapidly changing in relation to the key aspects of the emergency response (e.g. where to locate the camps to host the people in need).

- The **limited coordination, structured approach and administrative cooperation between the different national ministries involved**. For example, the collaboration between the MoMP and other Ministries was limited due to the relatively recent move in the public administrations towards more embedded inter-departmental working. Some national authorities interviewed also called for the establishment of a single contact point within the involved and relevant national authorities, to ensure better coordination from the point of view of national administrations.

3.3 Effectiveness

3.3.1 EQ9: To what extent have the objectives of the Regulation, and the specific objectives of the activation been achieved, in particular as regards to meeting the humanitarian needs of refugees and migrants in the different sectors of intervention?

**Judgment criteria:**

- JC9.1 Following the ESI activation the identified humanitarian needs of refugees and migrants were met, and/or these improved as a result of the ESI actions
- JC9.2 The ESI projects were implemented as planned on the ground
- JC9.3 The ESI projects met / improved the identified humanitarian needs of refugees and migrants
- JC9.4 Appropriate technical and other support and monitoring was provided by DG ECHO to the majority of the ESI projects

**Key findings:**

- The ESI projects met their anticipated targets in terms of outputs and results, but satisfaction of the final beneficiaries with the services received is a relatively low (which might in part be influenced by the general context of the uncertain future faced by beneficiaries).
- Expected outcomes and impacts at the organisational and systemic level have been realised partially, although some achievements are noted, especially in relation to complementing the response of national authorities and civil society

---

\(^{148}\) ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with national authorities.
initiatives whose capacity and future resilience is increased; successful handover of the response to national authorities as part of the exit strategy; improved pre-conditions for integration into the host society and enhanced preparedness to future influx. At the same time, some areas could have been further improved, e.g. the beneficiary’s overall situation (in terms of living conditions, better health, feeling of safety).

- DG ECHO provided appropriate support to the ESI projects on the ground.

The extent of effectiveness of the ESI funding differed, with more success observed at the individual project level (with respect to the achievement of outputs) whilst fewer successes were identified at the outcome and impact levels (see the ESI intervention logic in section 2.5). This is analysed in turn below.

**The majority of the ESI projects have achieved their outputs and addressed the identified humanitarian needs on the ground, with many reaching a higher number of beneficiaries than planned**

In relation to the outputs, the main achievements of the ESI actions were reaching a high number of people in need of such assistance (see also Annex 2), and improving their situation compared to the starting point in 2016. For example, it is estimated that the ESI financed MPCT programme had around 104,000 beneficiaries compared to the estimated 114,000-143,000 people in need in Greece in the 2017-2018 period.\(^{149}\) The ESI actions achieved an upgrade of people’s living conditions in terms of shelter, WASH, immediate living conditions, and their access to cash (see Figure 2 in section 2.1). The ESI funding improved the situation of the final beneficiaries overall, but there are also instances where such improvements were not sufficient. In this respect, the relatively low satisfaction of the final beneficiaries also indicates a partial effectiveness of the ESI assistance (as analysed in detail below).

As shown in Figure 14 (in section 3.1.2 above), the ESI support reached a high number of the total people in need of assistance in Greece since 2016. The analysis of the difference between beneficiaries targeted versus beneficiaries reached per sector (Figure 20) also shows positive results, namely that on average across the sectors, the number of beneficiaries reached was higher than expected, although patterns of achievement by sector varied. The results in the DRR and Preparedness sectors especially were well estimated in terms of number of beneficiaries targeted. For the MPCT sector, the number of beneficiaries reached compared to the initial target varies significantly. In some cases, the number reached is lower than expected and some cases it is higher. Framework partners reported challenges in correctly assessing the number of beneficiaries due to the ongoing movements of refugees and migrants and the insufficiently reliable national data.

\(^{149}\) UNHCR data estimated the number of arrivals over the period 2016-2018 (as of end of July) to be 219,430. Due to the ESI project monitoring systems, it is not possible to obtain a number of unique beneficiaries supported by the ESI projects. Interview partners indicated a high number of the ESI project beneficiaries covering the people in need on the mainland territory.
Figure 20. Difference between beneficiaries targeted versus beneficiaries reached per sector

The total number of beneficiaries reached per sector (Figure 21 and Figure 22) has been estimated following the ESI approach of one partner per camp policy adopted as of 2017 (e.g. one partner implemented health actions per camp). Hence, beneficiaries should not have benefitted from different programmes within the same sector. With the exception of two ESI actions in 2017 and 2018, for which the partner has implemented two activities within the same sector, implying a risk of double counting.\textsuperscript{150} The figures for 2016 are represented on the graph as an illustration. However, the number of beneficiaries reached is strongly limited by the fact that there could be a significant share of double counting.

\textsuperscript{150} This bias is limited to a maximum amount of 2\% of beneficiaries reached in the Protection sector in 2017 and 6\% of beneficiaries reached in the Health sector in 2018.
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Figure 21. Number of beneficiaries reached by ESI per sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter and settlements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic needs assistance (MPCT)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education in emergencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food security and livelihoods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction / Disaster Preparedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ICF. 2018. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases on 15.10.2018. Note: 2018 figures are estimated number of beneficiaries according to the project proposals.

Figure 22. Number of beneficiaries reached by ESI as a share of the total number of people of concern (estimated by UNHCR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter and settlements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education in emergencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food security and livelihoods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic needs assistance (MPCT)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction / Disaster Preparedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 2018 figures are estimated number of beneficiaries according to the project proposals.

The analysis of the average number of beneficiaries reached per project per gender (Figure 23) shows that 60% of reached beneficiaries were women and 40% men on average. Women remained consistently in the majority amongst the ESI beneficiaries in 2016, 2017 and 2018. Comparing the latter with UNHCR data on people in need of assistance in Greece (Table 5) shows a different profile, as amongst the overall number of people in need, 60% were men and 40% women. This means that the ESI reached more women than in the overall target population, which is positive as women tend to be more vulnerable in the emergency situations.
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Figure 23. Average number of beneficiaries reached per project, per gender

![Graph showing average number of beneficiaries reached per project, per gender]


Table 5. Cumulative numbers of people in need of assistance in Greece, by age and sex, 2017 and 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>66,583</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>men</td>
<td>65,909</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>44,311</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>women</td>
<td>44,985</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>110,894</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>110,894</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR. Population data – UNHCR estimates based on enrolment. Cumulative number of unique people in need for years 2017 and 2018.

On the one hand, the majority of ESI completed projects mapped have fully achieved their outputs and addressed the identified humanitarian needs on the ground.151 The project level assessments of DG ECHO in the FichOps in this respect frequently refer to the good performance of the framework partners and their flexibility in responding to changing needs on the ground.

The analysis of the Key Result Indicators of the ESI actions also demonstrates positive achievements of the targets set (Figure 24).152 All the sectors, except for the WASH activities, have on average surpassed the targets set in terms of beneficiaries to be reached, number of services to be provided, number of sites to be built/conditions improved or the number of support mechanisms to be implemented.

Comparatively, the most effective sector in this respect is the protection sector, where the activities have on average reached twice as many targets (number of beneficiaries, number of sites, number of staff to be trained, etc.) than initially planned – although this

151 ICF. 2018. ESI project mapping (29 projects).
152 The Result Indicators assess the achievement towards the direct results of the activities implemented by the projects. DG ECHO suggests 35 KRI options, with the framework partners being free to customise their own indicators. Result indicators typically relate to the number of beneficiaries reached, number of services provided, number of sites built/improved.
may happen more easily especially when it concerns activities such as large sensitization campaigns.

Figure 24. Average achievement towards the targets of key results per sector

![Image of a bar chart showing average achievement towards the targets of key results per sector.]

Source: ICF. 2018. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases on 15.10.2018. The figure shows the proportion of results achieved vs the result targets in each ESI sector. The label “sector” refers to the categorisation used in the HOPE/EVA classification relating mostly to WASH activities but has not been reallocated due to consistency of reporting.

The majority (60%, 187 out of total 308 indicators in 29 projects) of the output indicators set by the projects related to the reach of numbers of beneficiaries (Table 6). In 86% of the indicators (266 out of 308) the targets set were achieved or exceeded, and around 60% of such achievements related to the beneficiary level targets. Where targets have been achieved partially, the proportion of beneficiary level targets was slightly higher at 74% (31 out of 42 partially achieved indicators). This does not allow to draw strong conclusions whether the achievement of beneficiary level targets was more challenging than for the more structural types of activities and associated targets.

Table 6. Achievement of result indicators by key type of indicator

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of indicator / Level of achievement</th>
<th>Total number of target indicators</th>
<th>Relating to the number of beneficiaries reached</th>
<th>Relating to other activities (number of services provided, staff trained, stakeholders reached, system level actions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achieving and exceeding the targets set</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially achieving the target sets</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ICF. 2018. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases on 15.10.2018. Please note that the indicators have been classified into the core types manually and hence should be treated with caution as indicative.

In this context, the question to be raised is whether the output targets at the individual project level were set appropriately reflecting the budgetary allocations, the number of
The evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

November, 2018

63

people in need and the scope of project activities. Examples of targets of outputs being exceeded at the project level by over 300 and above proportions however may be indicative of initial targets having been set too low (in 15 or 5% out of total 308 indicators, targets were exceeded by 300% and above). Alternatively, it could also be a reflection of the fluctuations in the number of people arriving in Greece, exceeding in some areas the initial estimations of persons requiring assistance. The evaluation did not have sufficient evidence to enable the assessment of the appropriateness of targets set.

Stakeholders interviewed in the evaluation also confirmed that the ESI actions were largely effective, whilst simultaneously identifying a number of areas for future improvement. Interviewees concurred in considering the ESI as an effective instrument which reached its goals in providing immediate relief to the intended beneficiaries.

The achievement of intended outcomes and impacts was partial, both at the level of the overall ESI intervention and at the level of ESI actions

The following outcomes and impacts were partially achieved:

- ESI activities complementing the response of national authorities and civil society initiatives whose capacity and future resilience is increased;
- Contribution to improved pre-conditions for integration into the host society. While the ESI’s mandate is to provide emergency support, there is a strong benefit in also creating the pre-conditions for the integration of beneficiaries while they receive emergency support, especially where this may be provided for a longer period. This also facilitates the transition towards national support for integration;
- Successful handover of the response to national authorities as part of the exit strategy; and,
- Enhanced preparedness to future influx.

The lack of widespread improvements at the outcome and impact level generated by the ESI actions on the overall capacity of the national authorities is also evidenced by Greece not fully complying with the Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU) in providing the adequate conditions for the reception of asylum seekers. Furthermore, the INFORM index for risk assessment also assesses the coping capacity of Greece in relation to humanitarian crises and disasters with a low score of 2.5 and ranks the country at the 157th place in its worldwide ranking. Also important in the INFORM assessment is that the country’s coping capacity has not changed since 2013.

In terms of the outcomes relating to the improvement of the beneficiary situation, achievements are mixed. The absolute majority of outcome indicators set in the ESI actions related to the improvement of beneficiary situation. The achievement of outcome indicators set at the project level has been positive, but less so in comparison to the result indicators (Figure 25). Targets achieved and/or surpassed in 75% the indicators

153 See for example, FRA, Current migration situation in the EU: Oversight of reception facilities, September 2017, or the NGO assessment at http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/reception-conditions/housing/conditions-reception-facilities

154 http://www.inform-index.org/Countries/Country-profiles. INFORM is a collaborative project of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the European Commission and is hosted by the JRC.

155 The outcome indicators measure the contribution of projects results to the wider outcomes from the intervention. DG ECHO suggests 13 Outcome Indicators and the “custom” option is also available to the framework partners. The absolute majority of outcome indicators set in the projects were custom.
available in the completed projects. These were mostly related to the measured improvement of beneficiary situation (e.g. in terms of better living conditions, proportion of householder reporting their needs being met, better health, increase in the medical needs being addressed, children accessing education services, increase in the reported feeling of safety), as well as the improved conditions in sites, improvement in the capacity of national stakeholders and improved reception conditions. Comparatively, the actions implemented by the IO were slightly more successful when compared to actions implemented by international NGOs or UN partners:

- **IO**: Six outcome indicators were assessed for two implemented projects. Five of the six assessed indicators (83%) surpassed the initial targets set and 17% met their targets.
- **INGOs**: 48 indicators were assessed for 17 implemented projects. Over half of the NGO implemented activities have either achieved or surpassed the targets. 40% did not fully achieve the targets set, mostly related to the lack of improving the situation of targeted beneficiaries (for example, such as lack of improved feeling of safety, lower proportion of households with basic needs met, lower increase in the well-being, lower proportion of children accessing education, lower number of beneficiaries accessing referral services).
- **UN**: The majority of the UN implemented activities 69% achieved or surpassed the targets set. Only 32% partially achieved them, all related to the lack of improving the situation of targeted beneficiaries, for example lower numbers access to improved temporary accommodation, lower proportion of children accessing education, lower number of beneficiaries accessing referral services.

**Figure 25. Achievement of outcome indicators by type of partner**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Previously</th>
<th>Surpassed</th>
<th>Not Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Beneficiary feedback on their satisfaction with the services received from the ESI assistance and their needs being met is mixed. The beneficiary feedback collected for this evaluation in September 2018\(^{156}\) indicates that some of their needs were met and a certain degree of satisfaction with the support received from ESI actions (Figure 26). On average, across the services received, 50% of beneficiaries surveyed in the evaluation were either very happy or happy with the services received. However, to be noted is the varying degree of satisfaction with the different types of support received, with high approval ratings for services in the education, protection assistance and shelter/accommodation.

\(^{156}\) The survey link was sent to 10,901 households (i.e. to the head of the household) of the ESTIA programmes covering the five languages of the survey through UNHCR, 6,803 households received it (63%) and 1,788 responded to the survey. After cleaning the data and removing duplicates, 1,316 responses were considered valid representing a response rate of 19%.
Comparatively, beneficiaries were least satisfied with the cash services received (only about a third being very happy/ happy with them). The respondents were mostly satisfied (59%) with the education services they received, for themselves or their family. The majority (57%) of the respondents were satisfied or very satisfied with the services they benefited from the protection sector. Half of the respondents who received healthcare were satisfied with the support provided while around one third of the respondents were not happy with the health assistance received. In the shelter sector, in general, those who were happy with the support received and those who believed that their needs had not been covered were relatively equally distributed (47% and 42% respectively). Only a third of the beneficiaries were happy with the food services they received. Cash services seem to have satisfied few beneficiaries, with about half of the participants not being happy with the programme and considering that the support received did not respond to their needs. Only a third of the cash beneficiaries perceived that their needs were covered with the support received. Beneficiary satisfaction levels might in part be influenced by the general context of the uncertain future faced by beneficiaries at the time of the survey.

**Figure 26. Does the support you receive (good and services) responds to your needs and (if relevant) the needs of your family?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Very happy</th>
<th>Happy</th>
<th>Neither happy nor unhappy</th>
<th>Not happy</th>
<th>Not happy at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education (N= 86)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection-related services (N=158)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services and medicines (N=187)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter/accommodation (N=243)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food (N=165)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash (N=327)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The majority of the ESTIA beneficiaries consulted live in the mainland with less than one third living in the islands. When looking at the disaggregation of these services as per location (Figure 27), the results show that the health services and medicines, the shelter and accommodation, the food and the cash scheme responded less to the needs of the beneficiaries on the islands than in the mainland, which may be indicative of beneficiaries receiving fewer or lower quality services on the islands. Only the educational services seem to have better responded to the needs on the islands than on the mainland, where close to 70% of the respondents mentioned being happy or very happy with it.
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Figure 27. Does the support you receive (good and services) responds to your needs and (if relevant) the needs of your family/ (difference of views between respondents on the mainland and the islands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection related services</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services and measures</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter/ accommodation</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ICF. 2018. Mini mobile survey of ESTIA beneficiaries conducted in September 2018. N=486. Note: the difference in the total of respondents from the islands and mainland with Figure 26 is due to some respondents not specifying their location.

The issue of cash was also explored in the focus group undertaken for this evaluation with the beneficiaries who also reported a number of challenges (see Box below).

Findings from the beneficiary focus group on cash services

Beneficiaries reported having no problems with using the card to get cash, but they complained that the amounts received were not sufficient, about not having a cash point (i.e. ATM) in the camp, and a lack of transportation to the nearest urban area to buy supplies with cash.

Furthermore, as shown in Figure 28 below, 93% of beneficiaries surveyed in the evaluation also reported not being able to buy all the necessary things they need with the cash received, which explained the views on being unsatisfied with the cash services.

**Figure 28. With the cash support you receive, are you able to buy all the supplies you need (food, clothes, medicines, transport, maternity supplies, tools for work, other...)?**

![Figure 28](image_url)


18 ESI actions which used cash assistance also collected beneficiary feedback through surveys. The widespread use of this mechanism is a positive feature of the project implementation. Their results on the satisfaction with the cash services received are more positive than the survey in this evaluation. The summary of results indicates that around 60-90% beneficiaries surveyed expressed being satisfied with the services received (see Table 12 in Annex 2). Across the surveys, the general trend is that beneficiaries are reported being highly satisfied with the services and assistance they received. Importantly, however, in a number of projects a significant proportion of beneficiaries identified some needs being unmet (e.g. medical needs, safety concerns, which were also the responsibility of the national authorities).

Furthermore, in the framework partners and local implementing partners survey, 90% of respondents indicated having received feedback from their final beneficiaries, regarding the effectiveness of the framework partners' implemented actions and the fulfilment of their beneficiaries’ needs. Out of these, more than half of the respondents indicated that beneficiaries considered that their needs had been met to some extent (58%) while 39% indicated that needs had been met to a great extent, and a small minority (3%) reported that their beneficiaries only considered that their needs have been met to a limited extent (Figure 29).

**Figure 29. Available beneficiary feedback on the extent to which their needs were addressed by ESI projects**

![Figure 29](image_url)


**DG ECHO provided a good level of technical support, monitoring and other support**

Framework partners mostly agreed that DG ECHO monitored the situation and evolution of needs in the different sites therefore ensuring that framework partners were effectively covering those needs. In words of one stakeholder, “the constant, very close
monitoring they applied to all the actions was a key to success". Indeed, the close presence and extensive follow-up by DG ECHO was considered to be one important added value of the ESI as a whole, setting it apart from other EU funding instruments (see also section 3.5), as also confirmed by the stakeholder survey conducted by DG ECHO. However, some interviewed framework partners also pointed at the challenges faced by DG ECHO in providing support in a highly complex and continuously shifting environment, influenced by the decisions of the national authorities, which had to be respected, and reflecting also the interventions of other EU instruments. At the operational level, several local implementing partners pointed to the rather top-down approach to monitoring requirements and wished that monitoring requirements would have been discussed and agreed in more detail with the local implementing partners and national authorities.

Furthermore, a number of national authorities interviewed reported not having access to the full set of DG ECHO monitoring results, which might affect the successful coordination and handover of activities. In this respect, they maintained that the communication from DG ECHO could have been more extensive to keep them informed about the ongoing progress of the ESI actions on the ground. On the other hand, these findings need to be set against the extent of coordination mechanisms set in place (see section 3.2.2) and the gradual increase of national authorities participating in them. Indeed, national authorities were invited to the coordination meetings with partners, where these issues were discussed, and thus had access to the ESI information at the central level.

3.3.2 EQ10: Were there any particular factors influencing the achievement of these objectives?

Judgment criteria:

- JC10.1 Obstacles to the effectiveness of the ESI activities have been addressed appropriately and effectively across the majority of the ESI projects

Key findings:

- The ESI funded actions encountered a number of obstacles which could not be fully addressed (such as the limited national strategic capacity to deal with the emergency, unclear beneficiary data, administrative difficulties).
- A range of success factors were identified and capitalised by the framework and local implementing partners (such as the flexibility of the ESI, holistic approach to the needs of beneficiaries and their participation in the delivery of assistance, involvement of the national authorities and local implementing partners).

A range of obstacles at the strategic and operational level were encountered by the majority of ESI projects and could not be fully addressed, affecting negatively the effectiveness of ESI projects

More than half of the respondents (58%) in the survey undertaken by DG ECHO indicated having encountered challenges while implementing their ESI-funded actions in Greece (Figure 30). This is corroborated by the analysis of the project final documentation (SingleForms) where the framework partners identified having faced challenges affecting the implementation of the ESI projects in 22 out of 29 projects. The majority of the

---

158 ICF. 2018. ESI project mapping (29 projects).
framework partners and local implementing partners interviewed also identified a range of obstacles faced in the implementation of the ESI assistance.

**Figure 30. Share of partners/implementing partners having encountered operational challenges while implementing ESI-funded actions**


The most frequently mentioned challenge, across the various sources of evidence, relates to the actions of national authorities in general. More specifically, the following challenges were stated:

- **At the strategic level:** stakeholders pointed at the **absence of a plan and/or strategy** from the national government to respond to the large influx of refugees and migrants into the country. There were also limited adequate resources and experience in emergency assistance and asylum issues by the national authorities, to steer the activities in a consistent manner. The volatility and incoherence of fragmented national policies was also pointed out as an obstacle, as well as a lack of clarity in governmental procedures and weak coordination between different authorities. This has improved as the ESI implementation progressed, especially with the establishment of a single Ministry responsible for migration matters.

- **At a more operational level:**
  - Framework partners faced a situation of **insufficient, unreliable and fluctuating data on the beneficiaries** and the nature of their needs, which made it difficult to plan the individual project actions. This has somewhat improved over time as the migration situation has stabilised and better data emerged from the national authorities and UNHCR.
  - National authorities were considered to insufficiently manage the **security** in the various mainland sites. Over time, the situation was addressed and has improved at least in some camps.
  - Several **procedural and administrative obstacles** were encountered, including delays in obtaining permits to access locations and start planned actions, difficulties in adhering to the Greek legislative and administrative systems, which in turn led to delays in the provision of services by the ESI actions. Examples given included issues with the MoMP in determining site locations and the numbers of refugees and migrants per site, with constantly changing plans causing delays and changes in the implementation of actions.

Other challenges identified related to:

- **The difficult context** in which actions had to be designed and implemented: stakeholders cited for example the high mobility of target beneficiaries, the overcrowding of sites, the mental health symptoms displayed by many PoC and tensions between ethnic groups.
• Additional challenges pertained to the absence of a formal complaint mechanism for beneficiaries (which was somewhat compensated by many ESI actions involving beneficiaries in the design and delivery of emergency support services), the lack of languages spoken amongst the project staff to cover the main languages spoken by the final beneficiaries; and uneven framework and local implementing partners’ presence in the different sites – resulting in a high concentration of local partners in some sites and low numbers of partners in others. This exposes a certain gap in the needs assessments of ESI projects, as the framework partners are expected to identify these gaps in their proposals.

• Limited capacity and expertise of framework and local implementing partners. Framework partners, in particular at the start of the ESI activation, faced some challenges in the implementation of their actions, as they still had to build up their capacity and gather additional expertise. Similarly, some local implementing partners, while in general making highly useful contributions, did not immediately have the required capacity to be part of (sometimes multiple) the ESI actions. These issues gradually improved as the ESI implementation progressed.

Project documentation of six projects also report on operational delays due to the partners’ lack of capacity and expertise on the ground, which delayed the implementation of activities, as well as issues encountered with the management and oversight of implementation, due to:

- A lack of coordination with other humanitarian actors (identified in two projects);
- A lack of advocacy and communication towards national authorities (identified in two projects);
- A lack of community engagement and involvement (identified in two projects); and,
- Limited control over the local sub-contractors and local implementing partners (identified in two projects).

A number of success factors have also been identified in the project documentation reviewed and interview results. Factors which are most frequently mentioned include:

• The flexibility of the services provided by the framework partners and the continuous adaptation of the assistance to the constantly changing needs on the ground;

• The provision of holistic support to beneficiaries, addressing their complex needs in a package of support, supported by the availability of linguistic skills, where available, to interact with beneficiaries;

• Involving beneficiaries in the design and delivery of support, e.g. through volunteers or community leaders; and,

• Developing constructive relationships with the competent authorities in Greece as well as local NGOs, local authorities and other partners at the local level.

159 ICF. 2018. ESI project mapping (29 projects).
3.3.3 EQ11: To what extent did ESI-funded actions’ implementation method (i.e. channelling aid through framework partners) allow to effectively address the humanitarian needs?

Judgment criteria:

- JC11.1 Channelling the actions through framework partners allowed the ESI actions to timely and effectively fulfil the humanitarian needs of the targeted beneficiaries
- JC11.2 Comparison with the emergency support under AMIF (EMAS) in Bulgaria shows a slower response compared to ESI projects in Greece
- JC11.3 The change of the implementation selection of framework partners was effective in ensuring the right selection of framework partners to implement the ESI actions

Key findings:

- The use of framework and local implementing partners was appropriate and contributed to the effectiveness of the ESI actions.
- The ESI response in Greece was faster compared to other mechanisms.
- Few local organisations became framework partners, but local organisations were involved in the ESI delivery to a significant extent.

The specific method of implementation (i.e. by directly funding a set of framework partners, on the basis of the quality of the proposal and in relation with the ESI priorities defined) allowed the ESI to timely and effectively address the humanitarian needs of the targeted beneficiaries

The relevance of the implementation method to addressing the needs on the ground is analysed in section 3.1.4.

A number of stakeholders interviewed pointed to the fact that the ESI assistance was activated within a short period as a key indicator of its timely response. The timeline of the ESI launch (see Figure 2 in section 2) confirms a fairly rapid launch and frontloading of the ESI assistance, with the first ESI actions starting within a month of the ESI Regulation adoption. In the eight months of 2016 following the ESI activation, 14 actions were launched for a total of €247.5 million. This means that almost half of the total 29 ESI projects were launched and 38% of the total ESI funding of €644.5 million was allocated within the first eight months of the ESI launch.

The use of the framework partners to provide ESI emergency assistance was appropriate insofar they have already undergone a certification process, which has ascertained their capacity and capabilities, to enable a fast response and appropriate management of EU funds. In the words of one stakeholder, “due to the implementation method, we can give them (the framework partners) up to €3 million, which no other instrument can do”.160

Most framework partners, who already had a presence in Greece, immediately chose to use the ESI funding mechanism to provide emergency assistance following its activation (possibly in addition to implementing projects under other funding streams). Of the around 80 INGOs and NGOs participating in the UNHCR coordination meetings in Greece, around 30 were DG ECHO framework partners, and 28 submitted project proposals for

---

160 ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with DG ECHO.
the ESI funding. This indicates a high level of interest in the ESI from the framework partners.

The effectiveness of the implementation method is also confirmed in the framework and implementing partners survey where most of the respondents (90%) agreed that channelling ESI funding directly to framework partners has been effective or somewhat effective, while only 5% of indicated it had been somewhat ineffective, none of the respondents believed it had been entirely ineffective (Figure 31). In contrast, the possibility of working directly with Member State authorities was perceived by most respondents (58%) as either ineffective or somewhat ineffective, with a smaller share (35%) of respondents seeing it as either effective or somewhat effective.

Figure 31. Extent to which having ESI actions implemented by Member State authorities vs. ECHO framework partners would allow for a good, timely and effective response while considering the specific situation and the emerging needs faced by the Member State


The implementation method chosen was also pertinent considering the challenges faced by the national authorities to provide a coordinated response to the emergency. As shown in section 3.1.4, this was considered by the majority of the stakeholders consulted to be a major obstacle faced by the partners. On the one hand, this confirms the appropriateness of the implementation method as allocating emergency funding directly to national authorities would not have been as effective. On the other hand, the implementation method was also challenging, as neither the framework partners nor the national authorities had worked together following this specific method. This required a learning process and the creation of appropriate coordination structures, clarification of roles and responsibilities, as well as new modes of engagement and interaction.

However, national authorities interviewed expressed a different view, considering that the emergency support funding should have been channelled through the national authorities. In their view, this would have ensured more visibility, more acceptance by the Greek public of the actions, and a smoother handover, which would in turn translate into an improved sustainability of the actions. However, this view needs to be set against the vast evidence that shows that the reason why the ESI instrument was activated for Greece in the first place, was the limited capacity of the Member State to respond to an emergency situation of such scale. In this respect, AMIF national funding and EMAS were already in place in Greece, thus the main issue of their overwhelmed national capacity remains.

The comparison made under this evaluation, regarding the emergency assistance provided through EMAS under AMIF in Bulgaria shows a slower and less flexible response compared to the ESI actions in Greece (see also Box below). In Bulgaria, a typical EMAS procurement process takes six months on average for a standard procedure without
court contestations.\textsuperscript{161} The EMAS implementation has been slow due to the lengthy public procurement procedures, including the development of specification of the needs. Therefore, the process between the identification of the ‘need’ to intervene and the delivery of goods or services to the beneficiaries, typically, can take up to one year at least. This means that in practice urgent needs cannot be satisfied in this manner.

**Timeliness and flexibility of EMAS response in Bulgaria**

The majority EMAS assistance to Bulgaria was provided in the last quarter of 2016 and first quarter of 2017 – a total amounting to €160 million, about 80% of which was provided for border security related activities, while the rest was for asylum and migration related activities. Prior to 2016 AMIF EMAS assistance, was a protracted process, where negotiation between the Bulgarian government and the European Commission took up to six months. The implementation of the grants was (and continues to be) limited to twelve months. The absorption rate of the 2014 EMAS grants, was less than 60%, due to the time limitation (even though a three-month extension was granted in one case).

The 2016-2017 grants, which are still being implemented after two extensions of twelve months each (up to October 2019), have served more as ‘contingency’ investments, and have prepared Bulgaria for potential future migration crises. Unlike the pre-2016 grants, under intense political pressure and commitment of the Bulgarian Prime Minister and EU Commissioner Avramopoulos, the first grants were negotiated and signed in less than two months after the application deadline. The reduced number of migrants in 2017 and 2018 also made the absorption of some of the services slower, as the needs were far less than at the time of the call. As a result, the implementation of one of the IOM grants has been delayed, as identical services (mobile psychological and medical support) are provided by another grant still under implementation.

\textit{Source: ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews.}

The choice to use the framework partners to implement the ESI can also be considered appropriate based on the assessment of the projects’ effectiveness and positive achievement of targets (see section 3.3.1). The majority of completed ESI actions have fully achieved their results. The quality of both framework partners and their local implementing partners has been a contributing factor to this. A challenge reported in this respect was how to better organise the phasing out of the emergency support and ensure the handing over of activities to Greek government and Greek civil society partners as they began to develop more capacity (for the measures enabling a smooth handover to the national authorities see section 3.6). The appropriateness of the implementation method was also highlighted in the field visits undertaken for this evaluation.

**Field visit on accommodation: appropriate implementation method**

All interviewees\textsuperscript{162} had a positive judgement on the implementation method. They highlighted that the involvement of NGOs and municipalities ensured both complementarity and effectiveness of the actions. NGOs were fast in reacting to urgent needs and changes in action plans and had the previous knowledge on how to deal with similar situations. Municipalities are the best-fit actors to ensure that local communities are informed and consulted. Also, municipalities play a role in the sustainability of the future and/or continuation of the accommodation programme and the integration and acceptance of the PoC in the local communities. Finally, the best agents to provide complementary integration social public services are, again, municipalities. Though this is not yet happening, it should in principle happen in the future.

\textsuperscript{161} ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with SAR, MoI, IOM representatives.

\textsuperscript{162} EU institutions, framework partner, local implementing partners (NGOs and municipalities)
In order to also enable national NGOs with appropriate capacity to become framework partners, DG ECHO facilitated the selection procedure (e.g. by not requiring the applying organisations to have experience in third countries), so that the ESI could directly fund national organisations, which were often already acting as local implementing partners (see also section 3.1.4). Of the four applications subsequently received, three organisations passed the selection. Several other local implementing partners did not apply as they would not meet the requirements / have the capacity needed to act as a ‘full’ ESI framework partner.

Even though relatively few local organisations applied and later became framework partners, the existing framework partners used local organisations to deliver the ESI funded activities to a significant extent (Figure 32). Out of 95 agreements which the framework partners signed to implement particular services funded by the ESI actions, most (43%) were signed with local NGOs.

**Figure 32. Number of agreements signed per implementing partner type**

- Local NGO: 41
- Local authorities: 12
- Red Cross agencies: 11
- INGO: 30
- Governmental organisation: 1

95 contracts signed with different types of Implementing Partners

In this respect, most interviewed framework partners pointed at positive aspects of involving local implementing partners, as it allowed them to make use of their experience and knowledge of the Greek context and legal framework, and at the lasting impact of their involvement, as they could increase their capacity and take over activities when the ESI was finished. The use of local implementing partners also contributed to the increased effectiveness of implementation for end beneficiaries. In the words of one framework partner talking about a specific local partner, “When a grassroot organisation is involved, they are better informed about the everyday lives of the people, and as the organisation is built up of migrants, they understand better the environments that people are coming from”. This was also a prevalent view in the field visits carried out in the evaluation (see Box below).

163 ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with a framework partners.
The strong value of local implementing partners: views from the field

Interviewees¹⁶⁴ agreed that local NGOs working on the ground were flexible and fast in responding to the emergency as they knew very well the context. Their working method was adapted to the changing needs on the ground; for instance, one of the local implementing partners mentioned that private citizens offered to host beneficiaries in their own houses, before the private accommodations to rent became available.

Partnerships with local organisations, the transfer of knowledge, training courses, and hand-over of services established by ESI actions were the most important mechanisms to ensure sustainability. During the transition, framework partners worked with the local authorities, handing over the services and relevant information, as well as a stock of medicine and supplies.


3.3.4 EQ12: To what extent have the ESI-funded operations achieved EU visibility as set out by the Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union-funded Humanitarian Aid Actions?

Judgment criteria:

- JC12.1 The visibility of the ESI funded operations is high in Greece
- JC12.2 The Manual is used extensively by framework partners in the ESI funded activities¹⁶⁵

Key findings:

- Visibility guidelines (including the Manual) were applied and used extensively on the ground in the ESI funded activities including additional activities going above the mandatory visibility requirements.
- The visibility of the ESI funded operations was varied.
- At the initial stage of the activation, confusion occurred over various EU funds, other issues such as security concerns and a negative public perception were also encountered.

The visibility of the ESI actions varied in Greece despite various visibility activities undertaken by the framework partners and local implementing partners

Requirements of visibility are clearly stated in the ESOPs and other ESI documentation.¹⁶⁶ The visibility guidelines including the DG ECHO manual were used

¹⁶⁴ EU institutions, framework partner, local implementing partners (NGOs and municipalities).
¹⁶⁵ The use of the Manual was compulsory for ESI partners, whereas the submission of a communication plan per project was not compulsory.
¹⁶⁶ For example, ESPOESOP 2017 clearly articulates its "Visibility and Communication requirements", pp.15-16.

"Funding provided under the EU Emergency Support Instrument is an expression of European Solidarity towards vulnerable displaced people. Partners are expected and encouraged to acknowledge this as a key message in their project-related communication. Partners are also
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

extensively in the ESI funded operations. In addition to the mandatory use of the manual, 18 out of 29 ESI actions also developed an additional communications and visibility plan to ensure that the relevant activities met the mandatory visibility requirements and implemented additional visibility activities. The vast majority of the respondents (95%) in the framework and implementing partners’ survey reported both being aware of DG ECHO's visibility requirements and having managed to implement these under their ESI-funded actions (Figure 33). 15% of respondents reported having faced obstacles while doing so, whereas most of them (80%) stated that they did not face any obstacles. Stakeholders also reported that the initially low visibility increased over time as the implementation of the ESI matured and more projects were operational.

Figure 33. Implementation of DG ECHO’s visibility requirements


ESI project documentation reviewed shows that all projects used various forms of visibility mechanisms and the majority of framework partners met DG ECHO’s expectations and standards on visibility. All the projects mapped indicated that the framework partners followed the standard DG ECHO visibility requirements. A variety of communication channels were used in the projects, the top two types of media used by all the projects mapped so far being social media and audio-visual products (0).

encouraged to particularly highlight in their communication products the actions in line with EU priorities, namely Shelter, Cash, Health and education in emergencies. Partners will need to agree on their communication plans with DG ECHO and will be invited to provide regular updates on the nature of activities, mention of EU visibility, impact and results of the different communication actions taken. Partners are expected to inform DG ECHO in advance about media and communication activities planned in the framework of the joint projects in order for DG ECHO to advise on its participation in these events. Partners will be expected to acknowledge the EU as a donor through visibility and communication. This includes the prominent display of the EU emblem with accompanying text on all project sites, relief items and equipment as well as the systematic written and verbal recognition of the EU’s support when referring to EU-funded projects in press releases, social media, webpages, blogs, media interviews, articles and other communication products. The EU emblem should be included in all items where the partner organization’s emblem is planned and should be foreseen at the production phase. All partners are required to respect the guidelines laid out in the DG ECHO visibility manual http://www.echo-visibility.eu/
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Table 7. Number of ESI actions implementing the visibility requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of projects following the standard visibility requirements</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signboards, display panels, banners and plaques</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods and equipment</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press releases, press conference, other media outreach</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications, printed material</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social media</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner’s website</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human interest blogs, photo stories</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audiovisual products, photos</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ICF. 2018. ESI project mapping (29 projects).

Furthermore, some partners have implemented additional visibility activities than those required in the manual as a “standard” visibility, exceeding the “standard” requirements. These additional activities related a range of actions, including, for example, photo exhibitions, billboard advertising in the metro/transport, extensive media coverage and other. However, in practice, the visibility of the ESI was varied between sites. Challenges and a certain lack of visibility in several of the sites/services provided by ESI were identified in the project mapping results, field visits and the beneficiary survey.

The project mapping showed that DG ECHO’s assessment of the framework partners’ visibility pointed at the need to improve visibility in five out of 29 projects. Concerns were highlighted in relation to the limited visibility in terms of branding on the key services available, and the lack of DG ECHO branded items handed over to beneficiaries.

As reflected in the majority of the communication plans submitted by partners, the main target audiences of the communication and visibility activities in Greece were the general public and host communities, which explains the high amount of social media actions, the production of audiovisual products, web stories, media outreach, and other communication activities.

Although the beneficiaries of ESI actions were not the main target audience of DG ECHO’s communication and visibility activities, they were nevertheless one of the audiences targeted, and their awareness of EU assistance is therefore an important aspect to consider. Over 60% of beneficiaries surveyed in the evaluation were not familiar with the activities funded specifically by DG ECHO in Greece, with a further 12% being unsure about this question (see Figure 34), which indicates a low overall visibility of the ESI funding amongst its final recipients.

Figure 34. Are you familiar with the activities financed by DG ECHO in Greece and implemented through its partners (for example support activities for asylum applicants such as interpretation, transportation, legal information, food, education, etc.)?

Interviews also point to a varied visibility of the ESI in Greece, with some framework partners experiencing no issues whilst others reporting several visibility challenges. Concerns were raised by some framework and local implementing partners over the potential confusion on the different EU sources of funding. Several national stakeholders in Greece explained that in many cases, in the media and public discussions in Greece, the common belief was that the source of the funding was UNHCR and not the European Union. Other stakeholders pointed to a confusion between the standard DG ECHO visibility requirements and more political messaging in relation to European solidarity and management of migration flows.

Key obstacles to visibility activities reported mainly at the start phase of ESI’s activation, related to security concerns over the political visibility of EU-sponsored emergency support, as it was sometimes associated with the EU-Turkey Statement, or with the harsh austerity measures imposed on Greece by the EU. However, many of these concerns were overcome in the following years. In the five projects where concerns over poor visibility were raised by DG ECHO (noting a lack of reference to DG ECHO especially outside the camps and accommodation sites), this was in part due to the security concerns. In this context, some framework and local implementing partners questioned the use of DG ECHO’s logo in public spaces where the ESI sponsored services were provided (outside the sites and camps), when migrants and the local population might not be comfortable with the EU aid being advertised, due to overall negative feelings towards the political situation in the EU. A number of local implementing partners expressed the view that complying with the official visibility guidelines was not an operational priority, but they nevertheless complied with them.

3.4 Efficiency

3.4.1 EQ13: To what extent were the ESI-funded actions implemented in a timely and cost-effective way, taking account of the specific conditions of the emergency operations in Greece? And EQ 14: What factors affected the efficiency of the response and to what extent?

Judgment criteria:

- JC13.1 ESI’s response was timely and flexible (see EQ1)
- JC13.2 The allocated budget was proportionate to the targets set
- JC13.3 The ESI’s financial decisions and ESOPs were designed according to the specific needs and time constraints
- JC13.4 Humanitarian actions funded by the ESI were cost-effective
- JC13.5 DG ECHO promoted, developed and implemented cost effective approaches in the ESI projects
- JC13.6 DG ECHO balanced cost in relation to making strategic choices about its portfolio of assistance
- JC13.7 DG ECHO took appropriate actions to ensure cost-effectiveness throughout the project cycle
- JC14.1 No major impediments were encountered while ensuring the cost-effectiveness of the actions

167 The five projects, which were initiated in 2016, included the following partners: Oxfam, StC, UNHCR, ASB, ICRC.
Key findings:

- The ESI budget was not revised after external factors downsized the actual needs. Still, the total budget was utilised, and it enabled to meet the targets set.

- The ESI funded activities in certain sectors have proven to be cost-effective, while better cost-effectiveness could be achieved in other sectors.

- The cost-effectiveness of the ESI actions improved over time.

- DG ECHO and the framework partners endeavoured to adopt cost-effective approaches in the design and implementation of the ESI projects (internal factors).

- The evaluation identified several factors affecting the cost-effectiveness including the lack of well-defined national strategy, Greece’s peculiar context and legal framework, the absence of infrastructures and services to welcome refugees and migrants (external factors).

During the ESI activation, DG ECHO’s strategy was adapted to the evolving needs ensuring a flexible and efficient response

DG ECHO endeavoured to adapt the ESIs priorities and strategy over the years to improve the efficiency of the instrument. This is reflected in the ESOPs published annually.\(^{168}\) Whereas in 2016, the ESI focus was to primarily respond to the emergency in a timely manner (see section 3.1.1), concentrating on lifesaving activities, in 2017 and 2018, DG ECHO adopted a more structured approach to the crisis to avoid overlaps and ensure that a conditioned response would lead to improved efficiencies. Further, through the 2017 ESOP, DG ECHO promoted the “one partner per sector and per site” strategy avoiding duplication of activities, and favoured partners with a large geographical coverage to achieve economies of scale. The review of the projects’ proposals indicates that 18% of the proposals were rejected, among other reasons, because of a risk of duplication of the activities.\(^{169}\)

As developed in section 3.1.3 on the flexibility of the ESI, the modification requests allowed framework partners to adapt the actions to evolving needs. Evidence collected shows that this also contributed to improved efficiency. The majority of partners have requested modifications during the implementation of their projects. In 60% of the cases these concerned an adaptation of the strategic operations, such as upgrading the container sites, adapting the food offer based on the needs of the PoC, scale up of winter kits distribution or increase the legal aid provision to the PoC. Framework partners also requested adaptations to the timing and budget of their actions. The flexibility in modifying and extending the duration of the ESI actions rather than creating a new application is a factor that was raised by most of the partners as improving the cost-effectiveness of the response.\(^{170}\)


\(^{169}\) ICF. 2018. Review of the dashboard.

\(^{170}\) ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with framework partners.
The ESI budget was elaborated on assumptions which changed in the course of the activation period. However, the total budget was not revised

The total ESI budget allocated to projects over the three years amounts to €644.5 million (See Figure 8 in Section 2.4).

Evidence suggests that the total ESI budget was based on a set of assumptions which, although accurate at the time, were adjusted only later in the process. EU officials explained that the calculations were, in addition to UNHCR’s and authorities’ needs assessments, also based on the requests for civil protection contributions by Member States affected by the large influx of refugees and migrants.\footnote{DG ECHO. 2018. First round of Key Informant Interviews with EU Officials} Therefore, ESI’s budget estimation in principle covered, in addition to Greece, other Member States on the migratory routes towards Europe.\footnote{European Commission. 2016. Proposal for a Council Regulation on the provision of emergency support within the Union. COM(2016) 115 final.} Moreover, the initial budget was planned on the basis of higher estimations of end beneficiaries, as UNHCR had originally estimated that over 100,000 people would be stranded in Greece by the end of 2016. Both the planning of the ESI and the activation of the ESI took place before the establishment of the EU-Turkey Statement, when its outcome was still uncertain. Yet, the initial budgetary allocation was not reassessed afterwards, when the EU-Turkey Statement turned out to be functioning and when it became clear that the number of PoC would remain lower than estimated. Ultimately, the ESI was used for the refugee emergency in Greece only for a caseload of approximately 50,000 beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the budget was utilised by the partners.

The Framework Partners found the budget allocated proportionate to the ESI targets set

The stakeholder consultation (i.e. interviews with, and survey of framework and local implementing partners) indicates that the ESI funding was allocated proportionally to the needs identified by the partners and objectives set. The survey showed that 45% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that ESI’s financing decisions and allocated budget were proportionate to the needs (while 38% of partners neither agreed nor disagreed and 18% disagreed or strongly disagreed, see Figure 35). Similarly, the majority of the interviewed framework partners found that the budget was appropriate to the targets of the projects.

Figure 35. Framework Partners’ perception of the appropriateness of the allocated budget to the needs.

The costs of operating in Greece were overall higher than in other countries where DG ECHO operates, but when weighted, some sectors show higher and others lower costs per beneficiary

As it was the first time the ESI was activated in the EU, no comparison could be made with previous actions in other Member States. Instead, four third countries which were supported by DG ECHO during the Syria crisis were selected as a comparator to assess the cost-effectiveness of ESI, namely Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. These countries all welcomed large numbers of refugees from the Middle East and faced some similar challenges as those encountered by Greece in terms of having to create new structures and services. In addition, the actions were based on similar modus operandi (i.e. DG ECHO through framework partners) with the same objective (i.e. saving life) for similar target groups (i.e. refugees). The different levels of economic development were taken into consideration by weighing the costs using final consumption expenditure (FCE) per capita and GDP per capita.

Three indicators to assess the cost-effectiveness of the ESI in Greece were developed under this evaluation and are analysed below:

- The first indicator compares the cost per beneficiary of the ESI in Greece with the cost per beneficiary of other DG ECHO interventions in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The costs in the group of countries of reference is then indexed to the consumer price level of Greece (using the FCE). Although not perfectly accurate, this gives some indication of the cost-effectiveness of the actions based on similar modus operandi (i.e. DG ECHO through framework partners) with the same objective (i.e. save life) for similar target groups (i.e. refugees).

- The second indicator provides a comparison of the alpha ratio across the countries indicates the share of the cash and in-kind modalities that is directly transferred to the beneficiaries. A higher alpha ratio indicates better cost-effectiveness.

- The third indicator, finally compares the average share of specific costs per project in Greece and in the other countries, with a higher share of specific cost indicating a better efficiency of the projects.

The methodology on the use of these indicators and their comparison to the countries of reference can be found in Annex 1.

The average cost of implementation of the emergency support activities in Greece is €792 per beneficiary while the average cost per beneficiary in the other countries is €1,375 per beneficiary (Figure 36) once the prices are adjusted to the Greek price level (FCE). Although the figures per sector provide a first basis for comparison, they should be interpreted with caution; the rate might be biased as many other factors affect the costs such as the country taxes, the price of the goods bought on international market, exchange rates and import taxes, etc.

---

173 Initially an attempt was made to compare the ESI intervention with costs incurred in Bulgaria, which also witnessed an influx of forced migrants (albeit to a more limited extent) and, like Greece, had to set up certain structures and services from scratch. However, after a review of the available data, it was deemed impossible to draw any meaningful comparisons, due in particular to the differences in how financial information was recorded and some important data gaps.
Figure 36. Average cost per beneficiary, per sector, prices indexed on Greek FCE, 2016-2018


Note: Refer to Annex 1 for the methodology on the calculations of the cost per beneficiary.

While the ESI budget was fully utilised by framework partners, evidence suggests that some gaps remained in certain sectors and a better cost-effectiveness could have been achieved in others

Although being the third most funded sector (€109 million, 17% of ESI budget), the ESI funding allocated to the protection sector was lower than the funding needs in the sector as estimated in the UN appeals of 2016 and 2017 (see Figure 37).174 As discussed in section 3.1.2, gaps identified related to a lack of focus on legal assistance, mediation and interpretation services. The costs of protection services per beneficiary were higher than in the other countries (reaching over €2,000 per beneficiary), due to higher than average expatriate and local salaries (see Figure 46 in Annex 1) and the need for

additional specialised staff (e.g. interpreters and cultural mediators) who are not always necessary when delivering humanitarian aid in other countries, as these for example share the same language.

The average cost per beneficiary of ESI funded activities in the health sector was cost-effective (Figure 36) when compared with other countries, but possibly more funding to this sector could have been beneficial. DG ECHO partners have offered health services for an average cost of €462 per beneficiary which is below the (weighted) average of DG ECHO health activities in the other third countries. The UNHCR identified some gaps in the health sector, especially with regard to mental health, psychological and psychiatric health.\textsuperscript{175} It was confirmed during the field visits that health services in some camps were overburdened and the general capacity, of both humanitarian partners and national authorities to address mental health issues was low.\textsuperscript{176} The ESI funding towards the health sector was commensurate to the needs in 2016, when the initial framework partners present in Greece at the beginning of the emergency were able to respond adequately to the needs.\textsuperscript{177} However, as per UN appeal plans, funding towards health services was lacking in 2017 (Figure 37). According to the beneficiary survey, after food, medicines were the second most purchased item with the cash received, yet 48% mentioned that they were unable to buy enough medicines.

The S&S sector was allocated most funding, receiving 42% (€273 million) of the ESI budget over the evaluation period. It was also the most expensive sector per beneficiary reached in Greece (€2,066 per beneficiary, Figure 36). The high costs of the actions are driven by different factors. First, nearly all camps had to be setup for the first time in Greece in 2016, while in the other countries of comparison, at least part of the refugees was joining existing camps. However, other factors, although out of the control of the ESI or DG ECHO, have implied costly inefficiencies. First, the dispersion of the refugee camps throughout the Greek territory, often in remote places, at the request of the national authorities, implied that costs were to some extent duplicated (set-up costs, admin costs, logistics and transportation costs etc.) and much higher than in the comparator countries which operated much larger camps in fewer sites. A second element mentioned by various stakeholders related to the national authorities’ initial requirement for containers of a specific type and size, which were more expensive. Finally, the last-minute closure of a few camps that were already set-up, but which eventually, at the request of the Greek government, were not used to host refugees, also had important cost implications.

While the ESI funding towards the S&S sector was fairly commensurate to the needs as defined by the UN appeals plans in 2016, funding exceeded the amount appealed in 2017 (Figure 37). In that year, €57 million was allocated to UNHCR for the maintenance of the accommodations and the establishments of new apartments and buildings under the ESTIA programme, which also included the rental of the accommodations, the costs of equipment and repairs.\textsuperscript{178} While less cost-efficient, the ESTIA programme presents an important step towards greater sustainability of the response, as the accommodation scheme allows for a better integration of refugees in Greece.

\textsuperscript{175} ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with framework partners.
\textsuperscript{178} ECHO/-EU/BUD/2017/01003.
Figure 37. Funding needs versus DG ECHO funding allocation per sector

Source: UNOCHA, 2018, FTS data, extracted on 9.08.2018 and, ICF. 2018. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases on 15.10.2018. Note that the graphs represent the contract years (as per HOPE definition) and not the financial years. This is to represent the funding allocation as per execution date of the activities.

The Basic needs assistance (through MPCT) and FSL activities have been cost-effective and have demonstrated improvements in efficiency over time.

The Basic needs assistance (through MPCT) and the FSL activities have been implemented at a relatively low cost per beneficiary, making the ESI funded activities in those sectors as cost-effective as in the other countries of reference (Figure 36). In addition, the MPCT in Greece has demonstrated strong improvements in efficiency from 2016 to 2018 (Figure 38). The initial low cost-effectiveness of the MPCT in 2016 was most likely due to the lack of coordination in the distribution of cash and an initial lack of scale. The discussions on the improvements of the cash scheme with UNHCR in 2017 have delivered great results: after two years of implementation, the target of 80% of costs transferred to beneficiaries has been reached.

The total ESI funding to the FSL activities and MPCT together in 2016 was commensurate the needs as defined per UN appeal plans. However, the allocated funding was slightly lower in 2017 when compared to the UN needs estimations (Figure 37). The beneficiary survey (Annex 3) showed that 79% considered that the cash they received was insufficient, with 31% mentioning that they were unable to buy sufficient food (the first prioritised item purchased by beneficiaries).

179 ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with DG ECHO staff.
Figure 38. Average alpha ratio of the Basic needs assistance sector (MPCT) in Greece


The ESI was proportionally less efficient in 2016 due to higher support costs but efficiency improved in 2017 and 2018

Figure 39 shows the share of the total cost of the projects that was allocated directly to the implementation of the results. In 2016, in Greece, 13% of the budget was allocated to the support costs, which was higher than the average in the other countries (9%). This is mainly due to the fact that higher costs were incurred at the start phase to kick-start the activities in Greece. The higher share of support costs reflects the set-up and administrative costs of the activities in Greece at the beginning of the response, as well as the initial lack of coordination. However, over time, the share of specific costs increased showing an improvement in the efficiency of the response to the emergency. In 2017 and 2018, the share of specific costs in Greece has overtaken the average in most other countries.

Figure 39. Average share of specific costs in the total cost of the project


A range of internal factors affected the efficiency of the ESI

At proposal’s stage, one of the selection criteria related to the employment of local staff. Also during discussions on proposals and contracts, DG ECHO encouraged framework partners to reduce the reliance expatriate staff, which was considered less cost-effective and not sustainable in the long term. 93% of partners who responded to the survey reported using local staff as the main measure to ensure cost-effectiveness (Figure 40). The framework partners also mentioned the use of volunteers (including

---

180 See Annex 1 for the methodology on the calculation of the average share of specific costs.
migrant volunteers) as well as the use of citizen driven initiatives, grassroots movements and solidarity networks as elements contributing to the cost-effectiveness of the activities.

Similarly, DG ECHO pushed for the creation of partnerships with local NGOs as a means to improve efficiency. Over the evaluation period, DG ECHO’s framework partners have used 69 different implementing partners with whom they signed 95 contracts. Of those implementing partners, 25 were local NGOs and 10 were local authorities, the others were international NGOs, Red Cross agencies and a governmental organisation (Figure 32 in 3.3.3). UNICEF reported that 77% of its budget was transferred to local implementing partners. Nevertheless, some stakeholders considered that it would have been even more cost-effective to work directly through local NGOs rather than through international NGOs and IOs which in turn funded local actors, as this increased the administrative and/or operational costs. While this may be likely, it is important to consider that local, small organisations would not have had the capacity of DG ECHO’s framework partners (including the Greek NGOs which became framework partners in the course of the ESI activation) to manage a large-scale, holistic response.

While DG ECHO applied strict requirements in terms of monitoring ESI actions (for instance, UNHCR was required to conduct monthly certification of refugees and migrants, something which is not needed as part of humanitarian responses elsewhere), these overall helped to keep track of the extent to which targets were being met within the available budget. Throughout the project cycle, DG ECHO undertook regular project site visits to monitor the implementation of the ESI actions, during which, DG ECHO assessed the activities and, among others, made recommendations to improve efficiency. This was also reflected in some of the modification requests where DG ECHO made specific suggestions as to improve the efficiency of the activities and ensure that lessons learned from previous visits/projects were taken into consideration. In addition, DG ECHO experts played a key role in following the implementation of technical solutions on the ground and in proposing more cost-effective alternatives where necessary. For instance, on several occasions expensive requirements from the national authorities were adapted through coordination with DG ECHO experts to reduce the costs.

**Coordination** was also found a meaningful way to ensure efficiency. The stakeholder consultation findings show that one effort to ensure cost-effectiveness was the UNHCR-led inter-agency coordination mechanism, with all relevant humanitarian organisations, in order to better coordinate the activities implemented by different organisations and to avoid overlaps. The sharing of best practices and know-how among organisations working on the ground was also reported to reduce costs.\(^{181}\) 80% of partners who responded to the survey (Figure 40) reported the use of feedback and learning mechanisms from other actors (e.g. partners, implementing partners etc.) as the second most used measures to ensure efficiency.\(^{182}\) However, it is important to note that the coordination mechanisms were not fully functioning at the initial stage in 2016, but were quickly put in place and hence improved in 2017 and 2018. At the beginning of the response there was a clear lack of coordination amongst the partners leading to overlaps and duplications of activities (see section 3.2),\(^{183}\) which meant that framework

---

\(^{181}\) ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with framework partners.


\(^{183}\) ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with framework partners.
partners were working in silos and not benefitting from best practices, joint purchase or economy of scale.

Some framework partners reported that coordination with local authorities was also beneficial to ensure efficiency. This was confirmed during the field visit which found that the joint action of NGOs and municipalities proved to be the best solution for a timely and cost-effective response. However, if the coordination with local authorities (municipalities) has been helpful with regard to the implementation of the activities, issues related to coordination with the national authorities were highlighted. These included time delays in making decisions, the extensive length of discussions, and changes in the approach to be followed. This is further developed below.

The evaluation findings also identified other measures that framework partners and local implementing partners have put in place to ensure and/or maximise the cost-effectiveness of their ESIs actions. The findings from the consultation corroborated the findings from the framework and local implementing partner’s survey. The main measures included:

- **Cooperation with the private sector.** For instance, the private sector was involved through civil engineering and architectural studies. On the supply side, several elements were highlighted such as the use of local providers, a standard agreement with suppliers which ensured stable prices, and a centralised management of services and procurement.

- **The use of innovative method and new technologies.** For instance, Mercy Corps developed an app called ‘refugee.info’ which gave beneficiaries access to a range of services in their desired language. It was inexpensive, but impactful.

- **Partner monitoring systems,** including the use of efficiency-related indicators.

- **Community based participatory approaches** to allow PoC to support themselves and their peers.

*Figure 40. Measures implemented by framework partners and local implementing partners to maximise the cost-effectiveness of ESI-funded actions*


---

184 ICF. 2018. Field visit 2: The ESI accommodation projects under the ESTIA programme – working with local NGOs and municipalities - see Annex 5.
A series of external factors also affected the efficiency of the ESI

The main factors influencing cost-effectiveness lies in the absence of an overall national strategy to respond to the influx of migrants and refugees. The limited capacity of the national authorities and hence lack of well-defined strategy resulted in shifting instructions from the authorities. Some examples include demands regarding the type of containers to be purchased in view of winterisation, the premature closing of certain camps in which investments had already been made and the establishment of camps on private land. In addition, the lack of a national integration strategy also meant a low turnover of the ESTIA beneficiaries, who kept benefiting from the ESTIA programme, as they were not (yet) entitled to national social benefits and could therefore not leave the programme (i.e. ESTIA programme) preventing framework partners to help additional PoC. These examples show that a better established national integration strategy could have avoided wastage.

The national requirements opting for many relatively small and dispersed camps led to a suboptimal use of resources as it generated high logistical and coordination costs. For instance, fully equipped and functioning clinics were providing primary healthcare to a camp population of only 200-300 people. On the other hand, such approach was also believed to facilitate the integration of the PoC in the different localities and to guarantee a better geographical distribution of the sites, which favoured burden sharing and avoided ghettoisation across the regions.

The costs of operating in Greece are higher than in other countries where DG ECHO’s framework partners operate. The context of Greece, as an EU Member State, required a specific response which, in terms of costs, was not comparable to other humanitarian crises. The ESI had to adhere to EU standards, as well as EU and national legal frameworks and procedures which led to additional costs. Challenges identified were particularly related to the Member State specific context and legal framework. These included for example: a high level of taxation and social security obligations resulting from Greek labour law, insufficient provision of public services leading to additional transportation costs and high salaries paid to local and expatriate staff.

In the context of Greece, infrastructures and services to deal with refugees and asylum seekers were insufficient. The ESI had to fund many start-up costs related to the basic establishment of camps, services and operations that would not have been necessary in other Member States such as Italy, which has a longer record of hosting refugees. Therefore, a substantial part of the ESI instrument was used to set up new camps and coordinate the refugee’s arrival. In addition, procurement procedures were challenging as goods were not necessarily available in country and had to be purchased internationally resulting in longer delivery time and higher prices.

3.5 EU Added Value

3.5.1 EQ 15 and EQ16: What was the EU added value of the ESI activation in Greece? What is the specific EU added value of the ESI operations and working methods in Greece?

Judgment criteria:

- JC15.1 Actions financed by the ESI on the ground have a clear added value compared to actions financed by other EU instruments and/or other relevant donors
- JC15.2 The ESI has a clear EU added value when compared to existing national instruments
- JC15.3 The actions funded through the ESI could not have been implemented by any other national actor
Key findings:

• The ESI has demonstrated clear EU added value given the operational response provided in Greece, and also when compared to other national instruments in place and other EU funding mechanisms.

• The focus on pure humanitarian emergency support, as provided by the experienced framework and local implementing partners was highlighted as an important characteristic of the ESI.

• Actions funded by the ESI demonstrated EU added value as they were seen to address needs that were not being met by other EU funds, or national programmes.

• The timeliness of the ESI, once activated, was a distinguishing feature, along with DG ECHO’s field experts providing support and capacity building during the emergency response.

• Specific characteristics boosted the added value of the ESI actions, notably the flexibility of the instrument to adapt to evolving needs and the speed in which the ESI was activated and actions then implemented. DG ECHO’s expertise and technical assistance on the ground was also seen as highly valuable by multiple stakeholders operating in the field.

• At the same time, a number of shortcomings where identified, notably the administrative/procedural/political issues between all stakeholders involved, and the limited use of local NGOs at the start of the ESI implementation.

• EU added value could be further increased if the ESI would have been able to ensure a greater involvement of Greek NGOs from the set up: this could have improved the relevance of needs assessments (conducted both by DG ECHO and framework partners) and the channelling of funds.

• Finally, placing more emphasis on future handover/exit strategies at the start of an ESI activation can boost EU added value.

Although the ESI instrument was activated for the first time, significant EU added value can be attributed to the way it operated on the ground and the working channel it operated through

The ESI’s activation in Greece was overall successful (it addressed the main needs identified and was flexible enough to adapt to a dynamic environment) and demonstrated EU added value, as the instrument addressed a clear gap in the provision of emergency support. Although other EU funding instruments and tools active in the region (AMIF/EMAS, DG EMPL structural funds as well as the UCPM) contributed to addressing the emergency, the ESI provided timely support to large-scale actions that addressed the basic needs of beneficiaries in an emergency context, and allowed for relevant framework partners, along with their local implementing partners, to provide a holistic response.

Furthermore, at the time of activation, no national instrument was in place to respond to an emergency of such scale and nature, in particular to address the variety of humanitarian needs emerging. The vast majority of survey respondents (78%) considered that the emergent and changing needs would not have been met without the activation of the ESI, and interviewed stakeholders agreed that there was no national equivalent instrument available that could have successfully addressed the needs (Figure 41). The detailed needs assessments conducted by the European Commission, national
authorities and specific framework partners confirmed such an explicit need for humanitarian emergency funding, highlighting a gap in national level funding and capacity to address such an emergency.

Figure 41. Emerging needs could/could not have been met without ESI’s activation


The evaluation also found that the national authorities internal capacity was too overwhelmed to absorb the already available EU funds or to manage a new funding stream, to respond to the evolving emergency. This was further confirmed in a DG ECHO survey to framework and local implementing partners, where 60% of respondents considered that ESI-funded actions could not have been implemented by national actors, precisely due to their limited capacity and expertise in humanitarian responses and the level of administrative and political obstacles (Figure 42).

Figure 42. Stakeholder survey results: Actions could/could not have been implemented by the Member State


The ESI funded actions also developed onsite structures and resources to deal with the emergency, which were not in place prior to the EU intervention, with the presence of DG ECHO and its technical staff in the field being seen as particularly useful, not only resulting in a good overview and understanding of the needs and context in the field, but also shortening communication lines when implementing actions. The strong field presence was, in particular, identified as an element of added value (compared to other donors) with regard to: a) the positive impacts on the direct monitoring of projects through field missions and b) the possibility to directly advocate with framework and local implementing partners and authorities present at local level.

The method of channelling funds via framework partners to local implementing partners was highlighted through this evaluation as a strong element of added value. Their strong knowledge of local needs and contexts on the ground, considerably added value to EU-funded interventions in the region. This is evident, in particular, when looking at other
funding instruments, such as those provided by DG HOME (AMIF/EMAS), which do not allow for quick disbursement of funding to these types of organisations.

Finally, based on the Financial Tracking System (FTS) data, at the global level, and in comparison to international donors, the European Commission provided the majority of funding addressing humanitarian needs during this this period (86% or €800 million). From this, the ESI made up a large proportion of European Commission funding (approx. 70% in 2017 and 80% in 2018), by supporting 29 projects within the country amounting to €644.5 million. This means that had the ESI not been activated, a significant proportion of regional humanitarian needs would have been left unaddressed, especially given national capacity to react and the broader EU context.

Given the evaluation findings on relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability, specific characteristics of the ESI have been highlighted as distinctive from other instruments in place, and demonstrating EU added value:

- **The timely mobilisation and response to the evolving crisis**: All stakeholders taking part in the evaluation confirmed that the ESI was flexible enough to allow for operations to be activated and implemented in a timely manner, as a ‘rapid response’, especially in comparison to other EU funds operating within Greece at the time. Dispersing the funds and activating the actions on the ground were done in a timely manner;

- **A clear focus on humanitarian assistance**: Whereas other EU funding instruments can provide significant financial resources, these are not specifically designed to address the pure humanitarian needs of large groups of refugees and migrants;

- **Funding of experienced framework partners**: By channelling aid through established framework partners who had longstanding experience in dealing with such humanitarian emergencies, the actions were mostly effective and met the needs of beneficiaries in a time and cost-effective manner;

- **The flexibility of the response plans**: Updating the ESOPs, in particular the 2016 documents, in light of changing needs on the ground and the overall situation in Greece and the EU. This allowed for more accurate understanding of the situation and provided the opportunity for modifying the response to better meet needs of beneficiaries;

- **The flexibility in the implementation of actions**: In light of changing needs on the ground, the flexibility foreseen in the instrument, and promoted by DG ECHO staff, permitted for modifications to projects. This allowed the response to evolve along with the changing needs identified;

- **The technical and humanitarian expertise of DG ECHO and their capacity building/ knowledge transfer mechanisms**: DG ECHO has a network of sectoral and project field experts, who were redeployed to Greece to monitor and coordinate the actions on the ground. The presence of such experts was seen as crucial to support the framework partners in their work and to liaise with the national authorities, and also brought a wealth of knowledge and experience which improved the effectiveness of actions. This also contributed to a more cost-effective approach; and

---

185 FTS data might not be exhaustive as it encompasses only international humanitarian funding flows.
186 UNOCHA. 2018. FTS data.
The capacity building element of DG ECHO’s response plan was particularly useful as noted by the national authorities and local implementing partners. This allowed for a more effective response on the ground and developed capacities of staff.

At the same time, a few elements were identified that hampered the added value brought through the implementation of the ESI and its working method in Greece:

- **Better consideration of possible synergies between the various existing funds (UCPM, EMAS, AMIF) and the objective of the ESI:** Strong parallels between the various funds have been identified, with some stakeholders pointing towards the ability of the UCPM and EMAS to address some of the ESI objectives. The ESI should therefore consider exploring synergies with other funds when addressing an emergency response within a Member State, which would increase added value, but also improve coherence with other EU funding mechanisms;

- **Administrative/ procedural/ political issues between the national authorities, DG ECHO and framework partners:** The ESI activation in Greece constituted the first case where such stakeholders had to closely collaborate to address the emergency, therefore a certain degree of flexibility was needed to overcome obstacles and agree on implementation modalities. Any future activation should be accompanied by an operational framework setting out the division of tasks/responsibilities between all stakeholders involved, from the very start of the activation;

- **Local authorities and other local organisations** should be involved at the earliest stage possible, to fully benefit from their specific insights and to create a sense of shared ownership. In 2017, DG ECHO appropriately adapted its eligibility criteria to allow for national NGOs, with appropriate capacity, to become framework partners and receive funding directly. Organisations which, because of their small scale and coverage could not become framework partners, but which were already active on the ground, were encouraged to become local implementing partners in actions managed by DG ECHO’s existing partners. For future activations, a similar approach should be followed from the start. This could help limit un-addressed needs or problems arising from a limited understanding of the local context, and enhance contact with beneficiaries and other relevant local actors.

- **Limited comprehensive and timely exit/ handover strategies:** Although the ESI intervention is still ongoing, a more coordinated and strategic approach to planning the exit and transition of the ESI would improve its added value, as humanitarian aid by its nature has a short life-span, with the expectation of uptake by other sources. Such discussions and improvements must include not only DG ECHO, but other relevant actors such as the national authorities, framework and local implementing partners, and where relevant, other EU DG’s providing funding to the Member State concerned.

### 3.6 Sustainability

The ESI was activated for a period of three years and is due to end in March 2019. The first year concerned the activation and start-up phase, while the second year involved the implementation of coordination mechanisms and improvement of the operations to achieve the expected results. The third year focused on the transition, transfer of knowledge and capacity building. While some ESI actions have been handed over to the national authorities, the transition process is still ongoing. Therefore, it is not possible to assess the full extent of the transition and it is too early to determine whether the ESI actions will be sustained after the end of ESI. This section therefore focuses on assessing
DG ECHO and framework partners sustainability considerations in the design and implementation of the ESI actions as well as provide an overview of the ongoing transition, highlighting key challenges and success factors.

**3.6.1 To what extent can actions currently funded under the ESI continue after the end of the three-year activation on the basis of national funding, and relying on the national programmes under AMIF and ISF, or other sources of funding such as EUSF, ESF, ERDF and FEAD?**

**Judgment criteria:**

- JC17.1 The majority of ESI actions have built in the sustainability considerations into the project design and implementation
- JC17.2 Where relevant, the majority of ESI funded actions are handed appropriately over to the relevant EU/national authorities
- JC17.3 Key factors leading to sustainability have been maximised across the majority of ESI projects
- JC17.4 Specific actions have been taken on the ground to ensure a nexus between ESI funding and other EU funds (e.g. AMIF, ESF, etc., see also Coherence EQ8)

**Key findings:**

- The ESI Regulation does not formally refer to sustainability and exit strategies and in the case of the activation in Greece, only in 2018, the ESI explicitly referred to sustainability and exit strategies in the annual strategy (i.e. the ESOP). Throughout the period 2016-2018, several steps were nonetheless taken by DG ECHO and the framework partners to ensure sustainability.
- Although DG ECHO coordinated closely with MoMP and DG HOME, an overall strategy for long-term sustainability and transition had not yet been developed at the time of the evaluation. Similarly, no sector specific strategies were as yet developed. At the same time, the availability of DG HOME funds to continue funding operations at least throughout 2019 will facilitate the transition.
- All framework partners considered sustainability in the design of their ESI projects.
- There are several challenges related to the transition from ESI funding to DG HOME funding, including the lack of a national strategy, the lack of a formal agreement between framework partners and national authorities, and the differences in terms of resources, capacity, and working methods between framework partners and the national authorities.
- Several good practices were identified such as planning for transition early on, using local implementing partners, and coordinating with authorities. Similar practices are expected to be increasingly applied as ESI partners are completing their actions this and next year.

Though the emergency from 2015/2016 is over, many people remain in Greece and still require external assistance. As of July 2018, Greece counted a total of 28 open reception
facilities and six RICs, hosting more than 17,000 and 12,000 people respectively. In addition, arrivals continue to occur on a daily basis, accounting for over 23,000 arrivals to date in 2018, with over 3,000 arrivals in April 2018 only. In addition, a growing number of persons are awaiting a decision on their application for international protection, reaching nearly 63,000 persons in July 2018 compared to 38,000 in the same month a year before.

The sustainability of ESI actions is key to the continued support of existing PoC in Greece as well as for the management of new cases after the end of ESI. Sustainability is not the primary objective of the ESI interventions, as the instruments mandate is to provide emergency assistance, with the aim to preserve life, prevent and alleviate human suffering, and maintain human dignity. Nevertheless, in the context the ESI specific objective to support Member States which are ‘overwhelmed’ by an emergency but which ultimately have to take back full control once the crisis is ending, and in light of the important investments made through DG ECHO and framework partners, sustainability should be a core consideration of ESI actions, requiring the inputs of all partners involved in the response.

The ESI Regulation does not formally consider sustainability and exit strategies but several steps have been taken by DG ECHO and framework partners towards sustainability

For refugees, sustainable solutions include further movement, return or integration. Considering that, in the case of Greece further movement is restricted by the Dublin Regulation and returns are rare given that a high share of applicants qualifies for international protection, integration is the most likely sustainable option for migrants and refugees. Integration should have therefore been considered by all parties involved, which includes ensuring a smooth transition from humanitarian to integration assistance and ensuring that relevant ESI activities were sustainable (e.g. taken over by national authorities).

The ESI Regulation developed in 2016 does not include any provisions which require those funding and implementing the emergency support to consider how to best work towards the end of an activation period, in terms of exit strategies and sustainability. When activated for the first time for a defined three-year period, in 2016 and 2017, sustainability was not covered as part of the Commission Financing Decisions, nor as part of the ESOPs. It was only in the 2018 ESOP that DG ECHO formally referred to this issue, encouraging framework partners to integrate sustainability in their strategies and promoting transition. The 2018 ESOP further indicates that the ESI activities should be progressively handed over to the national authorities, as 2018 will be the last full year of contracting.

---

187 Open reception facilities: 26 in the mainland and 2 in the islands; Reception and identification centres: 1 in the mainland and 5 in the islands.
190 Eurostat, Persons subject of asylum applications pending at the end of the month by citizenship, age and sex Monthly data (rounded) [migr_asypenctzm].
191 Commission Decision on the financing of emergency support in favour of the affected Member States in response to the current influx of refugees and migrants into the Union to be financed from the 2018 general budget of the European Union (ECHO/-EU/BUD/2018/01000), C(2017) 8863 final, Brussels.
Despite sustainability only being formally referred to in 2018, DG ECHO did consider sustainability throughout the ESI activation period, as highlighted by the stakeholder consultation, the analysis of DG ECHO mission reports and dashboard as well as the project mapping. This included, for example:

- Placing substantial emphasis on the transfer of knowledge and capacity building of local and national organisations and authorities;
- Pushing for the creation of partnerships between framework partners and local organisations;
- Adapting rules and conditions to become an ESI framework partner to allow national NGOs to apply and receive funding directly mid-2017;
- The favouring of permanent structures as part of the portfolio selection (e.g. DG ECHO did not provide funding to non-permanent sites such as the Lavrio camps);
- The streamlining of activities (e.g. CASH assistance was provided by a single partner) to facilitate the handover;
- Supporting public services instead of creating parallel structures (e.g. education); and,
- Taking a first step towards integration with the creation of the ESTIA programme, as this provided refugees with autonomous housing and cash to make their own purchasing choices.

**Sustainability was also considered as part of the coordination mechanisms**

The Commission (DG ECHO and DG HOME) has been working to coordinate funding streams through monthly meetings in 2016 and 2017 (see section 3.2.2). In addition, DG ECHO actively pursued discussions with DG HOME and the MoMP through monthly meetings of the Steering Committee in 2018. The review of the minutes of these two types of coordination meetings shows that the organisation of the handover activities was however only discussed to a limited extent. Interviews with DG ECHO staff indicated that sustainability was implied through the involvement of the national authorities in the ESI implementation and through the sharing of certain information (e.g. project proposals). In addition, DG ECHO reported that decisions were taken collaboratively on which activities would continue to be funded under AMIF, the ESI or national funding as supported by the Financial Plans. The field consultations with the national authorities showed how the coordination and strategic planning from the national authority’s side improved over time with the newly established MoMP taking increasing ownership and strategic leadership of the overall national response to the crisis. Nonetheless, such discussions and activities did not result in a common strategy or framework which identified those ESI actions which had to be continued and considered handover options to ensure their longer-term sustainability, after expiry of the instrument’s activation period, which would have been beneficial for all parties involved (national authorities, donors, implementing agencies, etc.). Also, as there was limited coordination between MoMP and other relevant Ministries on the transition (see section 3.2.2), specific sectoral strategies were not developed either.

To date, short-term sustainability of most of the ESI actions is guaranteed as other EU instruments will take over (DG HOME, through AMIF) and will continue funding most existing ones until the end of 2019. On the one hand, this ‘transfer’ will imply that

---

192 ICF. 2018. Analysis of the meeting minutes.
193 ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with DG ECHO.
national authorities will gradually become directly responsible for managing and implementing the actions, thus ensuring a higher degree of sustainability. However, it will be equally important to explore the extent to which they will be able to autonomously fund and implement policies and programmes in the longer term.

**Sustainability was considered by all framework partners in the design of the ESI projects, particularly through capacity building of local actors**

At project level, there was no sustainability requirement in the SingleForm, i.e. no specific section was dedicated to sustainability or exit strategies. Therefore, the information and level of detail vary among framework partners. For 2018 projects, DG ECHO field staff specifically requested framework partners to include an exit strategy within a specific timeframe and to integrate capacity building and training of local officials and other local implementing partners.  

While sustainability was not the primary focus in 2016 and 2017, all framework partners did consider it in the design of their actions (i.e. SingleForm). All 29 ESI projects included sustainability considerations particularly through i. working with local implementing partners (Figure 43) and ii. training and capacity building of local authorities while some also included capacity building of beneficiaries (Figure 44).

**Figure 43. Number of contracts signed per implementing partner type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing Partner Type</th>
<th>Contracts Signed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authorities</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Cross agencies</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental organisation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** DG ECHO implementing partner contract list.

DG ECHO’s assessments of proposals (as reported in FichOps) further indicate that most projects sufficiently included measures to build local capacities, both aimed at beneficiaries and local institutions (65%, Figure 44).

**Figure 44. Does the project include measures to build local capacities (beneficiaries and local institutions)? (29 projects)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Not sufficiently</th>
<th>Blank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Measure included</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** ICF. 2018. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases on 15.10.2018.

Most projects were also assessed by DG ECHO staff to support long term strategies to reduce humanitarian needs, underlying vulnerability, and risks (55%, Figure 45). For instance, by providing cash assistance, by improving access to information and empowering PoC to know their rights and the asylum process through legal aid and

---

194 ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with DG ECHO.
195 ICF. 2018. ESI project mapping (29 projects).
integration classes or by taking a community approach, assigning community mediators, social workers and interpreters within the PoC population.

**Figure 45. Do the projects take opportunities to support long term strategies to reduce humanitarian needs, underlying vulnerability and risks? (29 projects)**

![Figure 45. Do the projects take opportunities to support long term strategies to reduce humanitarian needs, underlying vulnerability and risks? (29 projects)](image)


Other sustainability considerations identified in framework partners SingleForm include:

- Working with local NGOs and actors (i.e. local implementing partners, see Figure 43) (12 ESI projects);
- Working closely with national and/or local authorities (13);
- Creating sustainable pathways within national services (e.g. establishment of an Urban Working Group\(^{196}\), working with legal local organisations\(^{197}\), use of open school initiative\(^{198}\)) (6);
- Involving the beneficiary population in the activities (5); and,
- Aligning activities with government and local authorities' priorities and follow national standards and protocols (3).

While DG ECHO and framework partners consulted were relatively optimistic that some activities would be continued after the end of the ESI, local implementing partners were less so. Even though not all projects implemented are meant to continue after the ESI, for those that are, local implementing partners indicated that other funding was not yet secured. Issues in applying for national funding were highlighted (see challenges in next sub-section) as well as lack of knowledge of which actors (donors and NGOs) will remain. In addition, several local implementing partners reported not having their own exit strategy.

**Exit strategies of the ESI actions consisted of handing over activities to authorities or other NGOs, mainly as part of DG HOME AMIF/EMAS funding**

DG ECHO staff considered that 70-80% of the activities would be sustained after the end of ESI funding.\(^{199}\) Sixteen ESI projects mentioned in the SingleForm that some (or all) their activities would be handed over to authorities (national and municipalities) while 13 projects referred to a handover to local NGOs or other INGOs. Four ESI projects, implemented by three partners (The Smile of the Child, DRC and UNHCR) did not plan for an exit strategy as they will continue providing assistance with other funding.\(^{200}\) Several framework partners also reported to be in the process of developing a transition/handover plan.\(^{201}\)

In practice, some activities were handed over in 2017 and 2018 while others are still in transition. For example, since August 2017, responsibility for the provision of financial

---

196 ECHO/EU/BUD/2016/01001.
197 ECHO/EU/BUD/2016/01003.
198 ECHO/EU/BUD/2016/01015.
199 ICF. 2018. Second round of Key Informant Interviews with DG ECHO.
200 ICF. 2018. ESI project mapping (29 projects).
support to manage **shelters for UAMs** was transferred to the national authorities, supported through the use of funds available under the AMIF national programme. Several challenges were identified in relation to the transition (see Table 13 in Annex 2), including for example gaps in essential services, or decreasing number of spaces. In 2018, primary healthcare in sites is also delivered by national authorities, through the public healthcare system. In addition, some framework partners will continue to provide activities either through other funding (i.e. AMIF, private donors) or by being absorbed under UNHCR ESTIA programme.

For **ESI protection activities**, some activities have been handed over to local NGOs. For instance, Tdh handed over camp-based protection cases to ARSIS, Interosos and Keelpno (i.e. MoH), while others will be continued by framework partners under AMIF funding. The UNICEF safe zones in open accommodation sites will be taken over by IOM. In terms of **ESI education services**, non-formal educational activities in camps have been handed over to local NGOs and the MoE. In urban centres, some non-formal activities continue under the UNHCR ESTIA programme. Regarding formal education, services supporting the MoE are being handed over, for instance, with transportation now starting to be provided by the IOM under AMIF/EMAS.

**ESI’s health activities** on the Islands ended in July 2017 and were handed over to the MoH, following an agreement with the national authorities. However, some framework partners pointed at a lack of proper transition/ handover of health services on the islands, leading to gaps in response. In the mainland, the phasing out of the emergency support in relation to the provision of primary health care in sites took place in 2018 through the transition to the DG HOME-funded “PHILOS - Emergency health response to refugee crisis” programme, which aims to enhance the capacity of the Greek Health Services to address the medical needs of refugees and migrants. All activities in sites have been handed over by the end of May 2018. ESI health partners continue providing support with translation in hospitals and mental health care.

For **ESI multi-purpose cash assistance**, efforts have been made to align the assistance to the Greek Social Solidarity System (SSI). The latter strives to simplify payment processes by making the current system interoperable with the SSI. UNHCR and the MoMP are in discussion concerning the transfer of the ESTIA programme to the Ministry in 2019, with funding provided by DG HOME. UNHCR has also established contacts with other Ministries (e.g. MoL) and all the parties are promoting an increased involvement of municipalities in the assistance to the asylum services.

**Findings from the field visit:**

The 'Emergency Support to Integration & Accommodation' (ESTIA) programme was created as a flagship initiative towards sustainability and integration, helping refugees and their families rent urban accommodation and provides them with regular cash assistance.

While the **accommodation** support was initially only meant to be provided for a six months period after asylum has been granted, the lack of a national integration strategy meant that in reality beneficiaries were not provided with the means to become self-sufficient, at least in part. This puts the entire system at risk as new third-country nationals continue to arrive while those that have been in the ESTIA programme for more than six months are unable to leave the programme. The field visit further revealed that the ESTIA programme should evolve into a more complete support, providing PoC with integration services.

---

202 The authorities requested an extension to the grace period.
Source: ICF. 2018. Field visit 2: ESI accommodation projects under the ESTIA programme – working with local NGOs and municipalities

Camp management is officially already under the responsibility of the national authorities. However, framework partners still act as Site Management Support (SMS). The provision of services in camps will be sustained through AMIF/EMAS funding.

A range of issues affected the extent to which ESI activities could be transitioned successfully. While most relate to the specific situation and functioning of the Member States and are beyond the control of DG ECHO and its framework partners, these limitations could have been better taken into account when planning for transition. The main issues identified are listed below while sector-specific challenges can be found in Table 13 in Annex 2.

Challenge related to the ESI’s modus operandi include:

- While it was made explicit from the start that the ESI would be activated for a period of three years, **DG ECHO’s specific indication in the 2018 ESOP did not provide sufficient time to framework partners to plan for and implement the transition**. In a mission report, a field expert noted that “proper planning of a phase out with framework partners must be prepared well in advance of the end of the project, giving partners the required time to transition out of activities (letting go staff, handing over activities, finding other financial sources) while complying with Greek legislation.” With the ESOP 2018 being published in November 2017 and many ESI actions finishing in December of that same year, framework partners considered that little time was left to adequately discuss and insert transition elements in their new proposals.

Challenges in relation to external factors that could possibly have been influenced by DG ECHO and/or framework partners through a more active focus on transition:

- At the time of the evaluation, there was a **lack of an overall national strategy** as well as specific sectoral strategies concerning the refugee response from the Greek authorities, DG ECHO and DG HOME, which made it difficult for framework partners to plan for and implement the transition (although most did develop exit plans focussing on building capacity of actors at the local level).

- **The absence of a formal agreement** between DG ECHO, the framework partners and the national authorities (e.g. through an MoU) led to uncertainties on the specific roles and responsibilities of the different actors, which in turn affected the planning of the ESI exit. As framework partners had an insufficient understanding of the way in which the Greek administration worked and the way in which different Ministries cooperated in the management of the refugees and migrants, they were unable to engage with the right national stakeholders to plan future actions. As ESI implementation progressed, there were signs of improved understanding and cooperation between the different stakeholders.

- The **channels and working methods** of national authorities differ widely from the framework partners. In particular in the first year of implementation, the administrative and legal requirements led to delays. Some local NGOs experienced delays in funding (e.g. transition of the UAM shelter management). Some contingency measure could have been integrated to anticipate such issues.

- The limited capacity and resource limitations of the national authorities were insufficiently considered as part of the transition process. It was for example not

---

possible for authorities to offer the same **level and range of services** as provided by framework partners (as these were often of a higher standard than national services available to the local population), which meant that following transition, services had to be scaled down or dropped, leading to gaps in response and dissatisfaction among beneficiaries.

Challenges outside ESI, DG ECHO and partner’s control:

- **The lack of an overall national integration policy** increased the dependence of the ESI beneficiaries on financial and other forms of assistance. A few steps were taken to complement the emergency support with longer-term solutions to integrate PoC and foster their self-reliance in light of the end of ESI funding (e.g. ESTIA).

- **Alternative funding sources, post-ESI**, are limited to EU funding, in particular, DG HOME AMIF funding or the Greek national budget. Some local implementing partners are still looking for funding to continue their activities.

- Discrepancies in recruitment processes and **working conditions** (i.e. lower salaries, benefits, etc.) offered by framework partners under ESI and those offered by national authorities led to difficulties in finding sufficiently qualified staff to agree to work on sites and continue the ESI activities.

The evaluation also identified several **factors contributing to a successful transition**, implemented by ESI actions and hence by framework partners:

- In the absence of a national transition strategy, **local level strategies** were developed with municipalities to ensure a smooth transition.

- **Contributing to integration.** By supporting public services instead of creating parallel structures, favouring permanent structures, and promoting self-sufficiency, DG ECHO and framework partners helped to improve the pre-conditions for integration into the host society.

- **Transfer of knowledge and capacity building.** Some framework partners’ handover plans included capacity building and training of local actors as well as handover notes including all relevant information on the activities, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), successes and challenges, to further facilitate the passing on of experience and expertise for those taking over.

- The use of a **transitional period** (of several months) during which both systems, EU and Greek, worked in parallel, were reported to facilitate the cohesion between Greek communities and refugees and asylum seekers, and to foster integration. Seven projects requested a project extension to properly organise the handover the activities, ensuring a gradual transition.\(^\text{204}\)

- **Partnership with local organisations** were favoured; they possess the local knowledge and expertise and will remain after the ESI activation is completed. The continuity of the activities is therefore guaranteed providing that they can find appropriate funding.

- **Building capacity** of national and local authorities and actors to ensure understanding and ownership of the activities was key. Targeted workshops and

\(^{204}\) ICF. 2018. ESI project mapping (29 projects).
training were organised to strengthen the organisational and thematic capacities. For instance, the UNHCR provided targeted capacity building trainings to authorities on minimum standards for site management, protection and community engagement.\textsuperscript{205}

- Ensuring \textbf{coordination mechanisms} are in place. Regular meetings between the framework and local implementing partners, municipalities and the EU and national authorities were an efficient way of sharing knowledge, experience and good practices. Stakeholder consultation revealed that at local level, municipalities launched many different activities (e.g. microfinance programme, local labour integration, etc.) which however remained organic and not centralised.

- \textbf{Informing beneficiaries} of the transition and the implications thereof early on. As in most cases, services were scaled down, it was important that beneficiaries understood the alternatives offered by the national system.

Most stakeholders consulted expressed some concerns as the reception needs were continuously growing, and the absorption capacity of Greece was being questioned. The authorities consulted further highlighted the challenges in meeting the needs in 2018 with three funding mechanisms (i.e. ESI, AMIF Emergency Support and AMIF National Programme), and expressed concerns for 2020 onwards, when only one main funding mechanism would remain (i.e. AMIF national Programme). Needs may not be adequately covered as the latter is not as flexible and has lengthier funding procedures.

\textsuperscript{205} ECHO/-EU/BUD/2016/01005.
4 Recommendations

As requested in the terms of reference, this section presents the key strategic recommendations which have come out of this evaluation. Each recommendation is accompanied by a short background setting out the rationale and a series of suggestions on how to operationalise it.

The activation of the ESI should be accompanied by an obligation to develop an organisational framework outlining roles and responsibilities, tailored to each country of activation

The ESI was activated in 2016 for a three-year period to provide fast, needs-based emergency humanitarian support, complementing the response of the affected Member States. The evaluation found that in the first months of its activation in Greece, there was an overall lack of coordination and a lack of a clear division of roles and responsibilities, which hindered the start-up of the emergency response. Once coordination mechanisms were established, this strongly benefited the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, added value and sustainability of ESI actions.

It is therefore recommended that any ESI activation, in a comparable context, i.e. with different (humanitarian and other) agencies directly intervening on the territory in response to an emergency, should trigger an obligation, at the early stage of the activation, to develop an organisational framework, setting out the roles of all stakeholders, their mandate to act, and the responsibilities attached to each role. Such a framework could encompass the following information:

- Definition of main stakeholders and organisational mapping;
- Outline of the mandate of each stakeholder for the duration of the intervention; and,
- Clear division of responsibility per stakeholder, and the interlinkages between various stakeholders.

DG ECHO could take the lead developing a draft template for completing the information required on the organisational framework. The template should, following an activation in a Member State, be completed by relevant stakeholders, including national authorities, relevant agencies, Commission services, etc.

Aside from setting out the role of all stakeholders, this framework could also be used as an opportunity to improve ownership and enhance the impact the ESI can have as an emergency response mechanism, and in particular improve the following elements of the ESI:

- **Transparency of information**: Through such a framework, it would be clear to all (EU Institutions, national authorities, framework and local implementing partners) who is responsible and accountable for various administrative and operational decisions. It would also mean administrative and financial issues will be available for all relevant stakeholders;

- **Complementarity with existing funding/actions**: Setting out roles and responsibilities also includes understanding what is being done already by relevant stakeholders. This will minimise duplication and improve coherence;

- **Uptake of handover/exit strategies**: By assigning roles and responsibilities, the discussions around transition and handover strategies can be foreseen and elaborated from the start, and adhered to during the phasing out of the ESI.

The organisational framework, to be agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders, could be referred to in the general legal framework of the ESI, and flowed down into practical agreements (partnership agreements, project agreements, etc.) with the condition that it is
to be tailored to the specific type of intervention (refugee emergency, natural disaster) and
the specific Member State (taking into account national legal and decision-making bodies).

Finally, the organisational framework should not increase the administrative burden, but
rather define and clarify roles in the view of improving the relevance, efficiency and
effectiveness of the ESI as a tool.

---

**The ESI should include an explicit requirement for the development of an overall exit strategy as well as specific exit strategies sector and at action levels**

Though the emergency from 2015/2016 is over, many people are still awaiting the outcome
of their asylum application and still depend on external assistance. In addition, new arrivals
continue to reach Europe on a daily basis and Greece has witnessed an increase in numbers
in the past few months, including in the number of pending applications. The sustainability
of the ESI actions is therefore key to continue support of existing PoC as well as new
arrivals.

While the ESI’s mandate is to provide emergency assistance, with the aim to preserve life,
prevent and alleviate human suffering, and maintain human dignity, the evaluation found
that its first activation should have placed stronger emphasis on the ultimate need for
sustainability and transition. In the specific context of Greece, where the recognition rates
in 2017 were about 50%,206 integration into society is a key durable solution allowing for
self-sufficiency and therefore long-term sustainability. Ad hoc initiatives have been taken
but remained insufficient, in the absence of an overall exit strategy. While the evaluation
found that most ESI activities can and will be handed over, transition to date is patchy and
there are concerns that standards may be lowered as part of the handover.

In the case of a future ESI activation, an overall exit strategy should be developed from the
very start and framework partners should also be required to include exit strategies in their
proposals. Relevant stakeholders (Commission services, framework partners, national
authorities and other relevant national agencies) should liaise to plan for specific sectoral
strategies. Such strategies should include information on timelines, roles and
responsibilities.

At the operational level, the following elements should be considered to ensure the
sustainability of the ESI actions and enhance the transition process:

- The ESI legal framework could include a specific reference to sustainability,
  emphasising the importance of implementing, where feasible, activities that can be
  sustained and taken over by other parties once the emergency phase is over;

- Sustainability consideration and exit strategies shall be included in the ESOPs as of
  the first year of activation;

- In the SingleForm, a specific section shall be attributed to an exit strategy and such
  strategy shall be reviewed and assessed at the proposal stage and at subsequent
  submissions (e.g. Interim Report);

- In the final year, projects should be required to plan a transitional period, where
  activities would be handed over to relevant actors while humanitarian partners are
  still present in the field.

---

206 Eurostat, recognition rates in first instance and final decisions on appeal.
A transition plan shall be developed by each framework partner, in cooperation with relevant actors, in advance of the phasing out. The plan should include information such as: roles and responsibilities, budget and costs, timeline, Standard Operating Procedures, etc.

Sustainability and exit shall be on the agenda during the coordination meetings, in view of developing and adapting a coordinated approach.

Further synergies with other funding mechanisms to complement emergency activities with longer-term projects should be sought systematically as part of any future activation

Linked to the above recommendation, Article 6 of the ESI Regulation establishes that the ESI should be complementary to other existing Union instruments, especially to those that provide a form of the emergency assistance. This evaluation found that the ESI-funded actions complemented the actions implemented and funded through other EU or national instruments due to their different scope, mandate and implementation method. No clear overlaps or duplications were identified, also thanks to the close coordination between the main stakeholders, the mapping of funding and joint planning. Further complementarities and synergies could however have been sought to provide a more holistic response. The ESI support focusing on emergency and life-saving activities, could have been complemented by longer term programmes, working toward a contiguum approach.

In the case of a future ESI activation, the following activities, most of which were implemented in Greece, should be systematically undertaken to improve synergies and avoid duplication of effort:

• **A mapping of different funding streams**, objectives and programmes active in addressing the specific emergency within the given Member State: This would enable all relevant stakeholders to capture the main gaps that the ESI funding could fill, limiting duplications;

• **Conducting joint needs assessments, monitoring visits and develop joint programming**: By doing so, the various funding streams can be strengthened without duplicating actions or saturating different sectors of activities. This could lead to more effective results;

• **Allocating responsibilities based on the needs on the ground and mandate given to each stakeholder**: Organisations that are likely to remain in the field once the humanitarian emergency has stabilised should be engaging in projects with a longer duration, whereas the ESI actions should focus on primary life-saving needs. This dovetails with the need for increasing interaction between emergency and longer-term funding mechanisms.

The ESI should continue, more systematically, to aim for cost-effectiveness

Once the ESI was activated, the allocation of ESI’s budget was considered timely and effective. While most of the target sets have been achieved with the amount allocated, the evaluation found that in a few sectors, some needs remained addressed, whilst in others, some cost-efficiencies were identified. A number of internal and external factors which affected the efficiency of the ESI interventions were identified and higher value for money could have been achieved through better coordination, economies of scale and a clear implementation strategy.
In case of a future ESI activation, the Commission (and relevant stakeholders) should carefully review the financial envelope at regular intervals, in particular given the rapidly evolving and dynamic situation such emergencies are faced with. The objective of such reviews should be to monitor, and where needed make efforts to improve the cost-effectiveness of ESI interventions can bring by ensuring funding is directed to the most urgent and identified needs as they evolve. Using the case of Greece as an example, the following areas could be reviewed in view of this:

- **Close monitoring of the financial situation on the ground**: The Commission’s monitoring during implementation, as done in Greece (through field visits, primary and secondary data gathering, data sharing via partners) should highlight any changes in needs and capacities on the ground, allowing for an increase/decrease of funds, or a re-allocation of such funds, and/or identify possible cost-(in)efficiencies which may require further review;

- **Examining ways to improve cost-effectiveness within sectors**: With the help of the Commission’s technical expertise and through the knowledge and experience of local actors, more cost-effective solutions within different sectors should be explored, without hampering the quality of the aid offered. The Commission may also assist in liaising with national authorities when framework partners consider that certain national decisions could lead to reduced value for money.

- **Seeking further economies of scale**: Framework partners implementing similar activities could work together and benefit from economies of scale through harmonising their activities and engaging in joint procurement. The streamlining of cash activities, as applied in Greece, with one main partner responsible and one system utilised is an example of increased efficiency through harmonisation.

**Local partners should be more systematically involved in future ESI activations**

The evaluation found that national and local NGOs could have been more involved at the early stage of ESI activation, as this would have benefited contextual understanding, ownership and sustainability. This was later addressed by:

- Framework partners contracting many NGOs as local implementing partners (a total of 69 organisations), thus involving them both in the needs assessments and implementation of the actions.

- DG ECHO adapting the selection criteria for ESI framework partners (in particular by removing the requirement to have experience in third countries, which is not relevant for an instrument such as the ESI)

In the case of a future activation, the following is recommended:

- The relevant Commission services, with the help of national authorities and other relevant stakeholders, should make national and local NGOs aware that they can apply to become framework partners, from the start of an ESI activation.

- More systematic efforts should be made to involve, at an early stage, those local organisations who would not have the required capacity to become framework partners. This could include undertaking an initial mapping of these organisations with the support of national authorities or other relevant stakeholders; encouraging framework partners to contract local organisations (as happened in Greece); organising a consultative forum to introduce the ESI; encouraging UN or other humanitarian agencies, when acting as coordinators, to also include local organisations in their meetings, etc.
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Annexes
Annex 1. Methodological note

Stakeholder consultation

Table 8. List of stakeholders consulted as part of the Key Informant Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of stakeholder</th>
<th>Role/Organisation</th>
<th>Conducted as part of</th>
<th>Interviews conducted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews and Field visits</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Field experts</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews and Field visits</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG HOME</td>
<td>Heads of Unit</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>0 – no response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG HOME</td>
<td>Field staff</td>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSS</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Authorities</td>
<td>MoEconomy</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Authorities</td>
<td>KEELPNO/MoH</td>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Authorities</td>
<td>Ex-MoMP</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Authorities</td>
<td>MoMP</td>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Authorities</td>
<td>SG-MoMP</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>0 – declined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework Partner</td>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework Partner</td>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework Partner</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework Partner</td>
<td>IFRC/FICR</td>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework Partner</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework Partner</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework Partner</td>
<td>MCE</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework Partner</td>
<td>METAdrasi</td>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework Partner</td>
<td>MDM-BE</td>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework Partner</td>
<td>MDM-GR</td>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eight interviews were also undertaken as part of the scooping stage, including with DG ECHO HQ and field staff as well as with the MoMP and GSCo.
### Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework Partner</th>
<th>Key Informant Interviews</th>
<th>Field visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smile of the Child</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Red Cross</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TdH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARSIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faros</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Forum for Migrants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hellenic Red Cross</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intersos</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network for Migrant Women</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nostos</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMNES (Kilkis)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praxis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity Now</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOS children’s villages</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thessaloniki Municipality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Ioannina</td>
<td>0 – no response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other actors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Informant Interviews</th>
<th>Field visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency</td>
<td>0 – declined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Agency for Technical Relief</td>
<td>0 – declined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish Emergency Management Agency</td>
<td>0 – declined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caritas</td>
<td>0 – no response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Society</td>
<td>0 – no response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>0 – no response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Efficiency analysis

The use of the final consumption expenditure and GDP per capita to compare ESI with DG ECHO actions in other countries

As it was the first time the ESI was activated in Europe, no comparison could be made with other Member States. Nonetheless, four third countries were selected as a reference to assess the cost-effectiveness of ESI, namely Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. These countries all welcomed large numbers of refugees from the Middle East and faced some similar challenges as those encountered in Greece. The different levels of economic development were taken into consideration through final consumption expenditure (FCE) per capita and GDP per capita. Figure 46 indicates that the average price level of the four countries equals merely 32% of Greece’s level (Greece representing 100%). In other words, consumption of similar goods in Greece is nearly three times more expensive than in other countries. In the same vein, the average GDP per capita of the four countries equals 30% of Greece’s GDP per capita. This supports the assumption that the wage level in Greece is roughly three times higher than the averages in other countries.

Figure 46. Final consumption expenditure and GDP per capita (average from 2015 to 2017)


Note: this graph represents the share of the final consumption expenditure per capita and GDP per capita of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, as a share of the final consumption expenditure per capita and GDP per capita of Greece.

The average cost of implementation of the emergency support activities in Greece is €813 per beneficiary while it costs on average €379 per beneficiary in other countries. However, once the prices are adjusted to the Greek price level (FCE), the average cost per beneficiary in the other countries is €1,375 per beneficiary (Figure 47). The adjusted price is on average three times the original prices of consumption in the countries of reference. Although it provides a base for comparison, this should be interpreted with caution; the rate might be biased as many other factors affect the costs such as the
country taxes, the price of the goods bought on international market, exchange rates and import taxes, etc.

**Figure 47. Average cost per beneficiary, per sector, 2016 - 2018**

![Average cost per beneficiary, per sector, 2016 - 2018](image)

*Source: ICF. 2018. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases on 15.10.2018. Note: Some sectors were not covered in all five countries.*

**Quantitative indicators used to assess the cost-effectiveness of the ESI in Greece**

- The first indicator compares the **cost per beneficiary** of the ESI in Greece with the cost per beneficiary of other DG ECHO interventions in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The costs in the group of countries of reference is then indexed to the consumer price level of Greece (using the FCE). Although not perfectly accurate, this gives an indication of the cost-effectiveness of the actions based on similar modus operandi (i.e. DG ECHO through framework partners) with the same objective (i.e. save life) for similar target groups (i.e. refugees).
- The second indicator compares the **average share of specific costs per project** in Greece and in the other countries, with a higher share of specific cost indicating a better efficiency of the projects.
- And lastly, the **alpha ratio** of the Basic needs assistance (MPCT) sector indicates the share of the cash that is directly transferred to the beneficiaries. A higher alpha ratio indicating a better cost-effectiveness.

**Methodology of the calculation of the cost per beneficiary**

**Data sources**

Two datasets have been used to calculate the cost per beneficiary indicator: the "Transfer Modalities" and the "Beneficiaries" datasets extracted from the HOPE dashboard. The table below shows the variables that have been used for the calculations and the source of each variable.

The indicators used from the “Transfer Modalities” are:
• **Result Direct Specific Cost**: as given in section 4.3 of the single form “Estimated incurred total amount”. In theory, this should represent the amount of cost directly transferred to the implementation of the result.\(^\text{208}\) For example:

- Project of sensitisation in refugee camps:
  - Result 1: sensitisation of health matters to the refugees (Health).
  - Result 2: installation of sanitation equipment (WASH).

The cost for the running of the local office, the transport of the staff to the refugee camps are seen as common direct support costs. The cost of the sanitation equipment is a direct cost of result 2.

• **Contract Amount Signed by Partner**: The initial ECHO contribution to the total costs of the project.

• **Result Contract Amount Signed by Partner**: Initial ECHO contribution to each result

• **Result Individual Beneficiaries**: the number of beneficiaries, both individual beneficiaries and beneficiaries reached through households, at result level.

From the “Beneficiaries” dataset we have only extracted the total cost, which represent the total cost of the project.

**Limitations**

The analysis of the cost per beneficiary is only feasible for projects from 2015 to 2017. Before 2015, the Single Form did not make the distinction between the different types of beneficiaries. After 2015, the Single Form (section 4.3.1) makes the distinction between “Organisations”, “Individual Beneficiaries” and “Households”.

When the partner chooses to present the number of beneficiaries as households, the system calculates automatically the total number of individuals concerned (number of households times the average number of individuals in the household). Hence, our analysis is based only on results that target individual beneficiaries and households. We exclude the results which target “organisations” as these are meant to, in turn, target a number of beneficiaries that we are unable to estimate.

**Methodology**

To estimate the cost per beneficiary for each result, the total cost of each result was divided by the number of individuals reached. However, the total cost per result, which was not available in the datasets, was estimated by the weight of ECHO’s contribution to each result. Which was also equal to the weight of each Result Direct Specific Cost. Hence, the total cost of each results includes the direct support costs common to all results and the indirect costs.

Example of a project disaggregated per result with all the indicators used for the analysis of the costs per beneficiary and the share of direct specific costs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>c</th>
<th>d</th>
<th>e</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>g</th>
<th>h</th>
<th>i</th>
<th>j</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\(^{208}\) This was confirmed by emails exchanged with colleagues from ECHO analytics. However, some financial statements extracted from the Dashboard shows that it’s not always the case. For instance, the financial statement of the project ECHO/CHD/BUD/2014/91002 shows that support costs common to all results are included in the direct costs of the actions.
## Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

### Analysis of the share of direct specific costs

### Data sources

The two same datasets have been used to calculate the share of direct support cost and direct specific costs: the “Transfer Modality” dataset and the “Beneficiaries” extracted from HOPE.

The indicators used are:

- **Total cost**: The total cost of the project
- **Total cost per result**: Total cost of each result (including the indirect common costs and other indirect costs).
- **Contract amount signed by partner**: amount of ECHO contribution to the total cost of the project
- **Result contract amount signed by partner**: amount of ECHO contribution per result
- **Result Direct Specific Cost**: the "net" cost of each result, this excludes the indirect costs and the common direct cost of implementation
Methodology
In theory, the sum of the “result direct specific costs” (the pure or net costs of the results) should give an indication of the amount of money used to implement the action (directly transferred to beneficiaries).

Hence, the difference between the total cost of the project (a) and the sum of “direct specific cost” (d) should give a relatively good estimation of the “direct support costs” as described in section 10.2 of the Single Form. Note that Section 10.2 was introduced in late 2017 only.

The share of direct support costs (e) is hence equal to the estimated total direct support costs divided by the total cost.

Limitations
The first limitation of this analysis is the errors that could occur if the partners have not well reported their costs when specifying the direct specific costs in section 4.3 of the Single Form "Estimated incurred total amount“. It has been discovered that some partners allocate the direct support costs to the direct specific costs, prorated to the share of the costs of each result. This bias the analysis by overestimating the direct specific costs.

The second limitation comes from the limited data reported by the IP – see Court of Auditors “there is no information on the level of funding allocated to the UN implementing partners – more data is needed from the UN and its partners on how the money is used”.

Analysis of the Alpha ratio
The alpha ratio is the transfer value divided by the total costs. In other words, it represents the share of the total costs that is directly transferred to the beneficiaries in the form of cash, voucher or in kind.

Sources
The two same datasets have been used to calculate the alpha ratio: the “Transfer Modality” dataset and the “Beneficiaries” extracted from HOPE.

The indicators used are

- **TM name**: gives the types of transfer modality used per result
- **TM Direct Specific Cost**: the direct specific cost incurred to each transfer modality type
- **Total cost per result**: Total cost of each result (including the indirect common costs and other indirect costs).
- The database of the transfer modality gives an additional disaggregation of each result per transfer modality type. For instance, the table below shows a project that implemented two results in different sectors. The two results used cash as a transfer modality. However, the full amount of the costs was not given in cash, a share of it was used for other purpose and is referred as “no transfer”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Result number</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total costs per result</th>
<th>TM Name</th>
<th>TM Direct Specific Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>622,120</td>
<td>cash</td>
<td>11,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>622,120</td>
<td>in kind</td>
<td>32,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>622,120</td>
<td>No transfer</td>
<td>483,386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Methodology

As a first step, we have summed up for each result, the values of the TM direct specific cost that are given either in cash, in voucher of in kind (a+b for result 1, c alone for result 2). This gives the total value of the transfer, per result. Then, to obtain the alpha ratio, we have divided the value of the transfer by the total cost per result: (a+b)/c and d/e. This gives the share of the total cost that has been directly transferred to beneficiaries in the form of cash, in kind or vouchers.

Limitations

Since June 2016, the costs of each result are disaggregated by the net part of the cost allocated in the form of cash, voucher or in kind (directly transferred to beneficiaries), and the cost of the implementation of the result (banking fees, management etc.). Prior to June 2016, these costs were summed up and referred to as Cash and vouchers. Hence, there was an overestimation of the exact share that was transferred to beneficiaries. Therefore, we use only data from mid-June 2016 onwards.
Annex 2. Additional evaluative evidence

Coherence

Table 9. EU funding instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU funding instruments</th>
<th>Aim &amp; Objectives</th>
<th>Relevant Sectors/Policy areas</th>
<th>Timeframe and modalities</th>
<th>Budget (total)</th>
<th>Countries targeted</th>
<th>Intervention in Greece (Y/N) if yes, specify</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Support Instrument (ESI) – Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369</td>
<td>To preserve life, prevent human suffering and maintain human dignity through the provision of immediate and effective relief in exceptional disasters that result in severe humanitarian consequences in one or more EU Member States.</td>
<td>Food security, Shelter, Water, Hygiene and Sanitation (WASH), Protection, Education, Healthcare and psychosocial support</td>
<td>March 2016 – March 2019 (current activation)</td>
<td>Up to €700 000 000 (for Greece), of which €401 000 000 have been contracted for projects with partner organizations to date.</td>
<td>European Union Member States (currently Greece)</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ESI was activated for the first time on 15 March 2016 to respond to the refugee crisis in Greece through humanitarian projects.
## EU funding instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Instrument</th>
<th>Aim &amp; Objectives</th>
<th>Relevant Sectors/Policy areas</th>
<th>Timeframe and modalities</th>
<th>Budget (total)</th>
<th>Countries targeted</th>
<th>Intervention in Greece (Y/N) if yes, specify</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) – Council Regulation 2012/2002</td>
<td>To contribute to a rapid return to normal living conditions in regions affected by natural disasters, by financially supporting the community to respond to people's immediate needs and contribute to the short-term restoration of damaged key infrastructure so that economic activity can resume.</td>
<td>Post-disaster recovery and reconstruction</td>
<td>Created in 2002. An application has to be received by the Commission within 12 weeks of the onset of the disaster. The amount is decided upon by the Commission, the Parliament and the Council and is paid in a single instalment. The affected Member State is then responsible for implementation. The EUSF is not a rapid response mechanism and this process can take several months.</td>
<td>€5 086 074 000 have been channelled so far to 24 countries</td>
<td>European Union Member States</td>
<td>YES A total of €118 200 000 in aid have been granted to Greece through the EUSF to respond to floods, forest fires and earthquakes.²⁰⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) – Decision No 1313/2013/EU</td>
<td>To provide relief (through in-kind assistance, deployment of specially-equipped teams, or assessment and coordination by experts) in the immediate aftermath of a natural or man-made</td>
<td>Immediate post-disaster relief (including specialized tasks like search and rescue, aerial forest fire fighting, advanced</td>
<td>Launched in 2001. Whenever the scale of an emergency overwhelms the response capabilities of a country, the UPCM may be</td>
<td>€368 400 000 for the period 2014-2020</td>
<td>All countries</td>
<td>YES The UCPM was activated for Greece on 3 December 2015 and 29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EU funding instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Instrument</th>
<th>Aim &amp; Objectives</th>
<th>Relevant Sectors/Policy areas</th>
<th>Timeframe and modalities</th>
<th>Budget (total)</th>
<th>Countries targeted</th>
<th>Intervention in Greece (Y/N) if yes, specify</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Aid - Council Regulation 1257/96</td>
<td>To provide assistance, relief and protection to help vulnerable people in third countries (especially developing countries)</td>
<td>Food security, Healthcare and psychosocial support, Shelter.</td>
<td>The regulation entered into force since July 1996</td>
<td>A total of €7 100 000 000 billion was adopted for the period 2014-2020 for ECHO</td>
<td>Third countries (non-EU)</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


---

**Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union**

November, 2018
## EU funding instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Instrument</th>
<th>Aim &amp; Objectives</th>
<th>Relevant Sectors/Policy areas</th>
<th>Timeframe and modalities</th>
<th>Budget (total)</th>
<th>Countries targeted</th>
<th>Intervention in Greece (Y/N) if yes, specify</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>victims of natural disasters, man-made crises, or comparable exceptional circumstances. Such aid shall also comprise operations to prepare for risks or prevent disasters or comparable exceptional circumstances.</td>
<td>Water, Hygiene and Sanitation (WASH), protection, Education, Emergency repairs to infrastructure.</td>
<td>Funding is channelled in different instalments to partner UN agencies, NGOs and international organizations through annual calls for proposals based on the priorities defined by the country or region-specific Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs), in close coordination with the affected Member State(s).</td>
<td>(including the UCPM and ESI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) – Regulation (EU) 223/2014</td>
<td>To strengthen social cohesion by contributing to the reduction of poverty and the eradication of the worst forms of poverty in the Union. This should be achieved by supporting national schemes that provide non-financial assistance to alleviate food and severe material deprivation and/or contribute to the social inclusion of the most deprived persons.</td>
<td>The FEAD mainly tackles issues like homelessness, child poverty and food deprivation.</td>
<td>Introduced in 2014. 2014-2020 Assistance is delivered by partner organizations (often non-governmental) through national schemes (under shared management) following the Commission’s approval of National Programmes. EU countries may choose what type of assistance (food or basic material assistance, or a combination of both) they wish to provide and how the items are to be obtained and distributed.</td>
<td>Over €3 800 000 000 are earmarked for the 2014-2020 period</td>
<td>European Union Member States</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greek has been allocated €249 300 000 (in 2011 prices) from the FEAD for the period 2014-2020 to tackle food and material deprivation with a particular focus on single parent or multi-child families and the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### EU funding instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Instrument</th>
<th>Aim &amp; Objectives</th>
<th>Relevant Sectors/Policy areas</th>
<th>Timeframe and modalities</th>
<th>Budget (total)</th>
<th>Countries targeted</th>
<th>Intervention in Greece (Y/N) if yes, specify</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) – Regulation (EU) No 516/2014</strong></td>
<td>General objective: to promote the efficient management of migration flows and the implementation, strengthening and development of a common Union approach to asylum and immigration. Specific objectives: 1. Asylum: strengthening and developing the Common European Asylum System by ensuring that EU legislation in this field is</td>
<td>Asylum, Legal migration and integration, Returns and EU solidarity.</td>
<td>Launched in 2014. 2014-2020 88% of AMIF funding is channelled through shared management. EU States implement their multiannual National Programmes, covering the period 2014-2020. These programmes are designed and implemented by EU States in partnership with relevant stakeholders in the field, including civil society. Around 11% of the funding under shared management is allocated for Specific</td>
<td>€3 137 000 000 for the period 2014-2020</td>
<td>European Union Member States</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EU funding instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Instrument</th>
<th>Aim &amp; Objectives</th>
<th>Relevant Sectors/Policy areas</th>
<th>Timeframe and modalities</th>
<th>Budget (total)</th>
<th>Countries targeted</th>
<th>Intervention in Greece (Y/N) if yes, specify</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficiently and uniformly applied. 2. Legal migration and integration: supporting legal migration to EU States in line with the labour market needs and promoting the effective integration of non-EU nationals. 3. Return: enhancing fair and effective return strategies, which contribute to combating irregular migration, with an emphasis on sustainability and effectiveness of the return process. 4. Solidarity: making sure that EU States which are most affected by migration and asylum flows can count on solidarity from other EU States.</td>
<td>Actions (responding to specific Union priorities) and to support the Union Resettlement Programme. The remaining 12% of the total amount is divided between Union actions and Emergency assistance, to be implemented through direct management, in the framework of annual work programmes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>been allocated as long-term funding to Greece under the national programme for 2014-2020 (of which €164 million have so far been disbursed). 212</td>
<td>As part of Emergency Assistance (EMAS) funds from AMIF, €378.2 million have been directly allocated to Greek authorities and International organizations or Union Agencies (see Table 9 for details).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Security Fund (IFS) – Instrument for</td>
<td>Instrument for financial support for police cooperation, preventing Police,</td>
<td>Introduced in 2014. 2014-2020</td>
<td>ISF Police: Slightly over €1 000 000 000</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EU funding instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Instrument</th>
<th>Aim &amp; Objectives</th>
<th>Relevant Sectors/Policy areas</th>
<th>Timeframe and modalities</th>
<th>Budget (total)</th>
<th>Countries targeted</th>
<th>Intervention in Greece (Y/N) if yes, specify</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>financial support for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis management (Regulation EU 513/2014)</td>
<td>and combating crime, and crisis management (Regulation EU 513/2014) – Specific objectives: 1. Fight against crime: combating organized crime and terrorism, reinforcing coordination and cooperation between EU state authorities, including EUROPOL. 2. Managing risk and crisis: enhancing EU and Member States' capacity to manage security-related risks and crisis; protecting people and infrastructure against terrorist attacks and other incidents.</td>
<td>Crime prevention, Borders surveillance, Security, Irregular migration</td>
<td>ISF is mainly implemented by EU participating countries through shared management. Each country implements the fund through national annual programmes on the basis of multiannual programming. Beneficiaries of the programmes implemented under ISF can be state and federal authorities, local public bodies, non-governmental organisations, humanitarian organisations, private and public law companies and education and research organisations. Part of the ISF Police fund is managed by the Commission (direct and indirect management) through Union Actions, which include Calls for Proposals, procurement, direct awards, delegation agreements. For these actions the Commission</td>
<td>€662 000 000 channelled through shared management and €342 000 000 through direct management.</td>
<td>Member States</td>
<td>The ISF supports Greek national efforts to achieve a uniform and high level of control of the external borders and to fight cross-border organized crime. €456 million have been allocated as long-term funding to Greece under the national programme for 2014-2020 (currently disbursed: €342 million).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument for financial support for external borders and visa and repealing (Regulation EU 515/2014)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>As part of Emergency Assistance (EMAS) funds from ISF, €68.3 million have been allocated to Greek authorities and International organizations or Union Agencies (see Table 9 for details).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### EU funding instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Instrument</th>
<th>Aim &amp; Objectives</th>
<th>Relevant Sectors/Policy areas</th>
<th>Timeframe and modalities</th>
<th>Budget (total)</th>
<th>Countries targeted</th>
<th>Intervention in Greece (Y/N) if yes, specify</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nationals and tackling irregular migration. 2. Borders: supporting integrated border management and harmonizing border management measures in order to halt irregular migration.</td>
<td>Healthcare, Disease prevention.</td>
<td>approves Annual Work Programmes that define the priorities and objectives for each year, including the priorities for the Calls for Proposals.</td>
<td>€449 400 000 for the period 2014-2020.</td>
<td>European Union Member States</td>
<td>YES (no country specific allocation, the country needs to actively put forward proposals for funding to CHAFEA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Third EU Health Programme (2014-2020) – Regulation (EU) 282/2014 | General objectives: to improve the health of EU citizens and reduce health inequalities; encourage innovation in health and increase sustainability of health systems; focus on themes that address current health issues across Member States; and support and encourage cooperation between Member States. Specific objectives: to promote health, prevent diseases, and foster supportive environments for healthy lifestyles; protect citizens from serious cross-border health threats; contribute to innovative, efficient and sustainable health systems; | | | | | Funding from the Third EU Health Programme has supported a range of projects implemented to increase preparedness and responses to address migrant
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

EU funding instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Instrument</th>
<th>Aim &amp; Objectives</th>
<th>Relevant Sectors/Policy areas</th>
<th>Timeframe and modalities</th>
<th>Budget (total)</th>
<th>Countries targeted</th>
<th>Intervention in Greece (Y/N) if yes, specify</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and facilitate access to better and safer healthcare for Union citizens.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>health issues across several Member States, including Greece. As shown in Table 9, the projects were financed for around EUR 7.8 million and were implemented in the mode of grants requiring co-financing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Overview of key Health programme projects financed in Greece

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project title</th>
<th>Total EC funding</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Countries of partners involved</th>
<th>Mode of financing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen Community Based Care to minimize health inequalities and improve the integration of vulnerable migrants</td>
<td>€ 872 602,67</td>
<td>2017-20</td>
<td>Greece (coordinator based here), Italy, Spain, Bulgaria,</td>
<td>Grant afforded based on call for proposals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

213 Including the following projects funded since 2015: CARE – Common Approach for Refugees and other migrants’ health; Re-HEALTH – Supported Member States under particular migratory pressure in their response to health related challenges; EUR-HUMAN – European Refugees-Human Movement and Advisory Network; 8 NGOs for migrants/refugees’ health needs in 11 countries; SH-CAPAC - Supporting health coordination, assessments, planning, access to health care and capacity building in Member States under particular migratory pressure; ORAMMA – Operational Refugee and Migrant Maternal Approach; MyHealth – Models to engage Migrants, Refugees and Ethnic Minorities in their health, through Community Empowerment and Learning Alliance; Mig-Healthcare – Minimize health inequalities and improve the integration of vulnerable migrants and refugees into local communities. These examples are not exhaustive. See Table 9 for fuller description.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Grant Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>and refugees into local communities [Mig-HealthCare] [738186] - Project</td>
<td>€ 1 251 841,13</td>
<td>2016-2016</td>
<td>Cyprus, Malta, Austria, Sweden, France, Germany.</td>
<td>Grant afforded based on call for proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Refugees - Human Movement and Advisory Network [EUR-HUMAN]</td>
<td>€ 1 134 547,95</td>
<td>2017-2020</td>
<td>Greece (coordinator based here), Italy, Hungary, Croatia, Austria, Slovenia, Netherlands, United Kingdom.</td>
<td>Grant afforded based on call for proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Models to engage Vulnerable Migrants and Refugees in their health, through Community Empowerment and Learning Alliance [MyHealth] [738091] - Project</td>
<td>€ 477 014,37</td>
<td>2017-2019</td>
<td>Spain (coordinator based here), Greece, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, Czech Republic.</td>
<td>Grant afforded based on call for proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Refugee And Migrant Maternal Approach [ORAMMA] [738148] - Project</td>
<td>€ 1 689 045,11</td>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>Italy (coordinator based here), Greece, Slovenia, Malta, Croatia.</td>
<td>Grant afforded based on call for proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Approach for Refugees and other migrants' health [CARE] [717317] - Project</td>
<td>€ 2 756 269,00</td>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>Belgium (coordinator based here), Greece, Germany, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden, Norway.</td>
<td>Grant afforded based on call for proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 NGOs for migrants/refugees' health needs in 11 countries [8 NGOs in 11 States] [717307] - Project</td>
<td>€ 2 756 269,00</td>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>Belgium (coordinator based here), Greece, Germany, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden, Norway.</td>
<td>Grant afforded based on call for proposals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Emergency Assistance (EMAS) Funds for Greece

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek authorities</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>€25.68 million</td>
<td>Immediate Response to the Refugee - Migrant Crisis by providing them sheltering and accommodation, catering, health care and transportation on the mainland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>€14 250 000</td>
<td>Provision of shelter, accommodation, catering and transportation services for refugees and migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>€115 140 000</td>
<td>Ensuring and enhancing access to a fair and efficient Asylum Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>€115 140 000</td>
<td>Provision of shelter, accommodation, catering, health care and transportation services for refugees and migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>€115 140 000</td>
<td>Ensuring and enhancing access to a fair and efficient Asylum Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Comprehensive emergency health response to refugee crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of prefabricated shelter houses for the hosting of third country nationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>€9 710 000</td>
<td>Support to the return of third country nationals to their country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of transportation, accommodation and alimentation services to third country nationals in need of protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support the operation of the Greek Asylum Service, especially the provision of mobile asylum units on 4 border islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>€164 780 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organizations and Union Agencies (IOM, UNHCR, EASO)</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>€33 400 000</td>
<td>Emergency measures to enhance accommodation capacity and Site Management Support in the sites of Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Continuation of support to site management of Kara Tepe (Lesvos) and targeted support to protection activities in support to the Greek Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Open Centre for Migrants Registered for Assisted Voluntary Return (OCAVRR II) IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency response in accommodating unaccompanied migrant children - ERACUMIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>€15 780 000</td>
<td>Support to guarantee a smooth transition from emergency mode to stable management of the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

#### 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>€144 400 000</td>
<td>refugee and migrant situation and provision of services let by the Greek Government Support to the management of Kara Tepe (Lesvos) and Souda (Chios) sites (including provision of core relief items, catering and transportation services, protection, educational activities and healthcare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening the Common European Asylum System and safe pathways to the European Union for persons in need of international protection; accelerating relocation Support to assist most vulnerable migrants stranded in Greece Support to UNHCR Greece Emergency Response Plan and strengthening the capacity of the Asylum Service Support to the voluntary return of third country nationals to their country of origin Support to Greece for the development of the hotspot/relocation scheme and the asylum reception capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Total 2016: €144 400 000

#### ISF Emergency Assistance

#### Total ISF Emergency Assistance: €78 500 000

#### Recipient

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>€12 520 000</td>
<td>Provisional services to the TCNs and operational support to the Reception and Identification Centre (RIC) in the Evros region at the external borders Fylakio - Immediate Response to the Refugee - Migrant Crisis by providing them sheltering and accommodation, catering, health care and transportation on the mainland Provision of security services for RICs in Eastern Aegean islands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2016 | €37 640 000  | Construction of sewer system and water supply network in Samos Support to the effective management of immigration flows in Greece Provision of shelter, accommodation, catering, health care services and transportation at hotspots Upgrading of the Hellenic Police's IT system for the registration of third country nationals |

#### Greek authorities

November, 2018
### Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (€)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>18 090 000</td>
<td>Enhancement of human resources in First Reception Centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enhancement of the response to the public health challenge presented by the refugee/migrant emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reinforcement of the Orestiada Police directorate with police personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Administrative reinforcement of First Reception Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support to the deployment of additional staff members and Special Forces to the severely affected Aegean Hellenic Coast Guard authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enhancement of the operational capacity of Greek authorities and Civil Society Organizations to manage the extreme rise in refugee and migrant flows into Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reinforcement of the Eastern Aegean Police Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistance for unexpected maintenance and repair costs related to the intense use of Hellenic Coast Guard maritime assets as well as Search and Rescue and medical equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of legal information and interpretation services for the effective management of immigration flows in the Eastern External Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Procurement of Search and Rescue equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency assistance covering staff related costs at the Eastern Aegean EU external borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>68 250 000</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (€)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Organizations and Union Agencies (IOM, UNHCR, EASO)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>6 120 000</td>
<td>EASO emergency support to strengthen the Greek hotspots’ fingerprinting capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support to the development of the hotspot/relocation scheme as well as the asylum reception capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4 130 000</td>
<td>Strengthening of the first reception response to new arrivals in mixed migratory movements on the Aegean islands and in the Evros region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>10 250 000</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Effectiveness

**Table 12. Results of ESI project’s beneficiary surveys**

The information presented below was obtained as a result of a household survey carried out by The Red Cross in July 2017. As part of the survey, the Red Cross conducted a total of 393 interviews (52% male and 48% female).

When beneficiaries were transferred to the hospital/external clinic - those who didn’t go usually didn’t due to lack of interpreters being present or other reasons; in terms of safety, **majority of people not feeling safe were**
male (55% vs 45% female) and that was due to easy access from people outside the camp as fights between different groups living in the site.

The information presented below was obtained as a result of a household survey carried out by The Red Cross in December 2017. As part of the survey, the Red Cross conducted a total of 403 interviews (50% male and 50% female).

when beneficiates were transferred to the hospital/external clinic - those who didn’t go usually didn’t due to lack of interpreter being present or lack of transport money; in terms of safety, majority of people not feeling safe were male (55% vs 45% female) and that was due to easy access from people outside the camp as fights between different groups living in the site but when asked about what they would do...the majority of men wouldn’t do anything (30%) and women would talk to the organisation working on the site (27%).

The results presented below are part of a survey carried out by the Red Cross to assess the adequacy of the health services provided to migrants and refugees. The survey was carried out in July and December 2017 and covered the sites in Nea Kavala, Skaramagas and Ritsona. The survey received 393 responses in July 2017 and 403 responses in December 2017.

29% (with many more women than men) considered the external medical assistance not adequate because of:
- Attitudes of the clinic staff of the centres they were referred to (38%)
- The medical treatment was not according to their expectations (38%)
- No interpretation was available (29%)
29% of total people who were referred to external health services did not go to the clinic/hospital.

Obstacles they mentioned:
- No interpretation service in the clinic/hospital (24%)
- Did not know how to get there (18%)
- No AMKA (Greek Social Security number) 10%

Almost all the site residents (97%) who needed medical assistance looked for the services of the Red Cross Basic Health Care Units in their sites.

A third of the total population living in the sites (34%) feel unsafe, with the highest rates in Ritsona (52%). The feeling of unsafety is often connected to the entering of outside people in sites, as there is currently limited control by Greek authorities on who can access the sites. Relatively few (10%) persons expressed they do not feel treated with respect by staff working in the site, but it is a serious issue of trust. The survey does not provide information about the reasons for this opinion nor for the gender difference. Red Cross commits to look into the reasons and address any relevant issues on its side.

The results below were obtained as part of a Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) survey carried out by Caritas from February to April 2017 (covering cash distributions from January to March). The survey was carried out on the phone. Calls were made from a list of 918 phone numbers that were collected during registration and verification from 13 camps. The 918 phone numbers represented 19.2% of a total 4,787 cards loaded. Caritas received 187 responses.

"The CRS and Caritas Cash Assistance project provides monthly multi-purpose cash grants to approximately 7,000 refugees, asylum seekers, and other “persons of concern” (PoC) so that they can cover their basic needs including food, clothing, mobile phone, transportation, and other needs. In January, February, and March 2017, CRS, Caritas Athens (CA), and Caritas Hellas (CH) provided support in 13 sites in Attica (Scaramagas, Elliniko), Central Greece (Volos, Trikala, and Koutsohera), and the North (Vrasna, Sun Beach Hotel, Aetopetra Hotel, Refanidis Hotel, Vasilika, Derveni Alexil, Derveni Dion, Lagadikia, and Kavalari)."

---

214 An additional survey was done also in Nea Kavala in September 2017.
215 In July Lavrio was included, but Red Cross ceased services there shortly after
The results presented below were obtained as a result of a series of cash transfer PDM interviews carried out by The Red Cross in August 2017. The Red Cross carried out a total of 55 interviews (85% male and 15% female).

94% respondents stated that the Red Cross was helpful
96% were satisfied with the activities carried out by the Red Cross
84% of the respondents consider that cash assistance improved their living conditions
87% stated that the cash assistance has reduced the financial burden of their household
27% respondents stated that now they eat better quality food
18% stated that they have improved their sense of dignity
14% stated they have improved their freedom of choice

The results presented below were obtained as a result of a series of cash transfer PDM interviews carried out by The Red Cross in October 2017. The Red Cross carried out a total of 98 interviews (74% male and 26% female).

98% respondents stated that the Red Cross was helpful
100% were satisfied with the activities carried out by the Red Cross
96% of the respondents consider that cash assistance improved their living conditions
93% stated that the cash assistance has reduced the financial burden of their household
23% respondents stated that now they eat better quality food
27% stated that they have improved their sense of dignity
23% stated they have improved their freedom of choice

The results presented below were obtained as part of a common PDM conducted by the “Greece Cash Alliance” (GCA) partners in December 2017. The GCA Impact PDM aimed to assess the impact of the program on beneficiaries’ capacity to address their basic needs and to ensure that they can maintain a dignified and secure life. The PMD was conducted via phone and face to face interviews covering eligible population in 35 sites in mainland and islands. The PMD covered 369 households including 995 beneficiaries.

94% of PoC rely on cash assistance to cover their basic needs and 78% believe that the cash assistance improves their ability to meet these needs (with PoC receiving partial MEB reporting significantly higher shares of positive answers to that question 84%).

Regarding the impact of cash assistance on prevention of negative coping strategies, nearly 90% of the respondents believe that the GCA cash assistance contributes to this.

The results presented below were obtained as part of the PDM Survey carried out by the International Rescue Committee between the 22 and 26 May 2017. For this PDM, the International Rescue Committee surveyed 60 cardholders in Eleonas.

Regarding how respondents cover their basic needs, the three most frequent responses were for “NGO assistance cash” (77%), “Borrowing from family and friends” (11%) and “Support of family and friends (gifts)” (7%).

The results presented below were obtained as part of the PDM Survey carried out by the International Rescue Committee between the 27 and 29 June 2017. For this PDM, the International Rescue Committee surveyed 34 cardholders in Eleonas.

Regarding how respondents cover their basic needs, all respondents replied that they cover their basic needs with NGO assistance cash (100%). It is rather noteworthy mentioning that this is the first time that all of the respondents mention only one source of covering basic needs.

The results presented below were obtained as part of the PDM Survey carried out by the International Rescue Committee on the 29 August 2017. For this PDM, the International Rescue Committee surveyed 25 cardholders in Schisto.

216 The different partners participating in the PDM included: CRS, IRC, IFRC, MC and SP.
Regarding how respondents cover their basic needs, the majority of the responses were for “NGO cash assistance”. Additionally, the three most frequent responses were “NGO cash assistance” (40%), “Use of savings” and “Borrowing (family friends)”.  

**56% of the respondents agree or strongly agree that their family basic needs are better met by the cash received.**

44% of the respondents agree or strongly agree that cash assistance has allowed them to make better decisions for their household.

32% of the respondents agree or strongly agree that cash assistance has allowed them to participate in social activities.

60% of the respondents agree or strongly agree that cash assistance has allowed them to be part of the host community.

64% of the respondents agree or strongly agree that cash assistance has allowed them to feel respected by the members of the local community.

76% of the respondents agree or strongly agree that cash assistance has allowed them to feel safe in general.

---

The information below is part of the Mercy Corps’ PDM report published in September 2017. The aim of the PDM was to monitor the impact of the program on “beneficiaries’ capacity to address their basic needs and to ensure that they can maintain a dignified and secure life for their families”. The PMD was conducted via phone and face to face interviews covering eligible population in 28 sites in mainland and islands. The PMD covered 546 households including 1139 beneficiaries.

Overall beneficiaries considered the cash transfer as having a positive impact on their ability to meet their basic needs. **93% of people receiving full MEB report that being better able to cover their basic needs compared to 65% of the cases receiving partial MEB.**

62% of beneficiaries who receive full MEB cash assistance give a positive ranking to the impact of the cash assistance into meeting basic needs, while the same time only 40% of people receiving partial MEB gave the same ranking.

70% of beneficiaries feel that are in better position to take decisions of their household due to the cash program. 47% of the respondents agree with the fact that cash assistance enables them to do things that they were timid to do before (88% of the people who receive full MEB state more enabled concerning the decision-making ability, compared with 62% of the people who receive partial MEB).

75% of the respondents consider their sense of safety improved due to the cash distribution.

As regards the impact of cash assistance on preventing high risk practices such as informal work, smuggling, or other high risk, dangerous, or exploitative practice almost 60% of beneficiaries agree or strongly agree with the above statement.

---

The information below was obtained as part of the Mercy Corps’ PDM survey carried out in August 2017. The survey received 599 responses (24% female and 76% male).

- **55% of the cardholders claimed that basic needs were better met after cash transfer with significant fluctuations among partial and full MEB**
  - NGO assistance cash represented 81% of how beneficiaries covered their basic needs
  - 63% of respondents consider their sense of safety improved due to cash assistance
  - 37% of respondents report that there is a positive impact in family relationships

---

The information below was obtained as part of the Mercy Corps’ PDM survey carried out in July 2017. The survey received 298 responses (23% female and 77% male).

- **52% of the beneficiaries have improved their ability to cover their basic needs due to cash assistance**
  - 63% of the respondents reported that cash had a positive impact in all aspects of dignity
  - 63% of the respondents reported that cash had a positive impact in all aspects of safety
  - 61% respondents reported a positive impact in prevention of negative coping strategies

---

The information below was obtained as part of the Mercy Corps’ PDM survey carried out in June 2017. The survey received 278 responses (21% female and 79% male).

- **82% of basic needs are covered with NGO assistance cash**
  - 87% of the beneficiaries have an improved sense of safety due to the cash assistance
- 97% of respondents considered that their safety improved thanks to cash transfer
- 43% cardholders feel a positive change with the host community due to the program
- 35% of cardholders feel a positive impact within family relationships due to the program

The information below was obtained as part of the Mercy Corps’ PDM survey carried out in May 2017. The survey received 264 responses (15.5% female and 84.5% male).

- For 74% respondents the cash assistance was the only source of income
- 65% of the beneficiaries basic needs are better met after cash transfer
- 98% of basic needs are covered with NGO assistance cash
- 78% of respondents considered that their safety improved thanks to cash transfer
- 12% cardholders feel a positive change with the host community due to the program

The information below was obtained as part of the Mercy Corps’ PDM survey carried out in October 2017. The survey received 364 responses (20% female and 80% male).

- 96% of people stated that they are better able to meet their basic needs due to cash assistance with no important fluctuations between full and partial MEB receivers
- 66% of respondents reported that they are from moderate to absolutely better able to meet their basic needs due to cash assistance

The information below is part of the Mercy Corps’ PDM report published in November 2017. The aim of the PDM was to monitor the impact of the program on “beneficiaries’ capacity to address their basic needs and to ensure that they can maintain a dignified and secure life for their families”. The PDM was conducted via phone and face to face interviews covering eligible population in 24 sites in mainland and islands. The PDM covered 346 households including 790 beneficiaries.

82% of beneficiaries stated that this is done through cash assistance with significant variations between islands and mainland. NGO cash assistance is followed by food (48%) and items distributed in camps (70%).

96% of the respondents agree that their needs are better met due to the program. full MEB appearing significantly better able to meet their basic needs compared with those receiving partial (75% vs 58%).

39% of the respondents agree with the fact that cash assistance impacts positively feeling equal with the host community.

43% of partial MEB respondents report feeling equal with the host community while the respective percentage for full MEB is 33%.

full MEB have a more enhanced sense of safety (72%) compared to respondents receiving partial MEB (59%).

full MEB have a more enhanced sense of safety (72%) compared to respondents receiving partial MEB (59%).

The information below was obtained as part of the Mercy Corps’ PDM survey carried out in September 2017. The survey received 546 responses (20% female and 80% male).

- September PDM records an increase of the share of people reporting that they are better able to meet their basic needs with important fluctuations between locations receiving Full and Partial MEB (94% vs 64% respectively)

Sustainability

Table 13. Specific factors influencing the handover of ESI activities per sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Handover</th>
<th>Positive elements</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UAM</td>
<td>Authorities</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Gap in essential services (mental health, services for children with disabilities, access to education, access to labour market, e.g. apprenticeship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Insufficient funding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Sector: Protection
#### Handover: NGOs and INGOs
- Positive elements: n.a.
- Challenges:
  - Decreasing number of UAM spaces
  - Reluctance from partners to handover
  - Lack of cultural mediators

### Sector: Education
#### Handover: Authorities
- Positive elements:
  - Transportation funded under DG HOME
  - Existence of volunteer groups, some of which provided a well-managed, professional and fully integrated response
  - Inclusion of children into the formal education program contributed to children’s personal development, as well as in promoting mutual understanding and closer links between the local and migrant communities
- Challenges:
  - Delay in starting NFE in camps

### Sector: Health
#### Handover: Authorities
- Positive elements:
  - Concerted efforts to engage with the MoH and other NGOs to ensure the continuity of activities, capacity building, and introduction of volunteers in the camp to the handover partners
  - Activities scaled down/phased out/handed over as planned before the exit date
  - Protocols (management of SGBV) and tools (vulnerability, age assessment) were created and adopted by the Government
  - PHILOS received sufficient equipment, medicine and supplies to continue basic services uninterrupted for the next two months
  - Availability of AMKA cards for refugees making access to healthcare is sustainable
- Challenges:
  - Slow start of Philos
  - Lack of information sharing (e.g. patient information) preventing follow-up of patients
  - Limited exchanges between healthcare providers and site management and support
  - Challenges to recruit doctors under Philos
  - Lack of interpreters in hospitals and sites
  - Low stocks of medicines and supply.
  - Health needs remain uncovered (not all activities were taken over)
  - PHILOS has not taken on active outreach with health promotion in camps.
  - Environmental health hazards increased following transition.

### Sector: MPCT
#### Handover: Authorities
- Positive elements:
  - Aligned with the Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) scheme being rolled out under the Ministry of Labour
  - Development of a single platform and registry of PoC
- Challenges:
  - The establishment of the SSI does not enjoy broad consensus from the different Greek political parties
  - The transition from an emergency/humanitarian
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Annex 3. Mini Mobile Survey analysis

In order to engage a maximum of beneficiaries and to complete the qualitative information collected as part of the key informant interviews and focus groups with a quantitative analysis, a mini mobile survey was developed. The mini mobile survey
allowed to engage with a maximum of ESI beneficiaries and collect their views on their experience with ESI, more particularly on the Cash and Accommodation assistance provided under the UNHCR programme.

**Survey design and dissemination**

The survey was created in English and translated into French, Arabic, Farsi and Kurmanji to cover the majority of the refugees and migrants in Greece (i.e. language coverage of 81%)\(^{217}\) using the specialised software product SurveyGizmo. The survey was distributed by UNHCR using their ProGres database containing phone numbers of all cases (i.e. households) registered under the ESTIA programme.

As of September 2018, the ESTIA programme supported around 25,000 cases representing 54,000 individuals.\(^{218}\) The survey link was sent on 7 September 2018 to 10,901 cases of the ESTIA programmes covering the five languages of the survey through UNHCR\(^{219}\), 6,803 households received it (63%). A reminder was sent on 17 September 2018.

**Responses received**

A total of 1,788 cases responded to the survey. After cleaning the data and removing duplicates, 1,316 responses were considered valid representing a response rate of 19%.

The table below indicates that the obtained sample size is sufficiently representative of the total target population. The size of the sample ensures that our findings with regards to the target population are accurate with a margin of error of 3.46% at a confidence interval of 99%, and an error margin of 2.63% at a confidence interval of 95%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 14. Margin of error and confidence interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin of error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence interval</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{217}\) UNHCR. 2018. Data on languages spoken.

\(^{218}\) Note this figure varies on a daily basis, the estimate was provided by UNHCR on 17 September 2018.

\(^{219}\) A sample of 10,901 cases were contacted by UNHCR out of 25,000 registered cases. The sample was selected on the basis of the availability of the contact details and the language spoken.
Overview of respondents

*Figure 48. Where do you currently live in Greece?*

The majority of the ESTIA beneficiaries consulted live in the mainland with less than one third living in the islands.

*Figure 49. When did you arrive in Greece?*

The majority of respondents (59%) have arrived less than a year from the date of the survey. 41% have been in Greece for over a year, of which 17% have been in Greece for over two years. The majority of respondents living on the mainland has been there for over a year. While the majority of respondents living on the islands have been there for 6 months or less (Figure 50).

*Figure 50. When did you arrive in Greece (per location of beneficiaries)?*

The majority of respondents (59%) have arrived less than a year from the date of the survey. 41% have been in Greece for over a year, of which 17% have been in Greece for over two years. The majority of respondents living on the mainland has been there for over a year. While the majority of respondents living on the islands have been there for 6 months or less. (Figure 50).
Figure 51. What is your nationality?


The largest group of respondents came from Syria (40%) followed by Iraq (14%), Congo (8%) and Afghanistan (5%). An important share of the respondents (28%) were from a country different from the options provided in the survey. Around 5% of the respondents did not want to state their nationality.

Figure 52. What is your gender?


The vast majority of the ESTIA beneficiaries who participated in the survey were men (80%). Only 18% of the respondents were women and 2% did not want to report their gender.

Figure 53. How old are you?

The respondents are mostly young people (between 18 and 30 years old). 42% are between 30 and 45 years old. Elders represent a very small share of the beneficiaries; 8% of the respondent were older than 55 years old.

**Figure 54. How many people from your family currently live with you (counting yourself)?**

![Bar chart showing the number of people in the family.](chart1)


A majority of respondents live on their own, with no other family member (40%). 12% of the respondents lived together with one family member. 37% of them live together with two, three or four other family members.

**Figure 55. How many of your family members living with you are children (younger than 18 years)?**

![Bar chart showing the number of children in the family.](chart2)


If a large share of the respondents (43%) is not in charge of any children (younger than 18 years old). A majority of the ESTIA beneficiaries consulted were living with at least one child (57%). Around 17% of the respondents live with one family member who is younger than 18 years old. 40% of the respondents stated that they live with two or more family members younger than 18 years old.
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Figure 56. Are you familiar with the activities financed by DG ECHO in Greece and implemented through its partners (for example support activities for asylum applicants such as interpretation, transportation, legal information, food, education, etc.)?


The majority of the respondents were not familiar with the activities financed by DG ECHO in Greece (62%). Less than a third of the ESTIA beneficiaries consulted were aware of DG ECHO activities. 12% of the were unsure about which activities were financed by DG ECHO. The rest are unaware of DG ECHO’s activities.

Needs and support received under ESI

Figure 57. What were your main needs when you arrived in Greece?


Note: Respondents could select multiple responses, therefore the numbers do not add up to 100%.

The shelter and accommodation services are the most needed for respondents when arriving in Greece (70%), followed by protection and health services (60% each). Half of the ESTIA beneficiaries consulted also raised needs in education (50%). Cash and food were not the most urgent needs, raised by 45% and 38% of the respondents respectively. Respondents also mentioned the need for security, safety and protection as part of their main needs when they arrived in Greece. Psychological support was also raised by some respondents.

Figure 58. What type of support did you receive from DG ECHO partners since your arrival in Greece?
A significant share of the respondents has received cash support from DG ECHO’s partners since they arrived in Greece (68%). Half of the respondents have also received support for shelter and accommodation. A lower number of respondents have received support with health services (39%), food (34%) and protection-related services (32%). Less than 20% of the respondents had received any kind of educational activities. Some respondents added that the services they receive was good but not sufficient to cover their needs.

**Figure 59. Does the support you receive (good and services) respond to your needs and (if relevant) the needs of your family?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Very happy</th>
<th>Happy</th>
<th>Neither happy nor unhappy</th>
<th>Not happy</th>
<th>Not happy at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education (N= 86)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection-related services (N=158)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services and medicines (N=187)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter/accommodation (N=243)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food (N=165)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash (N=327)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The degree to which the support received responded to the ESTIA beneficiaries’ needs varied across the different sectors. The respondents were mostly satisfied (59%) with the education services they received, for themselves or their family. The majority (57%) of the respondents were satisfied or very satisfied with the services they benefited from the protection sector. Half of the respondents who received healthcare were satisfied with the support provided while around one third of the respondents were not happy with the health assistance received. As per shelter sector, in general, those who were happy with the support received and those who believed that their needs had not been covered were relatively equally distributed (47% and 42% respectively). Only a third of the beneficiaries were happy with the food services they received. The cash services seem to have satisfied few beneficiaries. About half of the participants who had received cash support were not happy with the programme and believe the support received did not respond to their needs. Only a third of the cash beneficiaries perceived that their needs were covered with the support received. This is also confirmed by Figure 64 below that shows the high share of beneficiaries stating they could not cover all their needs with the cash they received.
When looking at the disaggregation of these services as per location (Figure 60), the results show that the health services and medicines, the shelter and accommodation, the food and the cash scheme responded less to the needs of the beneficiaries on the islands than in the mainland. Indicating that the beneficiaries probably received fewer of such services on the islands. Only the educational services seem to have better responded to the needs on the islands than on the mainland, where close to 70% of the respondents mentioned being happy or very happy about it. Protection related services have been more helpful for the people living in the mainland than on the islands. Healthcare seems to have been lacking on the islands where close to half of the respondents said they were not happy or not happy at all with the services. Similarly, to the health services, the shelter and accommodation and the food offered seems to have been more appropriate to the beneficiaries living on the mainland than for those living on the islands, with respectively 38% and 35% of the island beneficiaries saying they were not happy at all with the shelter and
accommodation and the food they were offered. The cash service shows relatively similar satisfaction across the islands and the mainland.

**Figure 61. If you had any questions or complaints about the support you received, were you able to raise them (e.g. feedback mechanism)?**

![Chart showing satisfaction rates across islands and mainland.]

- N/A, 9%
- No, 45%
- Yes, 46%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Island (N=149)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainland (N=345)</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Respondents were evenly divided on whether they were able to raise any questions they had on the support received with 45% stating that they were not able to express their concerns and 46% agreeing that they could raise any questions they had.

**Beneficiary feedback on UNHCR cash assistance**

**Figure 62. How much do you, or the head of your household if you do not receive this directly, receive in cash per month from UNHCR?**

![Chart showing cash amounts received per month.]

- 2% receive less than €100
- 18% receive €100-199
- 34% receive €200-299
- 11% receive €300-399
- 11% receive €400-499
- 16% receive €500 or more


Most of the respondents have received for their household less than €200 a month from UNHCR with a third receiving between €100 and €200 and a fifth receiving less than €100 a month. On average, a household (or single person if the beneficiary is on his own) receives €247 per month. When divided by the number of people in the household, the average amount of cash received per person is €115 per month.

With the cash received the beneficiaries prioritise the purchase of food. Then, they buy either medicines, clothes or phone credit (with relative equal priority). The cash received is less used for transportation and home appliances. Other goods also mentioned by the beneficiaries were baby supplies.
Figure 63. **What do you buy with the cash support you receive?**

![Bar chart showing the distribution of cash purchases with food, medicines, transportation, phone credit, clothes, and other categories.]


Note: Ranked question. The size of the bar is representative of the priority given by the respondents to the purchased type of goods.

Figure 64. **With the cash support you receive, are you able to buy all the supplies you need (food, clothes, medicines, transport, maternity supplies, tools for work, other...)?**

![Pie chart showing the distribution of responses with Yes, 7% and No, 93%.]


Nevertheless, for 93% of the respondents, it seems that the cash support does not allow the beneficiaries to cover all their needs. Figure 65 indicates that the main reason for this (84%) is the lack of cash rather than the lack of supply or availability of the goods.

Figure 65. **Why were you not able to buy these goods/services?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other goods/services prioritised as the money was not enough to cover all the needs</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not aware of where to find them</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of transportation</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods/services not available at the time</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Respondents could select multiple responses, therefore the numbers do not add up to 100%.
Figure 66. What would you need but are not able to buy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clothes</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicines</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home appliances</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone credit</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation (bus, car, taxi)</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Respondents could select multiple responses, therefore the numbers do not add up to 100%.

If the food, medicines and clothes are the prioritized items bought by the beneficiaries of the cash programme (Figure 63), it seems that the cash received is not enough to cover those needs. 73% of the respondents mentioned they were unable to buy (additional) clothes. 48% respondents mentioned they would also need to buy (more) medicines. And the purchase of enough food remains an issue for 31% of the respondents. Home appliances, although not a prioritised item by the beneficiaries, is still lacking for 46% of the respondents.

Figure 67. Would you prefer to receive assistance in kind (supplies provided directly to you, e.g. food, medicines, school items, etc.)?


Hence, as shown on Figure 67, 58% of the beneficiaries would rather like to receive some goods in kind than receiving cash for it. Figure 68 below shows that clothes and medicines are the main items that would be preferable to be received in kind (72% and 70% of the respondents). Of those who would rather like to receive in kind items than cash, 59% mentioned they would also prefer to receive food than cash for food. Phone credit and transportation however seems to be less adequate to be given in kind, the beneficiaries still prefer to get cash for these purchases.
Figure 68. Which type of assistance would you prefer to receive in-kind?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistance</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clothes</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicines</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home appliances</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation (bus, car, taxi)</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone credit</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a conclusion, it seems that the cash programme already covers the major needs of the beneficiaries however 97% of them still think that the support could be improved through a better estimation of the amounts needed by the beneficiaries (79% of respondents, Figure 70). A smaller share of beneficiaries also suggests increasing the availability of supplies or to adapt the cash delivery process (use a different platform, procedure, distribution mechanism, timing of distribution, support, etc).

Figure 69. Do you think that the cash support (cash assistance) system in place should be improved?

Yes, 97%
No, 3%


Figure 70. How should the cash assistance be improved?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improvement</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better estimate the amounts of cash that are provided to better fulfil the needs</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make more supplies available for purchasing</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplify the way cash support is provided*</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Respondents could select multiple responses, therefore the numbers do not add up to 100%.

* use a different platform, procedure, distribution mechanism, timing of distribution, support, etc.
Beneficiary feedback on UNHCR accommodation support

A total of 508 cases responded to the survey that was sent to a sample of 554 beneficiaries.

The table below indicates that the obtained sample size is sufficiently representative of the total target population. The size of the sample ensures that our findings with regards to the target population are accurate with an error margin of 4.3% at a confidence interval of 95%.

**Table 15. Margin of error and confidence interval**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population size</th>
<th>25,669</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response distribution</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin of error</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence interval</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 71.** Since your arrival in Greece, how long did it take you to get accommodation through the UNHCR ESTIA programme?

![Bar chart](image)


Respondents usually have access to their accommodation in less than 3 months (43% of the beneficiaries). A third of the beneficiaries had to wait between 4 and 6 months before they could be accommodated. Hence, if the majority of the beneficiaries (72%) have waited less than 6 months, for 10% of the beneficiaries the waiting period still last for over a year.
The analysis of the satisfaction of the beneficiaries regarding their accommodation scheme indicates that none of the services, furniture or amenities provided with the accommodation fully satisfies the beneficiaries (Figure 72). The average satisfaction with the services, furniture or amenities included in the accommodation scheme varies strongly amongst the beneficiaries. While some beneficiaries seemed to be very much satisfied with these, others rated these very poorly.

The element that scores the best rating is the location of the accommodations with respect to amenities such as schools, hospitals, shops and places of worship (43% find it good or very good). Yet, 26% of the beneficiaries came out with a neutral feeling about the location, and 30% found it poor or very poor. Respondents also mentioned that the remoteness of the accommodation from the cities (being 'in the middle of the countryside') is an obstacle to their integration with the local population, despite their willingness to learn and integrate.

More than a third of the respondents are satisfied with the utilities (electricity, sewage and internet) as well as the climate (heater). However, a third of the respondents found it also insufficient. The respondents have mixed feelings about the equipment available in the accommodation. If a third of them are happy with it, more than a third of them found it also inadequate or lacking. For instance, one respondent mentioned that the electrical equipment provided are old and hence dangerous to use.

The cleanliness and sanitation of the accommodation do not satisfy the majority of the respondents. Close to half of the respondents found it poor or very poor. Some respondents also mentioned the presence of bugs and insects, and spoiled or crappy amenities due to moisture.

Finally, the space, privacy and safety of the accommodation had the worst ratings by the respondents. 41% of the respondents reported a feeling of unsafety and 56% of the respondents reported having insufficient space and privacy. The beneficiaries’ comments on this issue reveals the fear for their security. The sharing of the accommodations with strangers having different background and cultures can be particularly problematic. Beneficiaries have also complaint on the lack of space; one beneficiary mentioned having to share a 45sq m flat with 8 persons. Others have reported the lack of privacy being a concern especially for pregnant women, sick persons and elderlies.
Evaluation of the operation of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support in the Union

Figure 73. Have your living conditions improved since you benefited from the accommodation scheme under ESTIA?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, very much</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, fairly</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, not really</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, not at all</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although, respondents have a relatively negative perception of the quality and appropriateness of services, furniture or amenities provided with the accommodation scheme under the ESTIA (Figure 72), yet, half of the respondents still found that the ESTIA has fairly or very much improved their living conditions (Figure 73). 40% of the respondents did not feel an improvement of their living conditions thanks to the ESTIA accommodation scheme.

Figure 74. How did your living conditions improve as regards to those services?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Very helpful</th>
<th>Helpful</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Somewhat helpful</th>
<th>Not helpful at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accompaniment and interpretation (N=144)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referral to, and liaison with, the local school/s for enrolment of children (N=113)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psycho-social counselling (N=105)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referral to, and liaison with the local authorities for social security and tax registration (N=90)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-distance transportation for official appointments (N=63)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child protection support (N=58)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic employment counselling and referral (N=42)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic cultural orientation (N=31)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ICF. 2018. Mini mobile survey of ESTIA beneficiaries conducted in September 2018. N=509. Note: of the 509 respondents, 323 answered this question, 183 respondents skipped this question. The shares represented on the graph is based on the 509 beneficiaries, assuming that no response could also mean not having received additional services.

In addition to the services, furniture or amenities provided with the accommodation scheme under the ESTIA, the UNHCR also provided other services aimed at helping the hosted refugees. To note that out of the 509 surveyed beneficiaries, 40% skipped this question.

Figure 74 shows that none of the additional services provided seems to have been very beneficial to the respondents. Of these additional services, the one that was the most helpful to refugees is the accompaniment and interpretation services which was received by 28% of the respondents, and of which a third of them found it helpful or very helpful. The referral and liaison to local schools for the enrolment of the children has been offered to 22% of the beneficiaries and was helpful for a quarter (6%) of them. Psychosocial counselling has been offered to 21% of the ESTIA beneficiaries of which a quarter found it helpful or very helpful.
Annex 4. Field visit 1
The handover of the ESI health projects to National Authorities

Annex 5. Field visit 2
The ESI accommodation projects under the ESTIA programme – working with local NGOs and municipalities

Annex 6. Focus groups on education – analysis of responses
Focus groups with minors were created to discuss their integration process in the Greek educational system and activities (basic and non-formal education) they took part in.

For this evaluation, interviews were conducted with four teams (focus groups) of children aged between 7 and 17. In particular:

- Focus group of 5 children aged 7 to 9;
- Focus group of 7 children aged 10 to 11;
- Focus group of 5 children aged 12 to 14; and
- Focus group of 6 children aged 15 to 17.

In total, 23 children (13 boys and 10 girls) from the following countries were interviewed:

- Afghanistan: 6;
- Syria: 6;
- Pakistan: 3;
- Iraq: 2;
- Iran: 2;
- Congo: 2;
- India: 1; and
- Kuwait: 1

The interviews with focus groups 1 and 2 were conducted in the Lavrio Reception Centre (refugee camp) where children are living with their families. The interviews with focus groups 3 and 4 were conducted in NGO Faros’ Day Centre where the children attend daily Greek and English lessons, participate in non-formal education activities and career counselling.

The interviews conducted with the children were semi-structured. A questionnaire was used as a guideline for the interviews that the evaluator completed with open discussion.

The analysis of the children’s answers to the questionnaire, shows that:

- Most children were attending school in their country of origin before coming to Greece (18 out of 23 children)
• Most children are registered and attend school in Greece (18 out of 23)
• Most children say that they attend classes 3 times per week for 5 hours and that in-between they have a break.
• 2 out of the 5 children that don't attend school are currently in the process of registration and should start in mid-October 2018. Those two children were not registered in school last year because they were not in Greece yet.
• 3 out of the 5 children that are not attending school do not wish to register for the new school year that just started. One of the children says that (he) “cannot wake up in the morning”. One of the children says that the school is far from where he lives. While the third says that he doesn’t understand Greek well enough to be able to communicate at school.
• All children who go to school, do so daily.
• Most children say that their school is close to where they live (15’ walk).
• 12 out of 18 children go to school by bus (IOM bus escort).
• 2 out of 18 children go to school by public transport (subway).
• 17 out of 18 children say that they like their school because they learn new things and they have met children their age.
• 1 out of the 18 children say that he doesn't like his school because it is too strict.
• In most cases, there were 15 to 20 students per class. In two instances, the number of students exceeded 20 and in one, the number did not exceed 10.
• Classmates of the focus group children come from many different countries including Greece, Albania, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. Most of the classmates are Greek. Two children pointed out that having Greek students in their class helps them learn Greek faster.
• 17 of the 18 children have made friends at school. Only one child says that he has not made any friends.
• Most of the children’s friends have the same nationality as them.
• All 18 children say that they communicate with their classmates mostly in Greek and English. With the children of same nationality, they speak in their mother tongue.
• All 18 children say that the modules they attend at school are: Greek, English, Mathematics, History, Geography, Physics, Art, Gym and Music. One child says that his school program also has a computer module while six children say that they can also attend French and German lessons if they choose to.
• Most children say that they have difficulty in understanding in class since the teacher is speaking Greek. Only one child said that his teacher clarifies/answers questions re the lesson in English.
• Most children say that their favourite module is Mathematics (4 out of 18), Greek (3 out of 18), Sports (2 out of 18) and French (2 out of 18).
• Most children say that school has helped them a lot (more than any extracurricular activities) to learn Greek and English.
• 6 out of 18 children say that school has helped them acquire basic knowledge of French and German.
• All children say that the lack an interpreter at school is a problem for them and that they could have adjusted better to their school environment if interpreters were working on school grounds.

• Most children say that haven’t learned much other than what is taught in school. They also add that they have not learned anything about Greek and European culture. Two children say that they learned a little about Greek history, especially the Greek war of Independence (he was specifically referring to the 1821 Greek revolution against the Ottomans). One child mentions that he learned how to do the sign of the cross. Despite him being Muslim, he still participates in the morning prayer with his Christian orthodox classmates.

• Most children do not wish any extra module in their school program. Only one of them says that would have like to study Chemistry as well.

• All children say that they are aware about the school registration process and that it was not difficult nor time consuming as it took less than 3 months.

• Most children (17 out of 18) say that they feel safe at school. Only one child states that does not feel safe and a lot of fights happen in his school.

• Most children (17 out of 18) say that school has helped them socialize and it makes them optimistic about their future.

• All children say that they participate in many and different extracurricular activities (educational, sports, cultural) including computer, sewing, French or Greek classes. They all say that these activities are offered to them for free by NGOs, for example Faros and DRC.
HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS

**Free publications:**

- one copy:

  via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu);

- more than one copy or posters/maps:
  from the European Union’s representations
  (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);
  from the delegations in non-EU countries
  (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm);
  by contacting the Europe Direct service
  (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11
  (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*).

  (*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels
  may charge you).

**Priced publications:**


**Priced subscriptions:**

- via one of the sales agents of the Publications Office of the European Union