Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

Final Report
Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

Final Report
Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

Author: Transtec

Date: 30/03/2020
Abstract

This combined, independent evaluation focuses on DG ECHO’s humanitarian interventions in Iraq and its humanitarian protection interventions globally from 2014 to 2018; it includes a case study on child protection and education.

There was some variability in the quality of needs analyses in Iraq and globally, with good relevance of programming relative to needs identified and the context including for advocacy, though with questions regarding the decreased funding in 2018. The Iraq response was consistent with DG ECHO’s mandate, with weaknesses regarding the nexus. Actions in Iraq and globally were generally coherent with protection policies, with integrated programming somewhat less so with mainstreaming. EU added value included DG ECHO’s field presence and collaborative approach. Programming in Iraq and globally generally achieved short-term objectives, with protection mainstreaming somewhat weaker; addressing broader threats and deeper vulnerabilities encountered more challenges. Advocacy in Iraq had multiple areas of success, though could be strengthened further. Efficiency and cost-effectiveness in Iraq were appropriate, with possibilities for building staff capacities and availability. Nexus results were relatively weak despite some successes.

Recommendations focus on strengthening protection programming, advocacy, strategic planning, capacity for assessing efficiency and cost-effectiveness, deliberation around humanitarian principles, and the nexus.
Contents

List of Figures ........................................................................................................ 12
List of Tables ......................................................................................................... 13
List of Acronyms ................................................................................................ 14

Executive Summary (English) ........................................................................ 16
Introduction, evaluation objectives, scope and framework .......................... 16
Approach and Methodology ........................................................................... 16
Findings ............................................................................................................... 17
Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 24
Recommendations ............................................................................................... 27

1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 28
   1.1. Structure of the Report ........................................................................ 28

2. Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation .......................................................... 29
   2.1. Evaluation objectives and scope ......................................................... 29
   2.2. Evaluation framework ...................................................................... 29

3. Approach and Methodology ....................................................................... 31
   3.1. Theoretical approach to the evaluation .............................................. 31
   3.2. Methodology ..................................................................................... 31
       3.2.1. Case Studies ............................................................................ 35
   3.3. Limitations and Mitigation Strategies ............................................... 36
   3.4. Validity of the Evaluation Results ..................................................... 37

4. Portfolio Overview and Context .................................................................. 39
   4.1. Protection at DG ECHO ................................................................... 39
   4.2. Iraq Context, Portfolio Review and Intervention Logic .................... 42
       4.2.1. Iraq Context ............................................................................ 42
       4.2.2. Iraq Portfolio Review ............................................................... 50
       4.2.3. Iraq Intervention Logic ............................................................. 53
   4.3. Global Protection Context, Portfolio Review and Intervention Logic ... 57
       4.3.1. Global Protection Context ......................................................... 57
       4.3.2. Global Protection Portfolio Review ......................................... 72
       4.3.3. Global Protection Intervention Logic ....................................... 76

5. Findings ......................................................................................................... 79
   5.1. Introduction: Understanding of Protection .......................................... 79
   5.2. Relevance .......................................................................................... 81
   5.3. Coherence .......................................................................................... 96
   5.4. EU Added Value ................................................................................ 104
   5.5. Effectiveness ..................................................................................... 110
       5.5.1. Factors for success and challenges that limited the success of actions 128
   5.6. Efficiency .......................................................................................... 130
   5.7. Sustainability/Connectedness .............................................................. 135

6. Conclusions .................................................................................................. 141
   6.1. Introduction: Understanding of Protection ........................................ 141
   6.2. Relevance .......................................................................................... 141
6.3. Coherence ................................................................................. 143
6.4. EU Added Value ................................................................... 144
6.5. Effectiveness ....................................................................... 144
6.6. Efficiency ............................................................................ 147
6.7. Sustainability/Connectedness ............................................. 148

7. Recommendations ................................................................ 149

ANNEXES ................................................................................... 155

ANNEX1a: Case study Iraq: Good practices in integrating child protection in education into emergency programming .......... 156
1. Conceptual framework for integrating Child Protection in Education in Emergency programming ........................................ 156

ANNEX1b: Case Study Iraq: Detention ........................................ 190
1. Case Study Focus .................................................................... 190
2. Methodology .......................................................................... 190
3. Context for Detention ............................................................ 191
4. DG ECHO’s Response ............................................................. 193

ANNEX1c: Case Study Iraq: Integrated response ......................... 200
1. Case Study Focus .................................................................... 200
2. Methodology .......................................................................... 200
3. Brief Context for the Integrated Response in Iraq .................. 201
4. IOM’s DG ECHO-funded Integrated Response ....................... 202
5. Overall Conclusions ............................................................... 211

ANNEX 2: Evaluation Matrix ....................................................... 212

ANNEX 3: List of sampled projects .............................................. 225

ANNEX 4: List of Interviewees ..................................................... 227

ANNEX 5: Interview and Focus Group Discussion Protocols ...... 231
Key Informant Interview Guide for Implementing Partners and Sub-partners ................................................................. 231
Key Informant Interview Guide for DG ECHO ................................ 235
Key Informant Interview Guide for Donors ................................... 238
Key Informant Interview Guide for Community Leaders and Local Officials .......................................................... 241
Key Informant Interview Guide for Government Officials .............. 244
Questions for Beneficiary Focus Groups ...................................... 247

ANNEX 6: Survey Questionnaires ................................................ 249
SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR ECHO – GLOBAL PROTECTION .......... 249
SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR ECHO – GLOBAL PROTECTION .......... 256
SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR IPs – IRAQ PROGRAMME .................. 263
SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR IPs- GLOBAL PROTECTION .............. 269

ANNEX 7: Bibliography ............................................................... 275

ANNEX 8: Terms of Reference ..................................................... 294
List of Figures

Figure 1: Map of Iraqi Governorates and Major Cities ........................................... 42
Figure 2: DG ECHO funding (excluding country-wide funding), Iraq, and
Humanitarian Needs, Iraq: Jan-Oct 2014 ............................................................ 44
Figure 3: DG ECHO funding (excluding country-wide funding), Iraq, and
Humanitarian Needs, Iraq: Nov-Aug 2014 ......................................................... 46
Figure 4: DG ECHO funding (excluding country-wide funding), Iraq, and
Humanitarian Needs, Iraq: Sep 2015-Jan 2016 .................................................... 46
Figure 5: DG ECHO funding (excluding country-wide funding), Iraq, and
Humanitarian Needs, Iraq: April-Dec 2017 ......................................................... 49
Figure 6: DG ECHO funding (excluding country-wide funding), Iraq, and
Humanitarian Needs, Iraq: Jan 2016-March 2017 .............................................. 49
Figure 7: Number of IDP and returnees and DG ECHO annual funding in Iraq,
2014-2018 ....................................................................................................... 50
Figure 8: Allocation of DG ECHO funding in Iraq, by implementing partners, 2014-
2018 ................................................................................................................ 50
Figure 9: Allocation of DG ECHO funding in Iraq, in M€ by sector (2014-2018) 52
Figure 10: Allocation of DG ECHO-funded Protection Results in Iraq, by protection
sub-sector (2014-2018) ................................................................................... 52
Figure 11: Iraq - Reconstructed Intervention Logic............................................. 56
Figure 12: DG ECHO Global Protection Interventions: 2014 .......................... 58
Figure 13: DG ECHO Global Protection Interventions: 2015 ......................... 60
Figure 14: DG ECHO Global Protection Interventions: 2016 ......................... 63
Figure 15: DG ECHO Global Protection Interventions: 2017 ......................... 66
Figure 16: DG ECHO Global Protection Interventions: 2018 ......................... 69
Figure 17: Allocation of DG ECHO protection actions globally (including Iraq), by
type of implementing partner (2014-2018) ..................................................... 72
Figure 18: Allocation of DG ECHO protection funding globally (including Iraq), by
type of implementing partner (2014-2018) ..................................................... 73
Figure 19: Allocation of DG ECHO protection funding globally (including Iraq), by
world region (2014-2018) .............................................................................. 73
Figure 20: Allocation of DG ECHO funding globally (including Iraq), by protection
sub-sector (2014-2018), in % (DG ECHO calculations) ...................................... 75
Figure 21: Allocation of DG ECHO-funded protection results (excluding Iraq), by
protection sub-sector (2014-2018), by results .................................................. 75
Figure 22: Global Protection - Reconstructed Intervention Logic ..................... 78
Figure 23: Allocation of protection funding, by region ..................................... 89
Figure 24: Benchmark line for correlation between INFORM risk ranking and
protection funding ranking allocation of protection funding (unrealistic scenario)
 .......................................................................................................................... 90
Figure 25: Correlation between INFORM risk ranking and protection funding
ranking, by country .......................................................................................... 91
Figure 26: Share of proposals refused and accepted, global protection (including
Iraq), 2014-2018 ........................................................................................... 92
Figure 27: Share of protection funding, as a share of total funding Europe, 2014-
2018 ................................................................................................................ 92
Figure 28: Share of protection funding as a share of total funding, Latin America
and Caribbean, 2014-2018 ............................................................................. 92
List of Tables

Table 1: Number of Survey Respondents ..................................................... 34
Table 2: Sub-sector classification of protection results on HOPE ................. 74
Table 3: INFORM risk ranking, total funding rank and protection funding ranking, Turkey and Greece ................................................................. 92
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AISPO</td>
<td>Associazione Italiana per la Solidarieta tra i Popoli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCI</td>
<td>Cash Consortium for Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDO</td>
<td>Civil Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOPI</td>
<td>Cooperazione Internazionale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Child Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EiE</td>
<td>Education in Emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERM</td>
<td>Emergency Response Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESSN</td>
<td>Emergency Social Safety Net</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET</td>
<td>Evaluation Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCA</td>
<td>Forgotten Crisis Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Swiss Foundation for Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSL</td>
<td>Food, Security and Livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCT</td>
<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Implementation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOPE</td>
<td>HOPE is the online database used by DG ECHO staff (including Field Experts and Desk Officers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHRL</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEE</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORM</td>
<td>Index for Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Crisis Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCMC</td>
<td>Joint Coordination and Monitoring Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOI</td>
<td>Key Outcome Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRI</td>
<td>Kurdistan Region of Iraq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
KRI
Key Results Indicators

MADAD
European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis

MSF
Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)

NCCI
NGO Coordination Committee

NFI
Non-Food Item

NGO
Non-Governmental Organization

NRC
Norwegian Refugee Council

OCHA
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OFDA
Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance

OHCHR
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

PAO
Public Aid Organization

PDM
Prehospital and Disaster Medicine

PSS
Psychosocial support

SC
Steering Committee

SGBV
Sexual and Gender-based Violence

STC
Save the Children International

TLS
Temporary Learning Space

TOR
Terms of Reference

UN
United Nations

UNFPA
United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

WASH
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

WHO
World Health Organization
Executive Summary (English)

Introduction, evaluation objectives, scope and framework


The independent evaluation covered the period 2014-2018, and had a twofold objective: 1) a retrospective assessment of DG ECHO’s humanitarian interventions in Iraq, with a prospective purpose of contributing to shaping the EU’s future approach in the country; and, 2) a retrospective assessment of the EU-funded actions and engagement in the area of humanitarian protection at 2 levels:

- **Globally**: A portfolio analysis of funded actions with consideration also given to existing DG ECHO evaluations and studies;
- **Iraq**: An assessment of DG ECHO’s protection actions (both targeted and mainstreamed) including advocacy/humanitarian diplomacy activities, illustrated by a case study of DG ECHO’s protection activities in Iraq.

The global protection portfolio analysis component of the evaluation was complementary to the primary Iraq-focused component. There was also a case study on child protection and education in Iraq and two shorter case studies, on detention in Iraq and DG ECHO’s integrated response in Iraq.

The evaluation framework flowed from the evaluative questions and judgment criterion of the evaluation matrix. The evaluation criteria as specified in the Terms of Reference (TOR) were relevance, coherence, EU added value, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability/connectedness.

Approach and Methodology

The overall approach for the assignment involved a multi-level mixed methods approach, informed by contribution analysis. The total number of DG ECHO actions for the evaluation was: global protection (excluding Iraq), 871 actions; Iraq protection, 57 actions; and, Iraq other humanitarian, 71 actions. From this, the team sampled as follows: 25 global protection (excluding Iraq) actions, 13 Iraq protection actions, and 14 Iraq other humanitarian actions.

In line with the mixed-methods approach, the methodology involved qualitative and quantitative data focusing on the sampled actions and more broadly. Qualitative data included: document review, interviews (a total of 148 people were interviewed), Focus Group Discussions with beneficiaries, and observations during the field visits in Iraq (to Qayyarah Airstrip and Jeddah IDP camps, a former field hospital in Mosul, an emergency hospital in Dahuk, and two detention facilities, one in Erbil and the other in Baghdad). Quantitative data included: a survey of DG ECHO staff (54 respondents) and implementing partners (202 respondents), as well as further data from DG ECHO’s HOPE database. Data was triangulated and analysed including with strong contextual analysis. Data analysis involved using the qualitative analysis software NVivo, with data coded in line with the evaluation matrix’s sub-questions. Further, a workshop was conducted with the evaluation matrix’s questions.
steering committee following the submission of the draft report, to examine the findings in more detail and feed into the final report.

Limitations of the evaluation included that many individuals with direct knowledge of the actions from the earlier years of the evaluation period were often no longer in-post or contactable, which was mitigated by adopting a broad focus in the interviews on IP programming with available interviewees; the security situation in Iraq which necessitated cancelling several planned field visits; and, that mainstreaming of protection for the global component of the evaluation was not a focus given that the actions chosen to focus upon by the steering committee were those defined as protection actions in DG ECHO’s database.

Overall, the quality of the various data sources was good, particularly for the Iraq component due to the evaluation team focusing its efforts there. The evaluation team thus has good confidence in the validity of the evaluation results.

Protection at DG ECHO

The concept of protection is embedded in DG ECHO’s mandate and detailed in the Funding Guidelines on Humanitarian Protection released in 2009 and the “Thematic Policy Document n° 8 Humanitarian Protection Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises”, released in May 2016. These underline that the principal objective for the European Commission in humanitarian protection is to prevent, reduce/mitigate and respond to the risks and consequences of violence, coercion, deliberate deprivation and abuse for persons, groups and communities in the context of humanitarian crises. This is to be done through two main approaches: targeted actions (including integrated and standalone programming) and mainstreaming (protection as a cross-cutting theme). A third approach is capacity building, aimed at supporting the development of capacities within the humanitarian system to appropriately address protection in humanitarian crises.

Findings

In line with the evaluation’s dual focus, the findings treat the Iraq and global components together for evaluation questions that focus on both. They are organised by the evaluation criteria, along with an initial overall finding on protection vis-à-vis the evaluation.

INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING OF PROTECTION

Finding 1: There is significant convergence between DG ECHO and its partners on what constitutes humanitarian protection, yet there is also some degree of variation. One aspect of the variation is that more specialised organisations have a narrower definition than organisations with protection-specific mandates. A more significant aspect is at the level of practice, where we see often quite significant variation in understandings within organisations, and between international and local implementing partners. Overall, this poses challenges in evaluating protection since it is not a homogeneous concept where everybody means exactly the same thing when they use the same term.

RELEVANCE

Finding 2: Analysis of the full population of global and Iraq actions shows that all included a needs analysis. Analysis of sampled actions (Iraq and global) showed
a variety of appropriate assessment methods being used, with beneficiaries in general well consulted. In places where consultations with beneficiaries were not conducted or judged to be weaker, the difficult context was often the reason. There was variation in the quality of the needs analyses for Iraq and global protection actions in that while some of the most relevant needs and especially protection needs were considered, vulnerable sub-groups were not always well identified where it would have been appropriate to do so. Needs analyses were also sometimes conducted on a sector-by-sector basis with the protection linkages between sectors unclear, and some needs analyses were generic and high level. To partially address these various issues, DG ECHO has delivered some capacity-building on protection.

**Finding 3:** Overall, DG ECHO programming was well designed to take into consideration the needs of the most vulnerable, and particularly related to protection. There was also good evidence of IPs engaging beneficiaries during project implementation. But efforts to take long-term development objectives into account where possible – as specifically called for in the relevant policy documents – were in general weak. Yet humanitarian programming can sometimes be designed to address its primary goal of providing a needs-based emergency response while also considering more complex needs. As a result of the broad portfolio of work that DG ECHO’s programming often targets, programming in Iraq and globally was somewhat fragmented and did not address all of the components of the needs identified. There was also a risk of having poor continuity because the programming frequently shifted to follow new needs. This mode of operation can be appropriate; but it can potentially be harmful if some categories of protection work are discontinued.

**Finding 4:** The Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) have strong contextual analysis, with modifications to ensure ongoing relevance based on shifts in the context and the needs analyses including identification of gaps. The HIPs were overall effective at articulating the humanitarian response including constraints faced, and were strongly aligned with OCHA’s humanitarian response plans. One area in the HIPs that gave rise to some disagreement was regarding the characterisation of the situation in 2018. In that year, the HIP to some extent provided a justification for the organisational-level decision to draw down DG ECHO funding in Iraq; and while DG ECHO’s funding levels were largely in line with INFORM data (as detailed in finding 6), this draw down did not reflect the true nature of the context according to many IP interviewees. Important to underline is that DG ECHO respondents had the opposite point of view. Ultimately, this question is related to the lack of clarity around the nexus and the exact point at which humanitarian areas of responsibilities end. From a process perspective, a generally strong approach for developing the HIPs was noted. There is also clear congruence between the actions funded and the HIPs, with thematic and areas of focus aligning with particular areas of need.

**Finding 5:** DG ECHO’s Iraq HIPs document the current context and the changes in the context, critical areas of need and areas of work including what types of actions would be approved for funding – they thus articulate a broad strategic direction for the work. DG ECHO had other strategic planning documents, but to the knowledge of the evaluation team, there was no national strategic document that specifically showed how the activities from the portfolio of actions would lead
to the outcomes and impact sought. Further, strategic objectives – ‘results’ – articulated in the HIPs were at a high level and did not constitute clear targets. In saying this, there were also generally good logical linkages between DG ECHO’s activities, outputs, intended outcomes and impacts in Iraq. This is evidence of the more detailed strategic planning that in practice occurred between Iraq team members including the desk officer at DG ECHO HQ in Brussels. Such an approach can be effective; but it is time consuming and depends upon strong team coherence as well as leadership, conditions that are not always extant.

Finding 6: DG ECHO allocates funding globally based on a two-phase, country-level need analysis framework. Statistical evidence shows that DG ECHO in practice prioritises protection funding in line with the needs it identifies. But the data also demonstrates that DG ECHO does not have a purely needs-based prioritisation of countries for protection funding, with for example the Middle East and sometimes Africa and Europe receiving higher levels of funding and crises in Asia and Latin America receiving relatively lower levels of funding in absolute terms.

Finding 7: DG ECHO’s protection advocacy in Iraq involved encouraging the authorities to adhere to international law and guiding the work of implementing partners in line with priority areas of work, foci that were taken up by the 2017 and 2018 advocacy logframes. The logframes also focus on issues such as freedom of movement, accessing basic assistance, violence in new locations, access to vulnerable populations, and targeting of medical infrastructure. The documents identify key actors to target and activities to undertake, and the advocacy activities are in line with the priority areas. Overall, the advocacy on protection in Iraq was relevant to needs and was well-articulated though particularly from 2017 with the adoption of a logframe approach.

COHERENCE

Finding 8: The assistance, relief and protection provided in Iraq targeted the needs of the most vulnerable, in line with the Humanitarian Aid Regulation. Actions were also in general well-coordinated and aligned with the wider humanitarian response. Sampled actions were in line with the humanitarian principles, though the response to the Mosul crisis, while in line with the principles, saw DG ECHO weight the principles differently than some other key actors. In discussions about that response, DG ECHO argued that IPs who refused to operate at the front lines were being overly risk-averse and were insufficiently prioritising the principle of humanity. Such an approach has the effect of delegitimising the other organisation’s position and thus undermines the process of decision-making, which underlines the need to have effective decision-making processes and guidelines in place to make decisions around the principles during the challenging circumstances when saving lives is at stake. Finally, nearly all of the actions in the samples were coherent with relevant thematic and sector policies, and were in line with the principles outlined in the relevant DG ECHO thematic policies such as those on Gender, WASH and protection.

Finding 9: DG ECHO undertook a variety of measures to encourage coordination of humanitarian and development interventions in Iraq, including through IP reporting requirements in the Single Form and through discussions with IP representatives. DG ECHO also undertook meetings, joint missions and
workshops, and did some work on a recovery framework. This level of attention and the added role of MADAD as a bridging mechanism would seem to have positioned Iraq as a strong candidate for the nexus to succeed; but interviewees said that the nexus had not worked well. Reasons include that few development actors were present in the country; that there are other priority countries for development actors; because development and humanitarian actors have different goals and priorities; due to poor coordination of priority areas of work; and because of the often-extant political instability that makes nexus bridging challenging.

**Finding 10:** DG ECHO’s humanitarian protection actions globally and actions in Iraq were generally in line with its 2009 funding guidelines and 2016 policy on protection. Overall, survey respondents said that DG ECHO appropriately applied the approaches to humanitarian protection as outlined in its protection policy, including through targeted and mainstreamed actions, but interviews showed that the subtleties of the distinction between mainstreaming and targeted actions are not widely understood among IPs. There is also clear evidence of implementing partners of global and Iraq actions adopting the targeted approach, both stand-alone and integrated. As regards integrated programming, actions are often designed with relatively limited programming linkages between sectors, which lessens their quality. There are also many actions that incorporate protection mainstreaming yet it was overall not systematically incorporated into the Iraq and global sampled actions including due to sometimes weak capacities and understandings.

**EU ADDED VALUE**

**Finding 11:** EU Added Value analysis shows in Iraq and globally a strong field presence in contexts where the security environment allows, which supports better contextual analysis and modifications of actions as well as more pertinent calls for new actions. There is also strong partnering with IPs including because TAs have latitude for decision-making that makes modifications easier and thus helps to better meet needs. DG ECHO is also seen as open to funding in locations where other funders would not work, and as a reference donor on protection including influencing some IPs to further incorporate it into their programming. As regards innovation in protection, interview evidence suggests that DG ECHO does not foster significant new approaches, although this is less true in some contexts such as in Iraq. A further element of EU added value is related to DG ECHO’s responsiveness to shifting needs and an overall responsive stance in terms of approving and modifying actions.

**Finding 12:** The added value of DG ECHO’s protection advocacy in Iraq and globally is related to its strong field presence where the context allows, which gave it information and legitimacy to more effectively push its advocacy priorities. Also important is its partnership approach with partners and some degree of innovation in its advocacy work; perceptions of its neutrality by virtue of how EU member states’ national priorities are seen as coalescing around a more neutral approach; and, its multiple levels of engagement on advocacy, including supporting its partners in conducting advocacy, doing advocacy itself, and discussing/协调 advocacy messaging with other key EU actors.
EFFECTIVENESS

Finding 13: The most direct way to measure the extent to which DG ECHO achieved its objectives in Iraq is through the actions that it funded, since those actions were in line with the objectives in the various strategic documents. Data on Key Outcome Indicators (KOI) for the entire Iraq portfolio shows a relatively sustained rate of targets reached from 2014 and 2018, with KOI targets largely met to the same extent across locations in the country. Protection and other humanitarian actions both met approximately the same percentage of KOIs. However, protection stands out as the only thematic area where over half of the actions failed to meet all of their KOI target, linked to the fact that protection actions generally have more KOIs than other humanitarian actions. Overall, there is clear evidence of movement toward the achievement of DG ECHO’s objectives in Iraq.

Finding 14: KRIs for protection introduced in 2017 were in general seen as useful tools for measuring output level results by implementing partners, who also value the flexibility to select the most appropriate KRIs themselves. One issue that did emerge among some IPs is that they tend to classify their protection results as “other” to allow them to use custom KRIs only, though this is not endorsed by DG ECHO. DG ECHO has been testing a protection-specific Key Outcome Indicator (KOI) since 2017; it is generally seen positively, though guidance is needed in how to use it including in different cultural contexts and between individuals. As well, there are a number of more "systemic changes" on protection that are important intermediate outcomes and reflect innovative aspects of actions that DG ECHO has funded, but these are not currently integrated in existing indicators.

Finding 15: Based on qualitative analysis, several areas of DG ECHO’s work in Iraq programming worked well while others were seen as less strong. Cash programming was highlighted as an area of success, while the health response and the integrated response were seen as strong because of their efficiencies and ability to adjust rapidly. The flexibility of DG ECHO’s funding was also a strength, as was the rapid response mechanism due to the information that it gathered and rapidly disseminated. Respondents also singled out DG ECHO’s support to the cluster and to OCHA as improving the quality of the response. Protection was highlighted as a strength of the Mosul response, including due to the mix of actions funded. Detention was also felt to be an important area of protection work funded. Yet there was a sense that local organisations were weaker or more variable in the quality of their protection work. Other areas of weakness included protection mainstreaming, the response to gender-based violence and child protection, and referrals for health actions.

Finding 16: Beneficiary satisfaction in Iraq as reported by implementing partners was overall good, with areas requiring adjustments appropriately dealt with. Survey data shows that the majority of IPs in Iraq were highly confident that their DG ECHO-funded actions provided tangible benefits for the most vulnerable. FGDs and small group interviews including with beneficiaries as well as with IPs found a similar level of satisfaction. Yet accountability to the local population was generally weak in action reporting, which will likely be addressed with the protection mainstreaming KOI piloted since 2017.
Finding 17: In general, there is evidence of DG ECHO undertaking direct advocacy in Iraq in all of the areas of focus described in finding 7, though this data is not systematically recorded in a manner that would make possible a complete assessment. This includes advocacy with the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Center, field level advocacy to improve access, and working through the EEAS as well as with high level missions from DG ECHO HQ in Brussels. There is also good evidence of IPs whose actions had advocacy components undertaking advocacy directly with government actors, within the cluster system as well as through such mechanisms as the NGO Coordination Committee Iraq-based Advocacy Working Group. The advocacy gap that emerges is related to the advocacy plan since while the 2017 and 2018 logframes are a good start in laying out the activity areas, the targets for the activities and the indicators, they do not make clear how the plan will be implemented and monitored. In particular, there is no plan for follow-up and thus if advocacy targets are being met.

Finding 18: DG ECHO’s specific objectives in humanitarian protection are to address protection threats and to reduce protection vulnerabilities as well as build protection capacities for those affected by humanitarian crises, and to strengthen the capacity of the international humanitarian aid system to reduce protection risks in humanitarian crises. As regards threats, DG ECHO’s implementing partners were successful in many instances in mitigating immediate protection threats in Iraq and globally, though were not usually successful in sustainably reducing broader protection threats. Addressing protection threats was usually done through integrated actions that combined core protection activities. As regards vulnerabilities, stand-alone and integrated protection programming addressed protection vulnerabilities of target populations in Iraq and globally. However, DG ECHO’s implementing partners are often weak at outlining how they aim to target the most vulnerable. DG ECHO’s implementing partners in general successfully mainstream the most basic protection elements for addressing vulnerabilities; however, there was no section in the action documentation templates, at least until the 2017 pilot protection mainstreaming KOI, where IPs had to detail how they had mainstreamed protection – this led to variability in how clearly it was articulated. Most partners directly engaging with beneficiaries included protection referral systems, though the effectiveness of these was difficult to determine due to weaknesses in reporting and weak follow-up. Capacity building to increase self-protection capacities was also an important element in many sampled actions reviewed. Finally, nearly all IPs strengthened the protection capacities of their staff and volunteers as well as partner organisations, while DG ECHO conducted and emphasized capacity building on assessing protection risks and making referrals.

Finding 19: Quantitative assessment of the total population of protection actions globally including in Iraq found that close to 75 per cent of all protection KRIs were reached between 2014 and 2018. But only about 45 per cent of protection results successfully met all their KRI targets. IPs were in general cautious about what could be accomplished, which some DG ECHO interviewees said was so that they can be surer of achieving them. Where IPs’ actions did not succeed in meeting targets, it was often because the indicators and targets were capturing outcome-level results. Regarding regional trends in fully achieving KRI targets, Africa was slightly below average while Europe (including Turkey) and Latin America were
significantly above average. Looking at the two largest recipients of protection funding, in Turkey less than a third of protection results had achieved all of their KRI targets, while nearly two thirds had in Greece.

**EFFICIENCY**

**Finding 20:** Efficiency was overall good in the Iraq samples of actions, with budgets and plans quite often modified appropriately. Timeliness was sometimes a challenge, and there was relatively good coordination with other key actors so as to improve efficient implementation. DG ECHO championed cash as an efficient transfer modality. Staff turnover was flagged as an efficiency issue during the height of the Mosul crisis, while staffing changes caused several organisations to fluctuate in the efficiency and quality of their work. The cost-effectiveness of the Iraq projects sample analysed was overall good given the context and range of activities, with budget variations justifiable and in general well accounted for. The context did lead to some higher than expected security and implementation costs, some delays, and contributed to underspending for some actions. The proportion of budgets spent on support costs was overall reasonable, while overhead costs were good according to interviewees.

**Finding 21:** DG ECHO efforts to ensure cost-effectiveness of Iraq actions throughout the project cycle were variable. DG ECHO survey respondents found that it had ensured funds were used efficiently and cost effectively to achieve results; IP respondents found that DG ECHO-funded activities were appropriately efficient and/or cost effective given relevant factors; but NGO respondents were more cautious. Interviews made clear that the selection process for partner proposals was strongly needs driven, but efficiency and cost effectiveness was less important than other factors. While DG ECHO staff were strong at field monitoring, they were weaker at financial tracking of actions. And while some appropriate assessment tools were used, there were also gaps as a result of the process being insufficiently systematized; some DG ECHO interviewees also said that capacities were in some cases low. Importantly, the workload for TAs and desk officers forces them to prioritise some areas of work over others with cost-effectiveness being given less weight overall.

**Finding 22:** There were strong synergies between DG ECHO’s overall budget in Iraq and the evolving context, particularly from 2014 to 2016. The budget decreased significantly in 2017 and 2018, yet there were significant humanitarian needs and protection concerns for IDPs and returnees. This gave rise to some concerns regarding the appropriateness of the overall budget for 2017-18 in relation to the assessed needs in the HIPs. The proportions of the total budget allocated to each thematic area was generally well aligned with needs. As regards protection, the funding was generally in line with needs in the HIPs, though it is not clear whether the steep decline in 2018 was fully appropriate. The distribution between protection subsectors was in general appropriate given needs, though for some interviewees, insufficient funding was given to GBV. Balancing of costs vs effectiveness and timeliness were in general appropriate if quite variable depending on the context and type of programming. But overall, the costs were appropriate given the results targeted.
SUSTAINABILITY/CONNECTEDNESS

Finding 23: Results overall were weak in terms of sustainability/connectedness both in Iraq and in global protection. Survey respondents only slightly agreed that gains since 2014 could be sustained, while interviewees were overall negative about how the nexus is working. The samples as well as interviews showed significant variation in sustainability/connectedness, including in terms of clearly articulating an exit strategy. In protection, ensuring sustainability was found to be difficult especially because possibilities for implementing self-protection are limited, and because governments may not have the resources and/or the same objectives as humanitarian protection actors. The integration of refugee and IDP needs into national systems was overall quite weak. As regards Iraq, interviewees highlighted the positive role of MADAD as a bridging mechanism that helped to smooth over the gaps between humanitarian and development actors. As regards global humanitarian protection, DG ECHO provided capacity-building and facilitated the gradual transition of activities to relevant state authorities in some contexts. DG ECHO also at times advocated for governments to include social inclusion and social protection programmes in funding agreements. In contexts where state authorities do not have the resources to take over protection actions, there were several examples of good operational coordination between DG DEVCO and DG ECHO. Yet overall, the global humanitarian protection actions reviewed had relatively poor sustainability. This underlines that, as in Iraq, DG ECHO was weak in achieving sustainable results.

Conclusions

INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING OF PROTECTION

Conclusion 1: There is variation in understandings of protection within the humanitarian sector, which has implications for the consistency of its implementation and underlines the importance of deconstructing what partners understand by protection and protection-related capacity building.

Linked to findings 1, 2 and 10 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)

RELEVANCE

Conclusion 2: Needs analyses are overall appropriate though with some degree of variability in their completeness. Programming was well-designed to respond to the needs identified, though its relevance could be honed by focusing upon further improving the needs analyses, better considering long-term development objectives when possible, and by continuing to assess protection funding allocations relative to needs identified in particular countries.

Linked to findings 2, 3, 6 and 7 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)

Conclusion 3: DG ECHO’s strategy in Iraq was relevant to the context, including as a result of strong planning between team members; yet having a national level strategic planning document similar to an intervention logic would reinforce this process.

Linked to findings 4 and 5 (Iraq)
COHERENCE

**Conclusion 4:** DG ECHO’s response in Iraq was coherent with its mandate. Yet its approach to deliberating about the humanitarian principles in the Mosul response risks weakening the basis for strong future decision-making about them. Coordination around the humanitarian-development nexus in Iraq was weak, linked to the absence of a shared understanding of what it means in practice, a clear implementation strategy and stronger organisational commitment to making it work.

Linked to findings 8 and 9 (Iraq)

**Conclusion 5:** DG ECHO’s protection response in Iraq and globally was coherent with its protection policies, though there were weaknesses as regards mainstreaming and integrated protection.

Linked to finding 10 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)

EU ADDED VALUE

**Conclusion 6:** The EU added value of DG ECHO in Iraq and globally was related to its field presence, its relationships with partners, its responsiveness, to some extent its innovation and proactivity, and its encouragement of protection. As regards protection advocacy, the added value was linked to its expert knowledge, perceptions of its being more needs driven than other actors, and the multiple levels of its advocacy work which helped to ensure coherence of the advocacy messaging.

Linked to findings 11 and 12 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)

EFFECTIVENESS

**Conclusion 7:** DG ECHO’s objectives in Iraq were largely achieved via its various actions, with protection actions slightly less successful overall. Areas of success included cash and health programming, the integrated response to the Mosul crisis and the rapid response mechanism; areas of weakness were related to protection mainstreaming and local partners’ protection work. Beneficiaries were relatively satisfied with the Iraq response’s activities. The protection KRI and KOI are generally well received.

Linked to findings 13, 14, 15 and 16 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)

**Conclusion 8:** DG ECHO’s Iraq advocacy work was in line with its strategic priorities and involved both direct advocacy primarily focused on adherence to international law and access as well as indirect advocacy through its partners. While the logframes from 2017 and 2018 represent a good start in advocacy planning, there are opportunities to build upon them going forward including by reducing the areas of focus as well as by developing an implementation and monitoring plan.

Linked to finding 17 (Iraq)
Conclusion 9: DG ECHO’s actions contributed to reducing immediate protection threats though were weaker at addressing broader protection threats. Vulnerabilities were generally well targeted including through protection referrals, though with weaknesses as regards targeting vulnerable sub-groups and protection mainstreaming. Capacity building was an important area in many actions including building organisational capacity by IPs, though the quality of this was difficult to fully assess; DG ECHO also built protection capacity by conducting training workshops.

Linked to finding 18 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)

Conclusion 10: Protection actions both globally and in Iraq achieved about three-quarters of their protection KRIs, with UN IPs slightly less successful than others, Europe and Latin America actions slightly more successful and Africa actions slightly less successful, and no notable trends as regards particular protection thematic areas. There was a sense however that IPs are often cautious in estimating targets, which makes success more likely.

Linked to finding 19 (global humanitarian protection including Iraq)

EFFICIENCY

Conclusion 11: Efficiency and cost effectiveness were generally appropriate in Iraq, with variations in budgets well justified and plans appropriately modified though with some timing issues, higher than anticipated security costs and some underspending all linked to the context. Efforts to ensure cost effectiveness throughout the project cycle were sometimes weak, partly due to low capacities but particularly the high workload levels for DG ECHO staff.

Linked to findings 20 and 21 (Iraq)

Conclusion 12: Budgets were overall in line with needs for Iraq, though with questions about whether the drawdown in DG ECHO’s budget in 2017-18 was appropriate given the nature and seriousness of needs at the time. Costs were well balanced with effectiveness and timeliness overall.

Linked to finding 22 (Iraq)

SUSTAINABILITY/CONNECTEDNESS

Conclusion 13: There was weak evidence of sustainable results in Iraq and for humanitarian protection globally, primarily related to questions about how to implement the nexus in practice. In Iraq, health, WASH and education actions were relatively stronger while protection was relatively weaker; globally, successes included capacity building of authorities as well as social protection programming.

Linked to finding 23 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)
**Recommendations**

**Recommendation 1:** Build upon protection work by continuing with capacity building measures and direct support to partners, providing further guidance to partners, pushing for stronger protection reporting, and improving the classification of actions in the HOPE database.

**Recommendation 2:** Use the Iraq advocacy work as a starting point for further refining the advocacy approach, by building upon the 2017 and 2018 logframes and adding a clear implementation plan with monitoring so as to maximize advocacy results.

**Recommendation 3:** Develop country-level strategic documents with clear outputs, outcomes and impacts aimed at and use these in the planning and monitoring process so as to improve strategic planning and thus programming.

**Recommendation 4:** Develop/enhance guidelines on tools and approaches for assessing actions’ efficiency and cost effectiveness, provide training to staff, and ensure that staff have sufficient time to undertake these activities.

**Recommendation 5:** Put in place a system to deal with future challenges related to the humanitarian principles in emergencies by building upon the draft framework document. This would include developing internal decision-making processes as well as practical guidelines and training of staff.

**Recommendation 6:** Strengthen strategic planning around the nexus through a shared process of more practically defining it and specifying how it should be implemented in practice including specifically within the EU system, and emphasise its importance in the success of actions and as an area of focus for staff.
1. Introduction

The EU Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Operations (DG ECHO) has engaged Transtec to conduct the Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018. As part of that evaluation, the consultancy team has developed this final evaluation report.

The report includes an Iraq context section and a portfolio overview of DG ECHO’s Iraq protection and other humanitarian actions, as well as a global context section and portfolio overview of DG ECHO’s global protection actions during the period of the evaluation. Moreover, it incorporates reconstructed intervention logics for DG ECHO in Iraq and DG ECHO global protection, findings, conclusions, recommendations, and the three case studies: the main case study on integrating child protection in education programming in Iraq; the short integrated response in Iraq case study; and the short detention in Iraq case study.

1.1. Structure of the Report

The report is organised into seven sections, as follows:

1. Introduction
2. Purpose and scope of the evaluation
3. Approach and Methodology
4. Portfolio Overview and Context
5. Findings
6. Conclusions
7. Recommendations

The report furthermore has 8 annexes, in a separate document, as follows:

1. a) Case Study Iraq: Good practices in integrating child protection in education into emergency programming
   b) Case Study Iraq: Detention
   c) Case Study Iraq: Integrated response
2. Evaluation Matrix
3. List of sampled projects
4. List of interviewees
5. Interview and Focus Group Discussion protocols
6. Survey Questionnaire
7. Bibliography
8. Terms of Reference
2. Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

2.1. Evaluation objectives and scope

This independent external evaluation is required under the EC Financial Regulations and the Humanitarian Aid Regulations (Art. 18) carried out by the Evaluation Team according to the defined EU evaluation standards and principles. The combined, independent evaluation is to cover the period 2014-2018, and has a twofold objective:

- A retrospective assessment of DG ECHO’s humanitarian interventions in Iraq, with a prospective purpose of contributing to shaping the EU’s future approach in the country;
- A retrospective assessment of the EU-funded actions and engagement in the area of humanitarian protection at two levels:
  - **Globally**: A portfolio analysis of funded actions with consideration also given to existing DG ECHO evaluations and studies;
  - **Iraq**: An assessment of DG ECHO’s protection actions (both targeted and mainstreamed) including advocacy/humanitarian diplomacy activities, illustrated by a case study of DG ECHO’s protection activities in Iraq.

The evaluation thus combines a geographic element, focusing on humanitarian interventions in Iraq, and a thematic element, focusing on protection in Iraq and on a global level. It will outline forward-looking strategic recommendations linked to findings on DG ECHO-funded activities in Iraq and on humanitarian protection. As was noted during the kick-off meeting, the global protection portfolio analysis component of the evaluation is seen as complementary to the more primary Iraq-focused component. Additionally, the Terms of Reference (TOR) call for a specific deliverable on DG ECHO’s humanitarian protection, which it was agreed would take the form of a case study. The evaluation team also proposed conducting two more, short case studies (for a total of three).

Full details on the objectives and scope of the evaluation are contained in the TOR for the assignment, which are included as an annex of the report.

2.2. Evaluation framework

The evaluation framework relies on the evaluative questions and judgment criterion of the evaluation matrix, which is included as an annex of the report. The evaluation criteria for this assignment as specified in the TOR are relevance, coherence, EU added value, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability/connectedness. These criteria are linked to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria for evaluating development assistance (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability), to the adapted criteria for evaluating humanitarian action (coverage/sufficiency, effectiveness, relevance/appropriateness, efficiency, connectedness, coherence and impact), and to the adaptation of the humanitarian criteria for evaluating protection action.
(coverage/sufficiency, effectiveness, relevance/appropriateness, efficiency, connectedness, coherence and impact).\(^1\)

3. Approach and Methodology

3.1. Theoretical approach to the evaluation

The overall approach for the assignment involves a multi-level mixed-methods approach. This approach is suitable given the need to focus on different types of data at multiple levels – national and global – and simultaneously to incorporate strong contextual analysis of the implementing context.

The approach adopted is informed by contribution analysis, which focuses on understanding the contribution(s) made by the interventions under assessment relative to the observed results. The evaluation has drawn upon contribution analysis by first articulating the intervention logics for Iraq and for global protection. This ultimately fed into the development of reconstructed intervention logics for both Iraq and the global protection component of the assignment, and to analysis focusing upon assessing the results observed as well as the extent to which the programming contributed to them.

Overall, the evaluation is evidence-based and utilization-focused, to ensure maximal utility for end-users including DG ECHO staff (at headquarters, regional and country level), other EU actors, national and regional stakeholders, implementing partners, and other humanitarian and development donors including EU Member States and agencies.

3.2. Methodology

In line with the evaluation’s mixed-methods approach, the methodology has involved gathering qualitative data through document review, qualitative interviews with key informants, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with beneficiaries, and field observations, as well as quantitative data, through a short electronic (online) survey instrument administered to DG ECHO staff² and to implementing partners (IPs) as well as further data from DG ECHO’s HOPE database.

Overall, these various data sources have made possible triangulation of data between different respondents and different types of respondents, between different documentary sources, and between different types of data (qualitative and quantitative). Furthermore, the analysis is rooted in strong contextual analysis, given that the contexts have played a significant role in influencing DG ECHO’s humanitarian response.

The methodology has adopted a complementary and comparative lens for considering the different foci of the evaluation, i.e. the Iraq other humanitarian actions, Iraq protection actions, and global protection actions. Concretely, this has meant identifying themes, patterns, and issues in the programming at the global protection level and testing for these at the Iraq protection level, and conversely

---

² The DG ECHO staff to whom the survey was administered included global protection respondents and Iraq respondents, with the former including desk staff (i.e. desk officers based in HQ) and field staff (i.e. protection specialists and staff with protection actions in their portfolio based in field offices).
identifying themes, patterns, and issues in the programming at the Iraq protection level and testing for these at the global protection level. This dialogical method means that the Iraq protection component has also been analysed within the larger rubric of the global protection analysis, while the global protection analysis has been deepened by the more in-depth Iraq analysis. The complementary and comparative lens is also useful for considering the Iraq protection and Iraq other humanitarian components, by focusing on a shared overall implementation context and consideration of these programming areas as part of a larger, country-level humanitarian response as outlined in the humanitarian implementation plans (HIPs).

Data analysis involved using the qualitative analysis software NVivo, with data coded in line with the evaluation matrix’s sub-questions and subsequently analysed by the team and thus making possible a structured, consistent and methodologically rigorous consideration of the various sources.

Inception Phase

During the inception phase, the evaluation team with input from the Steering Committee defined the total number of DG ECHO actions relevant for the assignment. This was done based on how they are classified on the DG ECHO HOPE database – thus actions classified as protection constituted the protection list, with child protection actions and mine actions added to the list of protection actions since they are, from a policy perspective, part of protection. The Iraq protection list was taken from that protection list. A further search on HOPE was done for all actions with Iraq as an execution country; the Iraq protection actions were removed from that list, and the remaining actions in the list were taken to constitute the Iraq other humanitarian list. A comparison was also done with the EVA database, to ensure that no actions were being overlooked. Overall then, the total number of actions in the lists include:

- Global protection (excluding Iraq): 871 actions
- Iraq protection: 57 actions
- Iraq other humanitarian: 71 actions

The team then constructed a sample for analysis from that total population of actions based on four sampling criteria:

- Thematic area
- Geographic area for the global sample
- Year of implementation
- Type of implementing partner

The approach taken to constructing the sample was to seek to mirror the proportions of actions in each list – global protection excluding Iraq; Iraq protection; and Iraq other humanitarian – for the four sampling characteristics of interest. The team thus created a sample for each list that matched the proportions of the total population of actions for that list. The final numbers arrived at for the samples are as follows: 25 global protection (excluding Iraq) actions, 13 Iraq protection actions, and 14 Iraq other humanitarian actions. The final list of actions sampled is included as an annex of the report.
**Desk Phase**

The evaluation team conducted rigorous document analysis for the actions in the three samples, using each action’s documents and supplementing these with strategic documentation such as the DG ECHO HIPs for the five years of the evaluation as well as existing DG ECHO evaluations and studies related to humanitarian protection. This analysis fed into the desk review report, which included initial findings based on the documentary review.

A full list of documents used is included as an annex of the report.

**Field Phase**

The field phase involved an inception mission and a main mission, as follows:

- Inception mission to Amman, Baghdad and Erbil in July 2019
- Main Amman and Iraq Mission (Bagdad, Erbil and surrounding areas) in September/October 2019
- A series of remote interviews at the global level conducted between April and October 2019

A total of **148** people was interviewed for the evaluation, including individuals from all the types of interviewees targeted:

- DG ECHO representatives with knowledge of the relevant programming/actions, including thematic experts on protection and other thematic areas (food and cash-based assistance, shelter and WASH, etc.);
- Implementing partners and local implementing partners with knowledge of their organisation’s DG ECHO-funded actions from the sample as well as DG ECHO’s programming more generally;
- Other key humanitarian actors with knowledge of DG ECHO’s programming, such as from United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the protection cluster and the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq;
- Representatives from DG DEVCO, the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (the 'Madad Fund'), and the EU Delegation to Iraq;
- Iraqi government representatives from departments relevant to DG ECHO’s programming, such as the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs; and
- Other funders.

A full list of interviewees is included as an annex of the report.

Furthermore, a total of seven **focus group discussions** disaggregated by gender and age were conducted with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who were action beneficiaries at several sites in Iraq: Qayyarah Airstrip camp, and Jeddah camp. FGD data was supplemented with interviews with local implementing partners, which included an element focused on elucidating the experiences of beneficiaries. These interviews are detailed in the list of interviewees.

The **field visits** to Qayyarah Airstrip camp and Jeddah camp were supplemented with other field visits, to a former field hospital deployed by the World Health Organization as part of the Mosul response, an emergency hospital in Dahuk that
was converted from a health centre to cope with the crisis in Dahuk, and two detention facilities (the Men’s Reformatory Prison in Erbil and the Juvenile Reformatory – Jaefar prison – in Baghdad). Field visits were also planned to three other sites, but these had to be cancelled at the last minute due to insecurity resulting from the protests and government response that broke out in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities in the evening of 1 October 2019. The field visit sites were identified together with DG ECHO Iraq staff, and were aimed at gaining insights about DG ECHO-funded actions – including about the strengths and weaknesses, the challenges faced, and the implementation context more generally.

The survey evaluation questions mapped onto the evaluation matrix, thereby facilitating further triangulation of the data obtained from the Iraq and global portfolio review as well as the Iraq and global protection interviews. As expected, the number of survey respondents made it possible to integrate different types of respondents and perspectives into the overall evaluation data. However, this was slightly less true for responses from DG ECHO staff in Iraq, as these responses had overall low statistical significance, due to the small number of respondents.

The number of respondents from the four surveys was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Global Protection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing Partners</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Number of Survey Respondents

The survey protocols are included as an annex of the report.

The evaluation team also obtained from DG ECHO’s HOPE database experts a further download of indicator data for the full population of actions for Iraq and global protection. This includes baseline, target, and endline values, as well as the descriptions of all Key Outcome Indicators (formerly called Specific Objective Indicators) and Key Result Indicators for the 999 actions under evaluation. This data was assessed, based on adopting the following definition for the success of an action or results: all indicator target values are achieved or exceeded. This quantitative data was incorporated into the analysis in the report’s effectiveness section. Overall, the indicator data analysis provided valuable insights about the extent of success of DG ECHO’s actions in Iraq and in protection globally.

Synthesis and Reporting Phase

During the synthesis and reporting phase, the team drew together the various data sources and conducted full analysis including triangulation of the different sources and between different interviewees. Analysis of the survey data was based on comparisons of averages of the four-point scale responses from the four surveys that were statistically significant, and was disaggregated by respondent type, geographic region where relevant, thematic area of work as well as seniority level for DG ECHO respondents. Additionally, the data from all of the field visits
has been triangulated with other evaluation data. A draft evaluation report was then developed, which was submitted to the SC on 1 December 2019.

Finally, to ensure that the evaluation was maximally utilization-focused, the evaluation team with the support of DG ECHO staff organised 2 workshops to present, discuss and refine the evaluation’s draft findings and recommendations and to use this input to feed into the final evaluation report along with written comments received from the Steering Committee.

### 3.2.1. Case Studies

During the inception phase, discussions were held with Steering Committee (SC) members and with DG ECHO staff in Iraq in order to define the case study selection criteria. It was agreed that the criteria would be two-fold:

- Cases that represent new models or interesting and innovative practices;
- Cases that can inform the evaluation’s larger analysis by virtue of being somewhat ‘representative’ of the types of work DG ECHO has done in Iraq and also being a way of working that DG ECHO is interested in potentially deploying elsewhere.

The three case studies selected are each detailed in separate sub-sections below.

#### Protection

The full protection case study was, according to the inception report, to focus upon child protection and education. In line with this, the case study analyses the integration of Child Protection measures in the DG ECHO-funded Education in Emergency actions in Iraq. It also presents good practices and challenges encountered by implementing partners in allowing education to display its full protective potential. The case study – which involved document analysis, interviews, and a short survey of implementing partners – is included as an annex of the report.

#### Detention

The detention case study was, according to the inception report, to focus upon detention as an important area of work funded by DG ECHO in Iraq and an important issue in the country more generally. The aim of the case study then is to outline the context and key issues in the Iraqi detention sector during the period of the evaluation, as well as to detail and assess DG ECHO’s response – including offering conclusions that can inform future work in Iraq or other humanitarian contexts. The case study involved document analysis, field visits to detention centres, and interviews. The case study is included as an annex of the report.

#### Integrated Response

The integrated response case study was, according to the inception report, to focus upon an integrated response funded by DG ECHO, i.e. a response that integrated various components such as WASH, shelter, and camp coordination and camp management (CCCM). It was also agreed that the case study would focus upon International Organization for Migration (IOM), paying particular attention to IOM’s response to the Mosul crisis. The aim of the case study then is to briefly outline the relevant context and key issues in Iraq during the period, as well as to detail and assess IOM’s integrated response in Iraq, giving attention primarily to
IOM’s integrated response with the other partner organisations as well as to some extent its integration of the various components of its response within its own organisation. The case study also offers conclusions that can inform future work in Iraq or other humanitarian contexts. The case study involved document analysis, field visits to IOM action implementation sites, and interviews. The case study is included as an annex of the report.

3.3. Limitations and Mitigation Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitations</th>
<th>Mitigation Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individuals with direct knowledge of the specific actions done during the</td>
<td>The team worked closely with DG ECHO staff to identify the most relevant person available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>earlier years of the evaluation period and particularly 2014 and 2015 were</td>
<td>with some knowledge of the sampled actions or at the very least with knowledge of their</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>often no longer in-post or contactable.</td>
<td>organisation’s DG ECHO-funded work more generally. This included discussing with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organisational focal points who would be most appropriate to speak with, and included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>speaking with former staff who had moved on but who were contactable. Interviews were</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>thus able to focus upon the specific action sampled and to contextualise that action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>within a larger analysis of the implementing partner’s DG ECHO-funded work; or, they</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>could focus upon the larger analysis of the implementing partner’s DG ECHO-funded work,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with attention also given in a more general manner to issues or questions related to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>specific action sampled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The security situation in the field as a result of protests and the</td>
<td>There was no possible mitigation strategy for these eventualities, since security for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government response beginning in the evening of 1 October meant that some</td>
<td>team members had to be prioritised. Nonetheless, the team had proactively ensured that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>field visits had to be cancelled.</td>
<td>case study field visits would take place early in the mission in case these had to be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rescheduled; thus the most important visits had already taken place by the time that the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>later visits had to be cancelled. Further, team members conducted interviews by phone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with several key informants related to the cancelled field visits, to ensure that at least</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>this data could be incorporated into the evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The global element of the evaluation is focusing upon actions defined as</td>
<td>These limitations flow from the TOR and the approach adopted to defining the evaluand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protection in DG ECHO’s databases; this in turn means that the evaluation</td>
<td>during the inception phase in agreement with the steering committee, as well as decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is not assessing mainstreaming of protection in other humanitarian actions</td>
<td>made by the steering committee during the inception phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at the global level, though is considering mainstreaming for Iraq by virtue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of considering all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DG ECHO-funded actions in Iraq.

3.4. Validity of the Evaluation Results

The sample of actions strongly mirrored the proportions of total actions in each list – global protection other than Iraq; protection Iraq; and, other humanitarian Iraq – for the four sampling characteristics of interest: thematic area, geographic area for the global sample, year of implementation, and type of implementing partner. Furthermore, there was an oversample for Iraq because it is a region of particular focus in the evaluation. Thus while the number of actions sampled relative to the total number of actions implemented was low due to time limitations linked to the evaluation’s budget, the team is overall confident that findings from the analysis of sampled actions are indicative of the larger population of actions though not representative. This confidence also stems from other strategies adopted by the evaluation team, such as the broad focus of the interviews and the surveys (as discussed below).

The necessary documents to properly conduct the evaluation were available, including through access to the HOPE database for the evaluation team and as a result of documents being shared directly with the team. This made it possible for the team to develop a good understanding of the particular actions sampled, as well as of DG ECHO’s programming more generally – including through the HIPs, thematic documents particularly related to protection, and background documents related to such issues as advocacy and protection indicators.

The survey data included a robust number of respondents, though somewhat less so for DG ECHO staff in Iraq owing to low numbers of staff there. Thus while confidence levels and margins of error could not be calculated because the total population sizes were not available, the survey data provides strong indicative (though not representative) data that complements the qualitative data with further perceptual information related to DG ECHO’s programming. In particular, the fact that the survey questions overlapped with the interview questions meant that it was possible to contextualise qualitative interview responses within the larger sample of survey responses.

The overall number of interviewees was very robust, particularly for the Iraq element of the evaluation (in line with the SC’s decision that the global protection portfolio analysis component of the evaluation is seen as complementary to the more primary Iraq-focused component). This meant that the evaluation team was able to gather multiple perspectives and to triangulate these together to arrive at conclusions that could then be juxtaposed with conclusions from other evaluation data sources. Importantly, the team conducted interviews that focused on the sampled actions but also DG ECHO’s work more broadly, to be able to gain a larger perspective than would simply emerge from focusing on those specific actions.

Finally, the team’s usage of further indicator data from HOPE made it possible to gain insights about effectiveness for all of DG ECHO’s actions implemented during the period of the evaluation. While this data did not offer explanations of the results found, the team juxtaposed it with qualitative data to the extent possible so as to develop explanations.
Overall then, the quality of the various data sources was good, particularly for the Iraq component thanks to the evaluation team focusing its efforts there and because the global protection component was aiming to capture a wide range of programming in different global regions with relatively low levels of resourcing relative to the scale of that programming. Additionally, despite delays in the evaluation’s timeline, the process for analysing the data and reporting as detailed in the methodology section was strong. Among other things, this was thanks to the inclusion of a workshop with DG ECHO to present, discuss and refine the evaluation’s draft findings and recommendations. The evaluation team thus has good confidence in the validity of the evaluation results.
4. Portfolio Overview and Context

This section first outlines DG ECHO’s understanding of protection, to contextualise the report’s subsequent analysis.

Secondly, it details the context for DG ECHO’s Iraq protection and other humanitarian work based on an analysis of the actions it has implemented during the period of the evaluation, before outlining a portfolio overview of those actions. Following the portfolio review, the evaluation team presents a reconstructed intervention logic for DG ECHO’s Iraq programming.

Thirdly, the section details the context for DG ECHO’s global protection work based on an analysis of the regions and countries in which it has implemented actions during the period of the evaluation, before outlining a portfolio overview of its global protection actions. Following the portfolio review, the evaluation team presents a reconstructed intervention logic for DG ECHO’s global protection programming.

4.1. Protection at DG ECHO

The aim in this sub-section is to outline what is meant by ‘protection’ from the point of view of DG ECHO and draws on both the 2009 Funding Guidelines and the 2016 Thematic Policy Document.³

The concept of protection is firmly embedded in DG ECHO’s mandate as defined by the Humanitarian Aid Regulation⁴ and confirmed by the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.⁵ In line with these commitments, the Funding Guidelines on Humanitarian Protection released in 2009 establish the framework for the DG ECHO engagement to support protection activities.⁶ The Guidelines describe the fundamental purpose of protection strategies in humanitarian crises⁷: to enhance physical and psychological security or, at least, to reduce insecurity, for persons and groups under threat, to reduce the risk and extent of harm to populations by seeking to minimise threats of violence, coercion and deprivation, as well as enhancing opportunities to obtain safety and dignity.⁸ In line with that, the


⁴ Council Regulation (EC) N° 1257/96 of June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid defines in its Art.1 the scope of the Community’s humanitarian aid as follows: “The Community's humanitarian aid shall comprise assistance, relief and protection operations...”. Article 2 refers to the objectives of humanitarian aid actions, including explicitly referring to protection.

⁵ Article 8 of the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.

⁶ Also in line with the Humanitarian Charter and 2003 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship.

⁷ By humanitarian crises, the European Commission understands events or series of events which represent a critical threat to the health, safety, security or wellbeing of a community or other large group of people. Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 defines in its Art. 1 the scope of the Community's humanitarian aid as follows: "The Community's humanitarian aid shall comprise assistance, relief and protection operations ...". Article 2 refers to the objectives of humanitarian aid actions, including explicitly referring to protection. A humanitarian crisis can have natural or human-made causes, can have a rapid or slow onset, and can be of short or protracted duration.

⁸ In line with the IASC definition of Humanitarian Protection http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/en/about-us/who-we-are.html
Guidelines also define DG ECHO financial support to protection as “funding non-structural activities aimed at reducing the risk for and mitigating the impact on individuals or groups of human-generated violence, coercion, deprivation and abuse in the context of humanitarian crises, and in compliance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence”.

The “Thematic Policy Document n° 8 Humanitarian Protection Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises”, released in May 2016, in replacing the 2009 Funding Guidelines, reaffirms the definition of protection⁹ and reiterates that the principal objective for the European Commission in humanitarian protection is thus to prevent, reduce/mitigate and respond to the risks and consequences of violence, coercion, deliberate deprivation and abuse for persons, groups and communities in the context of humanitarian crises.

The same document also identifies the three main objectives through which the principal objective can be pursued.

These objectives are:

1. Preventing, reducing, mitigating and responding to protection threats against persons, groups and communities affected by ongoing, imminent or future humanitarian crises;

---

⁹“For the European Commission humanitarian protection is defined as addressing violence, coercion, deliberate deprivation and abuse for persons, groups and communities in the context of humanitarian crises, in compliance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and within the framework of international law and in particular international human rights law (IHRL), International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Refugee Law”. See: “DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document n° 8 Humanitarian Protection Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises”, May 2016.
2. Reducing the protection vulnerabilities and increasing the protection capacities of persons, groups and communities affected by ongoing, imminent or future humanitarian crises;
3. Strengthening the capacity of the international humanitarian aid system to enhance efficiency, quality and effectiveness in reducing protection risks in ongoing, imminent or future humanitarian crises.

DG ECHO recognises that humanitarian protection is both a cross-cutting issue and a sector in its own right. Thus, two main approaches can be used to work towards objectives 1 and 2 above: targeted actions (sector) and mainstreaming (cross-cutting). A third approach is capacity building, aiming to ensure the support to develop sufficient capacities within the humanitarian system to appropriately address protection in humanitarian crises (objective 3).

1. **Targeted Actions** relate to upholding of Protection Principles 3 and 4 from the 2011 Sphere Guidelines\(^\text{10}\) and consist of two distinct sub-approaches to reduce the risk and exposure of the affected population:
   a) integrated protection programming employs responses from one or more traditional assistance sectors (shelter, WASH, health, food assistance, nutrition, etc.) in order to achieve a protection outcome
   b) stand-alone protection programming, which consists of protection sector activities only (e.g. Refugee registration, legal aid for documentation, family tracing and reunification, etc.)

2. **Mainstreaming** is protection as a cross-cutting theme, which implies incorporating protection principles and promoting meaningful access, safety and dignity in humanitarian aid. Protection mainstreaming refers to the imperative for each and every humanitarian actor to prevent, mitigate and respond to protection threats that are caused or perpetuated by humanitarian action/inaction by ensuring the respect of fundamental protection principles in humanitarian programmes – no matter what the sector or objective. While mainstreaming protection is closely linked to the ‘do no harm’ principle, it widens it to prioritising safety and dignity and avoiding causing harm, ensuring meaningful access, ensuring accountability and participation and empowerment.

3. **Capacity building**: the European Commission is committed to enhancing the ability of those involved in humanitarian aid to assess, plan, deliver, monitor, evaluate and advocate for protection-sensitive humanitarian aid in a coordinated manner. Capacity building efforts should be sustainable beyond the funded action and coordinated amongst the relevant actors, at the local, national and/or global levels. They should also promote shared learning, through the dissemination of good practices and lessons learnt.

\(^{10}\) Sphere Project “Sphere Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response”, 2011.
4.2. Iraq Context, Portfolio Review and Intervention Logic

4.2.1. Iraq Context

DG ECHO’s pre-2014 engagement in Iraq

DG ECHO’s engagement in Iraq began in the 1990s, providing substantial amounts of humanitarian aid for displaced Iraqis, returnees, refugees and other vulnerable groups to ensure that they had access to basic services such as food, clean water, shelter, education and healthcare. By 2013, DG ECHO was providing support involving timely interventions in remote, relatively violence-prone areas neglected by the authorities, with a particular focus on detention and protection.

Lead-up to the conflict and the spread of hostilities in 2014

In December 2013, heavy fighting between the government’s Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and armed groups started in Anbar governorate, following months of repeated violent attacks and growing political tensions. The violence and military operations rapidly spilled over into other governorates, fuelled by continuous political tensions after the April 2014 elections, most notably in Saladin, Diyala, Baghdad and Nineveh governorates (see figure 1 for a map representing Iraqi governorates). The security crisis reached a peak when the Islamic State group (IS) and associated armed groups launched large-scale attacks against ISF in Nineveh governorate, taking control of Mosul city in June 2014 and other key towns.

Estimates by the UN and NGOs indicate that the first days of the Nineveh crisis triggered a sudden population displacement of between 250,000 and 450,000 people, some of whom had already been displaced from Anbar in late 2013 and early 2014. In August 2014, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) declared a level 3 emergency for Iraq – meaning that existing humanitarian assistance and protection did not match the scale, complexity and urgency of the crisis. This in turn activated a system-wide mobilisation of capacity.

From a protection perspective, DG ECHO’s humanitarian advocacy efforts were at the forefront of the response in Iraq. It thus encouraged informed and prudent communication on grave violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)/International Human Rights Law (IHRL), while also promoting the
enhancement and implementation of a comprehensive national protection framework in the country.

The figures on the following pages graphically represent the situation in Iraq between 2014 and 2018, highlighting the number of people in need and DG ECHO funding (excluding country-wide funding) in Iraq, by governorate. Analysis focuses on understanding the shifts in the context relative to the response by DG ECHO, thus also highlighting the relevance of that response. The five timelines for the period are in line with the way data is structured in the OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overviews, from which data on the number of people in need is also drawn. The classification of DG ECHO funding in Iraq has been made using ‘Jenks natural breaks optimization’ (i.e. data clustering method) to identify the best group similar values and to maximise the differences between classes.\footnote{https://pro.arcgis.com/en/pro-app/help/mapping/layer-properties/data-classification-methods.htm}
The map at the right shows the results of the outbreak of fighting by IS and the fall of Fallujah (see location 1 on the map), which soon spread towards Nineveh, with Mosul falling in June 2014 (2); conflict-displacements rose sharply to 1.2 million. Further attacks on Sinjar (3), Zummar (4) and Nineveh plains displaced many more people in Nineveh. The most severe needs were thus concentrated in Nineveh, along with Dahuk due to its proximity to Nineveh and in Anbar due to displacement from Nineveh and also fighting there.

In 2014, in the face of the humanitarian crisis, DG ECHO significantly scaled up funding to respond to the priority needs of newly displaced populations, populations trapped by the conflict and the most at-risk host communities; more particularly, the amount of humanitarian aid increased seven-fold between 2013 and 2014 (from €7 million to €47 million).

As can be seen in the map at the left, DG ECHO’s Iraq programming in 2014 was concentrated in Erbil, responding to the earlier displacement to that governorate as a result of the neighbouring Syria crisis. That programming involved significant protection, WASH, health, and emergency food assistance. DG ECHO was also very active in Anbar, where it was providing emergency assistance to IDPs and host communities affected by the violence in that governorate, particularly involving cash assistance, non-food items, and shelter. The level of assistance in Anbar underlines the extent to which DG ECHO’s programming was able to quickly respond to the developing crisis in the governorate, thereby ensuring its contextual relevance.
Intensification of the conflict in 2015

In January 2015, the Global Shelter Cluster counted approximately 8.3 million people as being in need of humanitarian aid in Iraq, including 2.9 million in dire need of aid to survive. Out of these 8.3 million people, 5.9 million lived in areas under governmental control and 2.3 million lived in areas outside government control.\[12\] This was in addition to the 217,800 Syrian refugees registered in Iraq, including more than 95 per cent hosted in the Kurdistan region of the country (KRI).

As 2015 progressed, the humanitarian situation in Iraq continued to worsen due to the intensification of the military campaign against IS, which controlled large swathes of the country’s central and northern areas. This included an offensive in the area around the city of Mosul by Kurdish forces supported by the United States-led coalition, suicide bombs in Baghdad, and fighting around Tikrit in Saladin governorate as well as around Ramadi in Anbar and in Kirkuk.

DG ECHO’s main response was to focus on addressing the most urgent needs in Iraq, by prioritising life-saving activities, primarily emergency health, WASH and protection, as well as food, shelter and non-food items. Partners were required to set priorities, so as to ensure that the most vulnerable were assisted first. DG ECHO also integrated greater flexibility in existing agreements with partners to enable rapid deployments. Unconditional cash assistance was preferred to cover emergency basic needs of the most vulnerable instead of in-kind assistance. Furthermore, DG ECHO partnered with a limited number of humanitarian partners to provide life-saving support, such as health and WASH, to civilians living in areas outside governmental control.

---

\[12\] See 2015 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).
The maps at the top and bottom right make clear the impact of the military operations to retake territory taken by IS in Anbar, causing further displacements and leading to Kirkuk hosting large numbers of IDPs even as fighting also was taking place in Kirkuk. Then in late 2015, Baghdad governorate received IDPs fleeing military operations to retake Ramadi (5).

DG ECHO’s evolving response is represented in the two maps at the left. That response saw a significant increase in funding from 2014, and was concentrated in the areas of shelter and settlements, WASH, health and more general emergency assistance including non-food items. The beneficiary groups focused upon were IDPs, local populations and refugees. Protection funding also nearly doubled from the previous year.

What is striking in comparing the maps at the top right and top left is the large degree of congruence between them, with DG ECHO’s response strongly mirroring the governorates of greatest need and thereby underlining relevance in the response. We notably see a further ramping up of activities in Anbar compared to 2014, plus a concentration of funding into Nineveh and Kirkuk compared to 2014, due to the crisis situation in those governorates.
Further conflict in 2016 and 2017 followed by an end to large-scale hostilities in 2018 and DG ECHO’s transitioning response

In January 2016, the Global Shelter Cluster counted 10 million people in need of humanitarian aid in the country – up from 8.3 million in January 2015 – including 3 million living in hard-to-reach locations and areas outside government control.\(^\text{13}\) Over the first part of the year, military operations intensified in Anbar, with fighting around Heet and Fallujah causing further displacement across the already-conflict affected governorate. At the same time, anticipation of the battle for Mosul and the area around the city led to further displacement, with needs becoming even more acute across Nineveh when the fighting actually began late in 2016 and continuing into 2017. Heavy fighting also took place in 2017 in Kirkuk, around Hawija, and again there were very significant displacements ahead of the fighting as well as once it got underway, with priority needs including food, water and medicine. The raging conflict caused the humanitarian situation to further deteriorate, with alleged and proven violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) reported from all parties involved in the conflict, including indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructures. By February 2017, according to OCHA, there were some 11 million people in need in Iraq, 3 million IDPs, 1.5 million returnees and 3.2 million host community members affected by the crisis. Of particular concern were the estimated 120,000 civilians trapped in IS-controlled areas of West Mosul over the first half of 2017, and similarly in Telafar, Hawija and West Anbar.

From 2016 onwards, a major area of concern to DG ECHO and the broader international aid community was the limited access to timely and sufficient humanitarian assistance for most newly displaced families – including children – suspected of IS affiliation. The majority were relocated into IDP camps with strong restrictions on their freedom of movement and other basic rights such as legal documentation. Thus, DG ECHO focused on providing life-saving assistance – food, water, WASH and protection – at first point of entry into areas of displacement, including targeting transit settings such as security screenings and checkpoints when authorities were not able to ensure basic protection safeguards.

While large-scale fighting in Iraq largely came to an end in 2017, a low-level insurgency continued including in 2018, with resultant security operations including in Saladin, Diyala and Kirkuk governorates. In January 2018, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee removed the level 3 emergency classification for Iraq. Yet an estimated 8.7 million Iraqis were still in need of some form of humanitarian aid – close to 80 per cent in Nineveh, Kirkuk and Anbar governorates.\(^\text{14}\) Furthermore, up to one million people were considered as not being able to return to their home areas before large stabilisation activities could take place, including

---

\(^{13}\) See 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).

\(^{14}\) See 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).
de-mining, reconstruction and livelihoods creation. In 2018, Iraq also hosted 244,000 Syrian refugees, who were dependent on assistance.

Returnee numbers reached 3.9 million across the country by July 2018, and aid focused on trying to absorb these returnees despite the often shattered infrastructure; at the same time, large numbers of people remained displaced, with deterrents to return including damaged infrastructure, lack of basic services and livelihood opportunities, insecurity, and challenges with social cohesion according to OCHA. DG ECHO promoted transitioning of the humanitarian aid response in line with the humanitarian-development nexus process, by supporting humanitarian provision of essential public services – such as the reconstruction of water, sanitation and electricity infrastructures as well as the provision of education and healthcare services – combined with mid- and long-term assistance strategies in the areas of stabilisation, good governance and accountability, education and skills development, and access to livelihood opportunities. DG ECHO also continued its efforts related to legal support to people in detention, as well as for ensuring minimum standards of assistance and basic services. These efforts were made due to the high number of security detainees that had caused already poor detention conditions to considerably worsen.
The two maps at the right make clear the extent of needs arising from the military operations in Anbar and particularly around Heet (6) and Fallujah (7). The Mosul (8) crisis also created significant needs in Nineveh in the lead-up to and following the outbreak of hostilities in October 2016, as did the fighting around Hawija (9) in Kirkuk governorate. The impact of the Mosul (10) crisis continued into the mid and latter part of 2017, as did that of the fighting around Hawija (11).

DG ECHO’s overall response in Iraq reached its peak in 2016, with programming focused on health, WASH, shelter and settlements and food security and livelihoods projects. In 2017, the scale of the response began to drop overall and this drop continued into 2018; this was not however true of protection-related programming, which reached its highest level in 2017 before subsiding the following year to below 2015-levels.

In comparing the maps at the right with their counterparts at the left, it is again striking the extent to which DG ECHO’s programming was concentrated in the areas of most significant needs: Anbar, Saladin, Kirkuk and particularly in Nineveh, upon which it placed a particular emphasis. This underlines the strong relevance of DG ECHO’s programming relative to the extant needs, even as they evolved within the country and the various governorates.
In terms of further understanding the relevance of DG ECHO’s response relative to evolving needs during the period of the evaluation, it is helpful to juxtapose funding with two of the major beneficiary groups that it focused on: IDPs and, from the end of 2017 onwards, returnees.

Figure 7 below highlights DG ECHO’s annual funding in Iraq in relation to the number of IDPs and number of returnees. In particular, it highlights the sharp increase of aid in 2015 and more so in 2016 in the face of the armed conflict between the ISF supported by the international coalition and IS. Funding dropped in 2017 and dropped still further in 2018 as the military operations came to an end in January 2018.


4.2.2. Iraq Portfolio Review

Funding allocated to Iraq significantly shifted from 2014 to 2018 between different types of implementing partners. In figure 8, it is notable how the role of NGOs grows progressively larger over the course of the evaluation period – from receiving less than one quarter of the country-wide funding in 2014 to 60 per cent in 2018. In contrast, allocations made to international
organisations were drastically reduced, from 50 per cent of DG ECHO Iraq funding in 2014 to no funding allocated in 2018 (though it is important to note that the ICRC received funding in 2018 for an action whose request was submitted in 2017 and was therefore accounted for in 2017 in the HOPE database). The fact that IOM is classified as a UN agency, and no longer as an international organisation, in the database from 2017 onwards only very slightly contributed to this trend, as IOM received only 3 per cent and 6 per cent of DG ECHO countrywide funding in 2017 and 2018 respectively.

The following two figures (on the next page) help to further illustrate DG ECHO’s humanitarian response in Iraq. Figure 9 shows spending by thematic area in millions of euros for each year covered by the evaluation; figure 10 focuses on the allocation of DG ECHO-funded protection results across protection sub-sectors for each year covered by the evaluation, bearing in mind that individual protection results are classified under more than one protection sub-sector. As illustrated by figure 9, greater emphasis was put on shelter and settlements as compared with other areas of funding. Additionally, in all areas other than protection, the amount of funding gradually increased until 2016 with the peak of the Iraq crisis before dropping; yet the funding for protection actions increased until 2017, after which it significantly dropped. Analysis of these trends can be found in the evaluation findings.

15 “International organisations” refers to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as well as IOM up to September 2016.
Figure 9: Allocation of DG ECHO funding in Iraq, in M€ by sector (2014-2018)

Figure 10: Allocation of DG ECHO-funded Protection Results in Iraq, by protection sub-sector (2014-2018)
4.2.3. Iraq Intervention Logic

The Intervention Logic\textsuperscript{16} explains the causal links between the DG ECHO-funded intervention in Iraq and positive desired impacts for the target population. This was reconstructed from the analysis of the HIPs published between 2014 and 2018, in which DG ECHO explained its priorities and objectives.

The DG ECHO intervention in Iraq between 2014 and 2018 aimed at reducing the immediate impact of the conflict for affected populations, especially by reducing morbidity and mortality, and increasing safety and protection. The intervention also looked in the medium term at creating the conditions for improved dignity and quality of life for conflict-affected people. Lifesaving, protection and dignity are the three impact-level achievements that would act as preconditions for future longer-term development interventions.

The rationale for the ECHO humanitarian intervention between 2014 and 2018 in Iraq – illustrated in detail in the context section of this report – can be summarised into four main areas of needs:

- Systematic disregard of IHL, IHRL and refugee law by all parties to the conflict, e.g. systematic targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructures (including WASH and health infrastructures, purposeful denial of humanitarian assistance and basic public services);
- Increased level of vulnerability of populations affected by the crisis, which were particularly high between 2015 and 2017 when at one point there were an estimated 8.3 million people in need of humanitarian aid in the country, including 2.9 million in dire need of aid to survive;
- Repeated and massive forced and multiple displacements due to violence and military force;
- Constrained access to life-saving and front-line humanitarian services, coupled with challenges to principled humanitarian assistance, to those most in need.

DG ECHO responded to these needs by engaging with its partners in humanitarian aid sector-specific activities, in particular in Health, Water and Sanitation, Shelter, Settlements and Non-Food Items, Food Assistance, Education in Emergency and Protection.

In the short-term, DG ECHO and its partners engaged in the Health sector mainly by providing emergency health on the conflict frontline, basic health services and medical supplies, as well as by supporting epidemiological surveillance and a health Information Management System; in the Water and Sanitation sector, activities focused on cholera prevention, emergency water supply, sanitation interventions and distribution of hygiene kits for IDPs and highly vulnerable communities in conflict areas; in the Shelter, Settlements and Non-Food Items sector, the activities involved establishment of IDP camps and collective centres (including site selection, planning and development of IDP camps, camp...
coordination and management) as well as emergency individual household shelter and distribution of essential non-food items; in the Food Assistance sector, in-kind food distribution and food voucher assistance was provided; in the Education in Emergency sector, activities concentrated on establishing temporary education spaces, supporting non-formal education activities in areas with a high percentage of out-of-school children and with grave child protection concerns, and emergency teacher training (including child protection and psychosocial support).

In the medium term, DG ECHO and its partners engaged in the Health sector mainly by supporting basic health services (primary and secondary health) and reproductive health, providing essential vaccination packages and medical supplies, rehabilitating health infrastructures, providing mental health and psycho-social support, and developing capacities of health staff and local health institutions. In the Water and Sanitation sector, assistance focused on provision of water supply, solid waste management, hygiene promotion, prevention of cholera and other water-borne diseases, and developing capacities of WASH civil servants and local health institutions. In the Shelter, Settlements and Non-Food Items sector, key activities focused on camp coordination and camp management in camps and collective centres. In the Food Assistance sector, food cash assistance was provided, as well as emergency livelihoods/promoting access to income interventions. Finally, in the Education in Emergency sector, key activities focused on supporting the transition from non-formal education to formal education, back-to-education campaigns/community mobilization, rehabilitation and winterization of educational infrastructures, capacity development of education personnel, and other support to formal education.

For Protection, DG ECHO’s intervention in Iraq has been guided by the Humanitarian Protection Funding Guidelines 2009 and the Humanitarian Protection Policy from 2016. Humanitarian Protection was pursued both through protection mainstreaming throughout the sector-specific delivery of aid, and protection targeted actions. The latter included integrated protection actions in which responses from one or more traditional assistance sectors (Health, WASH, Food Assistance, etc.) were used in order to achieve a protection outcome, plus stand-alone protection activities. Stand-alone protection activities focused on Protection Advocacy, Protection Information Dissemination, Protection Coordination, Assistance to victims of violence (including SGBV), Registration/verification/access to documentation, Referral mechanisms, Legal support, Tracing and reunification, Support to detainees and their families, Child soldiers/Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (CAAC), Rapid Protection Assessment Mechanism, as well as Child Protection and Psychosocial support.

Both the mainstreamed and targeted actions contributed to achieving the protection outcome of better protecting civilian vulnerable people and reducing

17 “Protection mainstreaming is protection as a cross-cutting theme, which implies incorporating protection principles and promoting meaningful access, safety and dignity in humanitarian aid. This might also be described as ‘good programming’ or ‘safe programming’.” – “DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document nº 8 Humanitarian Protection Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises”, May 2016.
their exposure to risk. Protection-related causal links are highlighted in dark blue in the reconstructed Intervention Logic diagram.

In addition to the strong emphasis on protection mainstreaming and integrated protection programming, DG ECHO also promoted integrated approaches across the sectors with the aim of increasing efficiency and maximising impacts. Examples of this are the integrated Health-WASH approach for outbreaks prevention, and the integrated Food-NFI & Shelter approach through multi-purpose cash-based assistance to support local markets and to enhance communities’ economic recovery, preparedness and resilience.

The main external factors – outside of DG ECHO’s control – that could have impacted on the implementation of the activities and therefore on the achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts, were identified as follows:

- Denial of humanitarian access to civilians in need;
- Limited humanitarian space leading to remote management;
- Lack of partners and local response capacity;
- Difficult humanitarian access due to security or political constraints.

The DG ECHO-funded activities and related outputs (i.e. provision of life-saving assistance, provision of basic services, provision of specialized protection services, humanitarian access and IL adherence) were expected to result in three main categories of outcomes:

1. Relating to short-term emergency assistance, the key outcome was that Conflict and affected Populations have access to emergency life-saving services;
2. Relating to short- and medium-term protection focused support, the key outcome was that Civilian vulnerable people are better protected and less exposed to risk;
3. Relating to medium-term assistance, the key outcomes were that Conflict-affected populations have access to basic services, and that Resilience of families and communities as well as resilience and capacities of national systems are strengthened. The achievement of the latter outcome is the basis for the humanitarian assistance-development nexus.

Some general risks and assumptions that could have influenced the causal links between activities-outputs-outcomes and impacts are as follows:

- HCT, cluster and inter-cluster architecture and other interagency coordination mechanisms are efficient, including efficient operationalisation of the “Whole of Iraq” approach;
- Needs-based approach adopted (vs supply-lead approach);
- The HRPs are fully funded and the international response is sustained;
- UN agencies and NGOs are able to implement and monitor projects’ resources;
- Partners and donors adopt a coordinated approach to preparedness and contingency planning;
- Humanitarian-development nexus: strategies are developed to link humanitarian aid and development.
Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

Figure 11: Iraq - Reconstructed Intervention Logic

### Activities

**Health**
- Emergency health on the conflict frontline
- Basic health services
- Medical supplies
- Epidemiologic surveillance and health information management system

**WASH**
- Emergency water supply, sanitation interventions, and distribution of hygiene kits for IDPs and highly vulnerable communities in conflict areas
- Cholera prevention

**Shelter & NFI**
- Settlements (site selection, planning, and development)
- Camp coordination & management
- Camp & collective centres
- Emergency individual household shelter

**Food Assistance**
- Support to informal non-formal education in areas with high % of out-of-school children & with grave child protection concerns
- Temporary education spaces
- Emergency teachers training (including child protection and PSS)

**EiE**
- Support to formal education
- Education personnel capacity development
- Rehabilitation and reintegration of educational infrastructures

**Protection Coordination**
- Protection Advocacy
- Protection Information
- Dissemination
- Advocacy

### Outputs

**Basic Services for People in Need**
- Resilience
- National capacities are developed and the system strengthened

**Conflict affected populations have improved livelihoods**
- Conflict affected populations have access to basic services
- Civilian vulnerable people are better protected and less exposed to risk

**Conflict affected people are safe and protected**
- Conflict affected populations have access to emergency live-saving services
- Conflict and affected populations have access to emergency live-saving services

### Impact

**Mortality, morbidity and suffering is reduced**
- Life-saving assistance

**Conflicts and affected Populations have access to emergency live-saving services**
- Specialized Protection Services

**Access to conflict-affected population**
- IL Adherence

### Rationale for the Intervention

1. Systematic disregard of IHL, IHRL, and refugee law by all parties to the conflict, e.g., systematic targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructures (including WASH and health infrastructures), purposeful denial of humanitarian assistance and basic public services

2. Increased level of vulnerability of population affected by the crisis peaking between 2015 and 2017; at one point, 8.3 million are in need of humanitarian aid in the country, 2.9 million in dire need of aid to survive

3. Forced and multiple displacements due to violence and military force

4. Constrained access to lifesaving, first line humanitarian services/challenges to principled humanitarian assistance to those most in need
4.3. Global Protection Context, Portfolio Review and Intervention Logic

4.3.1. Global Protection Context

Overall, in situations of natural disasters and man-made crises, DG ECHO aims to systematically look beyond immediate material needs to the broader issues of personal safety and dignity, ensuring that protection risks and needs are adequately addressed, in line with its mandate outlined in the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (1996) and confirmed in the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (2007). Its programming decisions are informed by contextual risks analyses in each crisis, including drawing on information from the Global Protection Cluster.

The figures on the following pages give an overview of DG ECHO’s global protection interventions from 2014 to 2018. Iraq has been mentioned in order to place it in the global protection context, though a separate and more detailed account of interventions in Iraq is provided in the previous sub-section. All figures draw on data taken from the HIPs and the HOPE database, unless otherwise mentioned.

---

18 As stated in the methodology section, protection-specific funding is defined as the sum of grants allocated to results classified in the HOPE database as protection, child protection and mine action.
In the Middle East, DG ECHO developed a very large multi-sectoral response to provide life-saving assistance to some of the 6.8 million people inside Syria in need of humanitarian assistance and over two million Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries, namely Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq (KRI). Inside Syria, DG ECHO allocated no more than 2 per cent of its total country funding to protection-specific results (as per the HOPE classification). However, it funded life-saving activities, such as health, which incorporated important protection mainstreaming elements. In neighbouring countries, DG ECHO maintained a large support for integrated protection actions for Syrian refugees and host communities, including gender-based violence (GBV) and psychosocial support (PSS). In Iraq, DG ECHO protection programming focused on responding to the priority needs of newly displaced populations, populations trapped by the conflict with Islamic State and the most at-risk host communities, as well as Syrian refugees despite access issues. In Yemen, as the country gradually descended into civil war following the Houthi take-over of Sana’a in September 2014, DG ECHO intervened to provide life-saving assistance to conflict-affected IDPs, including those facing food insecurity. In Palestine, DG ECHO scaled up its assistance to address the deteriorating humanitarian situation caused by the Israeli offensive in Gaza in July 2014, which drove a quarter of Gaza’s population out of their homes.

In Africa, DG ECHO significantly scaled up its emergency response to address urgent immediate needs of some of the 1.5 million South Sudanese IDPs by the end of 2014, and the half million South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia, Kenya,
Uganda and Sudan. In Somalia, DG ECHO allocated 12 per cent of its funding to protection-specific activities, in particular toward IDPs who represented 75 per cent of the country’s population facing acute food security crisis. In Eastern DRC, DG ECHO responded to the dramatically deteriorating security situation where both the armed forces and armed groups were frequently committing abuses against civilians, by funding PSS, mediation services, and integrated protection actions such as health activities, among others, with a focus on the most vulnerable people. Congolese asylum-seekers were also supported in Tanzania through UNHCR. In Central Africa, DG ECHO supported UNHCR and UNICEF to assist Central African Republic (CAR) asylum-seekers in Chad after the large refugee influxes in Southern Chad following the 2013 coup d’état in CAR. In Niger, DG ECHO funded UNHCR to support refugees from both Nigeria and Mali.

DG ECHO allocated 9 per cent of its annual protection funding to Asia and the Pacific. It maintained its ongoing presence in Afghanistan by providing assistance to Afghan IDPs and returnees, as well as Pakistani refugees, including new arrivals following military operations in a neighbouring district of Pakistan. In Pakistan, DG ECHO slightly scaled down its funding while maintaining protection services to conflict-affected populations and those affected by natural disasters. In India, DG ECHO focused on alleviating the emergency needs arising from protracted crises in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the Naxalite insurgency and localised food insecurity. Finally, in Myanmar, DG ECHO provided assistance to areas inhabited by ethnic minorities, including Rakhine State which was hosting 800,000 stateless Muslim people at the time.

In Latin America, where 7 per cent of protection funding was allocated, DG ECHO focused on providing aid to IDPs and conflict-affected civilians in Colombia, to respond to their immediate protection threats. In Venezuela and Ecuador, Colombian asylum-seekers and refugees were also provided with protection, legal and basic humanitarian assistance. Finally, in Haiti, DG ECHO facilitated the return of highly vulnerable IDPs, and supported survivors of natural disasters that hit the region’s poorest country in 2010 and 2012.

In Europe, aside from its assistance to Turkey as part of the Syria response, DG ECHO set up an emergency response to the armed conflict in eastern parts of Ukraine which displaced over one million people in the year; approximately 10 per cent of the funding allocated was protection-specific.
In the Middle East, DG ECHO significantly scaled up its response to the Syrian regional crisis, nearly doubling its budget during the year as the conflict took a dramatic turn, including indiscriminate and disproportionate aerial bombings and ground attacks by different conflict parties, with systematic disregard for rules of international humanitarian law to protect civilians. Protection assistance was very significantly increased in Jordan, and to a lesser extent in Lebanon, whose strict regulations rendered access for Syrian refugees increasingly difficult. DG ECHO also started supporting Syrian refugees in Egypt — which was classified as a forgotten crisis — along with poor host communities through UN-led programmes. In Iraq, the conflict worsened considerably with some 8.3 million people in need, to which DG ECHO responded with protection advocacy, life-saving activities such as emergency health programming, and child protection activities. In Yemen, the Saudi-led air campaign in March caused the conflict to spread to nearly all governorates. Thereafter, the Yemen crisis was classified as a system-wide level 3 humanitarian emergency by the UN, with 80 per cent of the country’s population deemed in need of humanitarian assistance. As a result, DG ECHO doubled its initially planned funding to strengthen essential life-saving assistance, including protection. In Palestine, DG ECHO renewed its support to the same implementing partners to continue addressing the protection needs generated by the 2014 Israeli military offensive in the Gaza Strip, as well as preventing further forced displacements in the West Bank.

In Africa, DG ECHO responded to new crises and maintained support to protracted ones. In Nigeria, following Boko Haram’s raids in villages with nearly no response from national authorities, DG ECHO set up an emergency integrated

In 2015, DG ECHO global protection funding increased by 30 per cent due to deteriorating humanitarian situations in both the Middle East and Africa.

Total DG ECHO Protection funding globally in 2015 was €150,907,492.
response to assist some of the 2.2 million IDPs in the North-Eastern part of the country, and refugees in neighbouring countries. DG ECHO also scaled up its protection assistance in Cameroon that witnessed similar attacks, as well as influxes of Nigerian and CAR refugees. In Libya, DG ECHO stepped up its response as the internal conflict triggered in July 2014 further developed, impacting the close to half a million UNHCR-registered IDPs as well as the large number of migrants and asylum-seekers. Yet information remained limited and action had to be conducted from Tunisia, thereby limiting effectiveness. The response to the South Sudan crisis, a level 3 humanitarian emergency, remained high on DG ECHO’s agenda. In Somalia, DG ECHO reinforced protection assistance to some of the 1.1 million IDPs and scaled up its assistance to Yemeni refugees, as well as in Djibouti. In Eastern DRC, it maintained assistance to protect civilian populations in areas where partners were faced with difficult access and complex displacements, as well as provided aid to incoming CAR refugees, following the persistent security problems and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the country. DG ECHO also provided assistance to refugees fleeing these crises. In Kenya, DG ECHO allocated protection funding primarily toward two major UNHCR refugee camps hosting Somali refugees and South Sudanese refugees respectively. In Ethiopia, DG ECHO delivered aid to South Sudanese refugees, along with host communities and the large number of IDPs affected by the El Niño drought. In Uganda, 57 per cent of DG ECHO’s funding was protection-specific and was allocated toward South Sudanese and Congolese refugees. In Tanzania, DG ECHO’s funding focused upon stand-alone protection actions as well as health, WASH and food security, which provided protection assistance to Burundian refugees who had fled the country in their tens of thousands following the government repression against protests opposing the Burundian president staying in power. In Sudan, DG ECHO maintained protection assistance to South Sudanese refugees at risk of statelessness, as well as multi-sectoral support to IDPs.

In Europe, as Turkey became the largest host of refugees in the world with over 2.3 million Syrian refugees by late 2015, DG ECHO increased protection support to out-of-camp refugees, who constituted 90 per cent of the total refugee population. In North Macedonia and Serbia, as the number of migrants who came from Greece was continuously rising, DG ECHO provided short-term integrated protection emergency support to respond to their basic humanitarian needs. Finally, in Ukraine, DG ECHO scaled up its emergency response – and raised protection-specific activities to 30 per cent of the country portfolio – to assist the large IDP population affected by the ongoing conflict, despite a ceasefire agreement signed in February.

In Asia and the Pacific, DG ECHO protection funding remained limited relative to other world regions. Still, DG ECHO significantly scaled up its integrated response in Afghanistan, and to Afghan refugees in Iran, as the conflict between government forces and the armed opposition in Afghanistan intensified and an earthquake struck the north-eastern part of the country at the border with Iran. Elsewhere in the region, DG ECHO also responded to several major natural disasters, including Nepal’s earthquake, and heavy floods and landslides in Myanmar and Bangladesh.
In Latin America, DG ECHO scaled down funding, totalling 4 per cent of its global protection funding, while maintaining protection assistance to IDPs in Colombia, and to a lesser extent, to Colombian refugees and asylum-seekers in Venezuela and Ecuador, as well as IDPs in Haiti.
In Europe, the migrant crisis meant that Greece and Turkey were the two countries that received the most DG ECHO funding globally, with Turkey allocated 23 per cent of DG ECHO’s annual global protection funding and Greece receiving close to 11 per cent. By early 2016, Turkey was hosting over three million registered Syrian refugees and hundreds of thousands of registered asylum-seekers and refugees of other nationalities, mostly Iraqis and Afghan nationals. In response, in late November 2015, the European Commission established the Facility for the Refugees in Turkey for an amount of €3 billion over two years, 2016 and 2017, including €1.4 billion allocated by DG ECHO, to improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable refugees and also to reduce the number of arrivals to Greece. In 2016, DG ECHO protection funding doubled in comparison to 2015, as a result of very large new interventions in Europe and a major scale-up of programmes in the Middle East.

In 2016, DG ECHO protection funding doubled in comparison to 2015, as a result of very large new interventions in Europe and a major scale-up of programmes in the Middle East.

---

19 The €1.4 billion funding was allocated to DG ECHO in addition to the funding made available in 2016 and 2017 from other sources, namely from EU Member States (€1.09 billion) and the EU (€0.31 billion). See European Commission report “First annual report on the Facility for refugees in Turkey”.
aimed to address immediate needs of migrants, mostly Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan nationals, from March 2016 until March 2019. DG ECHO did not fund as many core protection activities in Greece as it did in Turkey, although 21 per cent of the 2016 funding was still protection-specific. Finally, in Ukraine, DG ECHO scaled up its response to the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation, which was linked to increasing fighting and the suspension of pensions and social benefits to around 450,000 IDPs in February 2016. Over the year, DG ECHO increased its funding for referrals to protection assistance and put a greater emphasis on protection mainstreaming as noted in the HIP; funding was allocated almost exclusively to disputed areas under both government and separatists’ control.

**In the Middle East**, DG ECHO maintained very large full-scale support to integrated assistance programmes within Syria – a country facing continuously increasing levels of violence in complete disregard of international humanitarian law – as well as in neighbouring countries, in particular Jordan, the third largest global protection funding recipient in 2016, Lebanon, and to a lesser extent, Egypt and Iraq. Jordan and Lebanon showed themselves to be increasingly reluctant to host Syrian refugees, tightening their border policies and supporting at times forced returns and dismantling of informal settlements; thus DG ECHO’s strategy maintained a clear focus on protection. Activities funded in Syria and neighbouring countries sought to support the development of comprehensive protection strategies, including monitoring and advocacy. In Iraq, the crisis reached its peak and displacement affected many people, particularly as the Iraqi government moved to take back control of IS-controlled areas toward the end of the year; in response, DG ECHO focused on providing life-saving assistance as well as on such issues as capacity building on protection, protection advocacy, documentation and GBV programming. Yemen turned into the largest humanitarian crisis in absolute numbers in 2016, with 21.2 million people (82 per cent of the population) in need of assistance. DG ECHO scaled up its response by maintaining the same core priorities, including life-saving support for conflict-affected populations, as well as integrated and mainstreamed protection services. In Palestine, DG ECHO maintained ongoing support with a focus on protection, emergency preparedness and response, and humanitarian advocacy.

**In Africa**, although DG ECHO protection funding slightly increased in absolute terms, it represented less than 20 per cent of global funding in 2016, due to the very large-scale programmes in Europe and the Middle East outlined above. In South Sudan, the spread and intensification of fighting triggered new and massive forced displacements inside and outside the country as civilians were systematically targeted by armed forces, and populations suffered grave sexual and gender-based violence. This also had an impact on the food security situation, which was worse than ever since independence in 2011. DG ECHO scaled up its already very large funding to address increasing needs in the country, as well as in Sudan and Uganda, which witnessed constant influxes of South Sudanese refugees. In both countries, DG ECHO funding was almost exclusively geared toward protection. In other countries in the region, Kenya, Ethiopia and Tanzania, assistance was maintained for refugees fleeing Sudan and other man-made crises.
in Somalia and Burundi among others. In Western and Central Africa, DG ECHO stepped up assistance to IDPs affected by Boko Haram, which intensified its attacks in Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad, further threatening already highly vulnerable populations, such as in Chad and Niger where the closure of the borders with Nigeria disrupted local markets. DG ECHO also continued assisting longstanding refugees in the region, such as Darfuri refugees hosted in UNHCR camps in Eastern Chad. In Somalia, DG ECHO responded to the UN urgent appeal launched in early December 2016 for humanitarian assistance amid severe drought which left five million Somalis – more than 40 per cent of the country’s population – without sufficient food. In DRC, DG ECHO maintained ongoing protection support to conflict-affected population in Eastern provinces, and in the North, to CAR refugees who had fled in 2014. In Libya, DG ECHO continued supporting protection assistance to conflict-affected IDPs and new returnees in Benghazi, and in Algeria, to vulnerable Sahrawi refugees.

**In Asia and the Pacific**, DG ECHO scaled up its protection assistance to respond to the needs of the close to half million new Afghan IDPs who fled intensifying fighting between opposition and government forces, as well as of the same number of Afghans unexpectedly returning from Pakistan due to a complex series of push and pull factors, including harassment on the part of the Pakistani authorities. Integrated protection assistance was also provided to Afghan refugees in Iran, as well as to Pakistanis affected by the earthquake that hit the country in late 2015. Finally, DG ECHO maintained assistance to conflict-affected individuals in Myanmar.

**In Latin America**, DG ECHO further scaled down protection funding in absolute terms, representing less than 2 per cent of its global protection funding in 2016, in line with the total share of budget allocation to the region. Protection funding still represented 10 per cent of the region’s budget however. Aside from maintaining ongoing support to Colombian IDPs and refugees in neighbouring countries, it also provided emergency responses through integrated protection actions in Ecuador, which was hit by an earthquake, and in Paraguay, which was affected by heavy rains.
In Europe, both Turkey and Greece remained the two single largest global funding recipients. In Turkey, although overall DG ECHO funding further increased (by 56 per cent), protection-specific funding remained overall stable. Funding was allocated through the Facility for the Refugees, with a strong focus on creating linkages with and building upon government systems wherever possible. DG ECHO’s programme – in providing support for basic needs, health services and education support – was complemented by protection activities designed to better address beneficiary vulnerabilities. In Greece, DG ECHO further allocated funding through the emergency support instrument, adopted in 2016, including both integrated and standalone protection actions implemented by major UN and International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) protection partners. In Serbia, DG ECHO scaled down its support as the number of refugees and migrants reaching Europe through Greece significantly decreased, following the EU-Turkey deal. Finally, in Ukraine, DG ECHO maintained assistance to conflict-affected individuals and stepped up support following the drastic escalation of violence at the beginning of the year, including intensive shelling of residential areas. Very minor funding was also allocated for Ukrainian asylum-seekers and refugees in Russia.

In the Middle East, DG ECHO maintained large support to address the Syria regional crisis, as the conflict continued with overwhelming humanitarian needs in all parts of Syria, including in places where fighting came to an end, such as Aleppo. DG ECHO’s funding helped address some of these needs through an ongoing integrated approach. Importantly, DG ECHO increasingly emphasised the need to use Humanitarian Diplomacy within Syria to ensure those in need were not cut off from receiving assistance. In Lebanon and Jordan, and to a lesser
extent in Egypt, DG ECHO funded appropriate emergency assistance for newly displaced populations as well as continued support for vulnerable refugees and asylum-seekers severely affected by the protracted crisis. In Iraq, widespread displacement and high levels of need meant that DG ECHO focused on life-saving assistance as well as GBV, tracing and reunification, mine action, child soldiers and protection advocacy programming. In Yemen, humanitarian actors were confronted with a triple crisis: continued armed conflict, looming famine threatening nearly seven million people, and the largest ever cholera outbreak. DG ECHO maintained significant integrated protection support in a highly complex environment where frontlines were constantly shifting.

In Africa, DG ECHO slightly increased its protection funding, representing 25 per cent of its global protection funding at that point. In Uganda – the third-largest protection funding recipient in 2017 – DG ECHO very significantly scaled up its integrated protection assistance to South Sudanese refugees. Their numbers dramatically increased over the year, reaching close to 900,000 individuals by the spring of 2017, due to the intensification of fighting and worsened food insecurity in South Sudan. DG ECHO similarly provided further assistance to new South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia and Sudan, although to a lesser extent as they were not as numerous as in Uganda. In Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya, DG ECHO deployed emergency assistance to address the needs of the millions of individuals impacted by severe drought conditions; among these three countries, only the Somalia response had significant integrated protection components, however. In DRC, DG ECHO maintained essential protection assistance in the Eastern provinces and set up new interventions in the Western part of the country, but only limited protection-specific activities were conducted in the West. In Tanzania, DG ECHO also stepped up protection assistance to some of the quarter of a million Burundian refugees living in camps, who were identified as facing deteriorating conditions from late 2016. In CAR, DG ECHO scaled up its assistance to address the needs of the increasing number of IDPs as well as Central African refugees in Cameroon, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo. DG ECHO also provided ongoing protection assistance to IDPs in Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad, as the Boko Haram crisis unfolded, as well as Sudanese and CAR refugees in Chad. Finally, as Libya witnessed continued violence and instability, DG ECHO primarily focused on providing food assistance, water, sanitation and hygiene, health and education in emergencies.

Asia and the Pacific received slightly more than 5 per cent of DG ECHO’s global protection funding in 2017. In Bangladesh, DG ECHO expanded the ongoing response to accommodate the 700,000 new Rohingya refugee arrivals, and continued providing needed assistance to the more than 500,000 Rohingya individuals in Myanmar’s North Rakhine state who were in need of humanitarian assistance. DG ECHO also stepped up emergency responses in the two countries as well as in Nepal, which was hit by natural disasters. In Afghanistan, DG ECHO

20 As per the HOPE database. However, it is worth noting that close to three quarters of the protection-specific funding (€20.05 million out of €27 million) allocated to UNHCR was classified as protection, although it also included health, WASH and other sectoral activities. DG ECHO noted that this was the case for about 75 to 80 per cent of the UNHCR contracts.
scaled up its protection assistance through the Emergency Response Mechanism to address immediate needs of some of the more than a quarter of a million new IDPs, as the security situation further deteriorated and the number of civilian casualties was at a record high. DG ECHO also stepped up protection assistance to new Afghan refugees in Iran.

In **Latin America**, DG ECHO further scaled down its protection funding, allocating less than 1 per cent of its global protection funding to the region in 2017. Still, it maintained protection assistance in Colombia and neighbouring countries as well as in Haiti. Humanitarian interventions to respond to multiple natural disasters did not include core protection components, although some protection mainstreaming was ensured, and very minor protection actions were included in the response to the Venezuela crisis.
In the Middle East, DG ECHO reduced its overall funding by 27 per cent in absolute terms. In relative terms however, as global protection funding was scaled down in larger proportions (see box on the right), protection funding allocated to the Middle East as a share of global protection funding actually doubled. The second and third-largest recipients of protection funding worldwide were Lebanon and Syria respectively, after Turkey. Within Syria, DG ECHO maintained integrated protection interventions, although at a reduced scale, to address continuously increasing needs by mid-2018: 8.2 million people threatened by explosive hazards, 2.9 million people living with permanent disabilities and about 30,000 new conflict-related trauma cases every month according to the 2018 HIP. DG ECHO also maintained life-saving assistance where fighting was ongoing, such as for the population of the besieged enclave of Eastern Ghouta and Yarmouk, among others, retaken by government forces in April and May 2018 respectively. In Lebanon and Jordan, DG ECHO maintained emergency assistance for refugees and asylum-seekers affected by the protracted crisis as well as newly displaced populations. In Iraq, there were high numbers of returnees as well as still large numbers of IDPs – DG ECHO focused on addressing their needs including with protection programming focusing on such issues as documentation, tracing and reunification, and protection advocacy and capacity building. In Yemen, DG ECHO scaled up protection specific-funding – although not as much as the overall country funding, which increased by 64 per cent – to address drastically increasing humanitarian needs in the wake of escalating
conflict that followed the killing of former President Saleh in December 2017, as well as a famine, declared by the UN in early December 2018.

**In Europe**, Turkey remained the largest global protection funding recipient. DG ECHO maintained integrated protection actions, while building on its 2017 protection strategy, further supported information and awareness-raising, specialised protection services, and targeted protection monitoring and advocacy. In Greece, DG ECHO significantly decreased its protection funding as the number of refugees and migrants gradually decreased compared with the year before, and the emergency support instrument entered its third and final year in March 2018. In Ukraine, DG ECHO scaled up its protection assistance to conflict-affected people, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, DG ECHO funded an emergency response as the number of refugees and migrants quickly rose while their humanitarian situation deteriorated.

**In Africa**, DG ECHO scaled down funding to roughly 2015 levels, which nonetheless remained relatively high in order to address multiple new and protracted crises. In the Sahel, DG ECHO responded to the food and nutrition crisis which hit the region at levels unseen since 2012. In Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and CAR, DG ECHO funded integrated protection interventions to address threats linked to severe food insecurity. At the same time, DG ECHO intervened to protect conflict-affected individuals in some of these countries, including CAR, Chad, Nigeria as well as Cameroon, where rising tensions took place in the two western English-speaking regions. DG ECHO also slightly stepped up funding to address Niger’s cholera outbreak. In Eastern Africa, DG ECHO continued supporting South Sudanese IDPs and refugees in Sudan – hit by a severe economic crisis – as well as Ethiopia and Uganda. As regards the latter, DG ECHO significantly scaled up its initially planned funding as ongoing refugee influxes from South Sudan and DRC threatened to overwhelm humanitarian systems, with over 1.1 million refugees in the country by mid-2018. In Ethiopia, DG ECHO also stepped up protection assistance to respond to massive forced displacement in several regions of the country, as a result of long-standing tensions over access to natural resources and political control. In DRC, DG ECHO maintained its integrated protection interventions, in particular in Eastern provinces, as well as responded to the new Ebola outbreak in areas bordering Uganda. In Somalia, DG ECHO increased funding to address protection needs of some of the over 5 million people – about 45 per cent of the population – facing acute food insecurity. In Libya, DG ECHO ensured protection assistance to conflict-affected populations.

**In Asia and the Pacific**, DG ECHO maintained high protection funding to respond to the needs of close to one million Rohingya refugees living in refugee camps in Cox's Bazaar, Bangladesh. In Myanmar, DG ECHO also funded protection interventions, including intercommunity tension mitigation in the neighbouring Kachin and Shan States, as well as in Rakhine state. In Afghanistan, DG ECHO maintained protection support to conflict-affected IDPs, and to a much lesser extent to Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan.

**In Latin America**, DG ECHO increased protection funding by more than five times from 2017 to 2018, to respond to sharply increasing humanitarian needs in the
region. Still, Latin America remained the least-funded region in terms of protection, receiving less than 5 per cent of global protection funding in 2018, in line with the overall budget allocations to the region. In Venezuela, DG ECHO provided integrated protection assistance to the population severely hit by the socio-economic crisis, with 61 per cent of the country's population living in extreme poverty and 80 per cent being food-insecure. Venezuelan refugees were also assisted in neighbouring countries Colombia and Brazil, and as far as Ecuador and Peru. In Colombia, DG ECHO provided additional protection assistance to conflict-affected IDPs and local communities following a massive resurgence of violence by armed groups fighting to gain territorial control, resulting in about 10 per cent of the country's population being in need of humanitarian aid. DG ECHO also stepped up its response to Haiti’s severe food crisis, provided assistance to victims of earthquakes in Mexico, and assisted conflict-affected people in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
4.3.2. Global Protection Portfolio Review

In order to further understand DG ECHO’s global protection response during the period of the evaluation, it is useful to consider the breakdown of global protection funding by implementing partner (figure 17) for each year covered by the evaluation.

Among the 871 global protection actions (excluding Iraq) implemented between 2014 and 2018, the majority were implemented by NGO implementing partners, which conducted 58 per cent of all protection actions in 2014 and 65 per cent in 2018. UN agencies implemented more than a quarter of actions, and international organisations about 10 per cent (see figure 17). However, because UN implementing partners as well as IOs implemented significantly larger actions in terms of funding allocations, DG ECHO’s funding was equally allocated across NGO and UN implementing partners, with both of them receiving about 43 per cent of all protection action funding, and 14 per cent to IO implementing partners.

Figure 18 shows the allocation of global protection funding in a different light, due to the UN’s relatively larger protection-specific grants. Nearly half of the total protection funding in 2014, and more than half in 2015 and 2016, was allocated...
to UN agencies. In 2017 and 2018, HOPE data shows that two thirds and about 30 per cent of global funding was allocated to UN agencies respectively, possibly linked to the timing of grant allocation. International organisations received 17 per cent of protection funding globally in 2014, which dropped from 2015 onwards, stabilising around 5-6 per cent. NGOs received more than a third of protection funding from 2014 and 2016, slightly over a quarter in 2017 and close to two thirds in 2018.

As outlined in the previous section and further explained in the findings section (relevance), very large increases in protection funding in the Middle East took place in 2015, and significantly more so in 2016 when it doubled, after gradually decreasing from 2017. Furthermore, funding in Europe surged in 2016 and 2017, nearly reaching the level of protection funding allocated to Africa (the second world region by DG ECHO’s protection funding) and dropped in 2018.
Table 2: Sub-sector classification of protection results on HOPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-sector</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other (Protection)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building (Protection)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection advocacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of and response to violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection information dissemination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee and IDP Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection information management and monitoring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documentation, status and protection of individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and land property rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child soldiers / children associated with armed groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracing and reunification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to separated and unaccompanied children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention Programmes [renamed “Detention” from late 2017]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the cells coloured grey indicate that those sectors did not exist in the indicated years. The cells coloured dark blue indicate that those sectors existed as sub-sectors of the former ‘child protection’ sector, which was removed in 2017.

Figures on the allocation of global protection funding across protection sub-sectors must be interpreted carefully, as the HOPE protection results are classified into an unequal number of protection sub-sectors. Besides, the classification changed during the period of evaluation, as illustrated by table 2. Keeping this issue in mind, figure 20 on the next page shows estimates of the allocation of DG ECHO funding globally across protection sectors. Based on the same data, figure 21 on the next page shows the numerical count of DG ECHO protection results in each single protection sub-sector (see footnote 22 for further details).

---

22 As detailed in table 2, eight sub-sectors were introduced in 2015, including two that formerly were sub-sectors of the then ‘child protection’ sector. The ‘detention programmes’ sector was initially removed in 2017 and re-introduced late in the year under a new name, ‘detention’. Finally, the sub-sector ‘refugee and IDP protection’ was removed in 2016.
Figure 20: Allocation of DG ECHO funding globally (including Iraq), by protection sub-sector (2014-2018), in % (DG ECHO calculations)

Figure 21: Allocation of DG ECHO-funded protection results (excluding Iraq), by protection sub-sector (2014-2018), by results
4.3.3. **Global Protection Intervention Logic**

The Intervention Logic explains the causal links between the DG ECHO-funded protection intervention and positive desired impacts for the target population. This was reconstructed from the analysis of the global protection thematic guides, HIPs related to selected samples of actions, and other regional strategic documents published between 2014 and 2018 in which DG ECHO explained its protection priorities and objectives.

The figure that follows this introduction visualises the DG ECHO global protection results chain and how this links to the humanitarian assistance results chain. It does not include risks and assumptions as well as external factors – which would normally be in an intervention logic – because these are very contextual, and it is not possible to have them at a global level.

The DG ECHO global protection intervention between 2014 and 2018 aimed at increasing safety and protection of conflict and disaster-affected people, with a view to contributing to their improved dignity and quality of life. Safety and protection, as well as dignity and quality of life, are the global impact-level achievements of DG ECHO humanitarian intervention globally. These would act as preconditions for development interventions.

The rationale for the DG ECHO protection intervention between 2014 and 2018 could be summarised into three main areas of concern:

1. Respect of rights and obligations contained in the body of IHRL, IHL and refugee law, which are often disregarded;
2. Recognition that all people have certain fundamental rights that must be protected at all times, even in conditions of war and emergency, including the right to life, the right to legal personality and due process of law, the prohibition of torture, slavery and degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment and the right to freedom of religion, thought and conscience; and,
3. Upholding the European Commission’s humanitarian mandate as defined by the Humanitarian Aid Regulation and confirmed by the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.

DG ECHO has responded to these areas of concern by engaging with its partners in protection-related specific activities (stand-alone protection programming), leading to four main protection outputs as follows:

1. Access to specialised protection services: this is achieved through provision of specialised support such as Assistance to victims of violence including Sexual and Gender-Based Violence; Registration, verification and access to documentation; Referral mechanisms and case management; Legal support; Rapid Protection Assessment mechanisms; Family tracing and reunification services; Support to detainees and their families; Prevention,
demobilisation and reintegration services for child soldiers and Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups; Child Protection services; Psychosocial support, and Community awareness, mobilisation and empowerment on protection.

2. Capacity development of affected communities on protection: this is achieved mostly though protection information dissemination and awareness-raising on protection-related issues.

3. Access to conflict-affected populations: this is mostly achieved through advocacy efforts (often joint advocacy efforts between DG ECHO and its partners).

4. Adherence to IL: this is achieved mostly through humanitarian coordination, combined advocacy efforts and awareness-raising, information dissemination and training on IHL, IHRL and refugee law to warring parties at all levels.

Integrated protection programming\textsuperscript{24} was also employed to achieve the protection-specific outputs, while contributing to the wider humanitarian outputs and objectives.

In addition to that, protection has been mainstreamed across emergency life-saving assistance and basic services assistance in humanitarian sectors (e.g. Health, Water and Sanitation, Shelter, Settlements and Non-Food Items, Food Assistance, Education in Emergency) with the aim of preventing, mitigating and responding to protection threats that are caused or perpetuated by humanitarian assistance ("do no harm" principle) and ensuring the respect of fundamental protection principles in humanitarian programmes.

The DG ECHO-funded protection activities and related outputs were expected to result in a key protection outcome: civilian vulnerable people are better protected and less exposed to risk. Protection-related activities and outputs also contribute to the achievement of humanitarian-related outcomes. These outcomes are Conflict and disaster-affected populations have access to emergency live-saving and basic services, and Resilience of families and communities as well as resilience and capacities of national systems are strengthened.

\textsuperscript{24} Integrated protection programming employs responses from one or more traditional assistance sectors (shelter, WASH, health, food assistance, nutrition, etc.) in order to achieve a protection outcome. See: "DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document no. 8, Humanitarian Protection – improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises", May 2016.
Figure 22: Global Protection - Reconstructed Intervention Logic

Rationale for the Intervention

1. Rights and obligations are contained in the body of IHRL, IHL and refugee law
2. Recognition that all people have certain fundamental rights that must be protected at all times, even in conditions of war and emergency, including the right to life, the right to legal personality and due process of law, the prohibition of torture, slavery and degrading or inhumane treatment or punishment and the right to freedom of religion, thought and conscience
3. European Commission’s humanitarian mandate as defined by the Humanitarian Aid Regulation and confirmed by the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid

ACTIVITIES
- Assistance to victims of violence (including SGBV)
- Registration/verification/access to documentation
- Referral mechanisms
- Legal support
- Rapid Protection Assessment mechanism
- Tracing and reunification
- Support to detainees and their families
- Child soldiers / Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (CAAC)
- Rapid Protection Assessment Mechanism
- Child Protection
- Psychosocial support
- Community awareness, mobilisation and empowerment

OUTPUTS
- Protection Information Dissemination
- Protection Advocacy
- Protection Coordination

OUTCOMES
- Specialized Protection Services
- Communities have better capacity for protection
- Access to conflict-affected population
- Civilian vulnerable people are better protected and less exposed to risks

IMPACT
- Conflict and disaster-affected people are safe and protected
- Conflict and disaster-affected populations have improved livelihoods
- Conflict and disaster-affected populations have access to emergency live-saving and basic services
- Conflict and disaster-affected people have improved dignity and quality of life
- Conflict and disaster-affected populations have improved livelihoods
- Conflict and disaster-affected populations have access to emergency live-saving and basic services
- Conflict and disaster-affected people are safe and protected
- Communities have better capacity for protection
- Civilian vulnerable people are better protected and less exposed to risks

Integrated protection programming
- Health
- Shelter and NFI
- WASH
- Food support
- EiE

Communities have better capacity for protection

Life-saving assistance and Basic Services for People in Need

Resilience

National capacities are developed and systems strengthened

Figure 22: Global Protection - Reconstructed Intervention Logic
5. Findings

The findings are organised according to the evaluation matrix’s evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, EU added value, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability/connectedness, along with a short introductory section (section 5.1) that is an overall observation related to the understanding of protection.

As was noted in section 2.1 of this report, the Terms of Reference for the evaluation specify that it has a combined focus on DG ECHO’s interventions in Iraq (both humanitarian protection and other humanitarian) and on DG ECHO’s humanitarian protection interventions globally. Many of the evaluation questions thus focus on both global and Iraq, though some only focus on one of the two.

In line with the evaluation’s dual focus and the methodology’s use of a complementary and comparative lens between the different areas of focus (as outlined in the methodology section), the findings treat the Iraq and global components together for evaluation questions that focus on both. Overall, the finding statements specify whether the finding is focusing on both global and Iraq or on only one component. Furthermore, the evaluation question and sub-questions to which a particular finding is linked are noted, so as to orient the reader. This approach was adopted in agreement with the Steering Committee.

5.1. Introduction: Understanding of Protection

Finding 1

There is some variation in understandings of protection overall, particularly at a practical level though also to some extent between organisations with a protection-specific focus and those with a narrower focus such as on health or another thematic area.

This poses challenges in evaluating protection, since it is not a homogeneous concept where everybody necessarily means exactly the same thing even though they use the same term.

Section 4.1 of this report outlines DG ECHO’s understanding of humanitarian protection, which is rooted in the humanitarian principles and within the framework of international law. DG ECHO’s 2016 policy and definition of protection refines what constitutes protection within humanitarian actions for the European Commission. This definition aims to disassemble the constituent parts of protection work within humanitarian actions, in order to make them visible and to add to understanding about how to implement protection in humanitarian programming.

There is very significant convergence between DG ECHO and its partners on what constitutes humanitarian protection, around a definition involving activities aimed at ensuring respect for the rights enshrined in international law by reducing risks,

25 This is not a finding linked to a specific evaluation question, but rather is an overall observation about protection in relation to the evaluation.
threats and vulnerabilities and stopping rights violations. Yet there is also some degree of variation. One aspect of the variation is that more specialised organisations, for example those focusing on health or another particular thematic area, have a narrower definition than organisations with protection-specific mandates, for example International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). A further and more significant aspect is not at the policy level but practice. Here we see often quite significant variation in understandings within organisations, and between international implementing partners and local implementing partners. This latter point is important, because for some international IPs it is local implementing partners who are expected to understand and implement activities in line with the protection policies of their international partners. It also helps to explain the sometimes-vague articulations by implementing partners of both protection mainstreaming and the protection aspect of integrated protection programming in project documents and interviews.

Additionally, while some DG ECHO interviewees said that the organisation’s understanding of protection has been quite influential on IPs, the evaluation team’s interviews showed weak uptake of that understanding. This was particularly as regards the distinction between protection mainstreaming and protection integration – which is also outlined in the IASC protection policy of 2016 – with many implementing partners making no difference between the two. The evaluation team also noted that there is variation in the understanding of protection by DG ECHO’s field-based Technical Assistants (TAs), which in turn might impact upon IPs’ understandings of it. In this regard, there has also been discussion and debate within DG ECHO about defining basic needs response and how this would include protection.

Overall, this poses challenges in evaluating protection, since it is not a homogeneous concept where everybody necessarily means exactly the same thing when they use the same term. Other evaluators/analysts have also made the same observation – for example, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) guide Evaluation of Protection in Humanitarian Action says that, ”[...] protection is variously understood as an activity, as an approach or lens through which to understand humanitarian action, or as a goal or objective of such action”, which in turn points to a fundamental definitional problem for protection work and for evaluating it.26

5.2. Relevance

**EVALUATION QUESTION 1**

To what extent did the design of EU-funded protection activities globally and both protection and other humanitarian activities in Iraq take into account the needs of the most vulnerable – in particular women, children, the elderly and persons with disabilities? To what extent were beneficiaries consulted in the design and implementation of EU-funded projects?

JC 1.1: Have Implementing Partners conducted detailed needs and vulnerability analysis by gender, age and taken into account needs of persons with disabilities, IDPs and refugees and other factors such as ethnicity, religion and unique geographical differences?

JC 1.2: In designing and implementing humanitarian actions, did IPs engage with beneficiaries in order to identify and understand their most crucial needs and their capacities?

JC 1.3: What were the most critical needs and capacities identified, and how well did the design and implementation of interventions highlight and address these needs and make use of the existing capacities?

JC 1.4: In particular, how well were the protection situation and needs assessed and integrated into design?

**Finding 2**

All DG ECHO actions have needs analyses, and in general, appropriate methods, including beneficiary consultations, were used to inform the needs analyses in the sampled actions.

There was variation in the quality of the needs analyses in both Iraq and for humanitarian protection actions globally, with major needs well identified overall though some vulnerable sub-groups insufficiently considered and sometimes quite generic, high-level and/or relatively narrow analyses.

Analysis of the full population of 999 global and Iraq actions for this evaluation showed that all included a needs analysis. Analysis of sampled actions showed a variety of appropriate assessment methods being used, including focus group discussions and interviews with host community leaders and other key informants. Beneficiaries were also in general well consulted in the actions sampled (global and Iraq), including by community outreach workers and partners, via participatory camp assessments as well as assessments of out-of-camp populations, and using interviews, thematic meetings and focus group discussions usually disaggregated by gender, age, etc. Several implementing partners noted that DG ECHO had encouraged them to conduct such community-based assessments, which contributed to improving their protection analysis.

Most of the DG ECHO and implementing partner staff who responded to the survey felt that DG ECHO ensured that its programming was based on a comprehensive needs analysis that considered the most vulnerable groups. This was less true of

---

27 Responds to JC 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3
survey respondents from Europe however, possibly due to the very large programmes implemented in Turkey and Greece, which made it more difficult to tailor needs analyses.

In places where consultations with beneficiaries were either not conducted or judged to be weaker – such as in Iraq, in Yemen, or for a natural disaster response in Indonesia among many others – the very difficult context for such consultations was often the reason. It is also worth recognising that there is sometimes a trade-off between conducting a quicker needs analysis in order to begin to implement humanitarian activities, compared to taking more time to do a highly detailed needs analysis. It’s also important to underline that consultations with beneficiaries at the design stage tended to facilitate IPs’ subsequent access to their target communities.

Based on the desk review, survey and interviews with DG ECHO protection staff, TAs, as well as individuals from the protection clusters, there was a considerable degree of variation in the quality of the needs analyses both for Iraq and global protection actions. More particularly, while some needs and especially protection needs were considered including for women, children, the elderly and persons with disabilities, particularly vulnerable sub-groups such as female-headed households, unaccompanied minors and secondary displacements were not always well identified in cases where it would have been appropriate to do so, given the circumstances. This was more marked in emergency actions including in Iraq, which could perhaps be explained by the IPs having insufficient time or access problems that made it difficult to conduct full needs analyses. The issue was also identified in actions implemented in other conflict-affected countries, including Syria and Yemen. In such cases, the needs analyses often drew upon other organisations’ needs analyses/earlier needs analyses, which could be appropriate where organisations had overlapping programming in the same context.

The desk review of actions showed that needs analyses were sometimes conducted on a sector-by-sector basis, with the protection linkages between sectors unclear. Some needs analyses were also generic and high level rather than being tailored to the action. This was more marked in the actions of some UN agencies and the ICRC, and could be because, as many interviewees underlined, these organisations’ actions funded by DG ECHO are often not designed as distinct projects but rather are a part of their broader national programming that has been designated as a project. The result is that the needs analysis is at the level of the broader programming, rather than being tailored to the action.

28 This was despite positive efforts in Iraq to overcome the challenge by conducting Rapid Protection Assessments jointly with emergency response.

29 Furthermore, the ET could not assess the needs and vulnerability analysis of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as it does not provide details in project documentation, based on a standard way of operating agreed with DG ECHO.

30 This is not to say that other partners’ projects are necessarily not part of broader national programming, but simply that a pattern was noted in relation to needs analyses and some UN agencies as well as the ICRC and was remarked upon by interviewees.
In the survey, 65 per cent of UN respondents and 73 per cent of INGO respondents strongly agreed that their programming was based on a comprehensive needs analysis. Conversely, 13 per cent of UN partners strongly disagreed – and 15 per cent of international organisation partners somewhat disagreed – that their DG ECHO programming was based on a comprehensive needs analysis, as compared to 5 per cent of INGO partners who either somewhat or strongly disagreed. This suggests that the UN – and to a lesser extent IO implementing partners – may more often consider their needs analysis as not being entirely tailored to the specific actions funded by DG ECHO than INGO partners.

Moreover, vulnerability criteria sometimes differed between organisations. Some interviewees also said that in contexts where DG ECHO field offices have a detailed understanding of the context and needs, including of different vulnerable groups and the rationale for actions, IPs assumed that they did not have to provide detailed analysis and explanations. As a result, their project documentation did not show how clearly their project design took into account the vulnerabilities of target populations.

To partially address these various issues, DG ECHO has delivered some capacity building, with a generalist approach to protection. DG ECHO reported having trained 700 to 800 individuals since 2012, of whom more than 75 per cent were IP staff. However, because DG ECHO does not specify the target audience for the training, implementing partners usually send protection specialists instead of programme staff – yet it is the latter who are the primary drafters of protection analyses. Therefore, the impact of the capacity building on the quality of protection analyses may be less than intended. It should also be underlined that this training has a good reputation, and as a result implementing partners wish that DG ECHO could target a higher number of staff than it currently does.

Several respondents also highlighted that the eSingleForm template made it difficult to articulate a comprehensive and detailed needs analysis, because: (i) it does not break down the aspects expected by DG ECHO; and (ii) for integrated protection actions, it is not conducive to highlighting interlinkages between the action sectors. This observation highlights concerns about how the form is structured and how that structure orients users to provide the information required for a strong needs analysis. Furthermore, interviewees from the Global Protection Cluster said that improving protection analysis in regular project reporting, including for DG ECHO, would be a critical aspect of improving protection analysis in the eSingleForm.

**Finding 3**

DG ECHO programming in Iraq and humanitarian protection programming globally was overall well designed to respond to the needs of vulnerable people.

---

31 Responds to JC 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4
While providing a needs-based emergency response is DG ECHO’s primary goal, it can also sometimes target more complex needs in its programming (in line with the relevant policies) – and opportunities to do so were not always taken advantage of.

Overall, based on the sample and evaluation interviews, DG ECHO programming was designed to take into consideration the needs of the most vulnerable, and particularly related to protection, based on the quality of the needs identified (as discussed in the previous finding). This included adopting combined approaches when appropriate; working through local organisations and the clusters; using mobile protection assessment units to do outreach beyond camp populations; building local capacity (for example of social service centres); and seeking to build upon the skills of beneficiaries, e.g. for mediation and outreach. There was also some evidence of partners effectively taking advantage of their added value, such as UNICEF working via its partners worldwide to provide family tracing and reunification services.

In addition, there was good evidence, in nearly all actions sampled, of implementing partners engaging beneficiaries during project implementation. This included, for example, by recruiting and training community-based volunteers and employees from among beneficiary populations, setting up community-based committees (such as child protection committees) run by beneficiaries, and tasking beneficiaries with protection referrals. This was most often the case when the IPs had already involved beneficiaries/target communities in project design. When DG ECHO partners provide emergency response activities however, implementing partners are rarely able to engage beneficiaries in project implementation. This can be explained by the challenging context in which such programming is being implemented, and the specialised nature of the activities (for example emergency trauma care).

However, according to many interviewees, efforts to take long-term development objectives into account where possible – as specifically called for in article 22 of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid – were in general weak in the humanitarian programming. Yet humanitarian programming can sometimes be designed in such a way as to address its primary goal of providing a needs-based emergency response (in line with article 8 of the policy) while also considering more complex needs such as those related to child protection or gender-based violence (GBV), both of which, according to many interviewees, were not well-addressed in programming. Indeed, doing so could be in line with ‘environment-building’ that is in some cases pertinent for humanitarian protection, as specified in DG ECHO’s 2016 humanitarian protection thematic policy document, on p.17.

To take one example from Iraq of taking long-term development objectives into account, there is a protection concern with violence against children that occurs

---

32 It is important to underline that this is not to say that this would always or even often be pertinent, but simply that long-term development objectives are not at present being well taken into account in instances where it would be possible.
in school settings; realising this, DG ECHO implementing partners worked with teachers to set up a code of behaviour. This code of behaviour subsequently came to the attention of the Iraqi Ministry of Education, which realised that the lack of an overall code of behaviour was a gap in its policy – thus working with the IPs, they came to adopt the code of behaviour and made it mandatory, thereby effectively taking long-term objectives into account. Another example comes from the detention programming in Iraq, where DG ECHO implementing partners exceptionally did renovations of detention facilities’ toilets and showers, which served to provide a needs-based emergency response but also took long-term development objectives of improving detention conditions into account.\textsuperscript{33} It should be underlined that the overall observation about the weakness of efforts to take long-term development objectives into account where possible is less true of programming by larger UN organisations such as UNICEF. They undertake a broader set of activities over a longer, multi-year time period as a result of their double humanitarian-development mandate. So, their DG ECHO-funded actions are nested within a larger programming framework.

As a result of the broad portfolio of work that DG ECHO’s programming often targets, programming in Iraq and globally was somewhat fragmented and did not address all of the components of the needs identified. Indeed, the fact that programming was not effectively addressing the complex, multi-dimensional needs of beneficiaries was a key reason for putting in place an integrated response (as explained in this evaluation’s integrated response case study). Overall, this underlines that there were sometimes gaps between all of the needs identified and programming, though also that there were good examples of proactive responses to those gaps. The interpretation of the policy also led to a risk of having poor continuity, because the programming frequently shifted to follow new needs. This mode of operation can be highly appropriate as part of a responsive and adaptive humanitarian response; but there is also an associated risk in that it can potentially be harmful if some categories of protection work are discontinued. This is because beneficiaries could be stranded at a time of great vulnerability. For example, IDPs in Iraq with IS affiliations/suspected IS affiliations could be targeted with emergency assistance such as Non-Food Items (NFIs) and shelter; but if the camp is suddenly shut down and they are targeted for retribution and there is no reintegration programming to assist them, they are effectively left highly vulnerable to humanitarian protection concerns.

It is important to underline that the key takeaway from this finding is that Iraq and humanitarian programming globally was overall well designed to respond to the needs of vulnerable people. Yet at the same time, it could sometimes be better designed to also take long-term development objectives into account in its emergency response. Doing so would strengthen the programming further and be in line with the policies that guide the actions of the EU.

\textsuperscript{33} For more on these examples, see also the evaluation’s case study on child protection and education in Iraq and the case study on detention in Iraq.
EVALUATION QUESTION 2

To what extent was a clear and context-adapted humanitarian strategy provided and applied in Iraq by DG ECHO? To what extent were DG ECHO and its partners successful in adapting and adjusting their approach as the needs evolved over time?

JC 2.1: Did DG ECHO conduct needs, conflict, stakeholder and gap analysis (including of relevant sectors and thematic as well as other areas of focus including targeting of IDPs) prior to developing its strategy in Iraq?

JC 2.2: Was DG ECHO’s strategy clear and based on a clear and sound Theory of Change, based on a set of objectives and targets and reviewed annually? Were all IPs well aware of the contents?

JC 2.3: How well did actual areas of activity as implemented fit with the overall strategy?

JC 2.4 What were the major changes in the context and humanitarian needs over time? How did DG ECHO and IPs consider these and make timely and appropriate adjustments to their implementation design?

Finding 4

There is strong evidence that DG ECHO’s humanitarian strategy in Iraq was adapted to the context, with life-saving prioritized. This was less clear in the 2018 HIP. Many interviewees said that the HIP provided a justification for a decrease in humanitarian funding that was not in line with the context. This highlights a lack of clarity around the nexus and the point at which development actors should take over.

There is furthermore strong evidence of partners appropriately adjusting to the major shifts in the context over time.

Analysis of the Iraq Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) for the period of the evaluation shows strong contextual analysis, with modifications from year to year and during the year to ensure ongoing relevance – based on shifts in the context and the needs analyses including identification of gaps. The HIPs were overall effective at articulating the humanitarian response, including constraints faced. Furthermore, document review showed that the HIPs were strongly aligned with OCHA’s humanitarian response plans for the same years, an observation that was confirmed by OCHA interviewees and interviewees from the protection cluster. This includes highlighting the steady worsening of the humanitarian situation from 2014 to 2016 and beyond as fighting escalated, and resulting in rising numbers of IDPs in Anbar and other governorates in the central and northern regions, with protection concerns, as well as needs related to WASH, shelter, health and food being the most important issues. The Mosul crisis is furthermore well-captured in the HIPs, as are the acute crises arising from it (again, concentrated in the areas of protection, WASH, shelter, health and food). The HIPs also capture the gradual

34 Responds to JC 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4
stabilisation of the situation to some extent in 2017 and particularly in 2018, with returnees a particularly vulnerable group. Overall these plans constitute a clear organisational strategy for DG ECHO as a funder and in turn for the activities that it would prioritise giving funding to.

One area in the HIPs that gave rise to some disagreement was the characterisation of the situation in 2018. In that year, the HIP called for DG ECHO to “promote transitioning of the humanitarian aid response”. According to multiple interviewees, this was in line with the humanitarian coordinator’s informal designation of 2018 as “the year of returns”, as well as the desire of the Iraqi government to declare the emergency over. Yet according to IP interviewees, this did not reflect the reality on the ground. Because the still large number of IDPs that had not then returned were the particularly vulnerable ones, with significant emergency needs often related to their having IS affiliations/suspected IS affiliations, and the nature and scale of their needs would have justified a continued and concerted humanitarian response rather than a transition. In other words, the HIP to some extent provided a justification for the organisational-level decision to draw down DG ECHO funding in Iraq in 2018 and did not reflect the true nature of the context. It is important to underline that DG ECHO respondents had the opposite point of view, and that DG ECHO’s funding levels were largely in line with INFORM data (as detailed in finding 6). Ultimately, this question is not easily resolvable due to the lack of clarity around the nexus, and the exact point at which humanitarian areas of responsibilities end and those of development actors start. This is an issue that will be returned to in later findings.

From a process perspective, key informant interviews underlined the generally strong approach for developing the HIPs. This involves the country team taking the lead in developing them, then sharing them with DG ECHO HQ in Brussels and also with review by and input from regional protection specialists in Amman. It should also be underlined that, in writing the HIP, the DG ECHO country teams are able to draw upon their own extensive understanding of the context, because they spend considerable time in the field compared to other funders (see also section 5.4 on EU added value).

Based on the actions reviewed and key informant interviews, there is clear congruence between the actions funded and the HIPs. First, thematic areas of focus were overall in line with those highlighted as being particular areas of need in the HIPs, for example in the prioritisation of the trauma response to the Mosul crisis by DG ECHO. Education is one area that was highlighted by DG ECHO interviewees as being somewhat less congruent with the needs highlighted in the HIP. However, education was prioritised for more programming, as a result of an organisational decision to focus on this thematic area.

Second, the geographic areas of focus were also in line with areas highlighted as being particularly in need in the HIPs. This emerges strongly in the Iraq maps in the context section, where analysis highlighted that the geographic areas of DG ECHO’s programming overall reflected extant needs, including as these evolved over time. Indeed, in addition to new projects being designed to respond to new or evolving needs, there was also clear evidence that individual actions were modified over their implementation cycle to respond to shifts in the context.
Examples were responding to health needs in newly retaken areas in West Anbar and around Mosul, changes in the routes being taken by IDPs and in the frontlines around Mosul, and changes in the security situation and in the vulnerability profile of the target populations.

Finally, the large majority of implementing partners in Iraq who responded to the survey indicated that DG ECHO was flexible in allowing adjustments to the implementation approach based on shifts in the context – although to a lesser extent in the sectors of support to operations, coordination and non-food items, due to the nature of programming in these thematic areas. One particular success in terms of ensuring adaptability was the Cash Consortium for Iraq’s (CCI) common fund, which made it possible to shift funding between consortium members if for example needs shifted from one geographic location to another location where a different member was operating. Overall then, this underlines the generally successful adaptation of programming as needs evolved.

**Finding 5**

DG ECHO’s HIPs document the current context and the changes in the context, critical areas of need and areas of focus. In so doing they provide guidance on priority areas for funding and thus a broad strategic direction. They do not, however, constitute a strategic plan that explains how areas of activity and outputs will contribute to intended outcomes and longer term impacts.

To the evaluation team’s knowledge, with regard to DG ECHO’s Iraq programming, there is no detailed national-level strategic document that is reviewed annually and that shows specifically the movement from activities to outputs to outcomes and impact such as a Theory of Change or intervention logic.

Yet in practice, there were generally good logical linkages between outputs, outcomes and impact aimed at, which can be linked to the Iraq team’s overall coherence and use of more informal mechanisms.

Overall, DG ECHO’s strategic direction in Iraq was articulated in the HIPs. In turn, the HIPs indicated what types of actions would be approved for funding, thus playing a key role in orienting the work done. IP interviewees also said that they were well aware of the contents of the HIPs.

DG ECHO had other strategic planning documents, including documents that articulated in a broad sense the move from a humanitarian response to resilience and development. But to the knowledge of the evaluation team, there was no national strategic document similar to an intervention logic or theory of change that specifically showed how the activities from the portfolio of actions would lead to the outcomes and impact sought. Furthermore, strategic objectives – ‘results’

---

35 Responds to JC 2.2
36 See for example the PowerPoint presentation “Overview of ECHO’s strategy and activities in Iraq (2015)”, slide 4.
Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

– articulated in the HIPs were at a high level: they did not constitute clear targets, but rather were more areas of intended focus, based on the needs identified.

In saying this, it is also important to note that, in line with the reconstructed intervention logic contained in section 4.2 of this evaluation report, there were generally good logical linkages between DG ECHO’s activities, outputs, intended outcomes and impacts in Iraq. This is evidence of the more detailed strategic planning that was in practice occurring between Iraq team members including the desk officer at DG ECHO HQ in Brussels, through the usage of tools such as the PowerPoint presentation referred to in the footnote earlier in this finding as well as through meetings and other communication. Such an approach can be effective; but it is relatively ad hoc, is often very time-consuming, and depends on strong team coherence as well as strong team leadership based on a clear vision for the response and an understanding of how all the different pieces of work come together to move toward larger objectives.

Finding 6

In general, DG ECHO allocated protection funding worldwide based on assessed needs.

Yet total protection funding was primarily focused on the Middle East and to a lesser extent Africa and Europe temporarily, with crises in Asia and Latin America receiving relatively lower levels of funding in absolute terms.

DG ECHO also tended to provide high levels of protection funding to countries which had lower levels of needs than other countries, particularly from 2016 as it played a prominent role in responding to the migrant/refugee crisis.

DG ECHO allocates funding globally based on a two-phase, country-level need analysis framework. First, it identifies and compares the level of risk of humanitarian crises and disasters across countries with the Index for Risk Management (INFORM). It also identifies humanitarian crises where the affected populations do not receive enough international aid, through its Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA), to which it allocates in principle approximately 15 per cent of its initial annual humanitarian budget. Second, DG ECHO carries

Figure 23: Allocation of protection funding, by region

Note: The figure shows cumulated funding, i.e. 'Middle East' being the highest and 'other' the lowest

37 Links to EQ 2, by providing global level analysis that helps to show how funding was allocated globally and how well that it matched up with needs.
out qualitative, in-depth assessments of humanitarian needs for the crises identified, through its Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF).

Statistical evidence shows that DG ECHO in practice prioritises protection funding in line with the needs it identifies, as measured by the country-level INFORM. The graphs below (see figure 25) show INFORM rankings for each country that received protection funding (1 being the highest risk country and 192 the lowest) and their protection funding rankings (1 being the largest recipient of protection funding, and 69 the least). A benchmark line shows in each graph the ideal – and unrealistic – scenario where the prioritisation of funding would be exactly the same as the level of needs identified by INFORM (see also figure 24 below).

Correlation between the two variables is strongly statistically significant for each year. Thus, on average, the higher the needs identified in a specific country (as measured by INFORM), the more likely DG ECHO was to prioritise protection funding to address these needs.

**Figure 24: Benchmark line for correlation between INFORM risk ranking and protection funding ranking allocation of protection funding (unrealistic scenario)**
The graphs also clearly demonstrate that DG ECHO does not have a purely needs-based prioritisation of countries for protection funding, as shown by the fact that the dots are largely scattered away from the benchmark line (which shows perfect alignment between needs and prioritisation ranks).

First, as graphically shown by the dots below the benchmark lines in figure 25, some countries received only marginal protection funding, despite relatively high identified levels of needs. Evidence suggests this was especially the case for Latin America and Asia, as shown in figure 23. Importantly as well, this observation about relative funding by region relative to needs was backed up by DG ECHO and other global interviewees.

Second, as graphically shown by the dots above the benchmark lines in figure 25, DG ECHO significantly prioritises certain countries despite lower needs being identified. Indeed, the coefficients of the linear regressions reveal that DG ECHO allocates large amounts of protection funding to countries with lower needs to a greater extent than it underfunds high-need countries. As shown in table 3 below, this is exemplified by two countries – among others – Turkey and Greece, which both received very high levels of protection funding from 2015 to 2018 despite the fact that their INFORM ranking was relatively low and significantly more so for Greece.

---

38 This is also graphically represented in figure 25 by the larger distance of the dots above the benchmark line than the dots below the line.
Despite these findings, HOPE data shows that DG ECHO declined the same percentage (47-48 per cent) of proposals made by implementing partners across all five world regions from 2014 to 2018 – with a slightly higher percentage of proposals being declined in Europe (55 per cent) (see figure 26).

Furthermore, the allocation of protection funding as a share of total funding has remained overall relatively stable in the Middle East, Africa and Asia and the Pacific. From 2014 to 2018, in the Middle East, it ranged from 10.6 per cent (in 2017) to 17.8 per cent (in 2018); in Africa from 6 per cent (in 2015) to 9 per cent (in 2017); in Asia and Pacific from 8.4 per cent (in 2014) to 14.5 per cent (in 2017). In Latin America and Caribbean however, large variations were observed, while in Europe, variations occurred to some extent, as shown in the two following figures (27 & 28).

Table 3: INFORM risk ranking, total funding rank and protection funding ranking, Turkey and Greece

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORM risk rank (out of 192)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total funding rank (out of 69)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection funding rank (out of 69)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORM risk rank (out of 192)</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, beyond prioritisation levels, the nominal levels of protection funding granted to both Turkey and Greece appear even more disproportionate to the needs identified. Figure 29 shows the allocation of protection funding across the five largest recipients of protection funding between 2014 and 2018, namely Turkey, Greece, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. The more than doubling of DG ECHO’s protection funding allocations in 2016 was mostly due to large allocations to Turkey and Greece, as the EU was responding to the migrant/refugee crisis. Indeed, in November 2015, the European Commission established the Facility for the Refugees in Turkey. It allocated €1.4 billion to DG ECHO over 2016 and 2017, in order to improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable refugees and migrants and to reduce the number of arrivals to Greece. In Greece, DG ECHO was mandated to provide humanitarian aid to these beneficiaries through the €643 million emergency support instrument, adopted in March 2016. As illustrated by figure 29 and mentioned in the context section of this report, this large amount of funding was allocated to DG ECHO in addition to existing funding, which remained overall stable over the period, thus not being allocated to the Middle East at the expense of other world regions.

In reference to these funding levels, some interviewees said that the allocation of humanitarian aid had been overly politicised, while multiple DG ECHO interviewees said that those funding decisions had caused significant disagreement on the part of many staff. Some IP interviewees also highlighted the contrast between the level of funding allocated to address the migrant/refugee crisis and that given to other crises where the absolute needs were higher.

**EVALUATION QUESTION 3:**

To what extent were DG ECHO’s protection advocacy engagement and actions in Iraq relevant to the needs of beneficiaries and well-articulated with DG ECHO’s response in other humanitarian sectors?
Finding 7

The review of protection advocacy planning documents as well as funded actions, plus the work of implementing partners and DG ECHO support to actors that conduct advocacy, show that DG ECHO’s protection advocacy engagement in Iraq was relevant to beneficiaries’ needs. This engagement was well-articulated, though particularly so from 2017 with the adoption of an advocacy logframe.

Based on documentation shared with the team, DG ECHO’s protection advocacy during the first years of the Iraq crisis was treated in a variety of different types of planning documents, though not in a formal logframe (as was introduced in 2017 and 2018, and is discussed below). A meeting document from the Council working party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA) from October 2016 gives an insight into this. The document highlights common advocacy messages on Iraq agreed by COHAFA. Priority was given to encouraging the Iraqi authorities to adhere to principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) by protecting civilians, including by how Iraq authorities undertake the fighting but also for example in how they conduct security screenings and detention, treatment of IDPs, and returns. The messaging is intended for the Iraqi authorities, while there is also a part of the document that is aimed at guiding the work of implementing partners, in line with these priority areas.

Priority issues as shown in the 2017 and 2018 protection advocacy logframes follow many of the same core themes – including systematic disregard of IHL and IHRL as well as common guiding principles on IDPs. This systematic disregard of IHL and IHRL creates serious protection concerns for civilians and particularly civilians fleeing violence. The documents also note that freedom of movement is highly constrained, basic assistance is difficult to access, and ongoing violence happens in their new locations. The logframes further specify issues related to access in providing humanitarian assistance to those most in need, especially with regards to (i) non-government-controlled areas; (ii) continually changing context;

---

39 Responds to JC 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
40 The Council working party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA) is the main EU forum for strategic and policy discussions on humanitarian aid between EU Member States and the European Commission. See: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/partnerships/relations/eu-member-states-cohafa_en.
and (iii) key implementing partners not operating in the areas of high need. Finally, the documents highlight challenges related to targeting of medical infrastructure and more general health-related access issues including denial of passage for ambulances. In response to these various needs, the documents identify a variety of key actors to target and activities to undertake whether bilateral or multilateral, including specifying fora for undertaking the activities. The activities outlined are strongly in line with the priority advocacy areas in the documents.

These various documents underline that DG ECHO’s advocacy on protection was clear during the period of the evaluation. However, this advocacy was made more actionable when incorporated into a logframe beginning in 2017, since the logframes also indicated actors to target and fora for undertaking advocacy activities.

Furthermore, the priorities and activities highlighted in these various documents are relevant to the needs of beneficiaries, based on the contextual analysis and needs analysis contained in the HIPs and other strategic documents. Indeed, the documents identify many if not most key opportunities for advocacy engagement in relation to these priorities. Document review and interviews showed two levels of advocacy:

First, nearly all of the sampled actions involve some form of engagement in field level protection advocacy with warring parties, armed actors or local authorities. In these actions, the implementing partners aim to ensure (i) access to delivering humanitarian aid, the security of the staff and partners, and (ii) the protection of civilians in line with international law and human rights law. This operational/logistical advocacy is a crucial part of effectively carrying out humanitarian programming and is in line with the larger strategic approach. It is also in line with the needs of beneficiaries. Importantly as well, documents such as the COHAFA meeting document referred to earlier show DG ECHO encouraging IPs to include protection advocacy in their programming and implementation approach: this encouragement was also described in interviews with IPs.

Second, advocacy focuses on higher level actors, with the aim of advancing goals that range from field access to improving the conditions of vulnerable populations (for example in prisons) and providing appropriate services to IDPs. The actors targeted include various Iraqi government departments as well as the Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCC) and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Center (JCMC). With these actors, advocacy is done both via direct engagement by DG ECHO and indirectly by bringing the advocacy priorities to key actors who can then push for them. These latter key actors include the IPs (particularly higher profile IPs such as the ICRC), the protection cluster, the humanitarian country team (HCT) and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), OCHA, as well as higher level engagement by DG ECHO headquarters and for example in donor conferences. Moreover, DG ECHO conducted bilateral advocacy with other humanitarian donors active in Iraq, including Iran and the Gulf countries. These types of advocacy are also relevant to the needs of beneficiaries.
These two levels of advocacy highlight how DG ECHO funded protection advocacy to support the activities undertaken by its partners. Additionally, DG ECHO supported the key actors who bring forward advocacy messages. For example, it funded OCHA in 2018, with the action involving support of the HC and HCT, improved coordination measures, and direct advocacy to key actors including government actors and others. These mechanisms were designed to identify and highlight protection concerns, based on the needs of beneficiaries.

5.3. Coherence

**EVALUATION QUESTION 4**
To what extent was DG ECHO’s response in Iraq aligned with DG ECHO’s mandate as provided by the Humanitarian Aid regulation, (b) the European Consensus on humanitarian aid, (c) the humanitarian principles, and (d) DG ECHO’s relevant thematic/sector policies?

| JC 4.1: Have the humanitarian aid activities supported by DG ECHO clearly targeted the most vulnerable and their most immediate needs? |
| JC 4.2: Has DG ECHO implemented its strategy using a cooperative and coordinated approach, engaging and sharing information and best practice with humanitarian players (UN, non-EU donors, NGOs, regional actors, and others)? |
| JC 4.3: How has DG ECHO ensured that the strategies and activities it supports are based on the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence? |
| JC 4.4: Were DG ECHO Iraq’s plans and projects it funded in the areas of protection, health care, WASH, shelter and food and other thematic areas consistent with the relevant thematic policy guidelines. And were thematic guidelines for mainstreaming protection followed? |

**Finding 8**

DG ECHO’s response in Iraq was overall consistent with the Humanitarian Aid Regulation.

It was also consistent with the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, including with the humanitarian principles. However discussions around the principles in the Mosul response underlined the need for a more effective decision-making process in relation to them.

Finally, it was consistent with the relevant thematic and sector policy guidelines.

The mandate of DG ECHO as specified in the Humanitarian Aid Regulation focuses on providing assistance, relief and protection in third countries, with a particular focus on the most vulnerable including victims of natural disasters and man-made crises. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid aims to improve the coherence and quality of that response by working in a coordinated and

---

41 Responds to JC 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4
complementary manner that is in line with the fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality, humanity, independence, and impartiality.

In assessing the documents related to DG ECHO’s humanitarian response in Iraq at the individual action level (from the samples) and more broadly in strategic documents and particularly in the HIPs (in their assessment of humanitarian needs and their articulation of the response to those needs), there is clear evidence that the assistance, relief and protection provided in Iraq targeted the immediate needs of the most vulnerable. This targeting was done based on assessments of vulnerabilities, for example as vulnerable IDPs, prisoners in detention, or indeed as particularly vulnerable sub-groups such as female-headed households in IDP camps or persons without documentation or individuals with particular health issues. Furthermore, interviews with IPs, DG ECHO staff and other key actors including OCHA highlighted the efforts to identify the needs of the most vulnerable over the course of the Iraq response. This was done through field visits by DG ECHO staff, by information sharing and by targeted information-gathering for example via the DG ECHO-funded rapid protection assessments mechanism.

Importantly as well, there is strong evidence that actions were in general well-coordinated and aligned with the wider humanitarian response. In other words, needs and gaps analyses were aligned with or reflected the Humanitarian Needs Overviews, as well as cluster and sectorial assessments. The majority of Iraq implementing partners who responded to the survey agreed that DG ECHO made sure that humanitarian actors worked together in sharing analysis of the context and needs, good practices and decision-making on responses to challenges. However, about one third of Iraq implementing partners other than health partners were less positive than the global implementing partners.42

Project documentation and particularly interviewees described activities being coordinated through the cluster system, as well as through NGO coordination mechanisms such as the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (NCCI). These mechanisms helped to ensure coherence of the humanitarian response by highlighting where needs were highest, what other actors were doing and how the response could be improved. DG ECHO also directly participated as an observer in the cluster meetings: interviewees reported that DG ECHO played an active role in the humanitarian country team including pushing for protection issues. Donor meetings were another coordination mechanism: these were held sometimes on an ad hoc basis but usually every month or two. DG ECHO staff also debriefed other actors following its field visits, including donors, and in particular the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS).

As regards the consistency of DG ECHO’s response with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence, assessment is

42 Furthermore, nearly half of the UN respondents in Iraq actually disagreed that DG ECHO played an important role in encouraging its partners to share analysis of the context and needs. Interview data suggests that this may be because UN agencies consider this task to be part of their own mandate rather than that of donors.
done at DG ECHO HQ in Brussels when partners sign Framework of Partnership Agreements and at country level as part of the process of selecting actions to fund and subsequent monitoring of actions. This process generally worked well, with evidence of debates and discussions within DG ECHO teams, including with headquarters about this issue, and documentary evidence also emerging of internal organisational reflection.\(^{43}\) Additionally, implementing partners in general focus on the humanitarian principles as an aspect of their decision-making, though there is also evidence of variability in how they operationalise, understand and weigh them in practice.\(^{44}\)

Importantly, based on review of sampled actions’ proposal documents and interviews that covered those actions as well as DG ECHO’s Iraq portfolio more broadly, the actions funded were in line with the humanitarian principles. In making this judgment, it is simultaneously important to further discuss one significant component of DG ECHO’s response in Iraq: the response to the Mosul crisis.

Much has been written about this topic, including studies specifically supported by DG ECHO in relation to it.\(^{45}\) This underlines the thorniness of the issues in the response to the Mosul crisis, for DG ECHO as well as other organisations. The core issue that this evaluation is focusing on is the trauma response, in which DG ECHO IPs implemented programming at the front lines that involved “co-locating” or “embedding” with Iraqi forces to ensure security and access. The argument for doing so was that access was otherwise not possible, and that by engaging many lives were saved, in line with the principle of humanity. But according to some reports and as was underlined by many evaluation interviewees, the decision to do this prioritised the principle of humanity over neutrality and independence. As regards neutrality, the argument is that working with only one side (the Iraqi government, supported by Coalition forces) compromised neutrality; but the counterargument is that it was not possible to work with Islamic State. As regards independence, situating the programming at the front lines meant security being provided by Iraqi forces and in practice working with Iraqi medics, which some argued compromised independence. However, the counterargument is that there was no other way to ensure security and that it was not possible to separate their work from that of Iraqi medics.

In assessing the data, it is first important to be clear that DG ECHO through the actions it funded acted in a manner that was consistent with the humanitarian principles in its response to the Mosul crisis. It is also clear that the four principles were weighted differently by the various actors. DG ECHO and its trauma response partners chose to emphasise humanity and the lifesaving support they could provide. Others, including the ICRC, chose to emphasise neutrality and


\(^{44}\) “Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq”, Here Geneva. May 2017, p.27.

\(^{45}\) See for example “Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO partners in Iraq”, 2017.
independence, in line with their organisational imperative to be seen as neutral and independent. This different weighting does not mean that any of the principles themselves were contravened. Indeed, as was observed in the Johns Hopkins report, while “[t]he humanitarian principles have conventionally been regarded as indivisible, to be followed in their entirety at all times...in practice, some are emphasized more than others depending upon the circumstances.” But it does underline the need for having effective decision-making processes and guidelines in place to make decisions around the principles, given the complexity of interpreting them, particularly in the sort of hard-to-reach areas targeted by DG ECHO that are more likely to give rise to such challenges. Here, it is also pertinent that in pushing to weight one principle more heavily than others, DG ECHO simultaneously argued that IPs who refused to operate at the front lines (based on a different weighting of the principles) were being overly risk-averse and were insufficiently prioritising the principle of humanity. This was instead of framing the situation as a debate about different legitimate weightings and how those weightings could and should be navigated. While recognising that these discussions took place within a stressful and difficult context as is often extant when saving lives is at stake, such an approach has the effect of delegitimising the other organisation’s position. It thus undermines the process of decision-making around the principles that was referred to earlier in this finding, particularly between DG ECHO and its implementing partners.

Finally, regarding coherence with relevant thematic and sector policies, the evaluation has found that the design and implementation of nearly all of the actions in the samples took into consideration international standards and guidance for particular sectors, including the Sphere Minimum Standards, the International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) standards, Minimum Standards for Child Protection in Humanitarian Action (CPMS), the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Gender-based Violence (GBV) guidelines, and guidelines in the ALNAP Protection Guide for Humanitarian Agencies, among others. Actions reviewed in the samples were furthermore in line with the principles outlined in the relevant key DG ECHO guidelines such as the DG ECHO Guidelines on Gender, WASH and protection.

**EVALUATION QUESTION 5**

In the context of the Nexus and humanitarian-development coordination instruments, what measures were taken by DG ECHO to coordinate humanitarian and development interventions in Iraq and how successful were these measures?

JC 5.1: Has DG ECHO been able to facilitate early and ongoing engagement bringing humanitarian and development players together during the crisis?

JC 5.2: If so, has this engagement led to joint analysis such as contextual analysis, sharing of best practices and any shared objectives and joint responses?

---

46 This emerged in multiple evaluation interviews with DG ECHO implementing partners. The point is also made less directly in the Johns Hopkins report, p.19.
Finding 9

DG ECHO did undertake some measures to encourage IPs to coordinate with development actors in Iraq. These measures included via reporting in the single form and by undertaking planning as well as meetings, workshops and missions with development partners.

But overall, DG ECHO’s measures for encouraging such coordination in Iraq were not very successful, because DG ECHO and other EU instruments as well as other development actors do not have common strategies for this transition and do not plan the nexus together.

The requirement for DG ECHO to take measures to coordinate between humanitarian and development programming is articulated in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. In particular, article 22 specifies that EU humanitarian programming should take long-term development objectives into account where possible and says that its aid is closely linked to development cooperation. Furthermore, article 30 underlines the need for humanitarian aid and development cooperation to be used in a coherent and complementary manner, while article 77 emphasises the importance of ensuring that humanitarian and development assistance work better together, including by coordinating from the earliest phases of a crisis response.

Most of the global protection implementing partners as well as DG ECHO staff who responded to the survey ”somewhat agreed” that DG ECHO played an important role in making sure that humanitarian and development players worked together in building resilience and supporting livelihoods, sustainable development, conflict prevention and peace-building. In Iraq however, respondents were more negative, in particular the protection implementing partners, among whom nearly half disagreed that DG ECHO played an important role for sustainability. DG ECHO respondents in Iraq were nearly as negative as their implementing partners. Importantly, both DG ECHO and IPs in Iraq working in health were significantly more positive than the average.

DG ECHO undertook a variety of measures to encourage coordination of humanitarian and development interventions in Iraq. One aspect was the

---

47 Responds to JC 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3

48 Article 22 of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid specifies that DG ECHO programming should take long-term development objectives into account where possible and says that its aid is closely linked to development cooperation. Furthermore, article 30 underlines the need for humanitarian aid and development cooperation to be used in a coherent and complementary manner, while article 77 emphasises the importance of ensuring that humanitarian and development assistance work better together including by coordinating from the earliest phases of a crisis response.
requirement in the Single Form for partners to describe how their intervention/proposed intervention complements development actions, how this coordination will increase sustainability of results, how phasing out will be done and what concrete coordination mechanisms will be put into place. The Single Form also asks how the action would contribute to addressing the root causes of vulnerability of the target population. Based on an assessment of the documents for sampled actions, the overall quality of these elements is quite variable, as is discussed in more detail in the section on sustainability/connectedness.

DG ECHO undertook other measures in Iraq. They included meetings with DG DEVCO and with the European Union’s Regional Trust Fund (MADAD) to discuss the nexus and to present a portfolio of actions that could potentially feed into development initiatives; several joint missions and workshops with DG DEVCO and EEAS; and some work on a recovery framework. DG ECHO interviewees also said that they had discussions with IP representatives regarding how their humanitarian work could feed into development work, with some degree of success on the topics of mental health and the Cash Consortium.

Because of this level of attention, plus the added role of the MADAD fund in particular as a bridging mechanism, Iraq would seem to be positioned as a strong candidate for the nexus to succeed. However, in Iraq, DG ECHO interviewees and many IP interviewees said that the nexus had not worked very well. Reasons for this include that few development actors were present in the country and thus rarely available to coordinate with, and that Iraq is a middle-income country and thus that there are other priority regions where development actors should focus their resources. But more fundamentally, the nexus did not work well because development actors have different goals and priorities than humanitarian actors, which in turn makes coordination difficult. This difference is partly due to the different lenses that each actor applies to assess needs, with the result that the needs they identify for addressing are different. This situation also emerged in the evaluation’s interviews with DG DEVCO staff. Other reasons for the nexus problems include the political instability that is often present and that makes nexus bridging challenging, as well as poor coordination of priority areas of work among humanitarian and development actors, for example between different UN agencies and between national/EU development and humanitarian agencies such as DG ECHO and DG DEVCO. These differences in priority areas of work mean that it is difficult for development actors to carry on with humanitarian actors’ work, even if the humanitarian project has given thought as to how it could happen. 49 This is particularly the case for protection. As many interviewees observed, many development actors do not prioritise protection and government actors – to whom humanitarian projects can aim to handover – are often one of the main sources of protection issues. Ultimately this is a political and an organisational issue, one that

49 For example, DG DEVCO interviewees described their priority areas in Iraq as including good governance, livelihoods and education. While some aspects of these could potentially pick up on work that DG ECHO had funded, in particular the education component, they in general do not follow on from the particular areas prioritised by DG ECHO that have been discussed elsewhere in this report.
requires harmonization of priorities and integrated planning between organisations that were weak during the period of the evaluation.

**EVALUATION QUESTION 6**

To what extent were DG ECHO’s actions in the protection sector coherent with the thematic policy document on humanitarian protection, and – as appropriate – the previous guidelines from 2009?

JC 6.1: Did DG ECHO develop a thorough risk analysis framework before designing protection programming?

JC 6.2: Did DG ECHO (and the kinds of projects it supported globally and in Iraq) apply the approaches to humanitarian protection as outlined in the policy document – targeted, mainstreaming and capacity-building?

JC 6.3: Did DG ECHO apply the appropriate response type and modality to humanitarian protection (as per the previous guidelines from 2009)?

**Finding**

DG ECHO’s humanitarian protection actions globally and actions in Iraq were in line with its 2009 funding guidelines and 2016 policy on protection, with protection risk analyses included and with targeted approaches overall coherent.

But there were weaknesses in the integrated protection programming and protection mainstreaming, including due to sometimes weak capacities and understandings.

Most DG ECHO survey respondents globally and in Iraq found that overall, DG ECHO appropriately applied the approaches to humanitarian protection as outlined in DG ECHO’s protection policy document, including through targeted and mainstreamed actions (the two main approaches). This was particularly so in Iraq and for DG ECHO global protection desk staff, among whom over half strongly agreed that this was the case. DG ECHO’s global protection field staff were somewhat less positive however, with over half of them not agreeing as strongly as their colleagues at HQ.

Risk analysis is undertaken by DG ECHO as part of its HIPs, in sections focusing on the context and on needs. And as was discussed in earlier findings on relevance, the analysis in the reviewed HIPs is generally good, incorporating strong consideration of all the elements of risk: threats, vulnerabilities, and capacities.

---

50 Responds to JC 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3

51 According to the policy, and as specified in the section of this report outlining DG ECHO’s understanding of protection (section 4.1), capacity building is another approach and is to be undertaken in addressing the third objective, “Strengthening the capacity of the international humanitarian aid system to enhance efficiency, quality and effectiveness in reducing protection risks in ongoing, imminent or future humanitarian crises.” Capacity building took place mainly with Enhance Response Capacity funds.
Regarding sampled actions’ documents, there was some degree of variability – as was discussed in an earlier finding on relevance.

However, interviews showed that the subtleties of the distinction between mainstreaming and targeted actions are not widely understood among DG ECHO’s implementing partners, and particularly by large protection actors such as UNHCR, UNICEF and ICRC. Yet UNHCR and UNICEF have both signed on to the IASC protection policy that uses the same distinction. Thus, even if evidence shows that DG ECHO’s implementing partners usually refer to the same core concepts to define protection activities, the “boundaries” of protection vary from one IP to another. This has the effect of in-practice blurring the definition of protection activities which DG ECHO had aimed to narrow down in the 2016 Thematic Policy Document. Moreover, there is some evidence that not all of DG ECHO’s field staff are fully systematic in applying the definitions, and that there is variability in understandings of protection by DG ECHO country technical assistants (TAs).

In assessing coherence with the two main approaches to protection programming, there is clear evidence of implementing partners of global and Iraq actions adopting the targeted approach, both stand-alone – e.g. mine action, child protection, and documentation activities – and integrated, such as a shelter and WASH-related action in Iraq that incorporated case identification, referrals and follow-up linked to protection issues. As regards integrated programming, according to the policy, the sectors must combine to achieve a protection outcome; if not, actions should merely be considered as multi-sectorial. Yet in practice, integrated actions are often designed with relatively limited programming linkages between different sectors, i.e. they are implemented by distinct sector-specific teams with limited interaction. Furthermore, the lack of inter-sectoral integration regularly lessens the efficiency of assistance and the quality of protection within actions. Implementing partners reported that they at times were unclear which of the sectors should take care of cross-sectoral activities, e.g. ensuring safe access after a health referral by a protection team. This can be linked to the fact that integrated programming remains an area where capacities and understandings are still being built up in the humanitarian sector, including among DG ECHO TAs (which helps to explain the sometimes-weak guidance given to partners on protection integration). Also, DG ECHO project documentation templates and tools frame results by sectors and thus limit the possibility of creating meaningful integrated programming.

There are also many actions that incorporate protection mainstreaming, including adopting the do no harm principle and prioritising safety and dignity. One example is WASH activities that incorporated protection elements by ensuring appropriate lighting for safety and thereby helping to ensure equal access. Yet overall, protection mainstreaming was not systematically incorporated into the sampled actions both in Iraq and globally based on assessing project documentation for descriptions of programming that constituted protection mainstreaming as well as specifically mentioning protection mainstreaming. While evidence from interviews found that IPs are often practicing protection mainstreaming in their actions, there is variability in the quality of that practice between organisations and within
organisations. There is also a lack of clear, systematic work being done, due to adopting a mainstreaming lens in all programming, as called for by the policy.

Some organisations are notably stronger than others, particularly protection actors that have been doing protection work for a long period of time, as well as organisations that focus specifically on protection work. Yet it is also important to underline the high level of variability in the coherence of the mainstreaming work of local partners, even if their international partners do have a strong understanding of protection. These coherence issues were exacerbated in Iraq by many international partners often implementing at distance – i.e. from Erbil. Because staff did not have the necessary permits to travel in federal Iraq or because their organisation’s security guidance limited their ability to travel in the field, as was mentioned by multiple IP and DG ECHO interviewees. Consequently, protection mainstreaming was not fully understood or incorporated into their programming by local partners.

5.4. EU Added Value

**EVALUATION QUESTION 7**

What was the EU added value of DG ECHO’s actions in Iraq during the evaluation period?

**JC 7.1:** Has DG ECHO, as a lead humanitarian agency, added value by exploring and promoting dialogue on new approaches for humanitarian aid, especially on protection?

**JC 7.2:** What, if anything, has made DG ECHO Iraq’s interventions unique or different from others, in terms of scale, type of intervention, geographic area of activity or new models? What have DG ECHO’s interventions made happen which might not otherwise have happened?

---

**Finding 1**

**EU Added Value in Iraq and globally shows:**

- a strong field presence
- strong partnering with its IPs
- openness to funding in locations where other funders would not work and innovation in terms of approaches
- acting as a reference donor on protection and influencing some IPs to further incorporate protection into their programmes
- an overall responsive stance in terms of approving and modifying actions

---

52 Responds to JC 7.1 and 7.2, as well as offering analysis related to the global humanitarian component
The first part of this finding is focused on the EU added value of DG ECHO in Iraq. The second part takes a broader look at its added value in humanitarian protection globally and in Iraq.

As regards EU added value in Iraq, interviewees all said that DG ECHO is very present in the field, with field visits taking place more frequently and to many more places than other funders and indeed than many other actors. This means that there is an overall stronger understanding of the situation in the field and of how that situation is evolving, as well as stronger monitoring of actions (rather than depending on third-party monitoring, like other funders). That understanding supports stronger contextual analysis for example in the HIPs, and stronger modifications of actions as well as more pertinent calls for new actions. Furthermore, the information helps to improve other actors’ understanding of the situation as a result of debriefings undertaken by DG ECHO. According to several interviewees from the humanitarian assistance agencies of EU Member States, this is an example of how DG ECHO gives them added value. Because they have tighter restrictions for travelling in the field but are able to partially compensate by using the DG ECHO contextual understanding to inform their own understanding. These same interviewees said that DG ECHO’s programming complements their national humanitarian programming and vice versa by virtue of it all being aligned with the HRP, as well as through the various other coordination mechanisms discussed in earlier findings. This complementarity gives them added value in providing further impetus toward the humanitarian goals.

IPs also were nearly unanimous in describing DG ECHO as being less like a funder and more like a partner. Partly this was thanks to DG ECHO staff travelling to the field and in general being more engaged than other funders in the implementation of actions, including making themselves available by phone rather than insisting on more formal meetings. It was also partly because of the technical knowledge of DG ECHO staff, who usually come from an implementation background as compared to other funders’ staff, and so can give more pertinent and actionable advice. Moreover, some IP interviewees underlined the latitude for decision-making for TAs: this generally made it easier to make modifications, leading to stronger adaptations to any evolving needs.

A further EU added value was that DG ECHO would fund actions in locations where other funders were unwilling to fund activities and was willing to be innovative and proactive in responding to emergency situations. For example by rapidly engaging with a new partner (NPA) in responding to the critical needs in the detention sector, and agreeing to its existing partner, WHO, to work with an atypical implementing partner – Aspen Medical, a for-profit medical care company – in the trauma response to the Mosul crisis when no other, more typical partners could be found. In terms of approaches, DG ECHO added value by supporting the Cash Consortium of partner NGOs and by supporting multi-purpose cash assistance, which emerged as a more efficient form of assistance, especially given the middle-income context in Iraq. A particularly innovative element in the Cash Consortium was the common fund: this made it possible to shift funding between consortium
members, if for example needs shifted from one geographic location to another location where a different member was operating. Ultimately, the Cash Consortium has been influential as an approach, including by facilitating other clusters looking at a harmonised response modality.

These positive elements in Iraq primarily involved NGOs, who, in the survey, overall agreed that DG ECHO-supported humanitarian activities had some distinctive and innovative features. By contrast, slightly more than half of the UN and IO respondents disagreed. Importantly, protection very clearly stood out from all other sectors in the survey data, with the equivalent of nearly two-thirds of protection implementing partners in Iraq agreeing that DG ECHO-supported humanitarian activities were innovative, in comparison to respondents working in all other thematic sectors.

Turning now to EU added value in humanitarian protection both globally and in Iraq, the evaluation has found that DG ECHO is seen by many IPs as a reference donor on protection. In this respect, interviewees understand a large and principled donor that plays an important role in setting the agenda on humanitarian protection and pushing for protection in the actions it funds. Among the survey respondents, a large majority of implementing partners both globally (across all world regions) and – to a slightly lesser extent – in Iraq found that incorporating protection considerations in their programming/projects was an important condition for working with DG ECHO. Both globally and in Iraq, NGO respondents agreed more strongly than did their IO counterparts, while UN respondents had an intermediary position. Similarly, DG ECHO protection staff across world regions agreed that a structured approach to humanitarian protection was one of the most important selection criteria to establish a partnership. This was less the case for field staff however, both globally and in Iraq, among whom half did not agree as strongly as their colleagues at HQ.

Furthermore, the survey data shows that global protection implementing partners overall agreed that DG ECHO provided some helpful guidance on protection issues and how to address them: this observation was shared across world regions. About a third of NGO respondents in Iraq and national NGO respondents globally were overall more positive than others. Global protection DG ECHO staff similarly agreed overall that DG ECHO provided leadership on Protection and Humanitarian Aid, fostering new models and innovative approaches to protection programming across world regions. However, the equivalent of a quarter of field staff, both globally and in Iraq, were not as positive as their desk colleagues.

Qualitative evidence confirmed that DG ECHO has directly or indirectly prompted its implementing partners to further incorporate protection into their programmes to a greater extent than other funders have. Reasons for this include:

On the Cash Consortium

In the words of one implementing partner interviewee, “...DG ECHO was the first donor to support [the] use of the common fund, and more generally has been one of the most influential donors for the consortium, [acting as] both a thought partner and collaborator in thinking about what assistance could be put in place.”
Some IPs noted that DG ECHO’s Thematic Policy Document on protection has led to an overall better understanding of protection, despite evidence showing that individual implementing partners may not fully understand some of its core concepts (see the coherence findings). Interviewees also suggested that DG ECHO’s policy has encouraged other donors to focus more and with greater clarity on protection.

Several implementing partners highlighted that DG ECHO had more expertise on protection than most other donors, including on “what works in protection” and expected outputs, and is willing to engage with IPs about protection elements beyond what is merely outlined in proposals.

DG ECHO’s direct capacity-building initiatives on protection are highly regarded by humanitarian partners, although these initiatives remain overall limited in scope.

DG ECHO provides specific protection support within actions, such as funding for safe programming audits, as well as alongside actions, like technical support for the development and use of protection mainstreaming assessment tools, among others.

As regards innovation in protection in particular, interview evidence suggests that DG ECHO does not foster significant new approaches to protection. However, this is less true in some contexts such as in Iraq, where the equivalent of nearly two-thirds of protection implementing partners found DG ECHO-supported humanitarian activities to be innovative. Moreover, while DG ECHO positions itself as “a strategic partner” to IPs, as far as protection is concerned, this is often not the case in practice. Because many IPs engage with DG ECHO mostly at field level, with little actual strategic reflection taking place on protection, including on desired protection outcomes.

However, as was noted in the Iraq-specific section of this finding, when the context allows, DG ECHO has a strong field presence that enables it to gain in-depth contextual knowledge. Thanks to this knowledge, it can efficiently adapt its actions to contextual changes during implementation. Implementing partners emphasised that the interaction with the country offices made a large difference to their engagement, in comparison with other donors. More generally, all implementing partners that received DG ECHO’s field support, including in Iraq, noted having significantly benefited from this support. The more support they had received, the more they reported having benefited from and appreciated it. Support provided ranged from regular but distant monitoring to nearly daily follow-up of actions with highly responsive support. On the other hand, in contexts where the security environment does not allow for a strong or even any field presence, the efficiency of DG ECHO’s interactions with its implementing partners significantly suffers, often as a result of decreased contextual knowledge. Finally, the overall quality of interaction with implementing partners also significantly depends on DG ECHO’s individual staff.

A further element of EU added value is related to DG ECHO’s responsiveness. In other words, that it responded more quickly than other funders, for example to shifting needs. IPs noted that as a humanitarian aid agency, DG ECHO was able to set up programmes swiftly to respond to emergency situations, mostly through implementing partners already operating in the areas or countries. Several IPs
highlighted that “DG ECHO’s speed of responsiveness made a difference”, such as in Kenya in 2015 where it was the first to intervene at entry points to provide protection assistance to South Sudanese refugees. Other partners spent three to six additional months to begin their emergency responses. Moreover, evidence shows that DG ECHO aims to hold to account implementing partners that delay in starting emergency actions. Yet it is unclear whether DG ECHO always does so appropriately since, as was noted by some concerned implementing partners, it may sometimes underestimate the challenges causing the actions to be delayed. Furthermore, in order to increase the flexibility of its programmes in fast-changing environments, DG ECHO set up mechanisms (including crisis modifiers, rapid response mechanisms and contingency funds) to speed up programme modifications, especially for the change of target locations. By the end of the evaluation period, implementation partners were increasingly aiming to use these mechanisms.

EVALUATION QUESTION 8

In Iraq and globally what was the EU added value of DG ECHO’s protection advocacy engagement and actions during the evaluation period?

JC 8.1: How has DG ECHO’s engagement in advocacy on protection differed in approach, as appropriate, especially in terms of advocacy areas of focus, scale, types of activities and enabling protection advocacy, as compared with other major actors?

Finding 1253

The added value of DG ECHO’s protection advocacy in Iraq and globally is related to its strong field presence, which gave it information and legitimacy to more effectively push its advocacy priorities.

This added value also comes from DG ECHO’s partnership approach when working with implementing partners and some degree of innovation in supporting its advocacy work; perceptions of its neutrality, by virtue of how the EU is seen; plus its multiple levels of engagement on advocacy.

DG ECHO staff who responded to the survey globally and in Iraq overall “somewhat agreed” that DG ECHO consistently and effectively engaged in protection advocacy from 2014 to 2018. DG ECHO protection staff in Iraq agreed slightly more strongly than their counterparts working in other countries in the Middle East, but at a similar level to the global protection average.

Furthermore, most protection implementing partners globally and in Iraq found that DG ECHO played an important role in enabling NGOs and civil society to advocate on protection. In Iraq however, two-thirds of UN respondents did not agree as strongly as NGO respondents did.

53 Responds to JC 8.1
The added value of DG ECHO in terms of protection advocacy has multiple components. The first is linked to its strong field presence (where the context allows). Because as was noted in the previous finding, DG ECHO has stronger information about the context, including about needs and how these are shifting, and therefore about what the appropriate response mechanisms would be. These information assets are further bolstered by DG ECHO’s funding of key information-gathering mechanisms. For instance, the rapid protection assessments mechanism made it possible to rapidly gain crucial insights about developing situations in any part of Iraq. From an advocacy perspective, having the most up-to-date information was described by interviewees (including within the cluster system) as a significant advantage. Because this information enabled DG ECHO to have a stronger voice, thanks to a nuanced understanding of protection issues: this informed and strengthened their arguments and positions. It also allowed DG ECHO to increase the scope of their influencing. For example, some of the DG ECHO messaging on forced returns even appeared in the speeches of religious leaders in Iraq.

DG ECHO’s field presence has a further yet less tangible aspect, in the view of many humanitarians. Because going out into the field helps to increase one’s legitimacy, by virtue of being seen as a serious and committed humanitarian actor and thus credible. So, as a result of its field presence, DG ECHO was more able to successfully advocate for protection.

A further component of DG ECHO’s field presence, as already touched on in the previous finding, is that it acted like a partner with its implementing partners. This partnership included direct support of partners on advocacy. One example is DG ECHO’s continued support and messaging to DG ECHO HQ in Brussels during the long negotiation process with the Ethiopian government on including protection in IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix. The partnership approach also included field advocacy aimed at gaining access for its implementing partners. For example, DG ECHO gained access to IDP camps under the control of Shia militias in Iraq for its IPs, by undertaking direct negotiation with the militias. At the same time, this advocacy initiative was aided by DG ECHO strategically funding actions in other Shia parts of the country: this demonstrated that, unlike other actors, DG ECHO was not ignoring the Shia community. The latter point underlines a further added value of DG ECHO’s protection advocacy: it sometimes called on innovative approaches to strengthening those advocacy measures.

Interviewees from the global and Iraq samples also made clear that DG ECHO is perceived by a number of implementing partners as being more neutral and independent than other funders as a result of the EU Member States’ national priorities coalescing around a more needs-driven approach. DG ECHO is also known for its principled and vocal stances on respect for IHL, which is significant given the EU’s political weight. Many interviewees noted that DG ECHO’s protection advocacy was strengthened by its access to key decision-makers in Brussels, who could pick up its advocacy messages, as well as to key actors such as the EEAS and other contacts in-country. Furthermore, several interviewees from the humanitarian assistance agencies of EU Member States said that they coordinated with DG ECHO on advocacy messaging. In their view, this is an
example of how DG ECHO gives them added value, since they are able to amplify their own advocacy messaging by virtue of (usually) harmonising their work. 

A final element to highlight about DG ECHO’s added value on protection advocacy is the varied nature of its advocacy engagement. DG ECHO supported its partners in doing advocacy and did direct advocacy itself. It also supported the mechanisms that did advocacy, such as OCHA and the humanitarian country team as well as the rapid protection assessments mechanism in Iraq. In so doing, DG ECHO was able to push its protection advocacy goals at multiple levels within the system. A further aspect of this was DG ECHO staff discussing and coordinating advocacy messaging with the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection and with key EU actors such as the European External Action Service, and by having its humanitarian messaging taken up by Brussels with other key actors including the UN system.

5.5. Effectiveness

EVALUATION QUESTION 9

To what extent were DG ECHO’s objectives (as defined in the HAR, the Consensus and the specific HIPs) achieved and the needs of the targeted end-beneficiaries satisfied? What concrete results were achieved in the country during the evaluation period?

JC 9.1: What were DG ECHO’s objectives and targets and the related timeline in
- The HAR
- The Consensus
- The specific HIPs
- IP’s major projects in each humanitarian sector

JC 9.2: Were the targets and objectives of the above achieved as planned?

JC 9.3: How successful were DG ECHO Iraq’s humanitarian interventions in different sectors in actually reaching the people/target groups intended?

JC 9.4: Which kinds of projects worked the best and why in producing intended results in each sector? What did not work well and why?

JC 9.5: How satisfied were beneficiaries and the sub-partners that worked directly with beneficiaries with the type and level of services provided? What were the major gaps and issues?

**Finding 13**

There is strong evidence that the sampled actions were in line with DG ECHO’s strategic objectives in Iraq as articulated in the HAR, the HIPs and the Consensus.

---

54 Responds to JC 9.1
The Iraq actions also largely met their specific objectives, thus there is clear evidence of movement toward the achievement of DG ECHO’s objectives in Iraq as defined in those strategic documents.

There are no specific measurable objectives for Iraq in the strategic documents mentioned above. Thus, the most direct way to measure the extent to which DG ECHO achieved its objectives is through the actions that it funded. Notably because, as was discussed in the findings on relevance, the samples of actions from Iraq show strong coherence with the priorities in the various strategic documents, including with the shifts in priorities from year to year.

The humanitarian context in Iraq changed very significantly over the period of the evaluation. This was due to the spread of the Islamic State group in Iraq, including to Ramadi and Fallujah and eventually to Mosul in 2014 and 2015, and the subsequent fighting to dislodge IS beginning in late 2015 and continuing over the next few years. The result was very large numbers of highly vulnerable IDPs, with significant impacts upon host communities and important damage done to infrastructure as a result of the fighting. This situation began to stabilise in late 2017 and into 2018, a period when return of IDPs accelerated, though with needs overall remaining high.

A review of the HAR, the individual HIPs for the years of focus of this evaluation (2014 to 2018) and the Consensus highlights a set of priorities aimed at responding to this shifting context. Priorities included protection, as well as basic assistance such as cash, NFIs and health in 2014. In 2015, IDPs were the main focus of WASH and shelter, health and food assistance activities. These activities were ramped up further in 2016, along with a focus on NFIs, nutrition assistance as well as education in emergencies, particularly for people in conflict-affected areas as well as vulnerable newly displaced people. Moving into 2017, the priorities were protection, shelter, NFIs, WASH, health, education in emergencies and disaster risk reduction, resilience and self-reliance especially for IDPs. In 2018, the focus remained on vulnerable IDPs, including IS affiliated/suspected IS affiliated beneficiaries along with education in emergencies and child protection as well as disaster risk reduction, resilience and self-reliance.

Data on Key Outcome Indicators (KOI) of DG ECHO’s entire Iraq portfolio shows a relatively sustained rate of targets reached from 2014 and 2018 (see figure 30). However, by classifying actions as unsuccessful when they have at least one KOI unmet, the analysis reveals a significant drop in successful actions in 2016, with two-thirds of actions not meeting all of their KOI targets – as opposed to one-third only in the two previous years (see figure 31). So

---

55 The objectives in the HAR, HIPs and Consensus are very high-level objectives.
although actions as a whole did not fail to achieve significantly more targets, more actions failed to achieve at least one of their targets. Two reasons may explain these trends. First, the highly complex security context, which swiftly evolved throughout 2016, made project implementation more complex and unpredictable. Second, the large-scale emergency funding allocated to Iraq implementing partners may have been made on the basis of indicators which could not have been fully met, given the highly complex context at the peak of the crisis. As the security situation improved and emergency funding dropped, the rate of full completion of targets increased in 2017 and again in 2018.

Evidence further shows that UN implementing partners met more of their KOI targets than IO and NGO partners in Iraq, from 2014 to 2018 (see figure 32). This could be linked to UN partners’ projects in fact being simply a portion of their broader national programming that has been designated as a project (as was discussed in an earlier finding); the result then is that the KOI targets are being contributed to by multiple lines of their organisation’s work rather than just by the DG ECHO-funded action.

Furthermore, estimates show that KOI targets were met to the same extent across various locations – yet the data available is not sufficiently disaggregated to analyse at a finer level than governorates.
Comparing protection actions with other humanitarian actions, evidence shows that both approximately met the same percentage of KOIs (see figure 33). However, protection stands out as the only thematic area where over half of the actions failed to meet all of their KOI targets (see figure 34 on this page and figure 35 on the next page). The underlying cause for this is that protection actions have more KOIs than other humanitarian actions on average (3.2 versus 2.4 KOIs per action respectively). So, although protection KOI targets are not disproportionally unmet, protection actions are more likely not to meet all of their KOI targets. Furthermore, survey data shows that a fourth of implementing partners who undertook protection actions found that their DG ECHO-funded actions had only "somewhat met" their target objectives (outputs) and addressed the needs of target groups. By comparison, implementing partners working in other large sectors – including health, WASH and shelter and settlements – were all extremely positive about reaching their targets.

---

56 This is particularly relevant as nearly all actions classified under protection, child protection and mine action on HOPE in Iraq from 2014 to 2018 (57 out of 58 actions) were stand-alone protection actions, thus reflecting an accurate assessment of the protection sector in Iraq.
This data can furthermore be linked to the Iraq intervention logic that was outlined in section 4.2.3 of this report, in that there is good evidence overall of DG ECHO’s intervention in Iraq having broadly similar success levels in the various thematic areas and with no one thematic area that was particularly weak, with the exception of mine actions. This underlines an overall response where the different funded activities would be more likely to combine effectively. This would be more likely to produce the outputs of life-saving assistance and basic services for people, and ultimately in moving toward the targeted outcomes.

Finding 14

KRIs for protection introduced in 2017 were generally seen as useful tools for measuring output level results by implementing partners, who also value the flexibility to select the most appropriate KRIs themselves.

The existing KOI is also generally seen in a positive light. However there is a need to provide guidance on how to use this KOI, including in different cultural contexts and between individuals. Moreover, some areas of important change are not captured.

DG ECHO has developed protection indicators at the output level, called Key Results Indicators (KRIs), which came into use in 2017. There are 15 KRIs that address outputs phrased as “reach”, i.e. number of beneficiaries provided with

57 Responds to JC 9.2 and 9.3
specific protection-related services, information or advocacy products disseminated, number of people participating in capacity-building activities, etc.

Figure 36 shows the use of custom and pre-defined KRI s for all protection results globally, including Iraq, between 2014 and 2018. Protection, unlike most other sectors including health, nutrition, WASH, shelter and settlements, education in emergencies, food security and livelihoods, and coordination among others, did not have pre-defined KRI s prior to 2017. As they were only introduced in late 2017, a very few IPs used them that year, for only 15 results (12 actions). In 2018, these KRI s were made mandatory, and more than half (57 per cent) of all protection KRI s were pre-defined indicators. As figure 36 shows, IPs did not offset their use of KRI s by further custom indicators, but merely substituted them.

Since the evaluation period includes actions from 2014 to 2018, it is somewhat early to assess the KRI s’ usefulness. Most partners interviewed knew about these KRI s and noted that they were useful tools in efforts to measure and aggregate results at the output level. Moreover, many partners emphasised how they appreciated the flexibility granted by DG ECHO in letting them select the KRI s which they deemed most appropriate to their actions, i.e. those which they thought they could meet. Some also mentioned having had fruitful discussions about indicators with relevant DG ECHO staff. Similarly, larger IPs such as UNHCR and ICRC – who have their own sets of indicators for their own results-based management systems – explained that they were able to tailor DG ECHO’s indicators to their own, by adding footnotes for example to explain how they define “appropriate response”. One issue that did emerge among some implementing partners is that they tend to classify their protection results as “other”, in order to allow them to use custom KRI s only. However, doing this is not endorsed by DG ECHO.

DG ECHO drafted a protection-specific Key Outcome Indicator (KOI) in 2017 and has been testing it since then. That indicator is:

“% of persons/target population in a given context reporting an improved feeling of safety and dignity by the end of the intervention compared to at the beginning”

The evaluation team found a lot of enthusiasm around this draft outcome indicator in interviews with IPs, but also requests for further guidance on how to actually use the indicator, especially as it has obvious weaknesses. These weaknesses

---

58 A slight increase in the average use of indicators per result is observed, but this seems to be an ongoing trend since 2015.
include: (i) it does not integrate all the relevant determinants of an individual’s feelings of safety and dignity arising from the action and its activities; and (ii) safety and dignity have largely heterogeneous definitions across cultures as well as between individuals.

Finally, it seems that there are several more "systemic changes" on protection and also behaviour around protection. While both are important intermediate outcomes and reflect innovative aspects of actions that DG ECHO has funded, they are not currently integrated in existing indicators. For example, improved capacities at the community level to identify and address protection needs, and how effective referral systems in different contexts are in following-up and solving protection issues.

Finding 1

Qualitative analysis showed what worked well in DG ECHO’s Iraq response, including cash programming, the health response, the integrated response and support for the rapid response mechanism and for coordination.

Areas of weakness included protection mainstreaming, the work of local implementing partners on protection, and to some extent the GBV and child protection responses.

Qualitative interviews conducted in relation to DG ECHO’s work in Iraq highlighted several areas of programming that were perceived to have worked well and others that were less strong.

Cash programming was highlighted by DG ECHO and IP interviewees as an area of success. Reasons given were the strength of cash as an approach to delivering aid in a middle-income country such as Iraq (including because of its empowerment of beneficiaries), the innovative consortium arrangement for the programming, and the flexible manner in which it was implemented including through the use of the common fund. There was also a sense among DG ECHO respondents that the health response had been strong. They said this was as a result of prioritising health as a thematic area of focus, including through the focus on geographical areas where other funders were not funding programming (at the front lines). They also liked the strong monitoring by DG ECHO staff, many of whom come from a health background. So according to IPs, these staff can give very pertinent feedback, which enhances the quality of the response.

Based on feedback from DG ECHO respondents and IP interviewees, the integrated response as a delivery modality was deemed an area of strength. They appreciated the resulting efficiencies and the ability to adjust rapidly by bringing planning and coordination into one organisation, as was clear in the response in Anbar. Key learnings from this evaluation’s integrated response case study are the need for strong coordination (including information management); the importance of integrated response partners being willing to compromise on their ‘normal’ ways

59 Responds to JC 9.4
of working; and the need to ensure that the expanded areas of work for a particular organisation are part of its core areas of expertise. These points are examined in much more detail in the case study, found in the annexes.

The flexibility of DG ECHO’s funding relative to other funders was highlighted by UNICEF, which noted that this flexibility made it possible to rapidly respond to the outbreak of cholera in 2015. That flexibility and the prioritisation of education as an area of interest also made it possible to respond quickly to the Mosul crisis by opening approximately 250 schools within the first 100 days. According to a UNICEF respondent, “This is amazingly fast and rare for education to get that kind of funding.”

The rapid response mechanism was also highlighted as an area of strength, thanks to the crucial information that the mechanism gathered and rapidly disseminated, thus strengthening the effectiveness of IPs’ response overall. Respondents also underlined the importance of DG ECHO’s support to the cluster and to OCHA, noting it helped to advance the quality of the overall response in Iraq by improving coordination between various key actors including IPs, government and civil-military coordination. Respondents particularly underlined the dynamic leadership of the humanitarian coordinator, though they noted an area of overall weakness was the insufficient challenging of the Iraqi government on disappearances.

Protection was overall highlighted as a significant strength of the Mosul response. This was because of the mix of actions funded as well as the particular areas of focus. Examples of that include the work at the front lines that reached vulnerable populations which otherwise would not have been targeted with aid, civilian documentation based on that being a crucial area of need, plus mine risk education and demining. Detention was also felt to be an important area of protection work funded by DG ECHO. Because conditions in prisons had significantly worsened, as a result of detainee numbers rising significantly with the high number of Islamic State prisoners. At the same time, the evaluation found some degree of duplication of services to detainees by different organisations with non-DG ECHO funding. Thus, it underlines the importance of strong coordination among funders on this thematic area.

There was a clear sense, however, among many respondents that local organisations were notably weaker or at the very least much more variable in the quality of their understanding of protection and of their protection work, as compared with the international partners. This was at least partly linked to the high costs of non-DG ECHO protection training. It was also due to local organisations being more susceptible to pressure from local actors, since the local organisation and its staff are based in the local community. Such pressure can for example lead to turning a blind eye to protection violations being committed by locally powerful actors, including the popular mobilisation forces. These actors were described as very active in IDP camps and interviewees said they had openly threatened humanitarian workers. A particular example of this was in the work of a local NGO that was working with IDPs, but whose contract was terminated due to the NGO’s poor record in safeguarding the IDPs from practices such as extortion as well as threats and SGBV.
A further issue with protection was overall weak protection mainstreaming. Some health actors were particularly singled out here, possibly because of their focusing on immediate health concerns and how to best treat these rather than also considering how to incorporate mainstreaming. Other areas of weakness that were noted by multiple interviewees include the response to gender-based violence as well as child protection more generally. Here there was a sense that the quality of programming was not as strong as it might have been, relative to other thematic areas of work. Finally, there were challenges with referrals for health actions, since it was not always clear to whom health beneficiaries with protection cases should be referred.

**Finding 16**

**Beneficiaries, based on information from implementing partners as well as from beneficiaries themselves, were relatively satisfied with the services provided as part of the Iraq response.**

**Yet accountability to the local population was generally weak in action reporting, an issue that will likely be addressed with the protection mainstreaming KOI piloted since 2017.**

Beneficiary satisfaction as reported by implementing partners was overall good, based on informal feedback that they had received from beneficiaries, though also through more formal means such as feedback mechanisms in IDP camps. This is not to say that there were no areas where adjustments were needed, but that areas of dissatisfaction – such as flooding in IDP camps near Qayyarah town that rendered some tents uninhabitable – were appropriately dealt with. Yet while ex-post qualitative assessments of beneficiaries’ satisfaction about projects’ relevance and achievements are a valuable way of ensuring accountability to beneficiaries, these assessments were seldom incorporated into action reporting for the period of the evaluation (though they are part of the protection mainstreaming KOI piloted since 2017 and are discussed in finding 13). Similarly, reporting data related to whether beneficiaries said that they had benefited from the services of an action was included for only a very small number of actions. So, this data provided very little insight.

Survey data shows that the great majority of implementing partners in Iraq were highly confident that their DG ECHO-funded actions provided tangible benefits for the most vulnerable people – although somewhat less so for partners working in protection coordination, possibly because they were not in direct contact with end-beneficiaries. Protection implementing partners were as positive as all other implementing partners, with the exception of those working in protection advocacy, protection information management, as well as monitoring and dissemination, who were only slightly less positive. The seven DG ECHO survey respondents in Iraq were not as strongly confident as their implementing partners, but they were still positive that DG ECHO interventions successfully reached the intended target groups.

---

60 Responds to JC 9.5
Importantly, focus group discussions and small group interviews (including with beneficiaries as well as with implementing partners conducted as part of the evaluation) found a similar level of satisfaction. Respondents emphasised how crucial the support was, how much they appreciated it overall, and in general characterised it as good. This was true of male and female respondents, and for both younger and older respondents. At the same time, beneficiaries perhaps unsurprisingly had difficulties in linking areas of dissatisfaction with areas of IP focus or responsibility. For example IDPs were distraught by and spoke at length about camp closures and what awaited them after what in their view was a forced return process, even though closing of camps was not within the control of the IPs but rather of government actors.

EVALUATION QUESTION 10

How successful was DG ECHO in its advocacy and communication measures in Iraq to influence other actors by direct and indirect advocacy on issues such as humanitarian access and space, respect for IHL, addressing gaps in response, applying good practice and carrying out follow-up actions of DG ECHO’s interventions? Was there an advocacy gap?

JC 10.1: Were the specific intended results (outputs and outcomes) of DG ECHO’s protection and advocacy and communications activities in Iraq achieved? In which protection advocacy areas were the interventions most successful and why? What could have been improved upon?

JC 10.2: To what extent have DG ECHO in Iraq’s protection advocacy led to specific protection advocacy programming and communications initiatives by partners and other humanitarian organizations?

JC 10.3: What changes have been made based on DG ECHO’s advocacy? Are there remaining issues where little or no advocacy has taken place? Why?

Finding 17

A variety of strong advocacy efforts were undertaken both directly and indirectly by DG ECHO and these are in line with its priority areas of work.

The challenge however is that the advocacy work is rarely specifically monitored and reported on, so much of the evidence on effectiveness is anecdotal.

DG ECHO’s advocacy work in Iraq has been both direct (conducted by DG ECHO directly with advocacy targets) as well as indirect. In other words, it is conducted by its partners who themselves directly engage with the advocacy targets. This advocacy has focused on field level advocacy, for example for access in order to deliver humanitarian aid, and higher level advocacy aimed at advancing goals – from respect for international humanitarian and international human rights law to improving civil-military coordination, such as in planning for the Mosul response.

61 Responds to JC 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3
The specific outputs and outcomes aimed at by DG ECHO in its advocacy were covered in a variety of different documents during the first years of the Iraq crisis. Based on those documents that were shared with the team, for example a meeting document from the Council working party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA) from October 2016, the main priorities were to encourage the Iraqi authorities to adhere to principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) by protecting civilians including during fighting, in the conduct of security screenings and in detention, as well as in the treatment of IDPs and in the returns process. For 2017 and 2018, advocacy logframe documents exist that pick up on many of the same issues. The first priority focused on was targeting systematic disregard of IHL and IHRL, as well as of common guiding principles on IDPs. This disregard has resulted in significant protection concerns for civilians and particularly civilians fleeing violence, with freedom of movement highly constrained, basic assistance difficult to access, and ongoing violence in their new locations. Furthermore, the logframes highlight challenges related to access in providing humanitarian assistance to those most in need, especially in non-government controlled areas and due to the context continually changing, as well as because of key implementing partners and particularly international partners not operating in the areas of high need. Finally, the documents highlight challenges related to targeting of medical infrastructure and more general health-related access issues, including denial of passage for ambulances. In response to these various needs, the document lays out a variety of key target actors and activities to undertake, whether bilateral or multilateral, including specifying relevant fora.

In general, there is some evidence from interviewees about DG ECHO undertaking direct advocacy in all of these areas of focus. However this data is not systematically recorded in a manner that would enable a complete assessment.

For the first main area of focus, interviewees mentioned the European Commission making a statement about shelling of civilians by coalition forces. DG ECHO also contributed to protection of IDPs by advocating directly with a senior Shia Sheikh in Karbala to ensure that no harm came to returnees, by framing the advocacy through the lens of humanitarian principles. It also strengthened the advocacy by funding a UNFPA action in Karbala, effectively demonstrating DG ECHO’s concern with the humanitarian situation in that city as well. There were also high-level missions from DG ECHO HQ in Brussels at various critical junctures during the period of the evaluation. Furthermore, DG ECHO advocated directly with the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Center (JCMC), which coordinates between the Iraqi government and the international community on issues related to crisis management coordination, to help postpone eviction of IDPs in Anbar governorate.

62 The Council working party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA) is the main EU forum for strategic and policy discussions on humanitarian aid between EU Member States and the European Commission. See: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/partnerships/relations/eu-member-states-cohafa_en.
As regards direct field level advocacy, there is also some evidence of DG ECHO advocating with JCMC to improve access to IDPs, and of it working through the EEAS to get access to IDP camps. DG ECHO interviewees also described successful advocacy with militia leaders for access to IDP camps under their control in west Ninewa governorate at the time of the Mosul operation. This advocacy was a big success, as it enabled access to a highly vulnerable group of IDPs.

Turning to indirect advocacy by DG ECHO, there is good evidence of implementing partners (whose actions had advocacy components) undertaking advocacy directly with government actors, for example advocacy for water access for IDPs or for IDP children to have access to education. There is also evidence of advocacy related to IHL, for example Geneva Call’s advocacy work with armed non-state actors, aimed at ensuring greater protection of civilians, and its strengthening of a network called “friends of IHL” that advocates for protection in line with international humanitarian law. IPs also conducted advocacy within the cluster system to advance their actions’ priorities, as well as through such mechanisms as the NGO Coordination Committee Iraq (NCCI)-based Advocacy Working Group. Access was also a focus area for the advocacy work, to be able to deliver programming.

Among survey respondents, about 60 per cent of the Iraq IPs reported that their actions did not include an advocacy component and 13 per cent said that they did not know about the impact of the advocacy component. The others who responded were overall very confident that their DG ECHO-funded action successfully advocated for protecting the rights of the most vulnerable people.

Thus, the advocacy gap that emerges is related to the advocacy plan. In other words, the 2017 and 2018 logframes are a good start in laying out the various activity areas (which are generally logical and appropriate although overly numerous, which could impact realisability). However the targets for the activities (which are logical) and the indicators (which are also reasonable, but could be made more measurable) have a weakness: they do not make clear how the plan will be implemented, or how it will be monitored. In particular, there is no plan for follow-up to assess and record what difference advocacy initiatives have made – i.e. what change did or did not occur and if there was a change, if/to what extent it can be linked to the advocacy undertaken. This lack of a plan makes it hard to know if targets are being met. For example, will IPs be assigned particular areas of responsibility and report back to DG ECHO?

Ultimately, there are multiple examples of success in advocacy by DG ECHO in Iraq. But these efforts could have an even greater impact if they were systematised within a plan that builds on the logframes from the latter part of the evaluation period.

**EVALUATION QUESTION 11**

To what extent were DG ECHO’s protection actions achieving the objectives stated by the Thematic Policy document on Humanitarian Protection?
Finding 1

DG ECHO, through the Iraq and global humanitarian protection actions it funds, has been largely successful in mitigating immediate protection threats and reducing vulnerabilities, including by building self-protection capacities and using referrals, though it is difficult to fully assess the effectiveness of referrals in addressing protection concerns due to lack of data.

Addressing broader threats and deeper vulnerabilities is difficult through short-term actions in multi-faceted crises, and was less successful.

Capacity building on protection had many components. These included capacity building of officials and community leaders, capacity building within IP organisations as well as for local partners, and capacity building on effective protection referrals. Their effectiveness was variable.

According to the thematic policy document on humanitarian protection, DG ECHO’s specific objectives in humanitarian protection are three-fold:

i) to prevent, reduce, mitigate and respond to protection threats against persons, groups and communities affected by ongoing, imminent or future humanitarian crises,

ii) to reduce the protection vulnerabilities and increase the protection capacities of persons, groups and communities affected by ongoing, imminent or future humanitarian crises; and,

iii) to strengthen the capacity of the international humanitarian aid system to enhance efficiency, quality and effectiveness in reducing protection risks in ongoing, imminent or future humanitarian crises.

Each of these objectives is treated in separate sub-sections below, first focusing on threats (in line with specific objective 1), secondly on vulnerabilities (in line with specific objective 2), and finally on capacity building in the humanitarian aid system (in line with specific objective 3). Consideration of specific approaches to addressing these various objectives – through targeted actions, protection

63 Responds to JC 11.1, 11.2 and 11.3
mainstreaming and protection capacity building, as detailed in section 4.1 of this report – is subsumed into the sections as appropriate.

## Threats

The 2016 Thematic Policy Document on Protection defines a threat as: “Violence, coercion, deprivation, abuse or neglect against the affected population/ individual. It is committed by an actor (note that perpetrators and duty-bearers are sometimes the same actor)”. Because most protection actions are of short duration, they are rarely the best level of analysis to try to assess whether they made a significant difference in actually mitigating some of the more complex and interrelated external threats that DG ECHO beneficiary groups face. Yet despite this caveat, the evaluation team found DG ECHO’s implementing partners were successful in many instances in mitigating immediate protection threats (outputs). However, these partners were not usually successful in sustainably reducing broader protection threats (outcomes), particularly because both DG ECHO and its implementing partners often have limited leverage at best in the multi-faceted humanitarian crises where they operate. It is worth noting that DG ECHO sometimes provides direct advocacy support in the countries where it has political leverage, thus directly contributing to the reduction of broader protection threats beyond the usual involvement of international donor agencies (see EU added-value findings). Some missed opportunities in achieving outcomes were due to (i) IPs’ insufficiently thorough protection and risk analysis outlining well-informed and comprehensive scenarios on how actions aim to achieve protection outcomes; and (ii) the short-term duration of actions, which hindered sustainable impact.

Addressing the results of protection threats was usually done through integrated actions that combined core protection activities. Examples include providing psychological first aid (PFA), referral services for child protection and GBV and SGBV, information on very specific risks, and helping with access to legal services, with health, education in emergencies (EiE), WASH, food security and shelter activities. These integrated actions were appropriate, given the multi-faceted needs of target populations and the greater efficiencies that can result from integrated programming in one area. The problem was that it was often not clearly explained how these integrated actions contributed to protection outcomes, partly because the focus was on addressing the broad needs of vulnerable populations rather than also specifically articulating the protection component. By contrast the evaluation team found a relatively small number of actions globally and in Iraq that were stand-alone protection actions – these understandably had a very clear focus on addressing specific protection threats and could better explain how they aimed to contribute to protection outcomes.

## Vulnerabilities

Stand-alone and integrated protection programming effectively addresses protection vulnerabilities of target populations. This is thanks to the nature of services delivered – such as community-awareness-raising, legal assistance to particular groups e.g. detainees, GBV, child protection, etc. – and effective
beneficiary targeting of those exposed to greater insecurity or deprivation. However, DG ECHO’s implementing partners are often weak at clearly outlining how they aim to target the most vulnerable. This partly due to the complex emergency situations in which they operate, plus a tendency among IPs to in practice adopt a status-based approach, whereby particular vulnerabilities become de-emphasised.

Additionally, the ET found that some opportunities had been taken to address further vulnerabilities through protection mainstreaming, by preventing and minimising unintended negative effects of interventions and by providing meaningful access. Evidence shows that DG ECHO’s implementing partners in general successfully mainstream the most basic protection elements, namely prioritising safety and dignity and avoiding causing harm, though overall protection mainstreaming was not systematically incorporated into the sampled actions. IPs also set up efficient feedback and complaint mechanisms to ensure accountability to beneficiaries. However, beneficiaries do not have leverage in the decision-making process of the complaint mechanisms. Furthermore, there was no specific section in the action documentation templates, at least until 2017 and the pilot protection mainstreaming KOI, where implementing partners had to specifically detail how they had mainstreamed protection. This resulted in variability in how clearly and completely this mainstreaming of protection was covered in the documentation reviewed, including on ensuring meaningful access. DG ECHO survey respondents both globally and in Iraq found that DG ECHO was overall “somewhat successful” in implementing protection mainstreaming across its programming. In Iraq, the respondents working in health and nutrition were slightly more positive than others. Worldwide, the equivalent of a third of DG ECHO staff with a global focus were more positive than the overall global average.

The review of project actions and interviews showed that most partners who were directly involved with beneficiaries included referral systems, mapping of service providers and the associated mechanisms for safeguarding the privacy of individual cases referred. Furthermore, the evaluation team found that referrals were nearly always the common approach in integrated protection actions. The actual possibilities for referrals varied significantly among country contexts, however. Several actions made reference to referrals and referral networks, while indicating that they worked in very underserved contexts with a lack of organisations with protection expertise. This gave rise to doubts about how well they were actually able to refer.

The evaluation team was not able to definitively determine to what extent other sectors tried to integrate protection in their actions by using referrals, though health was highlighted as one area where protection referrals were a challenge. It was also notable that non-protection activities are sometimes used to provide a point of entry for the provision of protection services, including in environments where authorities are sceptical about protection actions, such as in Syria.

The actual effectiveness of protection referrals and referral networks in addressing vulnerabilities was difficult to determine. First, beyond numbers of people referred for specific protection support, it seemed that most IPs did not follow up or at least did not report on this. So it was unclear what the results were. Additionally,
the evaluation team did not see examples or explanations of what kinds of support or capacity building DG ECHO and its partners provided to the “referring agencies”. Thus it is difficult to make a definitive judgment about which kinds of referrals seemed to be working well and why, and to what extent vulnerabilities had been successfully addressed.64

Reviews of projects classified as protection, along with interviews, also showed that IPs have increasingly emphasised building self-protection capacity by adopting community-based approaches – and they were often encouraged to do so by DG ECHO. IPs and their local partners have taken advantage of opportunities to work with existing community groups and committees and have facilitated the set-up of others on protection. Examples have included community-based protection outreach teams (especially in refugee and IDP camps), UNICEF’s strengthening of community-based solutions on PSS, providing information and tools to IDP and refugee committees on protection rights, providing specific tools and referral contacts for protection services, as well as supporting school-based child protection clubs. These were good practices, because they combined immediate support with building self-protection mechanisms for IDPs and refugees, and often included host communities.

**Capacity building in the humanitarian aid system**

Increasing protection capacities within the humanitarian community was also an important element in many of the actions reviewed (both global and in Iraq). As regards capacity-building of local officials and host community leaders, most protection actions conducted both awareness and information sessions for local officials. These sessions covered the meaning of protection, its importance, protection needs in their jurisdictions and approaches on how to build in protection activities and referrals into their services, even if not always systematically. One example from Iraq of government capacity building was of an action that helped to improve the case management system of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) by incorporating social workers into mobile outreach teams, as well as providing training on delivering child and maternal health messages to community-level volunteers and thereby increasing their capacities.

Nearly all of DG ECHO’s implementing partners strengthen the protection capacities of their own staff and volunteers as well as partner organisations. This in particular includes training their field teams and local implementing partners on the “do no harm” principle, although the content of these trainings is not often clearly explained nor is their quality or the outcomes for trainees’ knowledge well elucidated. On the last point, there was evidence from the Iraq fieldwork of local implementing partners that had received capacity building on protection from their DG ECHO-funded international partner, but their understanding of that protection remained low.

DG ECHO has also conducted and emphasised capacity building on assessing protection risks and making referrals. Many IPs for projects classified as

---

64 This is expected to be addressed with the new referral indicator introduced after the end of the evaluation’s period of focus.
“protection” do not directly provide protection services to beneficiaries. But they do enable the provision of in-depth protection services by specialised agencies. DG ECHO and the protection cluster have also provided guidance and training to other in-country humanitarian sectors about how to identify and refer risky protection situations at the community and individual levels.

**Finding 1**

A review of KRIs and KOIs for the total population of protection actions, including Iraq, found that 75 per cent of KRI targets were met.

**UN IPs were less successful in meeting targets than international organisations.**

**Africa actions were slightly less successful in meeting targets, with Europe and Latin America actions significantly more successful in meeting targets.**

This finding is focused on the extent to which DG ECHO protection actions globally, including in Iraq, achieved their objectives. It is first important to note however that meeting targets is clearly only a small component of what constitutes the “success” of an action, as emerged in the qualitative analysis of the DG ECHO Iraq portfolio.

Quantitative assessment of the total population of protection actions found that close to 75 per cent of all protection KRIs between 2014 and 2018 were reached (see figure 37 with disaggregated figures by year). This strongly reflects the survey data in which the equivalent of a quarter of global protection implementing partners on average found that their DG ECHO-funded actions only “somewhat met” their target objectives (outputs) and addressed the needs of target groups, while the remaining three-quarters were confident that their target objectives had been fully met. Among the 25 per cent who were less positive, several commented that the context beyond their and DG ECHO’s control caused the projects to not achieve their targets. Others also commented that targets were achieved as per “the deliverables defined in the action (...) but important needs on protection (were) neglected”. Overall, responses were very homogenous across world regions, types of implementing partners and protection thematic areas.

---

65 Responds to JC 11.1
Further assessment of the total population of protection actions shows however that only about 45 per cent of protection results had successfully met all their KRI targets, with three out of four KRIs per result on average. No significant difference was observed between custom and pre-defined KRIs (see figure 38).

It was clear overall that IPs were cautious about what could be accomplished – indeed, several DG ECHO interviewees said that IPs sometimes underestimate targets so that they can be surer of achieving them. For example, targets related to specific service delivery to specific numbers of beneficiaries, targets related to numbers of beneficiaries, community members or local officials trained on protection, and targets about “level of beneficiary satisfaction”, etc. were typically met or exceeded. Moreover, the evaluation team did not see analysis of what meeting these targets meant in relation to the scale of particular needs of specific vulnerable groups. What this underlines is that an action typically focuses on a particular group of beneficiaries, without linking the extent to which addressing the needs of the beneficiaries addresses the larger set of needs assessed in the needs analysis.

Significantly, the evaluation team found that in those cases where IPs’ actions did not succeed in meeting targets, it was regularly because the indicators and targets were capturing outcome-level results. These were indicators and targets that related to changes in behaviour, for example, adopting new protection practices, or victims of GBV and SGBV coming forward to social service centres.

Unlike what was found with the Iraq portfolio of actions, UN implementing partners were the least successful in meeting all their KRI targets in protection results. At the same time, international organisation partners were the most successful (ten percentage points higher), with NGO partners in between (see figure 39).
Minor trends emerged from the quantitative analysis, regarding the extent to which protection results fully achieved their KRI targets by DG ECHO world regions. Africa appeared below average (5 percentage points below), while Europe (including Turkey) and Latin America were significantly above average (10 percentage points) (see figure 40).

Looking at the two largest recipients of DG ECHO’s protection funding from 2014 to 2018, in Turkey less than a third of protection results had achieved all of their KRI targets, while nearly two-thirds had in Greece (see figure 41).

Finally, no significant trends emerged from the quantitative analysis on KRIs across protection sub-sectors, showing that overall results were fully or only partially met regardless of their protection thematic areas.

5.5.1. Factors for success and challenges that limited the success of actions

This sub-section outlines the main factors for success and those challenges limiting the success of actions, based on the evaluation research and related to the effectiveness section. The factors are listed below, with the relevant element of the evaluation that gave rise to the factor (Iraq and/or global humanitarian protection) included at the end of each bullet.

Factors for success

- **Contextual understanding:** partners with a long-term in-country presence and understanding of the social, legal and cultural context tended to be more successful, including because of their involving communities in the design and implementation of actions. This in turn further improved their contextual understanding, including of local needs, and helped to ensure meaningful access.
  Iraq and global humanitarian protection
• **Collaborative approach between DG ECHO and its implementing partners:** the often-strong collaboration between DG ECHO and its IPs, including in assessing the context as well as in designing and adjusting actions, supported stronger programming overall. This was sometimes reinforced by the technical expertise of DG ECHO staff's as former practitioners.

Iraq and global humanitarian protection

• **Flexibility/adaptability:** the adaptability of DG ECHO and its partners significantly helped in responding to contextual challenges as well as shifting needs, as reflected in the large number of modification requests granted by DG ECHO with the aim of keeping the actions relevant. DG ECHO shows significant flexibility in adapting implementation modalities, and relatively large flexibility in addressing evolving needs and locations of operation in a timely manner.

Iraq and global humanitarian protection

• **Partnerships with Government and local IPs as well as community-based approaches:** partnerships with Government and local implementing partners were key for getting buy-in to actions including improving access, service provision and sustainability. Through such partnerships, DG ECHO partners also strengthened the capacities of local stakeholders and thereby contributed to sustainability. Also important were community-based approaches, which improved the ability to reach vulnerable populations and built self-protection capacity.

Iraq and global humanitarian protection

• **Coordinated interagency approach:** the coordinated interagency approach through cluster systems has contributed to increased effectiveness especially, by establishing common standards of assistance and by coordinating responses.

Iraq and global humanitarian protection

**Challenges**

• **Access and security:** difficulties related to access and security challenged the implementation of almost all actions, though this was partially to be expected given that DG ECHO prioritised interventions in hard-to-reach locations, including those close to the frontlines in Iraq.

Iraq and global humanitarian protection

• **Weak reporting on integrated protection:** integrated protection actions did not systematically clearly highlight and report on how the interventions contributed to achieving protection outputs and broader outcomes: this made it harder to monitor the effectiveness of this aspect of the actions.

Iraq and global humanitarian protection

• **Coordination with Government actors and local capacities:** a key constraint that has challenged the implementation of many actions is difficulties in cooperating with government authorities. Local authorities’ often weak financial and human resources capacities have also challenged the implementation of programmes and the sustainability of the results, especially those more closely linked to existing services, such as health, education and water and sanitation. In Iraq specifically, while local authorities (e.g. governorates and provincial directorates) were supportive...
to help ensure smooth service delivery, the bureaucratic authorisation procedures for operating (as managed by the central government) hampered the smooth implementation of programmes. A further issue for many actions was challenges related to recruitment of qualified technical staff, including female medical staff for health actions. Iraq and global humanitarian protection.

5.6. Efficiency

EVALUATION QUESTION 12
To what extent did DG ECHO achieve cost-effectiveness in its response to the crisis in Iraq? What factors affected the cost-effectiveness of the response and to what extent?

JC 12.1: Were the budget and expenditure cost-effective as per the DG ECHO cost-effectiveness guidance (which is based on five judgement criteria with indicators for both DG ECHO as a donor and ECHO-funded partners and their actions)?

JC 12.2: If not, what factors limited cost-effectiveness? Was sufficient justification provided?

Finding 20

DG ECHO’s actions in Iraq were overall efficient and cost-effective, based on the types of activities it undertook, with good adaptation to the context (although there were some timeliness issues), and relatively good coordination.

According to the document *Study on Approaches to Assess Cost-Effectiveness of DG ECHO’s Humanitarian Aid Actions*, efficiency can be defined as how well inputs are converted to outputs, while cost-effectiveness refers to the achievement of intended outcomes in relation to costs.

Focusing first on efficiency, we see overall good efficiency in the samples of actions we reviewed and based on feedback from interviewees. Budgets and plans were often appropriately and rapidly modified, based on reasonable justifications from implementing partners so as to flexibly adapt to the changing or hard-to-predict context as well as evolving protection needs and populations. For example, an action implemented by DRC was modified four times to adjust to the context and in particular the higher than expected number of IDPs fleeing Mosul; changes included modifying the targets and beneficiary numbers and increasing the budget as well as providing a two-month no-cost extension to accommodate these needs. A further example is the rapid protection assessment mechanism, which according to interviewees was better able to get timely and useful data thanks to the

---

66 Responds to JC 12.1 and 12.2
flexibility of the DG ECHO funding, which in turn made it possible to rapidly plan and carry out missions.

Timeliness was sometimes a challenge in actions, as would be expected given the context and the types of actions that DG ECHO funded. For example, a Malteser action included an element of distributing NFIs to displaced populations in the Tel Afar area at a time in 2017 when IS was particularly active. This resulted in multiple delays to the distributions as well as insecurity for implementing partner staff, and thus some losses in efficiency. Some interviewees from WHO also said that one result of operating near the front lines was that they had to move more often than normal, which impacted their efficiency. Some innovative ideas proved less successful, leading to challenges and some degree of inefficiency – for example, an action implemented by Nonviolent Peaceforce in 2017 involved mobile protection teams monitoring displaced people, providing protection accompaniments and facilitating access to services. But according to DG ECHO interviewees, it was sometimes difficult to have this highly mobile technical response operating safely at the front lines, so the results were somewhat less than expected.

There was relatively good coordination with other key actors, such as government ministries and other implementing partners, with a view to improving efficient project implementation. This includes trying to find added value through (i) sharing of resources (e.g. through participating in the WHO-led medicine distribution network); (ii) building of capacity within the community; (iii) working with local partners such as the actions aimed at improving government prison infrastructure, and (iv) addressing demand of both IDPs and the host community together, such as providing support for water treatment infrastructure. As regards the medicine distribution by WHO, interviewees underlined problems in ensuring the steady supply of pharmaceuticals. This resulted from challenges in the approval process from the Ministry of Health and other actors, as well as difficulties accessing various locations with the medicines, thus affecting efficiency for some health actions.

DG ECHO also championed cash as an efficient transfer modality and one that is preferred by beneficiaries in a middle-income country such as Iraq, with efficiency also well served by the usage of a common fund to transfer money between partners. Staff turnover was one area that was flagged as an efficiency issue during the height of the Mosul crisis, as a result of a shortage of emergency health staff and some national staff moving between organisations to take advantage of differential salaries. Similarly, some interviewees noted that several organisations fluctuated in the efficiency and quality of their work over the period of the evaluation, as a result of different staff being in place, yet that they continued to receive funding regardless. This underlines an interesting challenge, whereby an organisation’s reputation for efficiency can lead to ignoring the inefficiencies of the staff in place at a particular time, even if this is known.

As regards the cost-effectiveness of the samples of actions, the desk review of sampled actions and interviews with IPs and relevant DG ECHO staff found that this was overall good given the context and the range of activities undertaken. More particularly, variations from the budgets were justifiable and in general well
accounted for. These variations were often linked to shifts in the context including the types, number and locations of beneficiaries as well as the security situation. The context also led to some higher than expected security costs for some actions, sometimes slightly higher than expected costs for construction/building rehabilitation – due to market fluctuations in an emergency context – and some delays in project implementation. The contextual challenges also contributed to the underspending that was noted for some of the actions sampled, though this was felt to be reasonable given normal bottlenecks, e.g. in terms of hiring. Some action also resulted in underspending, due to overestimating the cost of certain activities, though this was appropriately handled – e.g. UNOPS spent less than anticipated on an IDP call centre, and as a result returned over €100,000. The proportion of action budgets spent on support costs was overall also felt to be reasonable, according to interviewees, staying in the range of 20 per cent, though with some variation from that in more remote locations. Similarly, overhead costs were overall good according to interviewees, being in the 7-10 per cent range.

**EVALUATION QUESTION 13**

Was the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO in Iraq appropriate and proportionate to what the actions were meant to achieve?

JC 13.1: To what extent did the budget allocations allow for achieving intended outcomes and outputs in each humanitarian sector?

JC 13.2: Did DG ECHO and IPs manage their programming and expenditure appropriately and in an accountable manner?

**Finding 21**

DG ECHO’s efforts to ensure the cost-effectiveness of Iraq actions throughout the project cycle were variable, with appropriate practices in tension with a tendency to put more emphasis on other aspects of good programming.

As regards the appropriateness of DG ECHO efforts to ensure cost-effectiveness of actions throughout the project cycle, results were mixed. DG ECHO survey respondents found overall that DG ECHO had ensured that funds were used efficiently and cost-effectively to achieve intended results, with however about half of the respondents noting being only “somewhat” confident that this was the case. Most DG ECHO survey respondents also agreed that DG ECHO managed its programming and expenditures in an accountable manner, with about a third of Iraq DG ECHO staff being even more positive than their counterparts working in the Middle East overall. Furthermore, implementing partners found overall that DG ECHO-funded activities were appropriately efficient and/or cost-effective given the context and other relevant factors. But NGO respondents were more cautious in their answers – around half of the respondents only “somewhat agreeing”.

67 Responds to JC 13.2
International organisation respondents were unanimously highly positive, while UN respondents were in-between.

Interviews made clear that the selection process for partner proposals was strongly needs-driven, with considerable internal discussion at the country level and with DG ECHO HQ in Brussels to ensure the strongest proposals were picked, including the right mix of proposals. Furthermore, efficiency and cost-effectiveness were one factor in this decision-making process, but this was less important than other factors and particularly the assessed needs. Interestingly, according to one interviewee, DG ECHO has less leverage in this process than is sometimes assumed, since the implementing partners and particularly DG ECHO’s big partners, including NGOs, define the market price to some extent.

In turn this under-weighting of efficiency and cost-effectiveness carried over to monitoring of actions. Because while DG ECHO staff were in general strong at field monitoring (though with 2018 described as weaker than other years due to the de-prioritisation of field visits by the head of office in that year), they were generally weaker at close financial tracking of actions. This is not to say that there were no good examples of DG ECHO staff appropriately assessing and querying the cost-effectiveness of actions – indeed interviewees were able to cite multiple specific examples of appropriate assessment and follow-up, for example, a 2017 action where approximately €80,000 was wrongly spent, which was noticed by DG ECHO staff and ultimately resolved.

Some generally appropriate tools were also used, including to measure per beneficiary costs for health actions or to compare level of direct vs indirect costs. Yet there were also gaps in the assessments as a result of the process being insufficiently systematised overall and particularly relative to other donors. Some DG ECHO interviewees said that capacities were in some cases relatively low in terms of being able to appropriately ensure cost-effectiveness, with recourse sometimes made to something “feeling right” based on experience. Interviewees also underlined the high workload for TAs and desk officers, which forces them to prioritise certain areas of work over others and with cost-effectiveness tending to be given less weight overall. Indeed, as several interviewees noted, TAs are better seen by management if they can manage more actions, which encourages them to take on a very high number of actions. As a result, analysis of data in HOPE showed that one desk officer was responsible for 120 actions during the period of the evaluation, a total that underlines one interviewee’s observation that there is insufficient time to do detailed assessments of cost-effectiveness throughout the project cycle. Finally, some DG ECHO interviewees who did question financial aspects of actions felt that they were somewhat treated as a nuisance by other colleagues, who as a result of the questioning had to follow up on the action.

Finding 22

DG ECHO in Iraq’s budget allocations were generally appropriate given the objectives targeted, including the relative amounts given to

68 Responds to JC 13.1
different thematic areas. However, there were some concerns about the draw-down in funding in 2017 and 2018, given existing needs.

Costs were overall well-balanced with effectiveness.

Document analysis and key informant interviews underlined strong synergies between DG ECHO’s overall budget in Iraq and the evolving context, and particularly during the first half of the response from 2014 up to 2016, when the budget rose significantly year on year in response to the deepening crisis (as shown in the maps in this report’s Iraq context section, section 4.2.1). At the same time, the budget decreased significantly in 2017 and was reduced further in 2018, to a level lower than the 2014 levels. While IDP numbers were also dropping over this time, document analysis and key informant interviews have found that those IDPs who remained in-place had significant humanitarian needs and significant protection concerns, an observation that is true of both in-camp and out-of-camp populations. Furthermore, returnee numbers were rising heavily during this period, with large reintegration needs, including protection-specific needs. Thus there were some concerns, including from many IDP interviewees, about the appropriateness of the overall budget for the second part of the evaluation period (2017-18) in relation to the assessed needs in the HIPs. This underlines that assessment of the budget’s appropriateness for this latter period is intertwined with challenges related to the nexus and in particular to more clearly defining the nexus. Indeed, a strong definition would have indicated what types and levels of assessed needs are no longer a DG ECHO priority but are more a priority for more development-oriented actors. This would help DG ECHO to refocus funding on existing humanitarian protection needs.

As regards what proportion of the total budget was allocated to each thematic area, there is a generally good alignment with needs. This was also expressed by DG ECHO staff in the survey: they found that budget allocations allowed for achieving intended results in each humanitarian sector in Iraq overall; about half strongly agreeing that this was the case, and the other half “somewhat agreeing”. In particular, as shown in figure 9 earlier in this report, the funding to health, WASH, shelter and settlements as well as food security are in line with the context and objectives, peaking in 2016 and then drawing down. Regarding protection, the funding peaked in 2017, which is in line with needs as outlined in the HIPs, though it is not clear from the documents whether the steep decline in 2018 was fully appropriate as noted above. The distribution between protection sub-sectors was in general appropriate given the needs, including the prioritisation of protection advocacy, capacity building, documentation as well as prevention of and response to violence. However, interviewees suggested that insufficient

---

69 This is also marginally reflected in figure 25 in finding 6, which shows Iraq being less prioritised for protection funding (with three more countries with lower INFORM-estimated needs receiving higher protection funding in 2017 and 2018 in comparison to 2016). This, coupled with DG ECHO’s significant reduction in global funding during those years, translated into large funding reductions for Iraq in absolute terms.
funding was given to GBV. Funding allocated under “other (protection)” – the largest area of funding in 2016 and a significant area of funding for all five years of the evaluation – was in line with the above.\(^7^0\)

Document review and particularly key informant interviews gave insights into the balancing of costs vs effectiveness and timeliness, which in general were appropriate if quite variable depending on the context and type of programming. Thus, for example as regards DG ECHO programming implemented in hard-to-reach areas (such as near the front lines where other funders were not as present), effectively achieving objectives meant higher costs than such programming would incur in other settings. Reasons for this include the inflation in the salaries of medical staff and of medications in 2016 and 2017, as well as the need to work with some atypical, more expensive implementing partners such as Aspen. Respondents also noted higher security costs, and the requirement to implement quickly with a high degree of mobility of service delivery points as the context shifted. The same was true of the response to the Mosul crisis’ IDPs, which had higher than normal costs in setting up the camps, including due to the need to move quickly and as a result of inflation in the costs of construction materials caused by shortages. Importantly however, these costs were in general balanced with the actions’ effectiveness and including the timeliness of what was achieved given the actions’ objectives, and importantly as well, they came down as the context stabilised. The same was true of other, more “typical” humanitarian programming such as shelter and settlements as well as WASH programming, which was in line with costs for that type of programming in other, similar contexts relative to the level of results achieved. Thus, for example the cost of salaries for international staff was a significant expense that was also remarked upon by interviewees; yet these costs were in line with what would be expected to achieve the results. Put another way then, given the results that DG ECHO was aiming at, the costs were in general appropriate.

### 5.7. Sustainability/Connectedness

**EVALUATION QUESTION 14**

To what extent did DG ECHO manage to achieve sustainable results of its response in Iraq and in the sector of Protection? What could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanism, change of strategy, etc.) to promote sustainability and strengthen links to interventions of development actors? To what extent were appropriate exit strategies put in place and implemented?

JC 14.1: What are the prospects for sustainability of DG ECHO’s humanitarian interventions in Iraq – across sectors and especially in Protection?

JC 14.2: What has to happen and what can DG ECHO do to ensure that key activities are maintained? Can stakeholders continue key activities in the absence of DG ECHO support?

\(^7^0\) International Organisations (namely the ICRC) disproportionally classified actions under “other (protection)” in Iraq, doing so for 55 per cent of them, as opposed to 14 per cent of NGO actions and 12 per cent of UN actions.
JC 14.3: Have exit strategies been developed and documented in consultation with the stakeholders? Are these realistic given the context?
JC 14.4: To what extent have IDPs’ and refugees’ needs been integrated into national systems?

Finding 23

Results overall were weak in terms of sustainability/connectedness, both in Iraq and in global protection. Reasons for this include poor planning, as well as a lack of clarity about the practical definition of the nexus and how it should operate in practice.

Some good practices were observed in Iraq, however, including the bridging role played by MADAD and effective handover to government actors, particularly for WASH, health and education programming.

Some good practices were also observed for humanitarian protection globally, including examples of positive coordination between DG DEVCO and DG ECHO.

Assessment of the extent to which DG ECHO achieved sustainability/connectedness focuses attention on the humanitarian-development nexus. One key mechanism for achieving sustainability includes handing over to governments, which are ultimately the key duty-bearers, including for protection actions. Yet this may not be possible, due to: (i) the limited capacities and lack of willingness of state actors in resource-scarce countries; (ii) the reluctance of state actors to take over activities implemented by humanitarian protection providers and/or endorsing protection principles, in particular toward refugees but also toward IDPs and host communities; and that governments can be the main perpetrators of protection violations in some contexts, and thus are not suited for handover of protection programming. Another mechanism is to hand over to development actors such as UNDP, or to implementing partners that undertake humanitarian as well as development work, such as UNICEF.

Overall, survey respondents from Iraq and global protection only slightly agreed that gains since 2014 could be sustained. In Iraq, DG ECHO staff “somewhat agreed” overall that it was the case, and two of the seven respondents openly disagreed. Implementing partners expressed similar views, to a similar level across thematic sectors. Worldwide, DG ECHO global protection staff were on average slightly more pessimistic than in Iraq about the extent to which DG ECHO had ensured gains were made sustainable. In Africa in particular, a small majority of respondents openly disagreed, and in Asia and the Pacific, just as many respondents agreed as disagreed. Several of the survey respondents who

71 Responds to JC 14.1, 14.2, 14.3 and 14.4
72 For example, the 2015 HIP for the Horn of Africa highlights that the Kenyan government had exerted some pressure in favour of refugee returns, despite ongoing protection threats in their country of origin, Somalia and South Sudan. In this context, it was likely unrealistic that DG ECHO’s implementing partners who provided services to two UNHCR refugee camps in Kenya could integrate refugees’ needs into national systems.
disagreed explained that the contexts in which they were working were not conducive to sustainable results, including in Sudan, South Sudan and in Syria. Global protection implementing partners held the same views as DG ECHO respondents on average, but those working in the Middle East and those with a global focus were on average slightly more negative – with the equivalent of a third of respondents openly disagreeing. In contrast however, DG ECHO staff working in Europe were very significantly more positive, with all respondents finding that DG ECHO had made sure the gains of its programmes were sustainable. Implementing partners in Europe were also slightly more positive than the global average. Responses were homogenous across all types of implementing partners.

As regards how the nexus is working, interviewees from Iraq and from global protection were overall negative, describing the nexus as being at an early stage. Reasons for this include:

- The different needs prioritised by humanitarian and development actors, which according to DG ECHO and DG DEVCO interviewees in Iraq, is a significant challenge since it means the projects of one cannot be easily picked up by the other; importantly, this issue also applies to development actors other than DG DEVCO.
- A relatively poor definition of what it means in practice and a poorly articulated process for how it should work in practice – for example, is it that development actors should survey what has been done by humanitarian actors and build follow-on projects? Should humanitarian actors build projects that in addition to addressing assessed needs are in alignment with the development priorities articulated by development actors? Or should there be a joint process involving some degree of coordination including at the planning stage, and if so, how should this be managed?
- The longer timeline of development actors, which means that planning and approval processes are much slower to come online as compared with the humanitarian sector, which prioritises rapid decision-making to respond to more immediate needs.
- For Iraq in particular, there is a sense that realisation of the nexus has been difficult because development actors have been relatively absent from the country – thus joint coordination and planning has been difficult. The result then is that while humanitarian funding is drawn down, there is relatively poor uptake by development actors – and in post-conflict contexts where the drivers of conflict remain active, this puts prospects of peace at significant risk.

A review of the samples of DG ECHO actions for Iraq (protection and other humanitarian) and protection globally, as well as interviews, showed significant variation in terms of sustainability/connectedness, including in terms of clearly articulating an exit strategy.

In Iraq, health, WASH and education actions/components of actions tended to have a stronger linkage to development by virtue of linking to government departments, whether by handover of facilities or capital goods such as water treatment units or by building capacity of employees. Larger organisations with a greater portfolio of projects, such as IOM and UNICEF, were also able to link their
DG ECHO-funded actions to other projects they had in the pipeline, including projects with development components, and thereby to some extent contribute to coordination. However, actions aimed at supporting Syrian refugees were weaker, likely due to anticipating that these beneficiaries would ultimately return to their home country. There were also multiple actions that made vague references to discussions with development actors. However other actions – and particularly those providing short-term emergency assistance – did not discuss this aspect at all, though this is arguably reasonable for some types of short-term emergency assistance such as provision of NFIs.

In protection, ensuring sustainability was found to be difficult, because possibilities for implementing self-protection are very limited. Moreover, in many contexts where DG ECHO operates, governments may not have the needed resources and/or many do not necessarily have the same objectives as humanitarian protection actors. Furthermore, local civil society may have other types of motivation or difficulties in operating. For example, a survey respondent noted that in the West Bank, the Government of Israel would not be willing to sustain the protection interventions funded by DG ECHO, and for most local civil society actors, it would be impossible to have the space to do so. Similar views were expressed by interviewees in South Sudan, Syria and Yemen among others. Additionally, key informants noted that in some contexts, DG ECHO had engaged with the government, but insufficiently with civil society.

As regards the integration of the needs of refugees and IDPs into national systems, the document review and interviews found some variability but that overall it was quite weak. More specifically, while there were instances of effective integration in various countries including in Iraq, these were significantly outnumbered by the number of actions whose documents did not mention such integration or where it was quite poor.

Focusing on Iraq in particular, interviewees highlighted the positive role of the MADAD fund as a bridging mechanism between humanitarian and development actors. Furthermore, meetings with MADAD and DG DEVCO did lead to some successes in terms of uptake of DG ECHO work and thus of the nexus working well, for example of the Cash Consortium work that DG ECHO had significantly funded as well as the mental health consortium, which has been picked up by MADAD. This bridging role played by MADAD has also been adopted by the Germans, underlining a growing sense of its importance. For example, in Iraq, the German humanitarian and development aid ministries have sought to cooperate closely,
including by depending on their division for transitional aid. In the area of WASH, this has meant humanitarian aid focusing on emergency activities and then transitional aid coming in to provide capacity building of water authorities, etc. The role played by MADAD in Iraq then has to some extent helped to improve the working of the nexus, by smoothing over the gaps between humanitarian and development actors. Similarly, efforts by DG ECHO to meet directly with development counterparts and to clearly show which areas of humanitarian funding they could link to were strong and proactive measures that helped to contribute to the nexus.

As regards the global humanitarian protection component of the evaluation, DG ECHO has provided capacity building and facilitated the gradual transition of activities to relevant state authorities in some contexts where the state is willing and has the resources to take over protection actions. A DG ECHO interviewee highlighted that DG ECHO was insufficiently investing in social care programmes. Exceptions to this were however observed in countries with adequate resources, in particular in Europe. For example, in Ukraine, DG ECHO has been funding social care programmes for the elderly, which the public system might be able to partly take over after DG ECHO builds capacities by working with authorities. In Serbia, DG ECHO first handed over the management of refugee centres it funded during the migrant/refugee crisis to the MADAD fund, while at the same time building the capacities of state authorities to eventually take over the programme, including the protection components.

Furthermore, DG ECHO at times advocated for governments to include social inclusion and social protection programmes in funding agreements. One example in reviewed actions was in Uganda, where DG ECHO funded the construction of a hospital according to government standards, with the agreement that the Ministry of Health would subsequently run it. Moreover, some of DG ECHO’s implementing partners have a mandate to build the capacity of governments to take over responsibility of protection activities. For example, UNHCR builds the capacities of the authorities to conduct refugee registration – as it successfully did in Iran. Again, depending on how conducive the contexts are, this may be more likely to occur through gradual efforts – for example, in South Sudan, UNHCR is cautious about handing over refugee registration to the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management despite the authorities’ willingness to take over this task.

In contexts where state authorities do not have the resources to take over protection actions, the evaluation team noted several examples of positive coordination between DG DEVCO and DG ECHO at the operational level. For instance, there were joint field visits and exchange of information, such as in Democratic Republic of Congo. The evaluation team also found examples of implementing partners focusing on capacity building of local agencies, officials and communities on protection.

However, in contexts where humanitarian providers are unable to further protection services, some opt for transitioning them to livelihoods and value chain support, which do not require direct state intervention, as was done by IOM in
Ethiopia. Although this increases the prospects for sustainability of the interventions, it in practice equates to stopping protection support.

Overall, despite the positive examples highlighted above, the global humanitarian protection actions reviewed by the evaluation team had relatively poor sustainability. This underlines that, as in Iraq, DG ECHO was weak in achieving sustainable results during the period of the evaluation.
6. Conclusions

The following conclusions flow from the findings in the report, and are organised by the evaluation criteria with one additional initial conclusion related to the first finding on understandings of protection. They are particularly intended to highlight what worked and what did not, in line with the Terms of Reference for the evaluation.

6.1. Introduction: Understanding of Protection

**CONCLUSION 1**

There is variation in understandings of protection within the humanitarian sector, which has implications for the consistency of its implementation and underlines the importance of deconstructing what partners understand by protection and protection-related capacity building.

Linked to findings 1, 2 and 10 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)

- The evaluation has found that there is some variation in understandings of protection, particularly at a practical level including within organisations but also between organisations, for example between local implementing partners and their international partners and between organisations with a protection-specific mandate and those with a thematic focus such as on health.
- This has implications for the evaluation, since different actors are using the same term – ‘protection’ – but sometimes meaning something somewhat different when they do so.
- Going forward, this is important for DG ECHO to acknowledge. It points to the need to deconstruct specifically what IPs mean when they talk about implementing protection and particularly protection mainstreaming as well as integrated programming to some extent, both of which were areas of weakness in protection programming (as discussed in finding 10).
- It also underlines the importance of the protection capacity building undertaken by DG ECHO – see finding 2 – as well as the emphasis in the protection policy on capacity building within the humanitarian sector, since this is fundamentally a sector-wide issue.

6.2. Relevance

**CONCLUSION 2**

Needs analyses are overall appropriate, though with some degree of variability in their completeness. Programming was well-designed to respond to the needs identified, though its relevance could be honed by focusing on further improving the needs analyses, better considering long-term development objectives when possible, and by continuing to assess protection funding allocations relative to needs identified in particular countries.

Linked to findings 2, 3, 6 and 7 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)
- Needs analyses for Iraq and humanitarian protection globally were in general appropriate, though with some variability in quality, for example with some particularly vulnerable sub-groups insufficiently considered when they should have been. This can be partially linked to how the eSingleForm is structured and what it directs partners to think about and articulate, as well as to partner capacities (as mentioned in the first conclusion).

- Programming was overall well designed to respond to the needs of vulnerable people, both in Iraq and in the humanitarian protection portfolio, including through protection advocacy and with the introduction of advocacy logframes in 2017 which helped to structure DG ECHO’s advocacy activities in Iraq (see findings 3 and 7). Yet flowing from the previous bullet, it is possible to further improve the relevance of programming through stronger and more consistent needs analyses, including based on stronger IP understandings of protection vulnerabilities.

- DG ECHO’s humanitarian programming can sometimes also take long-term development objectives into account in addition to its primary goal of providing a needs-based emergency response, in line with the relevant policies; but this element is relatively weak, thus programming is less relevant to those more complex needs than it could be.

- Global humanitarian protection quantitative data showed that while in general there is good synergy between needs identified in particular countries and protection funding allocated, there is also some degree of variation. This is relevant to consider, since it could allow DG ECHO to assess whether the reasons for that variation are appropriate and in line with its various priorities.

**CONCLUSION 3**

DG ECHO’s strategy in Iraq was relevant to the context, including as a result of strong planning between team members; yet having a national-level strategic planning document similar to an intervention logic would reinforce this process.

Linked to findings 4 and 5 (Iraq)

- DG ECHO’s strategy was well adapted to the context in Iraq, including changing to adjust to shifts in the context. This is an area of strength of DG ECHO, and can be partially linked to its strong field presence in the country and contextual knowledge, its supportive and collaborative relationships with its partners, and its responsiveness to shifting needs.

- The relevance of programming has not been impacted by the lack of a national strategic document that specifically showed how the activities from the portfolio of actions would lead to the outputs, outcomes and impact sought, while also being adjusted in light of evolving needs. This is largely thanks to the strong coherence of the DG ECHO team during the period of the evaluation and their internal strategic planning. The risk is that if those team conditions fail to materialise in the future, DG ECHO’s work could be negatively impacted due to the absence of such a document. Furthermore, the process itself of producing such a document, including the shared analysis behind it, would contribute to fostering the team coherence that helps to ensure relevance of programming.
### 6.3. Coherence

**CONCLUSION 4**

DG ECHO’s response in Iraq was coherent with its mandate. Yet its approach to deliberating about the humanitarian principles in the Mosul response risks weakening the basis for strong future decision-making about them.

Coordination around the humanitarian-development nexus in Iraq was weak, linked to the absence of a shared understanding of what it means in practice, a clear implementation strategy and stronger organisational commitment to making it work.

**Linked to findings 8 and 9 (Iraq)**

- DG ECHO’s response in Iraq was coherent with its mandate, including the Humanitarian Aid Regulation, the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, the humanitarian principles, and relevant thematic and sector policies.
- This is also true of its Mosul response, though here the process of deliberation around humanitarian principles was undermined by failing to facilitate a discussion that validated different weightings of the principles as legitimate and by somewhat delegitimising other organisations’ positions in relation to the principles. The danger is that this approach undermines the process of decision-making around the principles between different partners, which could impact negatively on the quality of a future response.
- DG ECHO undertook a variety of measures to try to encourage humanitarian and development coherence, but overall the nexus did not work very well in Iraq even if there were some examples of success such as the Cash Consortium.
- This situation is likely to continue because of the lack of a shared understanding about what the nexus means in practice, weak harmonisation of priorities and integrated planning between humanitarian and development actors, and relatively weak practical commitment to making the nexus work.

**CONCLUSION 5**

DG ECHO’s protection response in Iraq and globally was coherent with its protection policies, though there were weaknesses as regards mainstreaming and integrated protection.

**Linked to finding 10 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)**

- DG ECHO’s actions were in line with its protection policies, including with risk analyses appropriately incorporated.
- Yet there were weaknesses particularly in terms of mainstreaming protection (with it not being systematically incorporated into actions) and to a lesser extent as regards integrated protection. The weaknesses can primarily be linked to weak protection capacities and understandings – which validates DG ECHO’s protection capacity building activities – as well as to weaknesses in the design of actions for protection.
## 6.4. EU Added Value

**CONCLUSION 6**

The EU added value of DG ECHO in Iraq and globally was related to its field presence, its relationships with partners, its responsiveness, to some extent its innovation and proactivity, and its encouragement of protection.

As regards protection advocacy, the added value was linked to DG ECHO’s expert knowledge, perceptions of it being more needs-driven than other actors, and the multiple levels of its advocacy work which helped to ensure coherence of the advocacy messaging.

Linked to findings 11 and 12 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)

- EU added value in Iraq and globally included DG ECHO’s generally strong field presence where possible (which also added value to other EU Member States by helping to inform their understanding of the context), its strong and collaborative relationships with implementing partners, its responsiveness in approving and modifying actions including responding to shifts in the context, some degree of innovation and proactivity, and its efforts to encourage incorporation of protection into IPs’ programming.

- The EU added value of DG ECHO’s protection advocacy in Iraq and globally was related to its expert knowledge including of the context; a sense that it is more neutral and needs-driven as compared with national actors, by representing many different countries, and because it focused on multiple levels of advocacy; and supporting its partners to conduct advocacy, conducting advocacy itself including in concert with other EU actors, and supporting advocacy mechanisms such as OCHA.

## 6.5. Effectiveness

**CONCLUSION 7**

DG ECHO’s objectives in Iraq were largely achieved via its various actions, with protection actions slightly less successful overall. Areas of success included cash and health programming, the integrated response to the Mosul crisis and the rapid response mechanism; areas of weakness were related to protection mainstreaming in general and local partners’ protection work.

Beneficiaries were relatively satisfied with the Iraq response’s activities.

The protection KRIs and KOI are generally well received.

Linked to findings 13, 14, 15 and 16 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)

- DG ECHO’s Iraq actions overall were largely successful in achieving their targets, with success rates around 80 per cent; and these targets were in line with the objectives in its strategic documentation. Success rates for protection actions were slightly lower, likely due to their higher number of key outcome indicators and thus greater number of targets to achieve for “success”.
Areas of success in the Iraq programming included cash programming and particularly the funding mechanism of the Cash Consortium, which allowed flexible shifting of funds between partners, the integrated response to the Mosul crisis as a proactive measure to better meet the various needs, the rapid response mechanism as an information-gathering tool that informed better programming, and the quality of the health response. Areas of weakness included protection mainstreaming – which can be linked to weak capacities in this regard amongst many humanitarian actors – and variability in the quality of protection work, particularly of some local implementing partners.

Beneficiaries were relatively satisfied with the services that were part of the Iraq response.

There is general enthusiasm for the protection-specific Key Results Indicators (KRIs) which came into use in 2017, as well as the Key Outcome Indicator (KOI) being trialled since 2017.

CONCLUSION 8

DG ECHO’s Iraq advocacy work was in line with its strategic priorities. This work involved both direct advocacy primarily focused on adherence to international law and access, as well as indirect advocacy through its partners.

While the logframes from 2017 and 2018 represent a good start in advocacy planning, there are opportunities to build on them going forward, including by reducing the areas of focus as well as by developing an implementation and monitoring plan.

Linked to finding 17 (Iraq)

A variety of strong advocacy efforts were undertaken, involving direct advocacy at a high level by DG ECHO including in concert with other EU actors (primarily focused on promoting adherence to international law and field access) as well as at field level (primarily focused on access). DG ECHO also undertook indirect advocacy through the actions it funded that had an advocacy component, and it supported actors that played an advocacy role, such as OCHA. These various advocacy efforts were in line with the priorities highlighted in the strategic documentation.

The advocacy gap is found in advocacy planning. In other words, while the logframes from 2017 and 2018 are a strong start for helping with strategic planning, they include a high number of areas of focus and do not make clear what the implementation process will be for the plans – including how the results, if any, of advocacy efforts will be followed up on through tracking and monitoring. So by building on these logframes going forward, there is an opportunity to further strengthen DG ECHO’s advocacy work.

CONCLUSION 9

DG ECHO’s actions contributed to reducing immediate protection threats, though were weaker at addressing broader protection threats. Vulnerabilities were generally well targeted including through protection referrals, though with weaknesses as regards targeting vulnerable sub-groups and protection mainstreaming.
Capacity building was an important area of work in many actions, including building organisational capacity by IPs, though the quality of this was difficult to fully assess; DG ECHO also built protection capacity by conducting training workshops.

**Linked to finding 18 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)**

- DG ECHO had good success in mitigating immediate protection threats, but less success at sustainably reducing broader protection threats (outcomes). There were also weaknesses in articulating how integrated actions contributed to protection outcomes.
- As regards vulnerabilities, needs were well targeted though with some weaknesses in articulating the targeting of vulnerable sub-groups, and weak articulations of protection mainstreaming at least until 2017 and the pilot protection mainstreaming KOI. A further important element is protection referrals, though full results here were difficult to assess including because many IPs did not follow up/report on follow-ups.
- Capacity building was an important element in many of the actions reviewed, with targets including organisational staff and volunteers as well as other key actors such as government officials; further, DG ECHO offered capacity building trainings and workshops for IPs. The quality of capacity building activities was difficult to fully assess, as reporting tended to be focused at the output level.

**CONCLUSION 10**

Protection actions both globally and in Iraq achieved about three-quarters of their protection KRIs. UN IPs were slightly less successful than others, Europe and Latin America actions were slightly more successful, and Africa actions were slightly less successful. There were no notable trends for particular protection thematic areas.

There was a sense however that IPs are often cautious in estimating targets, which makes success more likely.

**Linked to finding 19 (global humanitarian protection including Iraq)**

- DG ECHO’s protection actions in Iraq and globally achieved about 75 per cent of their protection Key Results Indicators (KRIs), though only about 45 per cent of protection results had successfully met all their KRI targets (with 3-4 KRIs per result on average).
- UN implementing partners were slightly less successful than NGO and international organisations overall; Africa actions were slightly less successful than other regions, while Europe (including Turkey) and Latin America actions were slightly more successful; and, there were no significant trends for particular protection thematic areas being more or less successful.
- A caveat is that there is a sense among interviewees of implementing partners often being cautious in their estimates of what could be achieved, which would tend to increase their success rate.
### 6.6. Efficiency

**CONCLUSION 11**

Efficiency and cost-effectiveness were generally appropriate in Iraq, with variations in budgets well justified and plans appropriately modified. However there were some timing issues, higher than anticipated security costs and some underspending, all linked to the context.

Efforts to ensure cost-effectiveness throughout the project cycle were sometimes weak, partly due to low capacities but particularly the high workload levels for DG ECHO staff.

Linked to findings 20 and 21 (Iraq)

- There was good efficiency of DG ECHO Iraq actions overall, with budgets and plans appropriately modified based on reasonable justifications. There were some issues in terms of timing, which was not unexpected given the context, as well as good coordination with other key actors.
- Cost effectiveness was overall good given the context, with variations from budgets well justified, some higher than expected security costs that can be linked to the context, and some reasonable underspending given contextual challenges such as hiring staff.
- As regards efforts by DG ECHO to ensure cost-effectiveness throughout the project cycle, efficiency and cost-effectiveness were among the factors considered when selecting partner proposals though less so than other factors. Similarly, while field monitoring was overall strong, close financial tracking of actions was generally weaker. Finally, there were some gaps in assessments, despite some generally appropriate tools being used, such as per beneficiary costs. This was partly linked to sometimes low capacities in ensuring cost-effectiveness, though more fundamentally to high workload levels for TAs and desk officers: these levels forced them to choose priority areas of work, with cost-effectiveness tending to be given less emphasis in this calculation.

**CONCLUSION 12**

Budgets were overall in line with needs for Iraq, though with questions about whether the drawdown in DG ECHO’s budget in 2017-18 was appropriate given the nature and seriousness of needs at the time.

Costs were well balanced with effectiveness and timeliness overall.

Linked to finding 22 (Iraq)

- Budgets were in general appropriate given the level of needs in Iraq, including budget allocations to specific thematic areas. Yet there were some questions about the drawdown in the overall budgets in 2017-18 relative to assessed needs. This can be linked to the nexus – see the last conclusion – and what types/levels of assessed needs are no longer a DG ECHO priority but are rather a priority for more development-oriented actors.
- The balancing of costs vs effectiveness and timeliness were in general appropriate, with some expected higher costs as a result of the context,
for example in the response to the Mosul crisis, where costs were higher including due to local inflation of construction material prices.

6.7. Sustainability/Connectedness

CONCLUSION 13

There was weak evidence of sustainable results in Iraq and for humanitarian protection globally, primarily due to questions about how to implement the nexus in practice.

In Iraq, health, WASH and education actions were relatively stronger while protection was relatively weaker; globally, successes included capacity building of authorities as well as social protection programming.

Linked to finding 23 (Iraq and global humanitarian protection)

- The operation of the nexus was overall quite weak, with generally poor sustainability of results both in Iraq and for humanitarian protection programming globally. This was due to such issues as the lack of a shared understanding of the nexus, a poorly articulated process for how it should work in practice, and a sense in Iraq that development actors were relatively absent – despite the positive role played by MADAD as a bridging mechanism between humanitarian and development actors.

- In Iraq, health, WASH and education actions tended to be stronger than other types of actions, because they could link up to government departments so as to ensure sustainability. Overall, protection was often weaker due to the limited possibilities for implementing self-protection as well as a lack of government resources/different government priorities.

- Globally, there were some positive efforts by DG ECHO to support governments to include social protection programmes in funding agreements, as well as to build the capacity of authorities.
7. Recommendations

These prospective recommendations are directed toward DG ECHO unless otherwise noted.

**Recommendation 1:** Build upon protection work by continuing with capacity building measures and direct support to partners, providing further guidance to partners, pushing for stronger protection reporting, and improving the classification of actions in the HOPE database.

**Rationale**
DG ECHO and its partners have made significant advances in the quality of protection programming overall, including for example as a result of capacity building measures such as those undertaken by DG ECHO. Yet there remain many areas for continued improvement. As was noted in the findings, there was variability and sometimes significant degrees of weakness in understandings of protection and of how to effectively incorporate it into programming. This was particularly seen in protection mainstreaming and to a lesser extent integrated protection. Furthermore, there were weaknesses in terms of how to appropriately conduct protection analyses, including prioritising key areas of concern such as resilience as well as protection and gender. These weaknesses have important implications for the quality of later programming that is designed to address the challenges identified. Moreover, there were weaknesses in protection-related reporting, for example in clearly articulating how integrated actions contributed to protection outcomes, including activities in different sectors. Referrals was one practical way of addressing protection concerns adopted by some partners and particularly with integrated protection actions, though there was some variability in how well referrals worked in practice. Finally, there were weaknesses in how protection actions were classified in the HOPE database, with high numbers classified as ‘other protection’ by implementing partners, and results classified into multiple sub-sectors.

**Operational measures**

- Continue with protection-related capacity building trainings/workshops and encourage IPs to send a wider range of participants to these sessions to build capacities more broadly within their organisations; DG ECHO should also encourage TAs to continue to offer protection-related support to implementing partners.
- Provide more guidance to implementing partners about how to conduct and integrate protection analysis into the eSingleForm, how to more effectively address the needs identified through their programming, and how to effectively report on it including how the programming specifically contributed to protection outcomes. Consideration should also be given to revising some of the tools – e.g. the sector-based results framework, which impacts negatively on the design of integrated approaches.
- Communicate expectations regarding protection mainstreaming to implementing partners, and develop and share mainstreaming good practices linked to the thematic guidelines (health, WASH, etc.).
- Encourage usage of the new referrals indicator introduced in 2019 and assess whether/to what extent it is encouraging IPs to follow up on their referrals and include this in their reporting.
• Ask implementing partners to report on their protection capacity building measures including for local partners, and ask them to assess these and report on them at the outcome level so that it is clearer what the effects of the trainings are and thus whether further action is necessary to strengthen them.

• Determine if and how the classification of protection actions in the HOPE database could be improved to address the challenge of results being classified into multiple sub-sectors. Also continue to push implementing partners to appropriately classify their actions, so as to enhance the reliability of data collected and subsequent analysis.

Recommendation 2: Use the Iraq advocacy work as a starting point for further refining the advocacy approach, by building on the 2017 and 2018 logframes and adding a clear implementation plan with monitoring so as to maximise advocacy results.

Rationale
The 2017 and 2018 Iraq advocacy logframes represent an important step forward in improving the rigour of DG ECHO’s advocacy. These logframes have some significant strengths in terms of laying out areas of focus, the targets for the activities and the indicators for them. Yet their weaknesses include that they do not have a clear implementation plan, which is exacerbated by their numerous response activities. Nor is it clear how they will be monitored, including follow-up to assess and record what differences (if any) advocacy initiatives have made and thus if targets are being met. The logframes should consequently be built on as a model, including in contexts other than Iraq where DG ECHO is working, in order to continue to enhance the quality and effectiveness of its advocacy work.

Operational measures
• Continue to develop logframes similar to the 2017 and 2018 Iraq logframes.

• As part of the process of development, consult with other key advocacy actors and see what priorities they are focusing on and how they can potentially be harmonised together with those of DG ECHO in order to ultimately reinforce results.

• Assign specific advocacy activities to specific actors, to make implementation clearer.

• Specify who at a particular organisation should be targeted and how, how frequently to follow up, as well as linking specific activities to specific targets.

• Indicators should be adjusted to be SMART: specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound.

• For advocacy activities done by implementing partners, DG ECHO should follow up to ensure that they agree with the advocacy priorities and incorporate them into their actions with measurable indicators; if they are a different type of actor, they should be encouraged to incorporate the advocacy priorities into their workplan.
• Develop a monitoring mechanism to ensure that progress is being reported on and tracked, including following up with non-DG ECHO actors.
• Review who within DG ECHO has the responsibility for doing this and ensure that they have the capacity to take on the work.

Recommendation 3: Develop country-level strategic documents with clear outputs, outcomes and impacts aimed at and using these in the planning and monitoring process so as to improve strategic planning and thus programming.

Rationale
DG ECHO did not have a national strategic document for Iraq that showed how the activities from its portfolio of actions would lead to the outputs, outcomes and impact sought. Furthermore, while the HIPs provide guidance on priority areas for funding, they do not constitute a strategic plan that explains how areas of activities and outputs will contribute to intended outcomes and longer term impacts. During the period of the evaluation, DG ECHO was able to compensate for this through strategic planning between Iraq team members and this planning worked as a result of strong team coherence, a shared vision and significant time invested by team members. Yet this process risks breaking down, for example due to time pressures on team members or poor team chemistry, with resulting impacts on the quality of DG ECHO’s response. There is thus a need for such strategic documents in Iraq and other countries, in order to guide and orient the in-country work.

Operational measures
• Develop an annual country-level strategic document with clear outputs, outcomes and impacts aimed at, in concert with work on the HIP; this could be done by adjusting the intervention logics included in this evaluation report.
• That document should then be used to guide the actions selected for funding.
• Furthermore, the document should be drawn on to track and report about overall country-level results, particularly at outcome and potentially impact levels; the goal should be to assess what is working well and what is not in terms of contributing to results, and to ensure the cohesiveness of national programming.

Recommendation 4: Develop/enhance guidelines on tools and approaches for assessing actions’ efficiency and cost-effectiveness, provide training to staff, and ensure that staff have sufficient time to undertake these activities.

Rationale
DG ECHO’s efficiency and cost-effectiveness were assessed as being largely appropriate in Iraq. Yet some systematic weaknesses were identified, in terms of understandings of appropriate approaches and tools for assessing efficiency and cost-effectiveness amongst DG ECHO field staff, as well as the very high demands on staff’s time that can make it difficult to prioritise monitoring and
reporting on cost-effectiveness. Furthermore, some interviewees pointed to an organisational culture within DG ECHO that sometimes discouraged them from questioning actions’ cost-effectiveness, because staff were already overburdened with other work priorities.

**Operational measures**

- Develop clear guidelines/enhance existing guidelines on appropriate approaches and tools for assessing all types of DG ECHO programming, and also specify how to assess what is “appropriate” based on different contexts and types of actions.
- Develop and conduct training for staff that would have to assess efficiency and cost-effectiveness, including for non-Iraq staff.
- Assess demands on staff time and ensure that there is sufficient time available to properly assess efficiency and effectiveness, including monitoring it.
- Ensure that assessing efficiency and cost-effectiveness is appropriately prioritised as an area of work within the organisation and that this is communicated to staff.

**Recommendation 5: Put in place a system to deal with future challenges related to the humanitarian principles in emergencies, by building on the draft framework document. This would include developing internal decision-making processes as well as practical guidelines and training of staff.**

**Rationale**

The debate around the humanitarian principles in relation to the Mosul response was an area where there was some degree of controversy, even though no principles were contravened. The issue identified is a practical one: how to ensure a robust discussion between actors about the principles, with clear rationales developed and decisions for action agreed on, including potentially divergent action plans between different organisations – all within the parameters of the principles. This is an issue that is particularly important because such situations will arise again in the future, especially given the challenging contexts where DG ECHO’s programming is implemented.

A draft framework for a principled approach to defining engagement with the humanitarian principles from June 2017 was shared with the evaluation team; no other similar formal document was shared or referred to in interviews or the workshops. The framework is an important piece of work on how to move forward on the above issue, with its articulation of a deliberation mechanism and when it should be used, and specification of two main situations: category A, where the protection environment is generally conducive and there are no serious concerns in terms of providing assistance in line with the humanitarian principles; and category B, where the protection environment is generally not conducive and/or there are serious issues in terms of providing humanitarian aid in a principled manner. In the latter case, the document specifies that deliberation should first take place at the OCHA sub-office or area ICCG level; if no agreement can be reached, the protection cluster should provide information
to cluster leads to inform discussion at the ICCG-level, with the HCT involved if relevant. Finally, if again no decision can be taken, the cluster would go to the HCT for discussion and deliberation.

**Operational measures**

- Take forward and develop the draft framework described above/continue to take forward the draft framework. This includes specifying DG ECHO’s internal processes to feed into the draft framework’s inter-organisational deliberation mechanism; for example, when a regional office should be informed about a particular situation and what role they might play in decision-making, when staff at headquarters should be involved and their role in decision-making, where the ultimate decision should rest, and how DG ECHO’s decision-making process can feed back into the broader decision-making occurring in concert with other humanitarian actors at OCHA or the ICCG including how to act if DG ECHO is not in agreement with other actors.

- Develop detailed practical guidelines for interpreting the principles, including the organisation’s understanding of and prioritisation of the humanitarian principles and how the different principles fit together, as well as examples of difficult situations and how the guidelines would suggest proceeding.

- Undertake internal learning sessions to train field staff and desk officers on working with the new guidelines and within the new inter-organisational deliberation mechanism.

---

**Recommendation 6: Strengthen strategic planning around the nexus through a shared process of more practically defining it and specifying how it should be implemented in practice including specifically within the EU system, and emphasise its importance in the success of actions and as an important area of focus for staff.**

**Rationale**

The humanitarian-development nexus has been highlighted as an area of weakness in the evaluation. Essentially, this is because of a lack of shared understanding of what the nexus actually means in practice, and how to implement it in practice. Importantly as well, this is not just a DG ECHO issue but is also true of the wider humanitarian sector as well as the development sector. A key part of the challenge is the short timeline for humanitarian actions and the much longer planning cycle for development actions, as well as the different priorities that humanitarian vs development actors emphasise when assessing needs and designing programming. Furthermore, there is a sense that despite the nexus often being mentioned as a priority, it is not one of the key metrics by which programming is judged as being ‘successful’ or not. This, coupled with the generally weak progress in realising the nexus – despite some efforts being made over a considerable period of time now – risks fuelling frustration and even cynicism among humanitarian and development actors about the nexus and further undermining its operation.
Operational measures

- Help to convene, jointly with other stakeholders, a forum of key humanitarian and development actors to more clearly define the nexus and how it should work in practice. This should include key EU actors including DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and EEAS, but also a broader set of humanitarian and development funders and implementing partners. Beyond the definition and how it should work in practice, one of the key aims of this forum would be to get broad buy-in to work on the nexus going forward.

- Following on from this, coordinate with DG DEVCO and other EU actors to elaborate a practical and actionable EU-specific definition and practical implementation guidelines in line with the relevant policy documents, including:
  - specifying when and how humanitarian and development actors should be involved in a particular context, including for example by developing joint analysis and planning and determining how these can link up so as to create programming synergies;
  - what constitutes development vs humanitarian areas of responsibility and in particular how to make decisions about this such that it is clear which actors are responsible in a particular circumstance, e.g. how to decide if and when returnees fall under humanitarian vs. development areas of responsibility;
  - how planning priorities should be coordinated including at headquarters, regional and field level;

- In so doing, draw upon organisational protection expertise including related to protection advocacy to champion the full inclusion of protection in the definition and guidelines.

- Integrate humanitarian-development coordination as a core element in judging the success of actions including during the action itself, so that TAs are monitoring for this as an action moves ahead.

- With EU partners, articulate indicators for success and reference these in performance appraisals of staff.
ANNEX1a: Case study Iraq: Good practices in integrating child protection in education into emergency programming

1. Conceptual framework for integrating Child Protection in Education in Emergency programming

The protective function of Education in Emergency is widely recognised\(^\text{73}\): out-of-school girls and boys are more vulnerable and exposed to higher risk of violence, abuse and neglect. This includes sexual and gender-based violence and exploitation, early marriage, early pregnancy, child labour and recruitment or use by armed forces or armed groups.\(^\text{74}\) In times of crisis, Education is also key to provide life-sustaining and life-saving physical, psychosocial and cognitive support.

Recent research\(^\text{75}\) by the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies on the protective roles and elements of Education in Emergency reaffirmed the consensus between Child Protection and Education actors on the key factors that make education protective during crisis. These are:

- Education provides physical, psychosocial, and cognitive protection

---

75 INEE "Where Child Protection and Education in Emergency Cross", 2018 - This research provides a mapping of the critical intersections between Child Protection and Education in Emergency by reviewing key literature both from Child Protection and Education in Emergency fields.
Education gives children a sense of hope and stability
Education gives children access to other critical, lifesaving services
Education strengthens social cohesion and supports peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts
Education supports gender equality and provides women and girls, who are often marginalized, with skills they need to empower themselves
Education enhances children’s wellbeing over the long term.

Despite the positive impact of education in emergencies, education is not in itself necessarily protective. Education carries potential risks, for example, violence, and sexual and labour exploitation of children can take place in schools. Further, traveling to and from school can leave children vulnerable to violence and injury. Education can be used to fuel intolerance and prejudice and exacerbate existing injustice and discrimination. Finally, education infrastructure can also be used for military purposes, making schools prone to attack.

Prevention and protection measures are therefore needed to create safe learning environments in which children can receive quality education in times of emergency, while building the foundation for safer and more protective learning environments in early and long-term recovery.

The case study analyses the integration of Child Protection measures in the DG ECHO funded Education in Emergency actions in Iraq. Through a review of the Education in Emergency DG ECHO funded programmes of selected partners (International Organisations and NGOs), this study presents good practices, challenges and limitations encountered by implementing partners in allowing education to display its full protective potential.
1.1. **Education in Emergency and Child Protection context in Iraq**

From the take-over of Iraqi territory by Islamic State (IS) in January 2014, the conflict between the government’s Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and coalition partners with armed groups resulted in massive internal displacement of population. Between 2014 and 2017, up to 8.3 million people were in need of humanitarian aid. The end of large-scale hostilities in 2017 left the country with some 11 million people in need in Iraq, 3 million IDPs, 1.5 million returnees and 3.2 million host community members affected by the crisis. In spite of the 4 million IDP returnees, insecurity, lack of social cohesion and livelihoods, and destroyed or damaged housing still hampered people’s ability to return home in 2018. A needs overview over the conflict period and early post-conflict period is outlined below.

- **2014 – 2015**
  
  **Children were among the hardest hit by the extended conflict.**

Reported grave violations of children’s rights doubled from June 2014 to May 2015, with over 2,000 children (1,055 boys, 897 girls, 90 gender unknown) affected in 666 violations, compared to the same period in the previous year. Children were the hardest hit by the conflict and were often the deliberate targets of conflict-related violence, particularly adolescents, including killing, maiming, abduction, forced recruitment, trafficking, and sexual and physical

---

76 OCHA 2018
77 Iraq Humanitarian Needs Overviews Iraq, 2014-2018
violence. Adolescent girls faced multiple forms of violence, including growing levels of sexual harassment, early and forced marriages, sexual exploitation and abuse, and were facing restrictions placed on their movement by their families. Adolescent boys were particularly vulnerable to abduction, recruitment, trafficking, and child labour. Further, children with disabilities faced additional risks and barriers linked to discrimination. And threats from ERW, IEDs, and landmines persisted.

2 million school-age children were out of school by late 2015. Within camps, 50 per cent of displaced children were attending school, and outside of camps, only 30 per cent of displaced children attended school. Schools in host communities were struggling to deal with teacher shortages and the destruction, damage, and occupation of educational facilities. The exposure to war, current living conditions, trauma, repeated displacement, and family separation also resulted in an increasing number of children suffering from psychosocial distress, further exacerbated by the limited availability of services to meet their immediate needs. It was therefore estimated that in some areas, only 1 per cent of children had access to safe spaces.

- **2016 – 2017**

Grave violations against children’s rights were an ongoing critical concern.

Continuous grave child rights violations were reported, affecting some 1,685 children. Negative coping mechanisms such as child marriage and child labour increased in 2016. 48 per cent of IDP families were living in locations where child labour was highlighted as the top child protection concern, followed by violence at home, child marriage, psychosocial distress and lack of services for children. Large numbers of children born under Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) control were without birth certificates, putting both children and their adult relatives, in particular their mothers, in situations of discrimination, violence and lack of access to services. Separation of families during displacement and screening continued to occur, causing further psychosocial distress.

Over 3.7 million school-age children were affected by Iraq’s crises by late 2016, including 1.4 million displaced children, 597,200 returnee children, as well as 1 million children in host communities and a further 105,000 children in conflict areas not under Government control at the time. All affected children had witnessed violence and suffered disruption to their learning, which required psychosocial support and specialized care. At the end of the 2016 academic year, only 60% of conflict affected children had access to some form of education. Fewer than 50% of children in camps, and fewer than 33% of children in out-of-camp settings, had access to education. There were also

---

79 Iraq Humanitarian Needs Overviews Iraq, 2016
numerous barriers preventing access to education for displaced children. These included: (i) shortage of teachers and of a physical space for learning, with temporary learning spaces for IDPs often requiring significant support, including rehabilitation of WASH facilities, winterization support, and teaching materials to ensure minimum education standards were met; (ii) unaffordable cost of learning materials or school transport costs which left 45 per cent of conflict affected children out of school; (iii) long travel distances to education facilities, coupled with the increasing use of informal child labour, further constraining access to education; (iv) many schools were contaminated with explosive hazards and, (v) according to IOM, in January 2017, schools were used as shelters for over 3,300 displaced people over the harsh Iraqi winter throughout the country.

- **2018**

**Child protection risks were extremely high overall.** First, high prevalence of poverty-induced child protection risks, such as child labour and child marriage, were observed both among IDP and returnee children, compared to past years. In addition, psychosocial distress remained very high, and violence at home was highlighted as another critical child protection risk. Further, a significant number of children faced challenges in accessing birth certificates and other documentation, especially those born as a result of rape. This continued to hamper childrens’ fulfilment of their rights and access to services. In addition, boys and girls with parents perceived to be affiliated to IS were at heightened risk of discrimination in accessing basic services, sexual violence and exploitation, and arbitrary detention. Prolonged displacement and lack of access to livelihoods in the areas of return significantly increased the incidence of certain child protection issues, such as child labour, as well as child marriage and other forms of sexual violence and exploitation. Minors joining armed groups due to economic vulnerability and insecurity continued to be reported, with no large scale specialized services and reintegration support available at the time. Finally, children with disabilities experienced physical and social barriers in accessing essential services, and were more vulnerable to violence, exploitation and abuse.

**Millions of children in Iraq continued to face challenges in accessing quality education,** including 32 per cent of school-aged IDP children in camps and 26% of those living out-of-camp with no access to formal education opportunities. The situation was equally concerning in areas of return where 21 per cent of children still had no access to formal education. Adolescents had been particularly impacted by the crisis, with a disproportionate number being out of school. In addition, barriers to educational participation were disproportionately affecting girls: by sixth grade (end of primary school), girls represented less than half of students. Further, teaching quality remained a key concern. Placement and payment of teachers was a challenge; although the Ministries of Education for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and federal Iraq indicated sufficient teachers on

---

80 Iraq Humanitarian Needs Overviews Iraq, 2018, 2019
their payrolls, displacement had resulted in a shortage of qualified teachers in some areas. Security and safety concerns were identified as the main barriers to accessing education in areas of return and newly retaken areas. The presence of explosive remnants of war were confirmed in at least five schools, and 166 schools were at risk. Over half of existing schools needed some form of rehabilitation or provision of equipment to offer a safe, protective and conducive learning environment. Further, the shortage of adequate facilities meant that schools hosted two or even three shifts of students, which reduced learning time and left few or no opportunities for any extra-curricular activities, including psychosocial support and social emotional learning. In addition, students attending afternoon shifts may have received poorer education as both students and teachers were tired and less productive.

Lack of access to education had further increased protection risks for children and youth. 68 per cent of out-of-school children were adolescent boys and girls by late 2018, with child labour, child marriage and psychosocial distress reported as widespread, major concerns. Out-of-school adolescents were more likely to engage in negative coping mechanisms including early marriage and participation in armed groups, as well as being more likely to be employed in higher-risk occupations.

2. Scope and methodology

The case study analyses the integration of Child Protection measures in the DG ECHO funded Education in Emergency actions in Iraq. Through a review of the Education in Emergency DG ECHO funded programmes of selected partners (International Organisations and NGOs), this study presents good practices, challenges and limitations encountered by implementing partners in allowing education to achieve its full protective potential.

The methodology for developing the case study includes:

- **Survey to implementing partners**: a survey was developed to collect good practices, lessons learnt, and challenges in integrating child protection aspects in DG ECHO funded EiE interventions in Iraq. Through a series of questions consistent with the analysis framework, partners were asked to illustrate examples of key factors in integrating child protection elements in their education response. The survey is presented in Annex 4: Child Protection – Education in Emergency integration Survey.

- **Selection of implementing partners**: in consultation with the DG ECHO office in Iraq, the DG ECHO Regional Office in Amman and DG ECHO Headquarters in Brussels, eight implementing partners were identified to contribute to the case study. These are:
  - ACTED
These partners have implemented Education in Emergency projects – either as stand-alone intervention or combined with other sectors\(^{81}\) – in a variety of settings (IDP camps, rural and urban areas of displacement), through different modalities (direct implementation and through existing systems), at different times in the course of the response. The actions therefore represent the main components of the ECHO education in emergency response in Iraq.

**Consent from the implementing partners:** implementing partners were contacted and briefed about the case study. Acted\(^{82}\), Norwegian Refugee Council\(^{83}\), People in Need\(^{84}\), Save the Children\(^{85}\), Terre des Hommes CH\(^{86}\), Triangle Generation Humanitaire\(^{87}\), and UNICEF\(^{88}\) agreed to contribute to the exercise. The International Rescue Committee had experienced a full staff turnover since 2017, and therefore could not retrieve the information needed to take part in the case study.

The maps below show the location of the DG ECHO funded actions for selected implementing partners participating in the case study over time.

---

\(^{81}\) Selected DG ECHO partners often implement combined EiE and Child Protection actions. But this case study focuses on analysing protection mechanisms integrated into education activities and does not specifically look at the complementarity between the two sectors.

\(^{82}\) https://www.acted.org

\(^{83}\) https://www.nrc.no/

\(^{84}\) https://www.clovekvtisni.cz/en/

\(^{85}\) https://iraq.savethechildren.net/

\(^{86}\) https://www.tdh.ch/

\(^{87}\) https://trianglegh.org/

\(^{88}\) https://www.unicef.org/iraq/
Light review of project documents for the selected partners: selected partners implemented 19 DG ECHO funded actions between 2015 and 2018 either focusing on EiE exclusively, or including EiE within a multi-sectorial
response, often combined with a Child Protection response (16 out of 19 actions). The light review was conducted prior to the evaluation’s field work, to build an overall understanding of the types of partnerships and EiE response implemented in Iraq. The list of actions reviewed is presented in Annex 2: List of actions.

- **Interviews with implementing partners**: these were carried out during the field mission and helped to shape the methodology and collect relevant evidence and experience besides that already captured in official project documents. Interviews with the Child Protection Cluster and with the Education Cluster also contributed to understanding the broader context in which the DG ECHO actions were implemented. The list of key informants interviewed is presented in Annex 3: List of interviewees.

The framework to analyse good practices, challenges and limitations in integrating child protection considerations in the Education in Emergency response are the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Preparedness, Response and Recovery. For each of the five INEE domains and 19 standards, the study identified key child protection aspects that should be taken into consideration to ensure that child protection risks and concerns are consistently addressed in the education.

### Analysis Framework

**Example**

**INEE Domain 2: Access**

**Standard 1: Equal access**

**Key protection consideration**: making sure that all learner children and adolescents most at risk have access to education opportunities (formal, non-formal or informal). For example, children with disabilities, minorities, girls, child workers, older children (adolescents), children out of school, and others.

**INEE Domain 3: Teaching and Learning**

**Standard 1: Curricula**

**Key protection consideration**: making sure that formal, non-formal and informal curricula include protective messages, such as conflict-sensitive content, mine risk awareness, and content to enhance learners’ capacity to lead independent, productive, and healthy lives.

---

89 The INEE Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery (2010) are a vital tool for quality and accountable programming in the education sector during crisis. Like the Sphere Standards for other humanitarian sectors, the INEE Minimum Standards outline crucial areas of response in the education sector, covering five domains:

1. **Foundational Standards**: These include coordination, community participation and analysis, and should be applied across all domains to promote a holistic quality response.
2. **Access and Learning Environment**: Standards focus on access to safe and relevant learning opportunities, highlighting critical linkages with other sectors such as health, water and sanitation, nutrition and shelter.
3. **Teaching and Learning**: These focus on critical elements that promote effective teaching and learning, including curricula, training, professional development and support, instruction and learning processes, and assessment of learning outcomes.
4. **Teachers and Other Education Personnel**: Standards cover administration and management of human resources in the field of education. This includes recruitment and selection, conditions of service, and supervision and support.
5. **Education Policy**: Standards here focus on policy formulation and enactment, planning and implementation.
response and therefore that education achieves its full protective function.

The full checklist of child protection aspects to be taken into account in EiE programming is presented in Annex 5: Child Protection Education in Emergency integration checklist. The analysis framework is in line with the best practices and recognised standards both in the Education in Emergency and in the Child Protection sectors. It is also consistent with the recently released DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document no. 10 “Education in Emergencies in EU-funded Humanitarian Aid Operations”, published in March 2019.\(^9^0\)

The two main limitations to the case study are: (i) there were no ongoing actions at the time of the case study and the large majority of actions ended in 2018. The extremely volatile context made it impossible to carry out field visits to project locations; and (ii) staff turnover and loss of institutional memory made it sometimes difficult to retrieve detailed information on the effectiveness of approaches and lessons learned.

\(^9^0\) Although this guidance note was published in March 2019, DG ECHO operational commitment to EiE and EiE/Child Protection integrated approaches in Iraq and the region dates back to 2016, with the release of internal guidelines on EiE to support country teams to formulate the HIPs. These guidelines are building on the INEE standards and emphasise the protective role of education.
3. Good practices, challenges and limitations in promoting the protective function of Education in Emergency in Iraq

This section presents good practices ✓, as well as challenges and limitations △ in integrating child protection considerations into the Education in Emergency response. These are not an exhaustive consideration of the entire DG ECHO funded Education response, but rather focus on analysis of the actions implemented by the selected implementing partners.

Good practices illustrated in this section were consistently implemented by all partners, unless otherwise indicated.

- Inter-cluster coordinated approach

  Coordinated Education and Child Protection approaches maximise effectiveness and impacts on the protection of girls and boys.

DG ECHO’s approach on the integration of Child Protection in Education in Emergency in Iraq has been developed in the context of the Education Cluster and Child Protection Sub Cluster. The clusters have worked closely together to design and adapt an integrated response to education and child protection needs. All selected partners for this case study are active members of the clusters, including UNICEF and Save the Children who co-lead the Education Cluster and the Child Protection Sub Cluster, and NRC, which leads the Anbar Sub-National Education Cluster. DG ECHO has promoted the joint work of the clusters and valued the thematic expertise of its partners by supporting them in shaping the overall humanitarian response.
The Education in Emergency and Child Protection strategy in Iraq illustrates how education can play a protective function by incorporating protection consideration at any stage of the education response. The strategy is based on a phased approach transitioning from an emergency response with a focus on creating safe learning spaces where children are protected, can re-establish routines and psychosocially recover from suffering, to early recovery by providing them with opportunities to reintegrate into the formal education system according to their profiles, in close coordination with Education authorities.

### Protective element is the Education in Emergency response in Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency response: safety and wellbeing</th>
<th>Early recovery: continued protection - resumption of formal education activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Non-formal education and recreational activities in safe temporary learning spaces/child friendly spaces to protect children, re-establish routines, promote psychosocial recovery and identify children most at risk.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Use of mobile approaches to reach the most vulnerable.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Capacity development of educational staff on core child protection issues (e.g. psychosocial support; identification of children at risk, code of ethics and child safeguarding / PSEA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Community mobilisation and awareness on protective factors – including importance of education and child protection.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reintegration in formal education activities including different formal and non-formal learning pathways</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- School safety (rehabilitation/winterization)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Structured psychosocial support (PSS) incorporated in the curricula</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Training of teachers on core child protection issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Parent Teacher Associations capacity development on child protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Back to school campaigns including education as a factor for protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Coordinated approaches to child protection between Ministry of Education and Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The inter-sectorial coordination between government agencies, including with non-government services providers, was a challenge. There was a lack of formal mechanism to facilitate inter-sectorial coordination with the government and this impeded joint responses to address issues related to vulnerable children, including for out-of-school children. The cluster coordination mechanism (Education and Child Protection) was instrumental in facilitating coordination, referral and exchange of information on services, but coordination with Government and local authorities was at times challenging and was not always successful.

**Focus on the most at risk children**

*Education in its protective function should ensure that vulnerable groups during and after the crisis are not excluded and that previous patterns of risk and exclusion are not reinforced in the emergency response.*
Partners have contributed to developing joint education and child protection assessment tools at inter-cluster level and used these to identify children who are most at risk as well as their needs. The tools notably included participatory methodologies (e.g. community group discussions). Assessment were carried out jointly by Child Protection and Education in Emergency experts. When multi-sectorial assessments were conducted, the partners through the clusters also made sure that EiE and Child Protection aspects were captured and that a protection specialist was always included in the assessment teams. Local authorities were also involved in the child protection analysis of needs to the extent possible, especially in assessing the inclusiveness of the learning pathways, and safety of schools and other education facilities.

In areas on the frontline of the conflict, hard-to-reach locations and newly retaken areas, vulnerable and at-risk children were identified through assessments carried out as a part of the Protection Cluster’s activities and funded by DG ECHO. Rapid Protection Assessments provided information on education opportunities for girls and boys at risk, such as children with disabilities, health problems, learning difficulties, hygiene neglect, psychological/behavioural problems, etc.

In the initial phases of the response, partners used different approaches to ensure access to education opportunities for the children most at risk. In camps, these included an approach that combined Temporary Learning Spaces with Child Friendly Spaces. Triangle Generation Humanitaire also used a mobile approach through “educational buses” to reach school children in hard to reach locations, such as Daratoo.

School Support Centres were also established to provide education opportunities to children lacking documentation and over-aged children who could not enrol in formal schools. These children were among those most at risk; thus, this type of non-formal education contributed to their protection and ultimately, psychosocial recovery.

Community engagement was also crucial to ensure that the right to access education was guaranteed for the most vulnerable children, such as children from minority groups, adolescent girls, child workers, children recruited by armed forces/groups, unaccompanied or separated children (UASC), and children with disabilities. Regular awareness raising activities, such as Back to School campaigns, and other community engagement activities have also had a significant impact in bringing children back to school. Save the Children particularly invested in child-led awareness and community mobilisation activities.

Access for children with disabilities in Temporary Learning Spaces in camps was ensured by putting in place paved walkways for children in wheelchairs,
Providing latrines for children with disabilities, and continuous maintenance of the facilities.

Economic hardship was one of the major factors contributing to keeping children out of school. The very difficult socioeconomic environment at household level lead to negative coping mechanisms such as children dropping out of school, getting married and engaging in child labour.

Girls’ education was significantly hindered by local social norms and negative coping strategies of families. Although partners supported community-based dialogues and awareness raising activities including parenting sessions to discuss child rights and the importance of education, the limited lifespan of the projects did not make it possible to fully tackle these issues. Doing so would have required prolonged and consistent efforts to change behaviours. Such long-term change however goes beyond the lifespan of DG ECHO humanitarian funding and needs engagement with other actors that could continue building on such initial efforts.

A large proportion of Iraqi children and adolescents lacked legal identity documents which deprived them of their right to legal protection, education and other basic services. Armed conflicts and displacements either led to the loss of legal documents or created institutional and legal barriers to the timely registration of marriages and births. Yet the Education Cluster, Child Protection Sub Cluster and UNICEF responded positively to this situation, advocating with relevant ministries to ensure the birth registration of all children in Iraq including those who were born under IS occupation. Joint advocacy was also conducted towards the Ministry and the Directorate of Education to allow enrolment of children who lacked civil documentation. In addition, child protection workers coordinated at Directorate and school levels to support enrolment of children who lacked civil documentation. UNICEF and NRC particularly offered legal support for children and adolescents to obtain legal documents.

In addition to the lack of documentation, there have been challenges in re-enrolling children in school in cases where they have been out of school for more than three years or for teenagers, due to the Directorate of Education (DoE) regulations related to school enrolment and age limits.

**Safe learning environments**

*Education programmes in emergencies through to recovery can provide physical and psychosocial protection. Temporary and permanent education facilities, including schools, learning spaces and child-friendly spaces, should be located, designed and constructed to be safe and accessible to all people whom they intend to serve. Teaching and learning processes should not harm students, and should promote their protection, self-protection and wellbeing. School-related gender based violence should be prevented and addressed in a timely manner.*
Safe facilities - Temporary Learning Spaces: partners established temporary learning facilities and child friendly spaces in camps in line with the Sphere and INEE minimum standards for construction of safe temporary learning facilities in camps. Locations of newly established learning spaces were identified with the participation of the community and the relevant authorities (i.e. mukhtars, mayors, camp managers) and following discussions on safety and protection of boys and girls, including on the route to/from the facilities.

Safe facilities - School rehabilitation: light rehabilitation and winterization of DG ECHO-supported schools was undertaken to ensure that learning environments were safe from hazards. These activities were coordinated with the DoE engineers from the school building department. At the same time, provision of fuel and general maintenance of power generators contributed to ensuring a conducive learning environment in DG ECHO-supported schools. Lighting, air cooling and heating facilities were also provided in all Temporary Learning Spaces/Non-Formal Education sites.

Safe facilities - Landmine clearance: in coordination with the Directorates of Education and the protection cluster, partners ensured that schools were cleared of explosive remnants of war before proceeding with light rehabilitation, winterization and general maintenance of the facilities.

Safe routes to/from education facilities: in assessing potential locations to establish Temporary Learning Spaces or identifying education facilities to rehabilitate, risks assessment on the way to/from the learning space were conducted and informed the selection of sites and schools. Risk mitigation measures such as buddy systems, volunteers accompanying children, transportation to/from facilities etc. were also put in place.

Preventing School Based- GBV through WASH: lack of access to school WASH facilities is a reason for girls dropping out, and increases the risk of gender-based violence in schools. Partners consistently ensured that WASH facilities in camps and in the rehabilitated schools were segregated by gender and accessible to children with disabilities.

Protective skills, life skills and self-protection skills: these were incorporated into the curricula of Temporary Learning Facilities and Child Friendly Spaces. PIN and ACTED for example developed an Awareness Manual for teachers and children to raise awareness on health and hygiene topics, road safety, safety in schools and class, fire safety and other topics.

Protective skills and GBV: partners trained educational and project staff on GBV. In particular, NRC and UNICEF established Adolescent Groups in the schools in camps and host communities. Adolescents were trained on the UNFPA-UNICEF Adolescent Girl Toolkit (including girls' participation, GBV awareness, reproductive health, rights and life skills) to equip them with relevant skills including on girls' participation in education, GBV awareness,
reproductive health, their rights and life skills to empower them to face contemporary challenges and issues affecting adolescent girls.

Classroom discipline – positive discipline and child-centred teaching methodologies: teachers were consistently trained on child-centred teaching methods and positive discipline. For volunteer teachers and other education personnel hired by the projects, the Code of Conduct and Child Safeguarding Policy of the partners also contributed to creating a protective environment in Temporary Learning Spaces. In schools, partners liaised with Directorates of Education that also provided supervision and support.

Classroom discipline – Corporal punishment: to ensure teachers used child-centred methods and refrained from using corporal punishment and discriminatory practices, partners strengthened monitoring systems and liaised with Directorates of Education, which also provided supervision and support. Further, in 2015, UNICEF supported the MoE to develop a Positive Discipline manual to train teachers with the objective of reducing violence against children in school and in non-formal education programmes. The training of the teachers focused on improving teacher-learner relations and this training continues to be rolled out across Iraq.

Safe facilities: School buildings, especially the ones in remote areas such as Daquq and Altun Kopri districts in Kirkuk governorate, were affected by the conflict from 2014 and have not been rehabilitated. The government does not have enough resources to rehabilitate all the schools especially WASH facilities and to conduct the works needed to improve access for children with disabilities.

Corporal punishment: despite the considerable efforts made by partners to ensure monitoring and support at the classroom level, corporal punishment and other negative discipline remained a concern especially in schools. Crowded classes and multiple school shifts were a challenge for teachers who often rely on punishment to manage large numbers of children.
Psychosocial Support

Emergencies expose children to traumatic experiences at the individual, family, community and societal levels. These can have a direct impact on their psychosocial wellbeing as well as compromise support structures that might otherwise protect them or help them bounce back quickly. Education offers a stable environment, structure, and routine that help heal, develop skills and behaviours that support resilience, and provide opportunities to build relationships and skills with learning spaces and communities that enable greater social cohesion.

Psychosocial support was integrated throughout the education response in different ways. First, at the onset of the crisis, psychosocial support activities were provided in safe spaces (e.g. temporary learning spaces, child friendly spaces and community-based youth centres). Outreach and mobile approaches were also used to provide assistance in hard to reach locations. Children and adolescents were offered age-appropriate recreational activities, e.g.: drawing, sports/games, music, and distribution of recreational kits for free play. They were also invited to participate in celebrating special events which implementing partners used as a vehicle to disseminate important messages on issues including child protection risks, using expressive arts and through open day events. Other activities included catch up classes, recreational activities like sports, group discussions and structured psychosocial support sessions to help children better cope with distress related to displacement and to better adapt to challenging situations. These activities initially helped children develop resilience and better adapt to their learning environments. At a later stage, following the training of social workers, actions delivered more structured psychosocial support activities for children and adolescents. Structured psychosocial support (PSS) interventions are those that are much more purposeful, carefully designed with a specific objective and a clear structure, to address one or more of the psychosocial domains (behavioural, social, cognitive and emotional). These activities seek to strengthen resilience by facilitating self-expression, enhance social interaction, build trust and confidence, peer support, goal setting, including life-skills sessions, etc.

In 2018, the Education Cluster and the Child Protection Sub cluster – of which the DG ECHO partners are active members, including leads and co-leads – provided guidance on how structured PSS services could be delivered and integrated into formal and non-formal education programmes.
UNICEF assisted the Ministry of Education in developing a psychosocial training manual to train teachers and school counsellors across the country. Following the development of the manual, 91 master trainers were trained in liberated governorates of Kirkuk, Anbar, and Nineveh. Rollout of training of teachers started in 2019.

Recognising that parents and caregivers were not immune to the effects of stress in emergency situations, partners liaised with child protection workers to provide psychosocial support to parents and caregivers. They were also engaged in child protection awareness sessions, enabling them to better care for children. This also helped the parents to recognize their own vulnerability, and encouraged them to seek early support from family and community networks when necessary.

- **Teachers and other education personnel**
  Teachers and other education personnel (e.g. volunteer teachers, facilitators, educators, Temporary Learning Spaces managers and school principals, head
teachers, school social workers) play a crucial role in the protection of children: they are key in identifying, supporting and referring children at risk, support the psychosocial recovery and wellbeing of children, promote their resilience, promote positive peer behaviours, and combat violence and discrimination. Their selection, recruitment, support and supervision therefore are vital in ensuring that they are equipped to play a protective role for students.

Code of Conduct: Until 2019 in Iraq, there was no formal Code of Conduct for teachers setting up clear standards of behaviour and protection of children. As such, the education response relied on Codes of Conduct developed by partners and consistently applied in non-formal education settings. Further, the staff hired through the project partners applied their organisational Child Safeguarding Policy. Importantly, teachers and other education and support personnel were systematically trained on child protection, Codes of Conduct, Child Safeguarding, and Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

Teacher capacity: At all phases of the response, teachers and other education personnel were consistently trained on Child Protection (including Gender Based Violence), psychosocial support, psychological first aid, identification and referral of children at risk, non-violent teaching methodologies and positive discipline. Partners largely used the inter-agency Teachers in Crisis Contexts training package\(^{91}\) contextualised to Iraq. This includes already-designed protective messages, particularly related to child protection and wellbeing, classroom management and positive discipline, as well as inclusion techniques.

Partners also relied on their own organisations’ training packages. For example, Save the Children used their “Learning and Wellbeing in Emergencies” training, NRC their “Better Learning Programme” training package; and Terre des Hommes their “Psychological Support for Conflict affected Children” training package.

In addition to trainings, some partners implemented coaching activities to ensure continued learning. For example, Save the Children facilitated the Teacher Learning Circles, peer-groups of teachers/facilitators that supported each other in their learning process, as well as classroom observations; spot-check were also regularly conducted by trained education staff.

There was no formal Code of Conduct for teachers and other education personnel in Iraq, and the Ministry of Education would not endorse a Code of Conduct issued by NGOs. This was problematic for education activities in formal schools. This challenge was mitigated through training of teachers (including volunteers) on child protection principles and positive discipline to help improve their interactions with children. A positive development was

---

achieved in 2019 with the Education National Cluster announcing the adoption of an official Code of Conduct for teachers working in Iraq.

The training of teachers on positive discipline was only cascaded to a limited number of teachers, leaving a wide gap in terms of numbers of teachers that had not been reached with this training. The UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys 2018 shows that 81 per cent of children experienced some form of violent discipline either at home or in school in the month before the survey, meaning that violence against children still remained a major challenge.

- **Referral and case management – support and supervision**
  *Girls and boys with urgent protection needs should be identified in a timely manner and receive age and culturally appropriate information and an effective multi-sectorial and child friendly response from relevant providers working in a coordinated, accountable manner. Education is crucial for timely identification and referral of children at risk and for their timely referral to Child Protection actors in charge of Case Management*

  All partners established links with Case Management services at the very beginning of their intervention. Whenever a learning space was established / identified, two-way referrals were established with Child Protection-Case Management actors: children in distress and particularly vulnerable who were enrolled in the learning spaces were identified and reported to the relevant CP service; reciprocally, the CP actors recommended to the education teams to enrol and support child beneficiaries in the learning spaces.

  Teachers and other education personnel were systematically trained on identification of children at risk.

  The Child Protection Sub cluster developed Standard Operating Procedures for Child Protection Case Management. The SOP define guiding principles, roles and responsibilities, case management processes, and coordination procedures to prevent and respond to protection concerns affecting all children in the KRI. The SOP is aligned with minimum standards and international guidelines related to child protection case management. The Sub cluster also addressed more comprehensive and context-specific guidelines for responding to challenging child protection cases. This SOP, developed in consultation with government partners, UN agencies and national and international NGOs, is currently rolled out in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and is implemented in other governorates together with government and non-government agencies working in child protection.
The lack of formal inter-sectoral coordination mechanism between the Directorate of Education, the Directorate of Labour and Social Affairs and other government and non-government service providers was a major challenge. The coordination gap was to some extent addressed by the establishment of a Child Protection Sub-Sector Coordination mechanism in Kirkuk, which facilitated coordination among government and non-government actors engaged in child protection and the humanitarian response. In the absence of a strong and holistic child protection system and the adoption of a system approach in the country, inter-sectoral coordination to support effective prevention, response services and the continuum of care were lacking.

Despite the Case Management system created by the Child Protection Sub cluster and coordinated with the Education Cluster, the lack of institutionalised child protection systems and formal inter-sectoral coordination mechanism challenged children’s access to specialised services, including preventive responses. The capacity of public social workers and the lack of proper service mapping furthermore challenged sustained effective referral from education to child protection.

Limited specialised child protection services offered by organisations were of great concern especially in the hard to reach locations targeted by DG ECHO programming. Further, limited legal services, protection for GBV survivors, as well as mental health and psychosocial support services made referral often impossible.

**Community participation**

Active community participation and engagement are critical to ensuring community-based child protection for girls and boys including promoting access to education as a way to protect children.

**Community-based child protection committees:** the committees established by partners were effective in identifying vulnerable children and either referred them to school or to child protection actors for appropriate support. Members of Community Based Child Protection Committees are community members, community leaders, parents, teachers and members of the Parent Teachers Associations. The community-based committees supported the identification of child protection issues in the community and
promoted child rights and protection in the community by organizing interactive community dialogues on issues related to children.

- **Community engagement and participation**: partners engaged and mobilised children, adolescents, care-givers, community members, and community representatives (e.g. community and religious leaders) on the importance of education. Awareness campaign, back to school campaign, outreach activities to mobilise more children to come to school as well as create awareness on the importance of education for children including for girls, especially in the crises context. Different kind of groups were established or pre-existing groups were strengthened: Child and Youth Committees (depending on the age of the participants), Mother Groups, Parent Teacher Associations (PTA), and volunteer groups. Overall, these projects were crucial in building and improving the interventions. At the same time, through Child Protection actions, Child Protection Committees were established. These worked in close coordination especially with the PTAs and Mother Groups on identification of vulnerable children, including children out of school and referrals.

NRC established Mother groups as a way to engage particularly on girls’ education. The Mother Group members were trained on protection issues and parenting skills especially with regards to girls’ education. They were also important in facilitating discussion on barriers to school enrolment and in engaging communities on the importance of education, in awareness campaigns, back to school campaigns, outreach activities and the mobilisation of other children to come to school as well as fostering awareness of the importance of education for children including for girls especially in the crisis context.

- **Parent Teacher Associations**: these were established and supported in schools targeted by the actions. PTA members were trained on their roles and responsibilities, school governance, and development. They were also trained on child protection issues and interactions were facilitated to discuss barriers to school enrolment. PTAs were supported to develop their schools’ improvement plans also in terms of protection and safety of the school environment. Additionally, PTAs conducted regular community meetings, outreach activities to promote enrolment in school and to sensitise parents to supporting education of their children.

- **Accountability to Affected Populations**: PIN and ACTED particularly worked on establishing a Feedback and Complaint Response Mechanism (CRM). This was a formalized process providing a safe, confidential, accessible, transparent and effective channel for beneficiaries and other relevant stakeholders to raise concerns, register complaints, call for investigations and make suggestions. The purpose of the CRM and relevant contact information (phone, email, physical address etc.) was communicated to beneficiaries through complaints boxes wherever relevant, as well as on distributed materials and / or at distribution sites. Staff were consistent in explaining the purpose to beneficiaries. The received complaints were categorized according
to level of sensitivity and severity and responded to in accordance with Standard Operating Procedures for Programme-related Complaints Response and Feedback Mechanisms.

Sustaining community structures remained a challenge. Members of community structures work on a voluntary basis; it is therefore difficult to retain them and sustain their motivation in the medium to long term. As a mitigation measure to minimise turn-over of members, it was important to engage them throughout with regular trainings and interactions – yet that measure was not always successful.

**Education policy**

*International legal instruments and declarations underline the right of all individuals to receive an education. It is the duty of national authorities and the international community to respect, protect and fulfil this right. The rights to protection, to non-discrimination and equal participation are integral parts of the right to education. In an emergency through to recovery, it is essential that these rights are protected and promoted. Education authorities should therefore be supported in fulfilling their mandate of ensuring that education systems are inclusive and non-discriminatory, that continuity is prioritised along with recovery of quality education, and that child protection is taken into account.*

All education cluster members intervened to advocate for child protection, child rights, and psychosocial wellbeing of children through different methods like embedding of psychosocial support and life skills education within the education system along with teaching of the regular curriculum. This was also implemented through non-formal education, recreational and outreach activities in formal schools, teacher training on positive discipline, awareness raising sessions, etc.

Ensuring the mainstreaming of child protection policies in education is a challenge and requires advocacy at Ministry-level. Further, integrating child protection into the education system needs policy and structural changes. Governorate-level interventions can also support evidence-based advocacy for policy and structural changes. However, as the current government system is centralised, scaling up of good practices is not straightforward and Ministry-level engagement remains a pre-condition for tangible change. If such policy level engagement is not pursued, there is a risk that the positive gains achieved in integrating child protection in education will not be sustained.

Fundamental policy obstacles to access education such as for example lack of documentation remained unresolved.
There was no formal Code of Conduct for teachers and other education personnel in Iraq prior to 2019. This represented a significant challenge for education activities in formal schools. A positive development was achieved in 2019 with the Education National Cluster announcing the adoption of an official Code of Conduct for teachers working in Iraq.

4. Further considerations

In conclusion, through the implementation of the DG ECHO funded actions, partners were able to further strengthen the application of global good practices in integrating child protection considerations into the Education in Emergency response in Iraq. In particular, through the coordination between the Education cluster and Child Protection sub cluster, partners were able to establish vital links between the two sectors and build common strategies and approaches, and share tools. The sector specific expertise of the DG ECHO partners led to a quality integrated response. Challenges and limitations to full integration remain however, especially with regards to the transition to recovery (see below).

Feedback from partners also highlighted several areas on which DG ECHO and its partners should further reflect to allow education to display its full protective potential. These areas are:

**Transitioning from acute emergencies to recovery**: there is a need to create mechanisms that allow a smooth transition for education programming, with no discontinuity in services. Discontinuity in services is an important risk factor especially for pre-adolescents and adolescent girls and boys who are the most at risk of dropping out of education and being exposed to forms of violence and exploitation.

This is particularly relevant in underserved, hard-to-reach locations – those often targeted by DG ECHO – where activities and services are naturally more difficult to hand over.

**Conflict sensitivity**: there is a need to reflect on how to best incorporate conflict-sensitive approaches in the emergency education response. This is particularly needed in the Iraqi context, where the conflict created profound divides, and social cohesion is extremely fragile.

---

92 It is important to note that this Case Study is based on the review of DG ECHO funded actions from 2015 to 2018. The Thematic Policy Document n. 10 ”Education in Emergency in EU-funded Humanitarian Aid Operations” released in March 2019, acknowledges the importance of these issues and provides guidance on how to structure the DG ECHO Education in Emergency Programming.
Cycle of funding: both Education in Emergency and Child Protection require longer cycles of funding than DG ECHO’s short term funding cycles so as to provide effective and sustainable results. In addition, the DG ECHO funding cycle is not necessarily aligned with the regular academic cycles, making it difficult to design logical sequencing of relevant activities.

Multi-sectorial approach: there is a need to strengthen the links between education and child protection programming and other sectors. Partners have faced different types of needs especially in non-camp situations in areas that were not served by other organisations. The multi-sectorial approach to support ad hoc WASH and NFI needs in education and child protection programming could be further explored.
Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

Bibliography

- DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document n. 10 “Education in Emergency in EU-funded Humanitarian Aid Operations” March 2019,
- DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document n. 8 “Humanitarian Protection – improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises” May 2016,
- Education Cluster and Child Protection AoR “Child Protection and Education in Emergency: increased effectiveness” 2015
- European Union “ Education 2030: Incheon Declaration and Framework for Action (ED-2016/WS/28) for the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all”
- INEE “Minimum Standards for Education in Preparedness, Response and Recovery”, 2011
- INEE “Where Child Protection and Education in Emergency Cross”, 2018
- Iraq Child Protection Sub cluster “Minimum CP Package for Urban-Retkan areas” 2018
- Iraq Education Cluster “From Emergency to Early Recovery: The Proposed Transition” 2018
- Iraq Education Cluster and Child Protection Sub cluster “Guidance Note - integrated EiE/CPiE programming for CFS/ TLS” 2017
- Iraq Education Cluster, INEE, Save the Children, UNICEF “Iraq contextualised Minimum Standards for Education in Preparedness, Response and Recovery”, 2018

List of actions reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement No.</th>
<th>Organisati on</th>
<th>Action title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECHO/CHD/BUD/2015/91003</td>
<td>STC-NO</td>
<td>Building Resilience for IDP Children in Iraq through Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2016/91013</td>
<td>TDH-CH</td>
<td>An integrated humanitarian response to the needs of vulnerable conflict affected communities in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2016/91017</td>
<td>NRC-NO</td>
<td>Improve access to education for conflict affected school aged children in Anbar, Iraq.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Title of person interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People In Need</td>
<td>Head of Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People In Need</td>
<td>Education Project Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of interviewees
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Child Protection Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Committee</td>
<td>Rescue Acting Deputy Director of Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Committee</td>
<td>Rescue Child Protection Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terre des hommes - Lausanne</td>
<td>Child Protection Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terre des hommes - Lausanne</td>
<td>ECHO Kirkuk project manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>MHPSS Support Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>Education Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
<td>Head of Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
<td>Education Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triangle Humanitaire Generation</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triangle Humanitaire Generation</td>
<td>Child Protection Technical Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triangle Humanitaire Generation</td>
<td>Child Protection Project Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Chief of Child Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Child Protection Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Education officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Child Protection Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Education Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Education Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Child Protection Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Protection Sub cluster</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Cluster</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Child Protection – Education in Emergency integration Survey

Review of good practices and lessons learned

This review aims at collecting good practices and lessons learnt in integrating child protection in the ECHO funded education programming in Iraq. The checklist below identifies key factors for such integration using the INEE Minimum Standards as analysis framework.

We therefore ask you to share your experience in implementing ECHO funded education interventions in Iraq by answering the following questions and providing specific examples of good practices, lessons learnt and challenges arising from the implementation.

Thank you very much for your contribution!

NAME OF THE ORGANISATION:

TITLE AND CONTRACT NUMBER OF THE ACTION/S:

ACCESS AND LEARNING ENVIRONMENT

1. EQUAL ACCESS
   a. How did the action/s ensure that children and adolescents most at risk have access to education opportunities (formal and non-formal)? For example children with disabilities, minorities, girls, child labourers, older children (adolescent), children out of school, and others

   b. If this was not possible, what were the key constraints and possible mitigation actions (if any)?

2. PROTECTION AND WELLBEING
   a. How did the action/s ensure that learning environments are safe and secure?

   b. How did the action/s ensure the psychosocial wellbeing of the learners?

   c. How did the action/s ensure that learners are not exposed to school-related Gender Based Violence?
d. If any of the above was not possible, what were the key constraints and possible mitigation actions (if any)?

3. FACILITIES AND SERVICES
   a. How did the action/s ensure that education facilities and learning spaces are safe?
      *Refer to physical structures, location of TLS/schools, sanitation facilities, design and access for people with disabilities*
   
   b. How did the action/s ensure education is linked to Child Protection Services? Eg. referral to case management systems

   c. If any of the above was not possible, what were the key constraints and possible mitigation actions (if any)?

TEACHING AND LEARNING

1. CURRICULA
   a. How did the action/s ensure that the curriculum (formal and non-formal) includes protective messages? *Eg. conflict sensitive contents, mine risk awareness, contents to enhance learners’ capacity to lead independent, productive, and healthy lives*

   b. If this was not possible, what were the key constraints and possible mitigation actions (if any)?

2. TRAINING, PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT
   a. How did the action/s ensure that teachers and other education personnel are trained on protection and child protection, psychosocial support, identification and referral of children at risk, non-violent teaching methodologies?

   b. If this was not possible, what were the key constraints and possible mitigation actions (if any)?

3. INSTRUCTION AND LEARNING PROCESS
   a. How did the action/s ensure that teaching methods do not harm learners? *Eg. are not violent or discriminatory*

   b. If this was not possible, what were the key constraints and possible mitigation actions (if any)?

TEACHERS AND OTHER EDUCATION PERSONNEL

1. RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION
   a. Did the action/s ensure that the job description of the teachers and other education personnel includes a Code of Conduct? *Eg. for
teachers, volunteer teachers, education administrative and support staff, school counsellors and others

b. If this was not possible, what were the key constraints and possible mitigation actions (if any)?

2. CONDITIONS OF WORK
a. Did the action/s ensure that a Code of Conduct setting clear standards of behaviour for teachers and other education personnel was developed and enforced? *Eg. for teachers, volunteer teachers, education administrative and support staff, school counsellors and others*

b. If this was not possible, what were the key constraints and possible mitigation actions (if any)?

3. SUPPORT AND SUPERVISION
a. How did the action/s ensure that referral pathways for child protection access are created between the temporary learning spaces /school and child protection actors?

b. How did the action/s ensure that teachers, counsellors and any other education staff are trained and supported in identification and referral of child protection cases?

c. If any of the above was not possible, what were the key constraints and possible mitigation actions (if any)?

EDUCATION POLICY

1. LAW AND POLICY FORMULATION and PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION
a. How did the action/s ensure continuation and sustainability of the combined education and child protection services?

b. How did the action/s ensure that education systems and policies take child protection into account?

c. If any of the above was not possible, what were the key constraints and possible mitigation actions (if any)?

FOUNDATIONAL STANDARDS

1. COORDINATION
a. How was the action coordinated with other actors? In the design and implementation

b. If this was not possible, what were the key constraints?

2. ANALYSIS
 Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

a. How did you ensure that assessments focus on identifying risks of different groups?
b. Were assessment tools jointly designed by EiE and CP experts?
c. If any of the above was not possible, what were the key constraints and possible mitigation actions (if any)?

3. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
   a. How did the action/s ensure community participation? *Eg. establishing Community Education Committees, PTAs, and other mechanisms*

   b. How did the actions ensure capacity development of families and communities on child protection through education programming? *Eg. training of PTAs, parenting programmes or other initiatives involving families of learners*

   c. If any of the above was not possible, what were the key constraints and possible mitigation actions (if any)?

Child Protection in Education in Emergency Checklist93

Domain 1: FOUNDATIONAL STANDARDS

**Standard 1: COORDINATION**
- Make sure that education activities are coordinated with child protection actors, especially on
- Case Management and other specialised Child Protection Services.

**Standard 2: ANALYSIS**
- Make sure that education assessments focus on identifying risks of different groups
- Make sure that education assessment tools are jointly designed by EiE and Child Protection experts

**Standard 3: COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION**
- Make sure that EiE interventions ensure community participation that could also serve for child protection purposes. *Eg. establishing Community Education Committees, PTAs, and other mechanisms*
- Make sure that EiE interventions ensure capacity development of families and communities on child protection through education programming. *Eg.

93 based on INEE Minimum Standards https://inee.org/resources/inee-minimum-standards
Domain 2: ACCESS AND LEARNING ENVIRONMENT

Standard 1: EQUAL ACCESS
☐ Make sure that learners most at risk -including children and adolescents- have access to relevant education opportunities (formal, non-formal or informal) For example children with disabilities, minorities, girls, child labourers, older children (adolescent), children out of school, and others

Standard 2: PROTECTION AND WELLBEING
☐ Make sure that learning environments are safe and secure
☐ Ensure the psychosocial wellbeing of the learners
☐ Make sure that learners are not exposed to school-related Gender Based Violence?

Standard 3: FACILITIES AND SERVICES
☐ Make sure that education facilities and learning spaces are safe. This refers among others to safety physical structures, location of TLS/schools, fencing, sanitation facilities, design and access for people with disabilities
☐ Make sure that EiE interventions are linked to Child Protection Services? Eg. referral to case management systems and other child protection specialised services

Domain 3: TEACHING AND LEARNING

Standard 1: CURRICULA
☐ Make sure that formal, non-formal and informal curricula include protective messages, such as conflict sensitive contents, mine risk awareness, contents to enhance learners’ capacity to lead independent, productive, and healthy lives

Standard 2: TRAINING, PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT
☐ Make sure that teachers and other education personnel are trained on protection and child protection, psychosocial support, identification and referral of children at risk, non-violent teaching methodologies

Standard 3: INSTRUCTION AND LEARNING PROCESS
☐ Make sure that teaching methods do not harm learners. Eg. are not violent or discriminatory

Domain 4: TEACHERS AND OTHER EDUCATION PERSONNEL

Standard 1: RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION
Make sure that the job description of the teachers and other education personnel includes a Code of Conduct? *Eg. for teachers, volunteer teachers, education administrative and support staff, school counsellors and others*

**Standard 2: CONDITIONS OF WORK**

- Make sure that a Code of Conduct setting clear standards of behaviour for teachers and other education personnel was developed and enforced. *Eg. for teachers, volunteer teachers, education administrative and support staff, school counsellors and others*

**Standard 5: SUPPORT AND SUPERVISION**

- Make sure that referral pathways for child protection access are created between the temporary learning spaces /school and child protection actors

- Make sure that teachers, counsellors and any other education staff are trained and supported in identification and referral of child protection cases

**Domain 5: EDUCATION POLICY**

**Standard 1 and 2: LAW AND POLICY FORMULATION and PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION**

- Ensure the continuation and sustainability of the combined education and child protection services

- Make sure that education systems and policies take child protection into account?
ANNEX1b: Case Study Iraq: Detention

1. Case Study Focus
As discussed during the inception phase of this evaluation, the detention case study focuses upon detention as an important area of work funded by DG ECHO in Iraq and an important issue in the country more generally. The aim of the case study then is to outline the context and key issues in the Iraqi detention sector during the period of the evaluation, as well as to detail and assess DG ECHO’s response including offering conclusions that can inform future work in Iraq or other humanitarian contexts.

2. Methodology
The evaluation team adopted an inductive, qualitative approach to the case study, with a methodology focusing on semi-structured key informant interviews, field visits and document review.

Interviews were done with DG ECHO staff with knowledge of the detention programming.

Interviews were also done with DG ECHO implementing partners working in the area of detention:

- Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) as well as NPA’s local partners Public Aid Organization (PAO) and the Justice Network for Prisoners in Iraq (JNP); the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); UNICEF; and, International Rescue Committee (IRC)

The team also met with key informants from government ministries responsible for detention:

- the Ministry of Justice; the General Reformatory Directorate (part of the Ministry of Justice); and, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (which operates detention facilities for juveniles)

The team also interviewed key informants from other organisations implementing detention programming in Iraq, to more broadly inform understanding and analysis:

- Justice Gate, a local organisation focusing on legal work and partnering with UNICEF; and, the Iraqi Law Firm, a local organisation focusing on prisoners’ rights

The team furthermore did field visits to two detention facilities – the Men’s Reformatory Prison in Erbil and the Juvenile Reformatory in Baghdad (Jaefar prison) – and interviewed their directors as well as several prison guards. A planned field visit to the prison where UNICEF works in Baghdad and an interview with its director had to be cancelled at the last minute due to the protests that broke out in Baghdad during the latter part of the week of 30 September.

---

94 Interviewees are listed in the evaluation report’s annex listing interviewees.
Document review focused on a review of documents from DG ECHO-funded detention actions, and research done by the team related to detention in Iraq including from journals such as *Foreign Affairs* and reports from organisations such as Human Right Watch.

Overall, the interviews, field visits and document review made it possible for the evaluation team to gain a good understanding of the detention sector and of DG ECHO’s response, including of good practices and challenges faced and the reasons for these. The field visits also helped the team to clearly understand the various issues highlighted in the interviews and documentation, including severe overcrowding and poor conditions for detainees for example as regards the toilets, showers and exercise areas.

### 3. Context for Detention

The detention sector in Iraq had significant challenges from the beginning of the evaluation’s period of focus (2014-2018), many of which actually pre-dated 2014. According to the United Nations Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), the main issues in 2014 in both federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region were:

- High numbers of detainees (37,305 person detained or imprisoned in April 2014), under the authority of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA)
- Overcrowding, linked to a slow pace in constructing new facilities and refurbishing old ones
- Poor provision of health services, due to insufficient medical personnel and inadequate medical facilities
- Allegations of torture and ill treatment
- Concerns related to due process and fair trial rights, including credible allegations of confessions extracted under torture, insufficient informing of rights to prisoners, defendants appearing without lawyers, and detention sometimes continuing beyond the prescribed limit

All of these issues continued in 2015 and became even more acute in 2016, 2017 and into 2018, for two main reasons.

The first was that the fighting with Islamic State (IS) led to the arrest of many individuals, particularly as the fighting around Mosul intensified. This caused the number of informal detention facilities run by various security actors to multiply

---

and led to much higher numbers of detainees in the formal detention system. The result was greater overcrowding, more problems accessing medical and health care, and outbreaks of diseases associated with overcrowded conditions such as scabies. As several IP interviewees also underlined, many of the detainees had or were perceived as having IS-affiliation; this made them even more likely to face ill treatment and concerns related to due process and fair trial rights as a result of their being perceived as 'the enemy' by many within the Iraqi justice and detention system.

Secondly, Iraq’s government faced a severe economic crisis, with significant disruption to the economy due to the war with Islamic State. This in turn led to increased costs for the government for example linked to the very high numbers of IDPs, but also due to the high costs of fighting the war. At the same time, the price of the commodity that is a very significant source of government revenues in Iraq, oil, collapsed. The impact of the low oil prices was exacerbated by the 2015 disintegration of an agreement with the Kurdish region’s government to export some 550,000 barrels of oil a day from territory that they administered, thus reducing overall oil exports and government revenue further. These various economic factors prompted the Iraqi government to introduce austerity budgets in 2015 and beyond, which in turn meant less money available for the detention sector at precisely the moment that increased funding was needed due to the influx of new prisoners. Indeed, several IP interviewees said that the financial situation caused two prisons to be closed during the period of the evaluation, further reducing capacity.

What emerges then is that by late 2015 and into 2016 and beyond, an already highly challenging situation in Iraq’s detention centres had become significantly worse due to a high influx of detainees and reduced government capacity to respond. At the same time, the types of prisoners that were swelling the system were often security-related detainees, which meant that they were even more likely than normal prisoners to be on the receiving end of ill treatment and to face concerns related to due process as well as fair trials.

96 According to multiple IP interviewees, there were also concerns regarding mistreatment including torture of security detainees associated or suspected of association with IS in the informal detention facilities, though these sites were not accessible to the IPs and do not constitute part of the detention system that is the focus of this case study.


4. DG ECHO’s Response

Brief overview of DG ECHO detention-related actions in Iraq

DG ECHO was engaged on the issue of detention in Iraq throughout the period of the evaluation, working with four implementing partners: ICRC, UNICEF, NPA and IRC.

ICRC had one DG ECHO-funded detention action in 2014, four protection actions with a detention component (one in 2016 and three in 2017), and one other humanitarian action with a detention component in 2015. These actions focused upon monitoring the conditions and treatment of detainees, advocating to Iraqi authorities for prisoners’ rights and improved conditions of incarceration for example as regards access to the open air, and communicating with detainees’ families as well as with embassies for foreign detainees. ICRC also undertook some rehabilitation of detention facilities (e.g. rehabilitation of the water supply system in a Basra prison in 2014; repairing/building water and sanitation facilities and ventilation systems in eight places of detention in 2017), advocated for prisoners’ access to appropriate healthcare and provided some support to local health teams working in prisons. ICRC in addition provided essential supplies such as clothes and blankets, nutritional supplements for expecting mothers and infants, as well as hygiene kits to minors and women. Training was furthermore given to officials on standards regarding detainees’ treatment and living conditions in 2016, and in 2017 a pilot was conducted to directly provide healthcare in several detention centres. The ICRC also monitored prisoner transfers from informal to official places of detention.

UNICEF undertook three DG ECHO-funded protection actions with detention components, one in 2016, one in 2017 and one in 2018. These actions involved upgrading several detention facilities (e.g. providing air conditioners and washing machines in one detention facility; upgrading the water supply and sewage system in a prison), and providing caravans/upgrading existing spaces for use as classrooms. UNICEF also provided legal assistance, rehabilitation and reintegration services, vocational training, as well as some urgent supplies such as mattresses and emergency clothing to children in detention. Further, the 2017 action built upon the 2016 action’s camp-based de-radicalisation activities with de-


radicalisation programming for boys in the detention system as well as for some boys that had already been released. The 2017 action also provided training for staff in six detention centres and social reformatories including social workers, teachers, religious guidance counsellors and guards aimed at breaking down harmful perceptions against children perceived of associations with IS.

**NPA** had one DG ECHO-funded action during the period of the evaluation, in 2017.\(^{101}\) The detention component of the action targeted the most overcrowded facilities, and was initially carried out by the Justice Network for Prisoners (JNP) though after a few months implementation shifted to a local NGO that is a member of the JNP, Public Aid Organization (PAO), due to its having greater capacity. The assistance involved providing hygiene kits, women’s dignity kits, child and school kits, winterisation kits, as well as clothes in 10 prisons and detention centres. It also involved undertaking rehabilitation of WASH facilities and other minor renovations in 6 prisons.

Finally, **IRC** undertook two DG ECHO-funded protection actions with detention components, one in 2017 and one in 2018.\(^{102}\) These actions focused on legal assistance for detainees and for individuals at high risk of detention due to suspected IS-affiliation, as well as capacity building for judges and detention centre officers on roles and responsibilities of judicial and detention personnel notably regarding detention conditions.

**Analysis of DG ECHO’s detention sector programming in Iraq**

There are several insights that emerge from analysis of DG ECHO’s detention related programming.

**Strong ongoing focus on conditions of incarceration, prisoners’ rights and adherence to international law.**

Through its funding of ICRC from 2014 to 2017, DG ECHO maintained a strong and continuous baseline commitment to monitoring of detainees and of their rights, facilitating of communication by detainees with their families, as well as advocacy to Iraqi authorities for prisoners’ rights and improved conditions of incarceration. Importantly, the lack of funding to ICRC in 2018 was, according to IP and DG ECHO interviewees, linked to the decrease in DG ECHO’s budget and not due to any particular concerns related to ICRC’s programming.

\(^{101}\) 2017/00687: The "RAP Project" (Rapid Assistance to Prisons and Detention Centers in Iraq, with Conflict Prevention and Preparedness Non-technical Survey)

\(^{102}\) 2017/00900: Integrated Protection Assistance to Conflict Affected Iraqis; 2018/00536: Integrated Protection and Education Response to Conflict Affected Iraqis
**Assessment:** In line with DG ECHO’s protection policy, these activities targeted a highly vulnerable population and sought to reduce their vulnerability through persuasion of Iraqi duty-bearers to improve conditions by respecting international law and standards. Further, they aimed to reduce threat by reducing potential violence, deprivation, abuse and neglect of detainees.

Overall, this dimension of DG ECHO’s response represents a recognition of the ongoing, important humanitarian concerns in Iraq’s detention sector, and a commitment to maintaining an effective core response when its budget permitted. More fundamentally, for such a response to be effective, the IP needs to have access to prisons and relationships with key Iraqi stakeholders for advocacy purposes, all elements that are built up over time. This underlines the importance of the ongoing nature of the funding for the four years where the level of humanitarian needs was the greatest.

---

**Proactive response to the surge in prisoners and deteriorating detention conditions with related protection concerns, though with weaknesses in NPA’s action, related to access**

The context section of this case study highlighted the significant deterioration in the already-poor situation in Iraq’s prisons and detention centres beginning in late 2015 and 2016 and continuing into 2017 and to some extent 2018. This was primarily related to the high number of detainees as a result of the fighting with Islamic State, which strongly exacerbated overcrowding and such challenges as healthcare access, as well as giving rise to greater concerns regarding treatment of detainees due to IS/suspected-IS affiliations. Further, the financial situation of the Iraqi government meant that it had a reduced ability to respond to this deepening crisis.

DG ECHO responded by:

1) incorporating new elements into existing implementing partners’ programming, and
2) working with other partners that could target different aspects of the detention situation

The first aspect of DG ECHO’s response can be seen in the ICRC’s actions incorporating new elements in 2016 and 2017: repairing/building water and sanitation facilities and ventilation systems in eight places of detention; providing essential supplies such as blankets, clothes and nutritional supplements; and, piloting a health response for detainees in cooperation with the Ministry of Health by providing healthcare and also doing health-related training and capacity building.

“The situation in 2017 and our response to it...it was us reacting to the severity of the crisis since otherwise people would die.” An ICRC interviewee
The second aspect of DG ECHO’s response involved funding UNICEF in 2016, 2017 and 2018, with its actions incorporating upgrading of detention facilities overwhelmed by detainee numbers, provision of supplies and legal services, and de-radicalisation programming aimed at the IS/suspected-IS detainees as well as the detention facility staff working with them. Further, DG ECHO began working with NPA in 2017 to directly provide relief in detention facilities including delivering supplies and carrying out renovations in facilities overwhelmed by the detainee numbers and particularly security-related detainees – according to DG ECHO, “the justification for this result and intervention was the increased prison population and overcrowded living conditions caused by the mass arrest of IS-affiliated people.” Finally, DG ECHO funded IRC in 2017 and 2018 to provide legal assistance that particularly targeted detainees and individuals at high risk of detention due to suspected IS-affiliation and provided training to judicial and detention personnel.

103 Final Report, 2017/00687: The "RAP Project" (Rapid Assistance to Prisons and Detention Centers in Iraq, with Conflict Prevention and Preparedness Non-technical Survey). Single Form, pg. 78.
**Assessment:** DG ECHO was proactive in relation to the crisis in 2016 and 2017, with a response that was needs-driven and in line with its protection policy. A key strength of the response was its multi-dimensionality, with a legal aspect, an infrastructure focus, a health component, a de-radicalisation component and the provision of supplies in detention facilities.

As regards the ICRC actions, the new elements of the programming were appropriate in that they temporarily substituted for and supported the Iraqi duty bearers that were unable/unwilling to respond as needed, and moreover targeted key areas of need. A particular strength of its health response was the coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Health and the handover of programming to it, thereby contributing to greater sustainability of this element.

The UNICEF actions were similarly appropriate in that they targeted a vulnerable population – children – while also capitalising on existing relationships between UNICEF and Iraqi duty bearers to identify and target a particularly vulnerable sub-population, IS/suspected-IS detainees, with well-structured de-radicalisation programming.

The IRC actions were also appropriate since the situation in 2017 and 2018 was marked by an increased need for legal assistance especially for IS/suspected-IS detainees, and including related to civil documentation (a significant challenge since individuals with IS-issued documents were often presumed to be affiliated with IS and thus at greater risk of arrest, detention and mistreatment). A particular strength of IRC’s legal response was the building of judicial and detention facility staff’s capacity, which had both immediate effects but also the possibility of longer-term impacts. Further, the IRC protection team were authorised by the local authorities to access the check points, mustering points and transit sites in targeted governorates and thus to reach detainees as early as possible with legal assistance, a clear value-added in terms of reducing their vulnerability and the threats faced.

NPA’s programming increased DG ECHO’s capacity to respond to the crisis by reaching the vulnerable populations in Iraqi detention facilities with much-needed supplies and timely renovations and thus temporarily substituting for and supporting the Iraqi duty bearers that were unable/unwilling to respond. A strength of the programming was that it showed DG ECHO proactively reaching out to a new IP for them as a result of the needs. Further, NPA worked through a national network of local organisations (JNP), which contributed to the network and PAO having stronger relationships with Iraqi detention facility officials and thus a greater ability to work with detainees in the longer-term. Yet NPA’s programming encountered several challenges:

- **It tried but was not able to access as many facilities as originally anticipated;** further, it was initially only able to access facilities under the Ministry of Social Affairs but not those under the Ministry of Justice, yet it is in the latter where most security-related cases were located

- **It tried but was not able to specifically identify and target IS/suspected-IS affiliated detainees** – thus the needs of this particularly vulnerable sub-group were not prioritised above those of the general prison population

- **The Iraqi authorities did not give permission to provide medical assistance including visits by medical specialists and provision of medicine for chronic diseases in detention facilities**
5. Overall Conclusions

DG ECHO’s detention-related programming in Iraq during the period of the evaluation underlines the importance of needs analyses that are able to identify the various dimensions of need including as these evolve over time. A key aspect of this is the strong engagement of DG ECHO with its partners through ongoing discussions and sharing of information, a point that was mentioned by multiple IP interviewees as well as DG ECHO interviewees.

The analysis has highlighted multiple other factors that should be considered when implementing a detention response, some of which are also more broadly applicable to other programming:

- It is important to proactively respond to shifting needs by reshaping existing programming and engaging with new partners in a timely manner so as to effectively target them; this includes encouraging partners to go into areas of work that are atypical for them
- It is necessary to fully query a partner’s and particularly a new partner’s ability to deliver on what it proposes, including based on their having the necessary experience and capacity
- Access is a key issue for detention programming due to its highly sensitive nature, and there is evidence that having collaborated with government and detention actors over a longer period of time facilitates access by virtue of the relationships and trust that are built up
- Flowing from this, once detention has been identified as a thematic area of interest in a particular context, it is useful to consider funding programming on an ongoing basis rather than seeking to suddenly engage in the area
- NPA relied on local organisations for access, many of which publicly pressure the Iraqi government on detention conditions in addition to delivering aid, as compared to the international organisations’ focus on delivering aid coupled with discrete advocacy: while such public pressure and shaming can be an appropriate response modality, it is likely that organisations which do it will have weaker relationships with government and security actors and thus challenges with access and in delivering more sensitive programming such as for security detainees
- Building on the previous point, it is important to fully query an implementing partner’s approach to securing access, to be aware of the likelihood of delays, to pre-emptively put in place measures to help overcome delays (for example through direct advocacy with decision-makers), and to determine if delays would undermine the logic of the intervention and thus point toward finding another solution
- Capacity building within the detention sector of officials including the guards who interact with detainees can help to effectively meet emergency

“Because I’ve worked with UNICEF for 15 years now, I normally skip the formal process as we can just have a phone call together... we personally [as regards the UNICEF contact person] have a long relationship, over 10 years now, so we can easily do things together.”

A Ministry of Justice interviewee
humanitarian needs by improving their treatment, and can also have positive longer-term effects, particularly when linked to development programming

- Needs analyses should consider whether deradicalisation programming in detention facilities is necessary, and if so it should be undertaken with the involvement of specialised actors since in their absence, efforts can be undertaken by detention officials that are out of line with good practices and thus risk having poorer results
ANNEX1c: Case Study Iraq: Integrated response

1. Case Study Focus
As agreed during the inception phase of the evaluation, this case study focuses upon an integrated response funded by DG ECHO, that is, a response that integrated together various components such as WASH, shelter, and camp coordination and camp management (CCCM). It was also agreed that the case study would focus upon one integrated response implementing partner, International Organization for Migration (IOM), paying particular attention to its response to the Mosul crisis. The aim of the case study then is to briefly outline the relevant context and key issues in Iraq during the period as well as to detail and assess IOM’s integrated response in Iraq, giving attention primarily to IOM’s integrated response with the other partner organisations as well as to some extent its integration of the various components of its response within its own organisation. The case study will furthermore offer conclusions that can inform future work in Iraq or other humanitarian contexts.

The case study represents an interesting practice adopted by DG ECHO and also a way of working that DG ECHO is interested in potentially deploying elsewhere.

2. Methodology
The evaluation team adopted an inductive, qualitative approach to the case study, with a methodology that involved semi-structured key informant interviews, field visits and document review.

Interviews104 were done with DG ECHO staff with knowledge of the integrated response programming and the Mosul crisis more generally.

Interviews were also done with IOM staff involved in and with knowledge of its integrated response to the Mosul crisis and its Iraq programming more generally. Interviews were furthermore conducted with IOM’s key partners in its integrated response, DRC and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), as well as with the other two integrated response partners, UNICEF and UNHCR.

The team met with key informants from other organisations with knowledge of the Mosul response and of IOM’s involvement in it: the Iraq protection cluster, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Iraqi government’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Centre (JCMC), and the Iraqi government’s local implementing partner in Jeddah camp, Representative of Nineveh Voluntary for IDPs (RNVDO).

The team did field visits to two IDP camps near Mosul, Qayyarah Airstrip camp and Jeddah camp, touring the camps and conducting interviews.105 IOM designed

104 Interviewees are listed in the evaluation report’s annex listing interviewees.
105 The planned visit to Hajj Ali camp, which was designed, built and managed by IOM, had to be cancelled due to the Iraqi government suddenly announcing its closure two days before the visit. Interviews related to this camp were however undertaken, and are integrated into the analysis.
and took the lead in building Qayyarah Airstrip camp with DRC providing camp management, while the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration designed and took the lead in building the adjacent Jeddah camp with RNVDO providing camp management – thus by comparatively considering the two camps, the evaluation team was able to highlight strengths and weaknesses related to this aspect of IOM’s integrated response to the Mosul crisis. Important to note however is that only elements specifically funded by DG ECHO are analysed in this case study.

**Document review** focused on a review of documents from DG ECHO-funded integrated response actions, and research done by the team related to the integrated response including from OCHA reports.

Overall, the interviews, field visits and document review made it possible for the evaluation team to gain a good understanding of IOM’s integrated response to the Mosul crisis, including of good practices and challenges faced and the reasons for these.

### 3. Brief Context for the Integrated Response in Iraq

In December 2013, heavy fighting between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and armed groups started in Anbar governorate, following months of repeated violent attacks and growing tensions. The violence and military operations rapidly spilled over into other governorates, most notably Salah ad-Din, Diyala, Baghdad and Ninewa governorates, with the Islamic State group (IS) and associated armed groups taking control of various key locations including Fallujah in January 2014 and Mosul city in June of that year. Estimates by the UN and NGOs indicate that the first days of the Ninewa crisis triggered a sudden population displacement of between 250,000 and 450,000 people, some of whom had already been displaced from Anbar in late 2013 and early 2014.

Conditions continued to worsen in 2015 due to the intensification of the military campaign against IS, which controlled large swathes of the country’s central and northern areas. In January of that year, the Global Shelter Cluster said that there were over 8 million people in need of humanitarian aid in Iraq, including 2.9 million in dire need of aid to survive. This number rose to approximately 10 million by January 2016, with military operations to retake Ramadi in December 2015 contributing to that.

The year 2016 saw increased fighting in Iraq as government forces moved to take back areas under IS control. This included fighting in Anbar, with the battle to retake Fallujah leading to approximately 100,000 people being displaced by June/July 2016, many of which headed toward already-overcrowded IDP camps including Ameriyat Fallujah.¹⁰⁶ According to multiple interviewees, the

> “With the Fallujah response, we were not prepared for the massive influx of people, there were people that just started to ‘settle in’ and we also couldn’t coordinate well...that was one of the driving forces behind the Mosul response.”

- an international implementing partner interviewee

---

humanitarian community felt that its response to the Fallujah crisis could have been stronger and that this sense contributed to their determination to have a stronger, more coordinated response to the upcoming Mosul crisis.

Fighting to retake Mosul city began in October of 2016 and continued until July 2017. The number of displaced from Mosul city was nearly 700,000 according to the Iraqi government, though other estimates put the figure closer to a million people.\textsuperscript{107} The humanitarian response was very large and complex, targeting over a million people and involving activities in multiple areas given the widespread needs: protection, health, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), food security, shelter and non-food items, camp coordination and camp management (CCCM), education, emergency livelihoods, rapid response mechanism, and multi-purpose cash assistance. At the same time, operational requirements for the humanitarian sector involved emergency telecommunications, logistics, as well as coordination and common services.\textsuperscript{108} The scale of the challenge was highlighted by DG ECHO, who in October 2017 said that, “\textquote{massive urgent humanitarian needs remain and need to be covered... [t]he humanitarian consequences of the Mosul operations have surpassed the worst-case scenario estimated by the UN and humanitarian partners.}”\textsuperscript{109}

This situation slowly began to improve including as a result of the massive mobilisation by the humanitarian community. In 2018, major combat operations ended and attention began to shift to new areas of focus: returns, clearing explosive hazards, restoring infrastructure, and opening schools and health centres.

4. IOM’s DG ECHO-funded Integrated Response

Brief overview of IOM’s DG ECHO-funded integrated response actions in Iraq

IOM had a DG ECHO-funded action in each of the five years of the evaluation.\textsuperscript{110} As emerges in the following description of the five actions, they built upon one


\textsuperscript{108} 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan

\textsuperscript{109} 2017 HUMANITARIAN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (HIP) IRAQ

\textsuperscript{110} The five DG ECHO-funded IOM actions between 2014 and 2018 were: 2014/00632 - Emergency response addressing the critical Non-Food Item (NFI) and cash needs of displaced families fleeing violence across Iraq
another as the context and the response evolved. The term ‘integrated response’ first appeared in late 2015, with the signing of a modification request that specified the integrated response partners – IOM, DRC, NRC, UNHCR and UNICEF – and that laid out their respective areas of responsibility as well as the aim of greater coordination as part of their integrated response. According to DG ECHO and IOM interviewees as well as action documents, an integrated approach was adopted due to beneficiaries’ complex needs and the resultant requirement for integrated humanitarian support in multiple thematic areas – NFIs, shelter, WASH and Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) in particular – as well as the scale of need and the shifting context that made inter-organisational coordination essential. More concretely, there was a sense that was articulated by multiple evaluation interviewees including from DG ECHO, OCHA, the protection cluster and various implementing partners that the response to the Fallujah displacement crisis in the first half of 2016 could have been stronger, and that displacement from the anticipated Mosul offensive would be much more significant and so required a stronger and more effective response.\textsuperscript{111}

In 2014, IOM’s action focused upon providing humanitarian assistance in the form of NFIs, cash assistance and tents to IDPs in Anbar governorate and in Ninewa in the northern part of Iraq. Coordination was particularly with UNHCR, who with IOM were co-leads of the NFI/Shelter cluster, and took place through the NFI/Shelter cluster and other clusters, weekly Inter-Cluster Coordination Mechanism meetings, and working groups including the NFI and the Shelter working groups. IOM also coordinated with cash partners including direct meetings with DRC and NRC. Particular areas of focus were harmonising geographic areas of distribution with DRC and NRC as well as ensuring that beneficiaries did not receive multiple grants. The latter element involved IOM sharing lists of beneficiary public distribution system numbers (as names cannot be shared for privacy reasons) on an ad hoc basis with DRC and NRC; IOM took the lead on this as the original plan for a common database to be set up by NRC was not realised.

\textsuperscript{111} For analysis of the impact of the Fallujah displacement and the anticipated displacement related to Mosul, see also: https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/fallujah-and-iraqs-deepening-displacement-crisis
In 2015, IOM targeted the central region of Iraq with NFIs for IDPs and emergency shelter support. It also conducted communication with communities (CwC) activities to strengthen communication between communities and humanitarian actors, with coordination through the Rapid Response Mechanism and the clusters, to ensure harmonization of strategy and minimum assistance packages and to limit the duplication of services. In November of 2015, the action was modified to adopt a more integrated approach, with IOM also taking on mobile Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) activities as well as WASH assistance. Actions were to be even more closely coordinated with UNHCR, UNICEF, DRC and NRC (which were also funded by DG ECHO for similar actions), with coordination particularly close with DRC and NRC as they, like IOM, focused upon out-of-camp locations. Coordination in 2015 was primarily through the clusters, and focused upon increased alignment of indicators as well as harmonisation of responses and smoother site selection by IPs. IOM also took on the information management for the integrated response, with locations, site status and output information incorporated into the database.

IOM’s 2016 action built upon the 2015 action by continuing and deepening the integrated approach between UNHCR, UNICEF, DRC, NRC and IOM, with IOM providing integrated shelter, NFI, WASH and CCCM programming for IDPs in informal sites. IOM along with DRC and NRC also added CCCM activities in formal camps due to challenges with UNHCR providing this service alone. IOM furthermore continued with its information management activities for the integrated programming. IOM received two top-ups to its original 4 million EURO grant, of 3.5 million EUROs in September and a further 4 million EUROs in November, in relation to the mounting Mosul crisis. This new funding allowed it to significantly expand its existing areas of programming and also to provide shelter and NFIs at emergency sites as well as undertake tent and tent site upgrades and general improvements aimed at out-of-camp and in-camp beneficiaries including in Qayyarah Airstrip and Hajj Ali camps (which IOM designed and built with non-DG ECHO funding). IOM also expanded its staff in Iraq very significantly, growing from 750 staff in April 2016 to 1,000 staff in November; this included hiring a dedicated DG ECHO project manager, an information management specialist for the

"As a result of various site visits and assessments...it was found that IDPs living in critical shelter arrangements have various needs beyond standard provision of shelter. In particular, integrated support which includes WASH, as well as improvement in CCCM and site maintenance on behalf of the government, is required. Therefore, IOM has expanded the original proposal to include CCCM and WASH actions, to ensure that shelter assistance is not standalone, and that IDPs receive life-saving integrated support.”

- IOM 2015 action’s November modification request report

"Through feedback from beneficiaries, as well as lessons learned of the previous action, it has been consistently found that IDPs require an integrated package of services – [for example] a standalone NFI kit or Shelter support without [also] incorporating WASH will miss specific needs of these vulnerable populations.”

- IOM 2017 action’s final report
integrated response, cluster coordinators, training consultants, emergency response specialists, national field staff, and emergency surge staff. IOM furthermore coordinated internally with other IOM offices, who provided support to the Iraq country office due to the scale of the response.

Coordination with integrated response partners was through the cluster system and via bi-weekly integrated response meetings in Baghdad supplemented by ad-hoc meetings. Coordination focused upon harmonising the response including indicators to incorporate in action documents, tools such as the shelter assessment form, and assistance packages; developing technical guidelines; and, coordinating with government authorities. Further, a joint workplan was developed, and IOM continued to take the lead on information management so as to reduce duplication between partners, improve site selection, aid tracking, and improve reporting.

In 2017, IOM largely continued the same types of activities, with an integrated shelter, NFI, WASH and CCCM response that focused upon informal sites and formal camps. IOM integrated response partners, including new partner Terre des Hommes (TdH), also sought to further develop their integrated response by improving coordination as well as by harmonising tools and services including for example harmonising aid packages between organisations. There was a particular emphasis on closer coordination between partners during the early stages of programming expansion in Ninewa, linked to areas once controlled by IS now being accessible. Inter-agency coordination forums were also launched in some locations including Hajj Ali camp, though IOM elected to work through the existing coordination mechanisms (OCHA and the clusters) in Mosul city. IOM also worked closely with the camp managers in Qayyarah Airstrip camp, DRC, by providing shelter and camp management support. There was also close coordination with local authorities so as to gain access to the most vulnerable and to ensure safety at distributions.

The action from 2018 saw a shift in IOM’s work, with a focus upon CCCM and provision of NFIs but also a linking up with and support for camp consolidation and closure efforts and the returns programme. IOM furthermore provided support including capacity building to RNVDO in an IDP camp with relatively weak management and oversight structures – Jeddah camp – as well as providing support to NGO and government partners in other camps. Coordination was again through the clusters, with IOM also the lead in the returns working group.

**Analysis of IOM’s DG ECHO-funded Integrated Response**

There are several insights that emerge from analysis of IOM’s DG ECHO-funded actions in Iraq between 2014 and 2018 as well as evaluation interviews and other research.

**DG ECHO and IOM along with other implementing partners effectively assessed beneficiary needs relative to the response in 2015 and proactively sought to better address the immediate needs as well as to lay the groundwork for more effective programming going forward by creating an integrated response.**
Assessments on the ground in the latter part of 2015 clearly showed that beneficiaries in central Iraq had needs in multiple thematic areas, for example shelter, NFIs, WASH etc. At the same time, the scale of the needs and the rapidity with which the situation on the ground was developing and was anticipated to continue to develop given the Iraqi forces’ moves to reconquer areas controlled by Islamic State meant that aid had to be delivered quickly and efficiently so as to reach the most vulnerable. DG ECHO and its partners responded to this situation by creating an integrated response between 5 partner organisations in late November 2015, that aimed to enhance aid delivery by:

- improving coordination mechanisms and standardisation between the IPs
- assigning IPs specific areas of responsibility (e.g. IOM, DRC and NRC were to focus upon the out-of-camp response)
- expanding IPs’ areas of work (e.g. IOM began to deliver mobile CCCM activities as well as WASH assistance, in addition to continuing with its NFI and emergency shelter support)

**Assessment:** The integrated response represents a proactive response by DG ECHO and its partners, one that shows needs analyses were working well including as these needs were developing during the course of an action, and that communication channels between the funder and its partners regarding these needs were similarly working well. It furthermore underlines that there was a realistic assessment of the quality of the response and of where it was found wanting, with an appropriate and timely adjustment to IOM’s actions put in place to address this. This shows flexibility on the part of DG ECHO and its implementing partners. It also shows good anticipation that a more integrated response would best serve needs in upcoming Iraq crises, including during the Fallujah response and the later Mosul crisis, which multiple interviewees underlined were already anticipated to be highly demanding.

The ability to successfully put in place the integrated response in late 2015 was facilitated by the fact that the partner organisations had already been working together in Iraq.

IOM and other integrated response partners were already partnering together prior to the formal launch of the integrated response in late 2015. More particularly, in 2014 IOM had been coordinating with UNHCR on NFIs and shelter, and with DRC and NRC on cash programming.
The integrated response was put in place under very difficult contextual conditions. Taking this into account, the integration of multiple areas of responsibility within IOM was relatively smooth according to IP interviewees, while IOM’s integrated response with the other partner organisations had some initial challenges but gradually improved over time particularly due to efforts on more effective harmonisation and stronger information management.

The integrated response was implemented in a context where needs were rising rapidly and organisations were, according to multiple implementing partner interviewees, struggling to cope particularly once the fighting around Fallujah began in the first half of 2016. Issues included access and planning challenges, with IDP numbers very high and uncertainty about where people were and exact needs in each location, as well as gaps in coverage. And as was highlighted earlier, the context got significantly more challenging as the Mosul crisis began, with events on the ground very fast moving and significantly higher numbers of IDPs coming out of the city needing multiple types of aid.

In this highly challenging context, implementation of the integrated response had three main components:

- **Internal organisational integration measures**
  IOM focused on effectively and efficiently delivering its expanded roster of activities, including integrating new staff into its Iraq operation and with support from other IOM offices and IOM headquarters, in line with its

---

**Assessment:** The prior experience of collaboration facilitated the implementation of an integrated response, for several reasons:

- It meant that there were already cooperative relationships and trust in place between the organisations in Iraq, which could facilitate the later integrated response.
- It meant that the organisations had already been encountering and working through challenges, which contributed to a shared sense that greater integration was necessary to improve programming. For example, there were challenges in 2014 in IOM’s collaboration with DRC and NRC related to geographic areas of responsibility, which arose because IOM had not been collaborating with the two organisations when the initial cash partner map had been drawn up. There were also technical challenges in coordinating beneficiary lists, most notably because it was decided to use beneficiary public distribution system numbers rather than beneficiary names so as to protect beneficiary privacy, but DRC did not have those numbers easily available in its database. Both of these challenges led to delays in delivering aid, but were ultimately resolved.

---

112 Iraq Humanitarian Response to the Fallujah Crisis, Operational Update. 26 June-1 July 2016. OCHA Iraq
Corporate Emergency Activation policy for an L3 emergency such as in Iraq.¹¹³

- **Increasing alignment between partners**
  IOM and other partners focused on aligning their indicators, tools such as the shelter assessment form, and technical guidelines; partners also sought to harmonise their response modalities and their assistance packages (beginning with setting minimum assistance packages).

- **Improved information management**
  As an aspect of the effort toward increased alignment, IOM took the lead on information management so as to improve mapping of locations and beneficiaries, beneficiary status including distributions, and to strengthen output information; more broadly, the information management work focused upon reducing duplication and clarifying respective geographic areas of responsibility.

The initial **division of tasks** between the partners was also revisited in the second year of the integrated response. Thus while UNICEF and UNHCR were initially in charge of formal camp locations with IOM, DRC and NRC focusing on out-of-camp locations, in 2016 it was recognised that further CCCM support was needed in camps. The result was that IOM, DRC and NRC also increasingly took on responsibilities in formal camp locations.

¹¹³ https://emergencymanual.iom.int/entry/16834/iom-corporate-emergency-activation
Assessment:

IOM interviewees were clear that the integrated response was strengthened by virtue of expanding IPs’ areas of work and thus integrating multiple thematic areas of responsibility within each organisation. This was due to the increased efficiency of being able to quickly communicate, make decisions and coordinate the various teams’ activities internally, as well as the ability of IOM to scale up its staffing quickly and relatively efficiently. IOM interviewees also said that as a result of the expansion, they had the capacity to work across the cycle of displacement and thus to deliver a more effective and coordinated response. IOM and DRC interviewees furthermore noted that an important aspect of why the expansion of IPs’ areas of work was successful was because the areas of responsibility assigned played to each organisation’s strengths, for example assigning IOM CCCM activities. Further, there were positive efforts to ensure flexibility in allocation of funds as needs shifted on the ground, which improved the quality of the integrated response.

The efforts to increase alignment between partners also strengthened the response overall, though interviewees from the partner organisations and from IOM were clear eyed in saying that this aspect of the integrated response improved as time went on and contributed to the strength of the Mosul response relative to the Fallujah response.

One key aspect of the increased alignment was harmonising of indicators, tools and guidelines. This harmonisation meant that there was a more consistent approach that was increasingly adopted across the different partners as the integrated response continued beyond 2015 and the necessary adjustments were made. The same was true regarding beneficiary assessment and monitoring, as well as the harmonisation of assistance packages. As regards harmonisation of packages, interviewees noted that it is important since it helps to reduce the sense of frustration and anxiety that beneficiaries can feel when there is variation in the assistance offered (an issue that cropped up earlier on due to variation between IOM and other integrated response partners’ packages). Interviewees were not aware of any efficiency gains as a result of organisations offering similar packages.

As regards information management, there were some challenges encountered, particularly initially. This included weak buy-in to the new system by UNHCR and UNICEF, who advocated for continued use of the ActivityInfo system for all information management; the result was challenges in reporting on coordinated actions. That said, the information management concerns continued to be worked on as the integrated response progressed and did improve over time. The improved information management system helped to ensure stronger delineation of geographic areas of organisational responsibility over time, improved aid tracking, and better coordinated site assessments such that over-assessment became less of an issue. Related to site selection in particular, a good practice adopted by IOM, NRC and DRC was to undertake a de-confliction exercise prior to implementation.
Assessment (continued):

A particular strength of the integrated response was the adjustments to the overall response over time in terms of the division of tasks between organisations. This reflects a flexible approach similar to the original impulse for putting in place the integrated response, of recognising that needs could be better met in a different manner and adjusting accordingly.

More broadly in terms of how the integrated response was implemented, the previous section of the case study underlined the many coordination mechanisms including through the clusters, working groups, dedicated integrated response meetings and bilateral meetings. IOM and other integrated response partners felt that the right balance was struck between having sufficient coordination measures to share information and streamline the response but not so many as to become intrusive or overly onerous. One positive example of efforts to ensure this balance was related to the inter-agency coordination forums that were launched in some locations but not in Mosul city, where IOM worked through the existing coordination mechanisms rather than create parallel mechanisms. Further, it was noted that these meetings effectively focused on pre-planning as much as possible, including where people were likely to go as they exited Mosul city, what the numbers were likely to be and what the needs were likely to be including based on worse-case scenarios. This meant that as much as possible, the response could anticipate needs and respond to them effectively, for example in terms of where to site the IDP camps given where people were likely to come out of the city.

Further insights emerging from the field visits to Qayyarah Airstrip camp and Jeddah camp and related interviews:

There was good evidence of a strong, cooperative relationship between IOM and DRC in Qayyarah Airstrip camp, for example on jointly managing the huge influx of IDPs including the registration process but also the distribution of NFIs. This gives a window in to how the integrated response worked in practice, with these two key partners coordinating effectively under highly demanding conditions.

As regards the distribution process, interviewees from the two organisations particularly noted that DRC effectively worked to identify the most vulnerable and communicated this to IOM; further, IOM’s NFI teams complemented this effort by circulating on-site to ensure that needs were met. Interviewees also said that distribution points were relatively more controlled in Qayyarah Airstrip camp as compared to in Jeddah camp (where registration lists were often inaccurate), which meant that more NFIs reached the intended recipients.

Under its 2017 action, IOM also cooperated closely with DRC – the camp managers at Qayyarah Airstrip camp – in assessing the need for winterization activities and then in carrying out those activities, including sandbagging of tents and improvements of roads to ensure good drainage. Again, the cooperative relationship with DRC underlines how the integrated response came to work in practice.
5. Overall Conclusions

IOM’s DG ECHO-funded integrated response underlines the importance of having effective needs analyses, of realistically assessing the response relative to needs, and of proactively responding to weaknesses in the response when necessary. As an aspect of this, it is also important to effectively anticipate what future needs are likely to be, to assess what changes could be made to better respond to those and then to consider implementing them.

The analysis has also shown that an integrated response can be an effective tool for improving a response in a complex and rapidly changing context. There are multiple key elements to keep in mind in implementing such a response:

- Integrated responses take time to set up and require good will on the part of partners including to make compromises on their ‘normal’ ways of working in the interests of a stronger overall response as well as an organisational culture that is open to such change; strong coordination efforts between organisations; and, a proactive engagement by DG ECHO to ensure that partners work together effectively
- Effectively dividing up areas of responsibility between organisations both thematically (WASH, CCCM etc.) and geographically is important, to reduce duplication and ensure greater efficiency; yet flexibly adjusting these areas of responsibility based on field assessments is also important, to ensure that a response remains relevant and responsive to needs
- Shared standards, particularly as regards assistance packages, are important to prioritise though are less crucial than effectively dividing up areas of responsibility
- Expanding an organisation’s areas of responsibility based on shifts in needs should be consistently informed by organisations’ strengths, by getting them involved in areas of work that are part of their core areas of expertise and where they have the capacity to respond
- Informal, on-the-ground cooperation is more likely to be successful when it takes place between organisations that have a history of such cooperation and thus increased trust in the other’s ways of working
- There is a balance to be struck between too much and not enough coordination – meetings, working groups etc. – and it is important to strike this balance such that coordination facilitates rather than impedes programming, in line with the Goldilocks principle
- Information management is a fundamental element that underlies the effective working of an integrated response, and requires dedicated resources, an openness to data sharing, and an openness to compromise

114 Based on the children’s story of the Three Bears, in which the character Goldilocks tastes three bowls of porridge and prefers the bowl that is neither too hot nor too cold but is ‘just right’.

211
ANNEX 2: Evaluation Matrix
## Evaluation matrix

**Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014–2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Evaluation Criteria, sub-questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EQ 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| To what extent did the design of EU-funded protection activities globally and both protection and other humanitarian activities in Iraq take into account the needs of the most vulnerable—in particular women, children, the elderly and persons with disabilities? | JC1.1. Have Implementing Partners conducted detailed needs and vulnerability analysis by gender, age and taken into account needs of persons with disabilities, IDPs and refugees and other factors such as ethnicity, religion and unique geographical differences? | • Type, coverage and quality of needs and capacity assessment analysis  
• Use of gender analysis and other vulnerability assessment tools  
• Use of protection specific assessment tools and risk analysis | • Desk review of needs assessments, strategies and project documents  
• Interviews with IPs |
|                     |                                     |            |                         |
| To what extent were beneficiaries consulted in the design and implementation of EU-funded projects? | JC1.2. In designing and implementing humanitarian actions did IPs engage with beneficiaries in order to identify and understand their most crucial needs and their capacities? | • Types and number of consultations held with beneficiaries and local groups | • Desk review of needs assessments, strategies and project documents  
• Interviews with IPs and their sub-partners |
|                     |                                     |            |                         |
|                     | JC1.3. What were the most critical needs and capacities identified and how well did the design and implementation of interventions highlight and address these needs and make use of the existing capacities? | • Critical needs identified and ranked by priority and frequency and linkages of these to design of interventions | • Desk review of needs assessments  
• Desk review of DG ECHO strategy documents and projects  
• Interviews with IPs |
## Evaluation Question

**JC1.4.** In particular how well were the protection situation and needs assessed and integrated into design?

**EQ 2** To what extent was a clear and context-adapted humanitarian strategy provided and applied in Iraq by DG ECHO? To what extent were DG ECHO and its partners successful in adapting and adjusting their approach as the needs evolved over time?

### Evaluation Criteria, sub-questions

- JC1.4: Degree to which protection needs were clearly defined and integrated into strategies (i.e. advocacy, integration/mainstreaming and stand-alone approaches)
- JC2.1: Types, coverage and quality of stakeholder needs and gap analysis
- JC2.2: Explicit and logical intervention logic developed and shared
- JC2.3: Content of main activities and links to strategy (including on objectives and results)

### Data Collection Methods

- Desk review of documents such as HIPs, the Protection Strategy, sector strategies, and selected projects
- Survey of DG ECHO’s Protection staff
- Interviews with IPs and sub-partners
- Analysis of DG ECHO’s Intervention logic
- Desk review of strategy and project documents
- Interviews with IPs
- Desk review of selected projects
- Desk review of strategy documents
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Evaluation Criteria, sub-questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| JC2.4. What were the major changes in the context and humanitarian needs over time? How did DG ECHO and IPs consider these and make timely and appropriate adjustments to their implementation design? | • Major changes in current context and related risk analysis  
• Appropriateness and timeliness of changes to implementation  
• Number of evaluations and reviews of strategy and key projects carried out  
• Specific adjustments made to implementation design and major activities in response to changing context and needs | • Desk review of relevant research including contextual analysis  
• Review of HIPs  
• Addendums and guidance provided by DG ECHO to IPs  
• Interviews with IPs |
| EQ 3 To what extent were the DG ECHO's protection advocacy engagement and actions relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries, and well-articulated with DG ECHO's response in other humanitarian sectors? | JC3.1. Does DG ECHO have a clear policy and strategy for advocacy on protection? | • Coherence between risk analysis and advocacy and communication strategy on protection  
• Existence and quality of the advocacy and communications strategy on protection  
• Evidence that protection advocacy is provided for in activities of other sectors | • Desk review of protection strategy and results indicators  
• Interviews with DG ECHO officers and survey of Protection staff |
| | JC3.2. Is DG ECHO Iraq's protection strategy, in particular the advocacy and communications strategy for protection, logical, well-designed and flexible in response to critical needs of beneficiaries including as these evolved over time. (See also 1.1 and 2.1) | • Extent and type and appropriateness of targeted advocacy and communications plans and activities in the area of protection.  
• Evidence of timely adjustments to strategy when the situation has changed | • Interviews with IPs and sub-partners  
• Desk review of strategy documents  
• Interviews with IPs and sub-partners |
## Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Evaluation Criteria, sub-questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| JC.3.3. Did DG ECHO’s programming ensure that protection advocacy was built into programming and implementation approaches in other humanitarian sectors? | • Degree of understanding of what protection advocacy means and how to translate it into action  
• Presence of protection advocacy components in other humanitarian sectors’ programming | • Desk review of strategy documents |
| JC4.1. Have the humanitarian aid activities supported by DG ECHO clearly targeted the most vulnerable and their most immediate needs? | • Clarity and appropriateness of definition of who the target groups are and how to meet their needs | • Interviews with IPs  
• Survey of Protection Staff |
| JC4.2. Has DG ECHO implemented its strategy using a cooperative and coordinated approach, engaging and sharing information and best practice with humanitarian players (UN, non-EU donors, NGOs, regional actors, and others)? | • Extent to which DG ECHO has consulted with and coordinated with other actors  
• Level and quality of DG ECHO’s engagement in the Cluster System and specifically in the Protection Cluster and sub clusters | • Desk review of key strategy documents  
• Interviews with selected DG ECHO officials and other main humanitarian actors  
• Interviews with cluster chair and co-chair or selected cluster members |
| JC4.3. How has DG ECHO ensured that the strategies and activities it supports are based on the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence? | • Explicit reference to these principles and explanations of how these have been taken into account | • Desk review of key strategy documents  
• Interviews with selected DG ECHO officials and other main humanitarian actors |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Evaluation Criteria, sub-questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| JC4.4. | Were DG ECHO Iraq’s plans and projects it funded in the areas of protection, health care, WASH, shelter and food and other thematic areas consistent with the relevant thematic policy guidelines. And were thematic guidelines for mainstreaming protection followed? | • Extent to which thematic policy guidelines are highlighted and addressed in strategy documents and followed in projects  
• Extent to which protection mainstreaming was incorporated in the humanitarian programming | • Review of thematic policy guidelines and related strategies for each humanitarian sector in Iraq |
| EQ 5 | In the context of the Nexus and humanitarian-development coordination instruments, what measures were taken by DG ECHO to coordinate humanitarian and development interventions in Iraq, and how successful were these measures? | JC5.1. Has DG ECHO been able to facilitate early and ongoing engagement bringing humanitarian and development players together during the crisis? | • Joint strategies and action plans developed and carried out by humanitarian and development actors and DG ECHO’s role in this process | • Desk review of minutes and reports of major coordination meetings  
• Key informant interviews |
| JC5.2. | If so, has this engagement led to joint analysis such as contextual analysis, sharing of best practices and any shared objectives and joint responses? | • Examples of how joint analysis have led to concrete responses and activities | • Interviews with development and humanitarian actors working on similar issues to those of DG ECHO |
| JC5.3. | Which of the DG ECHO humanitarian interventions have integrated into their programme design mechanisms to either (i) link with relevant development interventions, and/or (ii) built into their planning cycle activities which foster resilience and livelihoods, sustainable development, conflict prevention and peace building? | • Contents of interventions in terms of linking with development interventions, self-resilience and livelihood, sustainable development and conflict prevention and peace building | • Desk review of Project documents |
### Evaluation Question

**EQ 6** To what extent were DG ECHO’s actions in the protection sector coherent with the thematic policy document on humanitarian protection, and – as appropriate – the previous guidelines from 2009?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria, sub-questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC6.1. Did DG ECHO develop a thorough risk analysis framework before designing protection programming?</td>
<td>• Quality and content of risk analysis framework</td>
<td>• Desk review of Project documents and strategic documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC6.2. Did DG ECHO (and the kinds of projects it supported globally and in Iraq) apply the approaches to humanitarian protection as outlined in the policy document – targeted, mainstreaming and capacity-building?</td>
<td>• Reflection of principles from the thematic policy document on humanitarian protection in the approach</td>
<td>• Interviews with DG ECHO Protection staff in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Survey of DG ECHO Protection staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC6.3. Did DG ECHO apply the appropriate response type and modality to humanitarian protection (as per the previous guidelines from 2009)?</td>
<td>• Reflection of the guidelines from 2009 in the approach (where relevant)</td>
<td>• Desk review of Project documents and strategic documentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EU ADDED VALUE

**EQ 7** What was the EU added value of DG ECHO’s actions in Iraq during the evaluation period?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria, sub-questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC7.1. Has DG ECHO, as a lead humanitarian agency, added value by exploring and promoting dialogue on new approaches for humanitarian aid, especially on protection?</td>
<td>• Examples of DG ECHO promoting a dialogue on protection and sharing good practices and new approaches to protection among different stakeholders • Example of DG ECHO promoting dialogue and good practice sharing on humanitarian aid</td>
<td>• Desk review of strategy documents, evaluations and selected projects, especially on protection • Interviews with DG ECHO officials and IPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 7.2 What, if anything, has made DG ECHO Iraq’s interventions unique or different from others, in terms of scale, type of intervention, geographic area of activity or new models? What have DG ECHO’s interventions made happen which might not otherwise have happened?</td>
<td>• Specific major differences in DG ECHO’s approach (and what it allows for) compared to those of other actors</td>
<td>• Interviews with DG ECHO officials and IPs • Interviews with EU member states and other major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Question</td>
<td>Evaluation Criteria, sub-questions</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| EQ 8                | In Iraq and globally what was the EU added value of DG ECHO’s protection advocacy engagement and actions during the evaluation period? JC8.1. How has DG ECHO’s engagement in advocacy on protection differed in approach, as appropriate, especially in terms of advocacy areas of focus, scale, types of activities and enabling protection advocacy, as compared with other major actors? | • Degree of clarity of DG ECHO’s protection advocacy activities  
• Examples of achievements through DG ECHO direct and indirect (through IPs) advocacy engagement  
• Extent and manner in which DG ECHO’s engagement and actions have added value by focusing on approaches or needs or geographic areas that would otherwise have been ignored/under-addressed | • Desk review of Project documents  
• Survey of DG ECHO staff  
• Desk review of Project documents  
• Interviews with IPs and sub-partners |
| EQ 9                | To what extent were DG ECHO’s objectives (as defined in the HAR, the Consensus and the specific HIPs) achieved in Iraq, and the needs of the targeted end-beneficiaries satisfied? What concrete results were achieved in the country during the evaluation period? JC9.1. What were DG ECHO’s objectives and targets and the related timeline in  
• The HAR  
• The Consensus  
• The specific HIPs  
• IP’s major projects in each humanitarian sector | • Overall outcome and output-level results in relation to key objectives and targets as defined in the HAR, the Consensus and annual HIPs | • Desk review of HIPs, DG ECHO reports, IPs results reports and major evaluations  
• Annual IP progress reports of each humanitarian sector  
• Interviews with IPs |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Evaluation Criteria, sub-questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC9.2. Were the targets and objectives of the above achieved as planned?</td>
<td>• Actual implementation progress of various activities as compared to the above targets and objectives</td>
<td>• Desk review of DG ECHO reports and IPs annual progress reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC9.3. How successful were DG ECHO Iraq’s humanitarian interventions in different sectors in actually reaching the people/target groups intended?</td>
<td>• Degree to which the most vulnerable have been successfully reached and provided appropriate services</td>
<td>• Data on people reached and delivery of support to major vulnerable groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC9.4. Which kinds of projects worked the best and why in producing intended results in each sector? What did not work well and why?</td>
<td>• Degree to which specific project models and implementation design produced the best results and factors influencing this success or lack of success</td>
<td>• Desk review of Project documents • Interviews with IPs and sub-partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC9.5. How satisfied were beneficiaries and the sub-partners that worked directly with beneficiaries with the type and level of services provided? What were the major gaps and issues?</td>
<td>• Extent of positive, negative or neutral feedback received from beneficiaries</td>
<td>• Interviews with local officials and community leaders • Focus groups with beneficiaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ10</td>
<td>How successful was DG ECHO in its advocacy and communication measures in Iraq to influence other actors by direct and indirect advocacy on issues like humanitarian access and space, respect for IHL, addressing gaps in response, applying good practice, and carrying out follow-up actions</td>
<td>JC10.1. Were the specific intended results (outputs and outcomes) of DG ECHO’s protection and advocacy and communications activities in Iraq achieved? In which protection advocacy areas were the interventions most successful and why? What could have been improved upon?</td>
<td>• Specific changes in policies or action to which targeted advocacy activities significantly contributed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JC10.2. To what extent have DG ECHO in Iraq’s protection advocacy led to specific protection advocacy programming and communications initiatives by partners and other humanitarian organizations</td>
<td>• Examples of specific initiatives that were initiated and then pursued and followed-up</td>
<td>• Interviews with IPs and sub-partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Question</td>
<td>Evaluation Criteria, sub-questions</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Data Collection Methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of DG ECHO’s interventions? Was there an ‘advocacy gap’?</td>
<td>JC10.3. What changes have been made based on DG ECHO’s advocacy? Are there remaining issues where little or no advocacy has taken place? Why?</td>
<td>• Examples of specific initiatives that changed behaviour/activities of agencies responsible for protection, also specific changes in integrating referral practices</td>
<td>• Interviews with IPs and sub-partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Types of critical needs not yet sufficiently addressed and also in which geographic areas</td>
<td>• Interviews with IPs and sub-partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 11</td>
<td>To what extent were DG ECHO’s protection actions achieving the objectives stated by the Thematic Policy Document on Humanitarian Protection (and quoted above under sub-section 2.3)?</td>
<td>JC11.1. How successful have DG ECHO and its implementing partners been in preventing, reducing, or mitigating protection threats against persons, groups or communities?</td>
<td>• Desk review of selected projects in global review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Specific ways (and examples) in which DG ECHO support contributed to preventing, reducing or mitigating protection threats</td>
<td>• Desk review of selected projects in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Interviews with DG ECHO staff, IPs and sub-partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Examples of the areas of success (or lack thereof) where DG ECHO and IPs have helped reduce vulnerability and strengthened capacity</td>
<td>• Survey of DG ECHO Protection staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Examples of specific best practices introduced for mitigating protection risks</td>
<td>• Desk review of selected projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Interviews with IPs and sub-partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Survey of DG ECHO Protection staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Question</td>
<td>Evaluation Criteria, sub-questions</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Data Collection Methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC11.3. How have DG ECHO’s protection approaches and key activities strengthened the capacity of humanitarian actors to plan and implement effective protection activities?</td>
<td>• Examples of how UN Organisations/NGOs/CSOs have improved capacity to identify protection needs and act on them</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Interviews with NGOs/CSO sub-partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EFFICIENCY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 12</td>
<td>To what extent did DG ECHO achieve cost-effectiveness in its response to the crisis in Iraq? What factors affected the cost-effectiveness of the response and to what extent?</td>
<td>JC12.1. Were the budget and expenditure cost-effective as per the DG ECHO cost-effectiveness guidance (which is based on five judgement criteria with indicators for both DG ECHO as a donor and ECHO-funded partners and their actions)?</td>
<td>• Qualitative evidence of cost-effectiveness of DG ECHO interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JC12.2. If not, what factors limited cost-effectiveness? Was sufficient justification provided?</td>
<td>• Documented factors influencing cost-effectiveness and justification for modifications to funding requests and expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 13</td>
<td>Was the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO in Iraq appropriate and proportionate to what the actions were meant to achieve?</td>
<td>JC13.1. To what extent did the budget allocations allow for achieving intended outcomes and outputs in each humanitarian sector?</td>
<td>• Budget details and size of budget lines relative to cost forecasts and timeliness of making funds available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JC13.2. Did DG ECHO and IPs manage their programming and expenditure appropriately and in an accountable manner?</td>
<td>• Adequacy of financial management systems and quality and timeliness of financial reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUSTAINABILITY/CONNECTEDNESS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 14</td>
<td>To what extent did DG ECHO manage to achieve sustainable results of its interventions?</td>
<td>JC14.1. What are the prospects for sustainability of DG ECHO’s humanitarian interventions in Iraq -across sectors and especially in Protection?</td>
<td>• Specific areas of intervention which are now well-integrated with appropriate budget into government’s plans and those</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Question</td>
<td>Evaluation Criteria, sub-questions</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Data Collection Methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response in Iraq and in the sector of Protection? What could be further done</td>
<td></td>
<td>of major organizations/with</td>
<td>ministries responsible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(enabling factors, tools, mechanism, change of strategy, etc.) to promote</td>
<td></td>
<td>other civil society actors</td>
<td>- Interviews with IPs and sub-partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sustainability and strengthen links to interventions of development actors? To</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what extent were appropriate exit strategies put in place and implemented?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 14.2. What has to happen and what can DG ECHO do to ensure that key activities</td>
<td>Types of risks remaining for specific vulnerable groups and in certain geographic areas</td>
<td>Major gaps that are likely to persist in the absence of, or substantial</td>
<td>Interviews with IPs and sub-partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are maintained? Can stakeholders continue key activities in the absence of DG</td>
<td></td>
<td>reduction in, DG ECHO funding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO support?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 14.3. Have exit strategies been developed and documented in consultation with</td>
<td>Viability of exit strategies: degree to which exit strategies are accompanied by realistic</td>
<td>Desk review of documentation on exit strategies</td>
<td>Interviews with IPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the stakeholders? Are these realistic given the context?</td>
<td>action plans and risk analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC14.4. To what extent have IDPs’ and refugees’ needs been integrated into national</td>
<td>Content and resources of national systems/ministries that work with IDPs and refugees</td>
<td>Desk review of selected national planning documents</td>
<td>Interviews with government officials in ministries responsible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>systems?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Evaluation Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Evaluation Criteria, sub-questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC14.5.</td>
<td>What are the main lessons learned and best practices from DG ECHO’s interventions in Iraq and those of development actors that could be applied to promote sustainability?</td>
<td>Number/type of lessons learned and good practices that have been incorporated into DG ECHO’s plans and those of other actors to promote sustainability</td>
<td>Interviews with DG ECHO staff and IPs, Desk review of Project documents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX 3: List of sampled projects

### Table 1: Sampled Actions for Global Protection (other than Iraq)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Contract Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013/00919</td>
<td>ICRC Protection, tracing and primary health care/psychosocial support programs in DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/01335</td>
<td>Emergency support for conflict affected population in Yemen and enhanced INGO Coordination in Safety &amp; Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/00663</td>
<td>Enhancing Protection and Humanitarian Aid in FYRoM and Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/00171</td>
<td>Protection and Basic Assistance to Internally Displaced persons (IDPs) in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/00255</td>
<td>Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM) in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/01081</td>
<td>Life-saving Protection Response to mitigate protection risks for vulnerable IDPs and host communities and respond timely to emergencies and displacements through EP&amp;R in key locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/00907</td>
<td>Providing education in emergency situations for children - survivors of violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation in North West and South West Regions of Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/00311</td>
<td>d'amélioration d'accès aux moyens de subsistance, au droit foncier et d'un accès à une éducation de qualité dans un environnement sûr et protecteur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/00604</td>
<td>ICRC general assistance to civilian population and Protection of the civilian population activities in Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/00909</td>
<td>Enhancing the integration of IHL and IHRL into the humanitarian response to the Syria crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/00384</td>
<td>Provision of basic services in support to the return and resettlement process of the internally displaced population of Bangui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/00933</td>
<td>Improving access of most vulnerable refugees to Social Services in Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/00268</td>
<td>Integrated WASH, Shelter and Protection response to newly arrived South Sudan Refugees and host communities in Yumbe (Bidibidi), Arua (Rhino Camp and Imvepi), Moyo (Paloronyia) and Adjumani districts of Uganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/00318</td>
<td>Provide comprehensive primary health care and gender-based violence services in a protective environment for refugees in Kakuma and Dadaab Refugee Camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/01072</td>
<td>Child protection and emergency support for vulnerable refugee children and families on the move in Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/00644</td>
<td>Improving access to quality education for South Sudanese refugee children in Bidibidi and Omugo Refugee Settlements, Yumbe and Arua Districts, Uganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/00273</td>
<td>Protection and Life-Saving Assistance for Disaster-Affected Internally Displaced Persons in Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/00657</td>
<td>Life-saving Assistance to Population in Jordan Affected by the Syria Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/00630</td>
<td>Monitoring de protection et médiation dans les communautés isolées du Sud Kivu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/00485</td>
<td>Integrated Support Programme for Vulnerable Afghan Refugee Households Living In Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/00869</td>
<td>Emergency assistance and resilience building for the conflict affected population of Nashabye, Eastern Ghouta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/00229</td>
<td>Improving access to quality education for South Sudanese refugee children in Bidibidi and Omugo Refugee Settlements, Yumbe and Arua Districts, Uganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/00924</td>
<td>Red Cross Humanitarian Response to Earthquakes in Lombok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/00036</td>
<td>The 2015 UNICEF Humanitarian Action Response to Natural and Complex Emergencies in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

**Table 2: Sampled Actions for Iraq Protection**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Contract Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017/00780</td>
<td>Emergency Protection for IDPs at Immediate Risk in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/00582</td>
<td>Provision of critical humanitarian support to conflict-affected, newly displaced and underserved populations in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/00724</td>
<td>An integrated humanitarian response to the needs of vulnerable conflict-affected communities in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/01069</td>
<td>Emergency assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and host communities affected by armed conflict in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/00543</td>
<td>Humanitarian Access to Conflict Affected Areas in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/00829</td>
<td>Improve knowledge and respect of humanitarian norms by armed non-State actors (ANSA) and other key stakeholders in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/00751</td>
<td>Building Resilience for IDP and host community Children in Iraq through Education and providing emergency response for children and their families affected by the Mosul crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/00669</td>
<td>ICRC Detention, Wounded and Sick activities in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/00687</td>
<td>The &quot;RAP Project&quot; (Rapid Assistance to Prisons and Detention Centers in Iraq, with Conflict Prevention and Preparedness Non-technical Survey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/00876</td>
<td>Emergency WASH Assistance to Newly Displaced Populations of Kirkuk Governorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/00336</td>
<td>Integrated Protection and Education Response to Conflict Affected Iraqis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/00594</td>
<td>Multi-sector Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), Health, Education and Child Protection response to displaced populations affected by military operations in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/00524</td>
<td>Support to Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons in Iraq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3: Sampled Actions for Iraq other humanitarian**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Contract Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016/00702</td>
<td>Supporting lifesaving reproductive health services and Rapid Response Mechanism Dignity Kits to IDPs women in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/00607</td>
<td>Provision of emergency primary health care services for crisis affected population in urgent need in Ninewa Governorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/01083</td>
<td>Immediate UNICEF WASH response to the Cholera Outbreak in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/00946</td>
<td>Providing life-saving assistance to internally displaced vulnerable children and their families through WASH interventions in Kirkuk governorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/01026</td>
<td>Integrated Emergency Response Programme to improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable conflict-affected populations across Central Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/00607</td>
<td>Emergency relief with a particular focus on underserved communities in the region of Tal Afar and Tel Kaif, Northern Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/00348</td>
<td>Emergency Food Assistance to Displaced Syrians in Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/00597</td>
<td>Education for Conflict-Affected Children and Adolescents in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/00678</td>
<td>Emergency Health Response (EHR): Anbar, Salahaldin and Recently Retaken Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/00574</td>
<td>Strengthening humanitarian coordination and advocacy in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/00676</td>
<td>Essential lifesaving health services for the most vulnerable patients referred to Duhok’s Health facilities (KR-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/00701</td>
<td>Provision of emergency assistance for Iraqi internally displaced persons (IDPs) and communities affected by the on-going military conflict in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/00883</td>
<td>Provision and support of essential primary healthcare services for conflict affected populations in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 4: List of Interviewees

**Table 1: Inception Mission Interviewees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee organisation</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 interviewees, DG ECHO Amman</td>
<td>21 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 interviewees, DG ECHO Iraq/formerly DG ECHO Iraq</td>
<td>21-25 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, International Medical Corps (IMC), Amman</td>
<td>21 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees, UNHCR Regional Office, Amman</td>
<td>22 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, International Committee of the Red Cross, Iraq</td>
<td>23 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Danish Refugee Council, Iraq</td>
<td>24 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees, Norwegian People’s Aid, Iraq</td>
<td>24 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees, Save the Children, Iraq</td>
<td>24 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Nonviolent Peaceforce, Iraq</td>
<td>24 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, International Organization for Migration, Iraq</td>
<td>25 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, International Rescue Committee, Iraq</td>
<td>25 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Terre des Hommes, Iraq</td>
<td>Skype interview, July 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2: Main Field Mission Interviewees, Iraq**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee organisation</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees, ACTED, Iraq</td>
<td>5 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 interviewees, Triangle, Iraq</td>
<td>5 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 interviewees, People in Need, Iraq</td>
<td>8 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 interviewees, Save the Children, Iraq</td>
<td>8 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 interviewees, DG ECHO Amman</td>
<td>8-17 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 interviewees, DG DEVCO Amman</td>
<td>9 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the MADAD Fund, Amman</td>
<td>9 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, EU Delegation to Iraq</td>
<td>9 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 interviewees, Norwegian Refugee Council, Iraq</td>
<td>9-17 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 interviewees, International Rescue Committee, Iraq</td>
<td>9-18 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 interviewees, UNICEF, Iraq</td>
<td>9-22 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Child Protection Sub Cluster, Iraq</td>
<td>10 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 interviewees, Terre des Hommes, Iraq</td>
<td>11-12 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewees</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Rapid Response Team, Danish Refugee Council</td>
<td>11 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 interviewees, DG ECHO Iraq/formerly DG ECHO Iraq</td>
<td>11-20 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 interviewees, Public Aid Organization (PAO), Justice Network for Prisoners, Iraq</td>
<td>11-23 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Associazione Italiana per la Solidarietà tra i Popoli, Iraq</td>
<td>11 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Education Cluster, Iraq</td>
<td>12 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, al Mustakbal, Iraq</td>
<td>12 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Erbil Adult Reformatory Directorate, Iraq</td>
<td>12 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq</td>
<td>12 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 interviewees, International Organization for Migration, Iraq</td>
<td>15 September-8 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 interviewees, Danish Refugee Council, Iraq</td>
<td>15-30 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, War Child, Iraq</td>
<td>15 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Representative of Nineveh Voluntary for IDPs (RNVDO), Iraq</td>
<td>16 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Islamic Relief, Iraq</td>
<td>17 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Iraq</td>
<td>17-25 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees, World Health Organization, Iraq</td>
<td>17 September-1 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Intersos, Iraq</td>
<td>18 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Civil Development Organization (CDO), Iraq</td>
<td>18 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA), Iraq</td>
<td>19 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Relief International, Iraq</td>
<td>19 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Ministry of Justice, Iraq</td>
<td>19 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Al Tahreer, Iraq</td>
<td>21 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Iraq</td>
<td>22 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Baghdad Water Directorate, Iraq</td>
<td>22 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 interviewees, UNHCR, Iraq</td>
<td>23 September-10 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees, EU Delegation to Iraq</td>
<td>23 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Juvenile Reformatory in Baghdad, Iraq</td>
<td>24 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Iraq</td>
<td>24 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, General Reformatory Directorate, Iraq</td>
<td>25 September 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3: Main Field Mission Interviewees, Global Protection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee organisation</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Finn Church Aid, Uganda</td>
<td>16 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees, UNICEF, Turkey</td>
<td>18 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, DG ECHO Amman</td>
<td>19 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees, Relief International, Iran</td>
<td>23 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Syria</td>
<td>23 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Serbia</td>
<td>24 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Kenya</td>
<td>25 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, DG ECHO Yaounde, Senegal</td>
<td>26 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>26 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, ACTED, Afghanistan</td>
<td>26 September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Turkey</td>
<td>1 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Save the Children International (STC), Yemen</td>
<td>2 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Yemen</td>
<td>2 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), Syria</td>
<td>3 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, DG ECHO Nairobi, Kenya</td>
<td>3 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</td>
<td>3 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), Central African Republic</td>
<td>4 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Ethiopia (based in Turkey)</td>
<td>4 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, Care International, Jordan</td>
<td>8 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, UNHCR Brussels, Belgium</td>
<td>15 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, UNHCR/Global Protection Cluster</td>
<td>22 October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 interviewee, UNHCR</td>
<td>22 October 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 5: Interview and Focus Group Discussion Protocols

Key Informant Interview Guide for Implementing Partners and Sub-partners

The following protocol will be used for semi-structured interviews with staff of major implementing partners and sub-partners. It is not intended for any direct beneficiaries or focus groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisation:</td>
<td>Governorate:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time/Date:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Background and Introduction

DG ECHO has contracted with Transtec, a Brussels-based consulting firm, to carry out an external evaluation of the DG ECHO’s Humanitarian interventions in Iraq between 2014 and 2018, with a particular focus on Protection. There is also a global component to this evaluation that is focusing upon DG ECHO’s protection activities globally.

The overall purpose of DG ECHO’s humanitarian interventions in Iraq is to respond to the most critical humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable people in the country. The most critical areas of needs during the period of the intervention have included: Protection, Shelter, WASH, Health Care, Education in Emergency, Non-Food Items (NFIs), Camp Coordination and Management and building resilience. Overall, humanitarian implementation plans for the country have highlighted that Iraq has faced a “Protection Crisis”.

This review is not intended to be a detailed assessment of each of the humanitarian activity areas or all of the protection actions. It is rather looking at the bigger picture of whether these actions, taken together, are relevant to the needs of the most vulnerable groups in Iraq. The evaluation will highlight what has worked well and why, and any approaches that could have been different.

Your views are very valuable and essential information for this review. We assure you that your responses will be completely confidential. We would like to ask you a few “qualitative” questions based on your evidence and experience. This should take about one hour to one hour and fifteen minutes.

Respondent’s Questions

Would you like to make any comments, or do you have any questions before we begin?

Qualitative Evidence
Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

As part of the process for collecting qualitative evidence, the evaluation team is asking similar questions of all respondents. We are doing this so that we can examine patterns across different groups of respondents rather than being overly biased by responses of any single respondent.

**Relevance**

1. Please explain how you have conducted needs analysis of the most vulnerable groups: women, children, the elderly, people with disabilities, IDPs, refugees, prisoners, particular ethnic or religious groups etc. What, in your view are the most critical needs/were the most critical needs at the time of your programming/individual actions?

2. During the time of your programming/actions what have been the most significant changes in the needs of the vulnerable groups you support. How have you been able to change your implementation approach to address changing needs? How responsive has DG ECHO been to changes in the context and level of need?

3. What is your understanding of what “protection” really means in practice? How does your organization address protection in its programming? Has DG ECHO provided any guidance to humanitarian partners on protection topics and how to address them?

4. In your view what are now the most crucial protection challenges and needs in Iraq? How did these change over the period 2014-2018?

**Coherence**

5. Has DG ECHO implemented its support using a cooperative and coordinated approach with the government and the various humanitarian players in Iraq (such as UN, non-EU donors, regional actors and others)?

6. In your view has ECHO encouraged your organization to cooperate and coordinate with the government and other humanitarian players in Iraq? If yes, could you provide some examples of how?

7. In your experience how well have humanitarian actors in Iraq worked together in sharing analysis of the context and needs, sharing best practices and responses?

8. Can you provide any examples of humanitarian and development players working together to plan activities that build resilience and support livelihoods, conflict prevention and peace-building? What role if any did DG ECHO play in facilitating or encouraging such working together?

**EU-DG Echo Added Value**

9. What if anything, makes the humanitarian activities supported by DG ECHO different from others - such as new models and approaches, reach to underserved areas and people?

10. What protection activities, especially advocacy on protection, has DG ECHO enabled other actors to undertake?
Effectiveness
11. How well have your actions met objectives and addressed the needs of target groups? What worked the best and why? What might have been done differently?

12. What were the major challenges you faced in implementing actions? What have been the major gaps in reaching the most vulnerable and addressing their needs?

13. How have actions provided tangible benefits for the most vulnerable people?

14. In what ways has your organization been able to successfully advocate for protection of the rights of the most vulnerable people affected by the conflict? (i.e. children, women and girls, IDPs and refugees, the elderly). Please provide examples. Do you have any tools for monitoring how your activities have reduced risks or increased protection capacities?

Efficiency
15. What has been done to ensure that funds are used economically, efficiently and cost effectively to achieve intended results?

16. In consideration of the kinds of activities your organization has carried out with DG ECHO support, were some actions/activities more efficient and/or cost effective than others? What contributed to these differences?

Sustainability/Connectedness
17. Please provide examples of how the benefits of the actions in which you are involved are likely to continue to provide benefits beyond the end of the actions?

18. Is there anything else that needs to be done to ensure the sustainability of the benefits associated with these actions?

Exploratory Questions
The interviewer will then ask any follow-up questions where additional detail or more clarity would be useful.

Closing
1. Is there anything we haven’t discussed that you expected we would discuss? Any other points you’d like to raise?

2. Do you have questions you would like to ask me?

3. Follow-up on any documentation or evidentiary sources that could be helpful for evaluation.
4. Describe process: Once the review team’s field visits are completed, we will hold an informal workshop where the team presents what it has learned and asks partners to provide feedback and clarification.

Thank you
Key Informant Interview Guide for DG ECHO

The following protocol will be used for interviews with DG ECHO staff involved in Protection.

Name: 
Organisation: 
Title: 
Time/Date: 

Background and Introduction

DG ECHO has contracted with Transtec, a Brussels-based consulting firm, to carry out an external evaluation of the DG ECHO’s Humanitarian interventions in Iraq between 2014 and 2018, with a particular focus on Protection. There is also a global component to this evaluation that is focusing upon DG ECHO’s protection activities globally.

The overall purpose of DG ECHO’s humanitarian interventions in Iraq is to respond to the most critical humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable people in the country. The most critical areas of needs during the period of the intervention have included: Protection, Shelter, WASH, Health Care, Education in Emergency, Non-Food Items (NFIs), Camp Coordination and Management and building resilience. Overall, humanitarian implementation plans for the country have highlighted that Iraq has faced a “Protection Crisis”.

This review is not intended to be a detailed assessment of each of the humanitarian activity areas or all of the protection actions. It is rather looking at the bigger picture of whether these actions, taken together, are relevant to the needs of the most vulnerable groups in Iraq. The evaluation will highlight what has worked well and why, and any approaches that could have been different.

Your views are very valuable and essential information for this review. We assure you that your responses will be completely confidential. We would like to ask you a few “qualitative” questions based on your evidence and experience. This should take about one hour to one hour and fifteen minutes.

Respondent’s Questions

Would you like to make any comments, or do you have any questions before we begin?

In what important ways has this understanding evolved over time, between 2014 and 2018?

Relevance

19. Please explain how you have conducted needs analysis (or ensured that it is comprehensively undertaken) of the most vulnerable groups: women, children, the elderly, people with disabilities, IDPs, refugees, prisoners,
20. In developing ECHO's protection strategy and programming design (based on IPs proposals, etc) how have you tried to ensure that these needs and gaps are appropriately addressed?

21. The context for Protection in Iraq has significantly changed over the past four years in terms of critical needs, scale and geographic areas of need. Would you be able to highlight some of the major changes as well as how DG ECHO has responded to those changes and how well it has responded?

Coherence

22. Has DG ECHO implemented its Protection support using a cooperative and coordinated approach with the government and the various humanitarian players in Iraq (such as the UN, non-EU donors, regional actors and others)? What are the main coordinating mechanisms and how well have they functioned in practice?

23. In your experience how well have humanitarian actors in Iraq worked together in sharing analysis of the context and needs, sharing best practices and decisions on responses?

24. Can you provide any examples of humanitarian and development players working together to plan activities that build resilience and support livelihoods, sustainable development, conflict prevention and peace-building? What role did ECHO play in fostering this cooperation?

EU-DG Echo Added Value

25. In what ways would you say that ECHO globally and in Iraq has provided leadership on Protection?

26. What if anything, makes the humanitarian activities and especially the protection activities supported by DG ECHO in Iraq different from those of other actors, for example new models and approaches, reach to underserved areas and people? What about as regards advocacy on protection?

Effectiveness

27. Would you please explain what “protection mainstreaming” means in practice? In your view in which humanitarian sectors is it well-understood and successfully put into practice? What about within ECHO more generally, and how has this evolved between 2014 and 2018?

28. In your view, which of your partners has a structured and well-organized approach to Protection? And Protection advocacy in particular? Can you provide some examples of significant success of protection advocacy?

29. What are some of the major challenges to effective Protection efforts in Iraq and in particular protection advocacy?
30. From your perspective what are the most significant gaps to be addressed to achieve intended Protection results?

31. Do you have as yet any satisfactory tools or indicators for assessing the outcomes of your support for protection (ie. what difference the partners and actions you support have made)? Is the Logical framework for Protection advocacy sound? What is the quality of information that partners provide on outputs of their work?

**Efficiency**

32. What has DG ECHO done to oversee and ensure that funds are used economically, efficiently and cost effectively to achieve intended results?

33. To what extent did the budget allocations allow for achieving intended results in each humanitarian sector?

34. Based on the information you have, have DG ECHO and IPs managed programming and expenditure appropriately and in an accountable manner? What factors do you think either facilitated or hindered this?

**Sustainability**

35. How would you assess the prospects for the government to maintain some of the Protection activities and results DG ECHO has supported? What about local NGOs and CSOs?

36. Is there anything else that needs to be done to ensure sustainability of the progress/gains made in the past four years?

**Exploratory Questions**

The interviewer will then ask any follow-up questions where additional detail or more clarity would be useful. (or ask whether they might have time for a follow-up brief meeting?)

**Closing**

5. *Is there anything we haven’t discussed that you expected we would discuss? Any other points you’d like to raise?*

6. *Do you have questions you would like to ask me?*

7. *Follow-up on any documentation or evidentiary sources that could be helpful for evaluation.*

8. *Describe process: Once the review team’s field visits are completed, we will hold an informal workshop where the team presents what it has learned and asks partners to provide feedback and clarification.*

*Thank you*
Key Informant Interview Guide for Donors

The following protocol will be used for semi-structured interviews with humanitarian donors—including selected EU member states and other humanitarian donors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Organisation: | |
|-------------||
|             | |

| Time/Date: | |
|------------||
|            | |

Background and Introduction

DG ECHO has contracted with Transtec, a Brussels-based consulting firm to carry out an external evaluation of the DG ECHO’s Humanitarian interventions in Iraq between 2014 and 2018, with a particular focus on Protection. This review will also consider ECHO’s relevance and effectiveness in Protection more globally.

This review is not intended to be a detailed assessment of each of the humanitarian activity areas or all of the protection actions. It is rather looking at the bigger picture of whether these actions, taken together, are relevant to the needs of the most vulnerable groups in Iraq. The evaluation hopes to highlight lessons about what has worked well and why, and any approaches that could have been different.

Your views are very valuable and essential information for this review. We assure you that your responses will be completely confidential. We would like to ask you a few “qualitative” questions based on your evidence and experience. This should take about one hour to one hour and fifteen minutes.

Respondent’s Questions

Would you like to make any comments, or do you have any questions before we begin?

Qualitative Evidence

As the process for collecting qualitative evidence the evaluation team is asking similar questions of all respondents. We are doing this so that we can examine patterns across different groups of respondents rather than being overly biased by responses of any single respondent.

Overall

1. Please describe the primary areas of support for humanitarian aid that you focus on.
Relevance

2. In your experience, how responsive has DG ECHO been to changes in the context and level of need of the most vulnerable people in Iraq over the past five years?

3. What is your understanding of what “protection” really means in practice? Are there ways that you, as a donor can advocate for certain protection issues? Please explain.

4. In your view what are the most crucial protection challenges and needs in Iraq? How have these changed over time?

Coherence

5. Has DG ECHO implemented its support using a cooperative and coordinated approach with the government and the various humanitarian players in Iraq (such as UN, non-EU donors, regional actors and others)?

6. In your experience how well have humanitarian actors in Iraq worked together in sharing analysis of the context and needs, sharing best practices and responses?

7. Can you provide any examples of humanitarian and development players working together to plan activities that build resilience and support livelihoods, conflict prevention and peace-building?

EU-DG Echo Added Value

8. What if anything, makes the humanitarian activities supported by DG ECHO different from others—such as new models and approaches, reach to underserved areas and people?

9. What protection activities, especially advocacy on protection, has DG ECHO enabled other actors to undertake?

Effectiveness

10. In your view how effective have DG ECHO and its implementing partners been in the areas you support? What in your view has worked the best? What might DG ECHO have done differently?

11. In your view what are the Protection areas where DG ECHO has succeeded in best understanding Protection and made the greatest impact.

12. What have been some of the major challenges you’ve faced as a donor in making funding decisions and deciding which areas of need you will focus on?

13. How well has DG ECHO engaged in dialogue with you and reported to you and other donors about the progress and results of the activities it supports.
Sustainability/Connectedness

14. In your view what are the prospects for sustainability of the humanitarian activities you’ve supported in Iraq? Is an Exit strategy realistic?

15. Are there areas where government now clearly has the control and capacity to coordinate and provide essential humanitarian services? Is this evident in the new Poverty Reduction Strategy?

16. How might humanitarian actors better link their future strategies with development actors in Iraq to help plan and support activities that build-in self-reliance, livelihoods, conflict prevention and peace building?
Key Informant Interview Guide for Community Leaders and Local Officials

Name: 
Title: 
Organisation: 
Governorate: 
Time/Date: 

Background and Introduction

We are part of a team that has been asked to review the humanitarian work that countries that are part of the European Union have provided through DG ECHO. DG ECHO is considered as the humanitarian aid “arm” of the European Union. DG ECHO has contracted with Transtec, a Belgium-based consulting firm, to carry out this review which is looking at the past five years of humanitarian aid in Iraq. Star Orbits, a consulting group based in Jordan and Iraq, are part of this team.

DG ECHO works with partners such as UNICEF, UNHCR, which in turn work with local organizations and groups to help the most vulnerable people in Iraq such as: children, women, people displaced by the conflict and people living in refugee camps, the elderly, people with disabilities and others. By humanitarian aid we include for example, the needs of people for emergency shelter, education in emergency situations, water and sanitation, health services, protection of the rights of people, etc.

I would like to ask you about the situation and needs in your community and how these may have changed. We understand that (specify the NGOs/CSOs) have been working with you and your community. We’d like to ask you in general what kinds of activities have worked well and why in your community and about major challenges that remain.

Your views are very valuable and essential information for this review. We assure you that your responses will be completely confidential. We would like to ask you a few “qualitative” questions based on your evidence and experience. This should take about one hour.

Respondent’s Questions

Would you like to make any comments, or do you have any questions before we begin?

Overall

Please describe your role and the most important things we need to understand about this governate/community.
Relevance

1. Please explain the most important humanitarian needs which have affected your area over the past five years. In your view who are the most vulnerable people in your area who have needed support?

2. Would you explain in what ways the situation and needs of particular groups or communities might have changed between 2014 and 2018?

3. In your view have the action activities of xx (name) organization(s) serving your area been planned and delivered to address the most important needs?

4. How has xx (name) organization consulted with local people and beneficiary groups and involved them in planning or carrying out activities?

Coherence

5. In your view how well have humanitarian agencies worked together in your area to understand the situation and needs and responses?

6. Can you provide any examples of organizations cooperating together to help make communities stronger and support livelihoods?

Effectiveness

7. In this area what are the major challenges in reaching and helping people who are the most vulnerable?

8. Would you explain what difference the activities of xx under this action (s) have made in the lives of the people and communities they have worked in? What are the evident benefits?

9. In your view what, if anything, might have been done differently or improved upon?

Sustainability/Connectedness

10. Do you think that the benefits that have come from this action (s) are likely to continue to be felt? Please explain.

11. What needs to happen to make sure that the benefits/changes can be sustained?

Exploratory Questions

The interviewer will then ask any follow-up questions where additional detail or more clarity would be useful.

Closing
9. *Is there anything we haven’t discussed that you expected we would discuss? Any other points you would like to raise?*

10. *Do you have questions you would like to ask me?*

*Thank you*
Key Informant Interview Guide for Government Officials

The following protocol will be used for semi-structured interviews with government officials working in donor relations and sectors covering humanitarian needs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time/Date:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Background and Introduction

DG ECHO has contracted with Transtec, a Brussels-based consulting firm, to carry out an external evaluation of the DG ECHO’s Humanitarian interventions in Iraq between 2014 and 2018, with a particular focus on Protection. There is also a global component to this evaluation that is focusing upon DG ECHO’s protection activities globally.

The overall purpose of DG ECHO’s humanitarian interventions in Iraq is to respond to the most critical humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable people in the country. The most critical areas of needs during the period of the intervention have included: Protection, Shelter, WASH, Health Care, Education in Emergency, Non-Food Items (NFIs), Camp Coordination and Management and building resilience. Overall, humanitarian implementation plans for the country have highlighted that Iraq has faced a “Protection Crisis”.

This review is not intended to be a detailed assessment of each of the humanitarian activity areas or all of the protection actions. It is rather looking at the bigger picture of whether these actions, taken together, are relevant to the needs of the most vulnerable groups in Iraq. The evaluation will highlight what has worked well and why, and any approaches that could have been different.

Your views are very valuable and essential information for this review. We assure you that your responses will be completely confidential. We would like to ask you a few “qualitative” questions based on your evidence and experience. This should take about one hour to one hour and fifteen minutes.

Respondent’s Questions

Would you like to make any comments or do you have any questions before we begin?

Qualitative Evidence

As the process for collecting qualitative evidence the evaluation team is asking similar questions of all respondents. We are doing this so that we can examine patterns across different groups of respondents rather than being overly biased by responses of any single respondent.
Overall
Please describe your role and the primary aspects of your activity areas that are the most important to understand. How have these changed over the past 4 years?

Relevance
37. What, in your opinion and experience are the most critical needs of the most vulnerable groups: women, children, the elderly, people with disabilities, IDPs, refugees etc.?

38. What in your experience have been the most significant changes in needs of particular vulnerable groups or in certain parts of the country?

39. In your experience, how responsive has DG ECHO and its partners (*note relevant partners*) been to changes in the context in Iraq and the level of need?

40. What is your understanding of what “protection” of the rights of most vulnerable groups really means in practice? How has your ministry been able to address protection? What can you influence and what is beyond your control or ability to influence?

Coherence
41. In your experience has DG ECHO implemented its support using a cooperative and coordinated approach with the government and the various humanitarian players in Iraq?

42. How well have humanitarian actors in Iraq worked together and with government in sharing analysis of the context and needs, sharing best practices and responses?

43. How well, in your opinion, does DG ECHO’s support/reinforce your government’s humanitarian policies and priorities, especially those on protection of the rights and needs of most vulnerable people?

EU - ECHO Added Value
44. Has DG ECHO as a lead humanitarian agency added value by promoting dialogue and solutions on new approaches for humanitarian aid, especially on protection?

Effectiveness
45. Please explain the major challenges your ministry (programme) has faced in the past five years (between 2014 and 2018) in trying to reach the most vulnerable people and serve their needs?

46. In your view what kinds of actions have worked the best/been the most successful in advocating protecting the rights/addressing rights abuses of the most vulnerable people (children, women and girls, the elderly, IDPs and refugees) (*Note: as appropriate to interviewee-in areas of Protection, Health, Shelter, WASH, Education in Emergency, etc.*)
47. Are there special protection measures that your government has been able to introduce that help safeguard the rights of the most vulnerable people? Please give examples.

48. Have DG ECHO and its partners (note refer to IP) strengthened the capacity of government ministries to address protection issues and for relevant ministries to coordinate their efforts, and if so how?

49. Would you say that ECHO-supported humanitarian actions have helped build resilience for the future?

**Sustainability/Connectedness**

50. What, in your view, are the prospects for sustainability of the activities that DG ECHO has supported, especially in protection?

51. How, in your view, has the capacity of government changed in planning and delivering basic humanitarian services? (including resumption of basic services in areas now under government control)

52. What needs to happen to ensure sustainability?

**Exploratory Questions**

The interviewer will then ask any follow-up questions where additional detail or more clarity would be useful.

**Closing**

11. Is there anything we haven’t discussed that you expected we would discuss? Any other points you’d like to raise?

12. Do you have questions you would like to ask me?

13. Follow-up on any documentation or evidentiary sources that could be helpful for evaluation.

Describe process: Once the review team’s field visits are completed, we will hold an informal workshop where the team presents what it has learned and asks partners to provide feedback and clarification.

Thank you
Questions for Beneficiary Focus Groups

Name of Focus Group and location:

Organisation associated with (if any):
   Governorate:

Time/Date:

Please note that the questions for focus groups will depend importantly on the actual focus group. These are to be considered as very broad questions which will need to be adapted or even very significantly different according to the specific focus group. For example, the questions asked of children would be different.

Background and Introduction

We are part of a team that has been asked to review some of the actions that have been carried out in the past five years to help people who have been most affected by the situation in Iraq and by the conflict. We are looking at some of the actions that countries which are part of the European Union have supported over the past five years to address peoples’ most important needs. “ECHO” is the organization that helps with these needs and ECHO works with many organizations and groups in Iraq. We are looking at the situation and needs of people in Iraq who have been very much affected by the conflict in the country. For example, children, women, people who had to leave their homes and communities because of the conflict and people living in refugee camps, the elderly, people with disabilities and others.

We would like to ask you about the situation and needs in your community and how these may have changed. We understand that (specify the NGOs/CSOs) have been working with you and your community. We’d like to ask you in general what kinds of activities have worked well and why in your community and about major challenges that remain.

Please feel very comfortable in sharing your experiences and views. These are very important to this review and what you say is going to be kept confidential.

Characteristics of FGD participants (Male/female, age, marital status - to aid in analysing responses by types of respondents)

Overall

1. Would you please explain about your community and how you found out about this action (s)? How did you begin to participate in this action (s)? For how long have you been part of this action (s)?

Relevance

2. How did this organization/action discuss with you about your situation and your needs at the beginning of your participation?
3. In what ways have you been able to discuss with this organization/action team about how your situation and needs may have changed over time? Would you explain the most changes that have happened over the past five years?

**Effectiveness**

4. How satisfied are you with the work of xx organization/action and how they have helped both you and your community?

5. Would you please explain and also give some examples of what differences or changes in your life and the lives of your families or communities that the action(s) activities have made?

6. In your opinion, are there any activities that might have been done differently to help better contribute to benefits for you or your community? Please discuss.

**Sustainability**

7. What, in your view, needs to be done or needs to happen to ensure that the benefits of this action continue into the future?

**Closing**

8. Are there any other points you would like to raise?

*Thank you*
ANNEX 6: Survey Questionnaires:

IRAQ PROGRAMMING

SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR ECHO – GLOBAL PROTECTION

(20 QUESTIONS)

1. For how long have you been working with DG ECHO?
   - Less than 1 year
   - Between 1 and 3 years
   - More than 3 years

2. In what thematic area is your work primarily focussed? (multiple responses are allowed)
   - Protection
   - Shelter
   - WASH
   - Health Care
   - Education in Emergency
   - Non-Food Items (NFIs)
   - Camp Coordination and Management
   - Other:

3. In what region do you work?
   - Africa
     Please specify the country
   - Asia and Pacific
     Please specify the country
   - Europe
     Please specify the country
   - Latin America and Caribbean
     Please specify the country
Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

4. What level best describes your position?
   - Head of office/regional office
   - Country TA
   - Thematic expert
   - Programme officer/programme assistant
   - Other (please specify)

5. DG ECHO ensures that its programming in Iraq is based on comprehensive needs analysis considering the most vulnerable groups (e.g. women, children, the elderly, people with disabilities, IDPs, refugees, prisoners, particular ethnic or religious groups etc.), as well as conflict, stakeholder and gap analysis.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
     Additional comments:

6. DG ECHO’s protection strategy and programming in Iraq is consistent with needs analysis and aims at addressing needs and gaps, relevant to the evolving conflict context from 2014 to 2018.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
     Additional comments:
7. DG ECHO had a clear policy and strategy for advocacy on protection in Iraq and ensured that protection advocacy was built into programming and implementation approaches in other humanitarian sectors
   ○ Agree
   ○ Somewhat agree
   ○ Somewhat disagree
   ○ Disagree
   ○ Don’t know
   ○ Not applicable
   Additional comments:

8. DG ECHO implemented its programming in cooperation and coordination with the relevant government institutions and the various humanitarian players in Iraq (such as the UN, non-EU donors, regional actors and others).
   ○ Agree
   ○ Somewhat agree
   ○ Somewhat disagree
   ○ Disagree
   ○ Don’t know
   ○ Not applicable
   Additional comments:

9. DG ECHO played an important role in making sure that humanitarian and development players worked together in building resilience and support livelihoods, sustainable development, conflict prevention and peace-building.
   ○ Agree
   ○ Somewhat agree
   ○ Somewhat disagree
   ○ Disagree
   ○ Don’t know
   ○ Not applicable
   Additional comments:
10. DG ECHO applies the approaches to humanitarian protection as outlined in the ECHO’S protection policy document – including through targeted, mainstreamed and capacity-building protection actions
- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:

11. DG ECHO in Iraq has provided leadership on Protection and Humanitarian Aid, fostering new models and innovative approaches to protection programming.
- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:

12. DG ECHO Iraq’s humanitarian interventions in different sectors successfully reached the intended people/target groups.
- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:

13. DG ECHO has successfully implemented protection mainstreaming across its programming
14. A structured approach to humanitarian protection is one of the most important selection criteria to establish a partnership.

15. DG ECHO has consistently engaged in protection advocacy from 2014 to 2018.

16. DG ECHO has satisfactory indicators and tools for assessing the protection outcomes.
17. DG ECHO ensured that funds were used efficiently and cost effectively to achieve intended results
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

18. DG ECHO’s budget allocations allowed for achieving intended results in each humanitarian sector
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

19. DG ECHO managed programming and expenditure in an accountable manner.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
20. DG ECHO made sure that progress/gains made since 2014 can be sustained either through the Government or though Iraqi Civil Society.

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:
GLOBAL PROTECTION

SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR ECHO – GLOBAL PROTECTION

(18 QUESTIONS)

1. For how long have you been working with DG ECHO?
   o Less than 1 year
   o Between 1 and 3 years
   o More than 3 years

2. In what thematic area is your work primarily focussed? (multiple responses are allowed)
   o Protection
   o Shelter
   o WASH
   o Health Care
   o Education in Emergency
   o Non-Food Items (NFIs)
   o Camp Coordination and Management
   o Other (please specify)

3. In what region do you work?
   o Africa
     Please specify the country

   o Asia and Pacific
     Please specify the country

   o Europe
     Please specify the country

   o Latin America and Caribbean
     Please specify the country
4. What level best describes your position?
   o Director
   o Head of unit/deputy head of unit
   o Team leader
   o Desk officer, geographical
   o Desk officer, policy
   o Other (please specify)

5. DG ECHO ensures that its overall programming is based on comprehensive needs analysis considering the most vulnerable groups (e.g. women, children, the elderly, people with disabilities, IDPs, refugees, prisoners, particular ethnic or religious groups etc.), as well as conflict, stakeholder and gap analysis.
   o Agree
   o Somewhat agree
   o Somewhat disagree
   o Disagree
   o Don’t know
   o Not applicable
     Additional comments:

6. DG ECHO’s protection strategy and programming in the Country/Region in which you work is consistent with needs analysis and aims at addressing evolving needs and gaps.
   o Agree
7. DG ECHO had a clear policy and strategy for advocacy on protection in the Country/Region in which you work and ensured that protection advocacy was built into programming and implementation approaches in other humanitarian sectors

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:

8. In the Country/Region in which you work, DG ECHO implemented its programming in cooperation and coordination with the relevant government institutions and the various humanitarian players in Iraq (such as the UN, non-EU donors, regional actors and others).

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:

9. in the Country/Region in which you work, DG ECHO played an important role in making sure that humanitarian and development players worked together in building resilience and support livelihoods, sustainable development, conflict prevention and peace-building.
10. In the Country/Region in which you work, DG ECHO applies the approaches to humanitarian protection as outlined in the ECHO’S protection policy document – including through targeted, mainstreamed and capacity-building protection actions.

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:

11. DG ECHO globally and in the Country/Region in which you work has provided leadership on Protection, fostering new models and innovative approaches to protection programming.

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:

12. DG ECHO has successfully implemented protection mainstreaming across its programming in the Country/Region in which you work.
13. A structured approach to humanitarian protection is one of the most important selection criteria to establish a partnership.

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:

14. In the Country/Region in which you work, DG ECHO has consistently engaged in protection advocacy from 2014 to 2018.

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:

15. DG ECHO has satisfactory indicators and tools for assessing the protection outcomes.

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
16. DG ECHO ensured that funds were used efficiently and cost effectively to achieve intended results.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
     Additional comments:

17. DG ECHO managed programming and expenditure in an accountable manner.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
     Additional comments:

18. In the Country/Region in which you work, DG ECHO made sure that progress/gains can be sustained either through the Government or through Civil Society.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:
IRAQ PROGRAMME

SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR IPs – IRAQ PROGRAMME

(19 QUESTIONS)

1. You work for:
   - UN Organisation
   - International Organisation
   - International NGO
   - National NGO
   - Other (please specify)

2. Your position within the organisation is:

3. Primary thematic area of work (multiple responses are allowed)
   - Protection
   - Shelter
   - WASH
   - Health Care
   - Education in Emergency
   - Non-Food Items (NFIs)
   - Camp Coordination and Management
   - Other

4. For how long have you been working within the area of ECHO’s funded programme/projects?
   - Less than 6 months
   - Between 6 months and 1 year
   - Between 1 and 2 years
   - Between 2 and 4 years
   - More than 4 years
   - Not applicable
5. In selecting Implementing Partners, ECHO makes sure their programming is based on comprehensive needs analysis considering the most vulnerable groups (e.g. women, children, the elderly, people with disabilities, IDPs, refugees, prisoners, particular ethnic or religious groups etc.), as well as conflict, stakeholder and gap analysis.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

6. During the time of your programming/projects, ECHO was flexible to adjust implementation approach to the changes in the context.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

7. Incorporating protection considerations in your programming/projects is an important condition to work in partnership with ECHO.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:
8. ECHO provided guidance to humanitarian partners on protection issues and how to address them.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

9. ECHO had implemented its support using a cooperative and coordinated approach with the relevant government institutions and the various humanitarian players in Iraq (such as UN, non-EU donors, regional actors and others)
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

10. ECHO has encouraged your organization to cooperate and coordinate with the relevant government institutions and other humanitarian players in Iraq.
    - Agree
    - Somewhat agree
    - Somewhat disagree
    - Disagree
    - Don’t know
    - Not applicable
    Additional comments:
11. ECHO played an important role in making sure that humanitarian actors in Iraq worked together in sharing analysis of the context and needs, best practices and decisions on responses.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

12. ECHO played an important role in making sure that humanitarian and development players worked together in building resilience and support livelihoods, sustainable development, conflict prevention and peace-building.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

13. ECHO’s supported humanitarian activities have distinctive innovative features (e.g. new models and approaches to reach to underserved areas and people).
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

14. ECHO played an important role in enabling NGOs and Civil society to advocate on protection.
15. ECHO funded projects in your organisation met target objectives (outputs) and addressed the needs of target groups.

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:

16. ECHO funded projects in your organisation provided tangible benefits for the most vulnerable people.

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:

17. Relevant ECHO funded projects helped your organization to successfully advocate for protection of the rights of the most vulnerable people affected by the conflict.

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
18. Project and activities carried out with ECHO’s support, were more efficient and/or cost effective than others.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

19. ECHO encouraged your organisation to make sure that progress/gains made since 2014 through ECHO funded project can be sustained either though the Government or though Iraqi Civil Society.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:
GLOBAL PROTECTION

SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR IPs- GLOBAL PROTECTION

(16 QUESTIONS)

1. You work for:
   - UN Organisation
   - International Organisation
   - International NGO
   - National NGO
   - Other (please specify)

2. Your position within the organisation is:

3. Primary thematic area of work (multiple responses are allowed)
   - Protection
   - Shelter
   - WASH
   - Health Care
   - Education in Emergency
   - Non-Food Items (NFIs)
   - Camp Coordination and Management
   - Other

4. In what region do you work?
   - Africa
     Please specify the country

   - Asia and Pacific
     Please specify the country
5. For how long have you been working within the ECHO’s funded programme/projects?
   - Less than 6 months
   - Between 6 months and 1 year
   - Between 1 and 2 years
   - Between 2 and 4 years
   - More than 4 years
   - Not applicable
   - Refused

6. In selecting Implementing Partners, ECHO makes sure their programming is based on comprehensive needs analysis considering the most vulnerable groups (e.g. women, children, the elderly, people with disabilities, IDPs, refugees, prisoners, particular ethnic or religious groups etc.), as well as conflict, stakeholder and gap analysis.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
7. Incorporating protection considerations in your programming/projects is an important condition to work in partnership with ECHO.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

8. ECHO provided guidance to humanitarian partners on protection issues and how to address them.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

9. ECHO had implemented its support using a cooperative and coordinated approach with the relevant government institutions and the various humanitarian players (such as UN, non-EU donors, regional actors and others)
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:
10. ECHO has encouraged your organization to cooperate and coordinate with the relevant government institutions and other humanitarian players in the Country/Region in which you work.

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:

11. In the Country/Region in which you work, ECHO played an important role in making sure that humanitarian actors worked together in sharing analysis of the context and needs, best practices and decisions on responses.

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:

12. In the Country/Region in which you work, ECHO played an important role in making sure that humanitarian and development players worked together in building resilience and support livelihoods, sustainable development, conflict prevention and peace-building.

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:
13. In the Country/Region in which you work ECHO played an important role in enabling NGOs and Civil society to advocate on protection.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

14. ECHO funded projects in your organisation provided tangible benefits for the most vulnerable people
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:

15. Relevant ECHO funded projects helped your organization to successfully advocate for protection of the rights of the most vulnerable people.
   - Agree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Disagree
   - Don’t know
   - Not applicable
   Additional comments:
16. In the Country/Region in which you work, ECHO encouraged your organisation to make sure that progress/gains made since 2014 through ECHO funded project can be sustained either through the Government or through Civil Society.

- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Don’t know
- Not applicable

Additional comments:
ANNEX 7: Bibliography


Barbado, E. (2019, September 26). Regional Protection and Gender Expert. (R. Stewart, Interviewer)


De Jagher, E. (2019, October 15). Interview with E. De Jagher, Senior External Relations Associate, UNHCR. (R. Stewart, Interviewer)
Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018


277
Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018


Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018


DG ECHO. (2016). *Final Report - ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2015/91012 - Provision of seasonal NFIs, emergency shelter and expansion of Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) and Communication with Communities (CwC) activities to meet the basic needs of vulnerable IDPs across Iraq*. Brussels: European Commission.


Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018


FEDERATION HANDICAP-FR. (2017). *Final Report - ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2016/91016 - Reduced threat from conventional weapons (CW) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and.* Brussels: DG ECHO.


FSD-CH. (2016). *Project Documentation - ECHO/-AF/BUD/2015/92013 - Provision of basic services in support to the return and resettlement process of the internally displaced population of Bangui.* Brussels: DG ECHO.


282


conditions of the most vulnerable conflict-affected populations across Central Iraq. Brussels: European Commission.


Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018

Mahmoud, A. (2019, October 02). Interview with A. Mahmoud, FSL Programme Manager. (R. Stewart, Interviewer)


Muia, T. (2019, October 02). Interview with T Muia, Grants Manager. (R. Stewart, Interviewer)

Norwegian People’s Aid. (2017). The "Rap Project" (Rapid Assistance to Prisons and Detention Centers in Iraq, with Conflict Prevention and Preparedness Non-Technical Survey). Oslo: Norwegian People’s Aid.


NRC-NO. (2017). Project Documentation - ECHO/YEM/BUD/2016/91002 - Emergency support for conflict affected population in Yemen and enhanced


Combined Evaluation of the European Union's Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018


Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018


https://www.unocha.org/fr/story/iraq-civilians-need-humanitarian-assistance-survive

https://unocha.exposure.co/mission-to-mosul


Combined Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Iraq and in the Protection Sector, 2014-2018
ANNEX 8: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference

for the combined evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian interventions in Iraq and in the Protection sector, 2014-2018
Table of Contents

EU HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Framework

1. The legal base for Humanitarian Aid is provided by Article 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR); Council Regulation No. 1257/96. The objectives of European Union (EU) humanitarian assistance are outlined there and could – for evaluation purposes – be summarized as follows: From a donor perspective and in coordination with other main humanitarian actors, to provide the right amount and type of aid, at the right time, and in an appropriate way, to the populations most affected by natural and/or manmade disasters, in order to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity.

2. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (the Consensus) – which has been jointly developed by the Council, the EU Member States, the European Parliament and the Commission – provides a reference for EU humanitarian aid, and outlines the common objectives, fundamental humanitarian principles and good practices that the European Union as a whole pursues in this domain. The aim is to ensure an effective, high-quality, needs-driven and principled EU response to humanitarian crises. It concerns the whole spectrum of humanitarian action: from preparedness and disaster risk reduction, to immediate emergency response and life-saving aid for vulnerable people in protracted crises, through to situations of transition to recovery and longer-term development. The Consensus has thus played an important role in creating a vision of best practice for principled humanitarian aid by providing an internationally unique, forward-looking and common framework for EU actors. It has set out high-standard commitments and has shaped policy development and humanitarian aid approaches both at the European and Member State level. Furthermore, with reference to its overall aim, the Consensus has triggered the development of a number of humanitarian sector policies.

3. The humanitarian aid budget is implemented through annual funding decisions adopted by the Commission, which are directly based on Article 15 of the HAR. In general, there are two types of financial decisions: decisions adopted in the context of non-emergency situations (currently

118 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid_en
entitled *World Wide Decisions* (WWD)), and decisions which are adopted in emergency situations. The WWD defines inter alia the total budget, and budget available for specific objectives, mechanisms of flexibility. It is taken for humanitarian operations in each country/region at the time of establishing the budget. The funding decision also specifies potential partners, and possible areas of intervention. The operational information about crises and countries for which humanitarian aid should be granted is provided through ‘Humanitarian Implementation Plans’119 (HIPs). They are a reference for humanitarian actions covered by the WWD and contain an overview of humanitarian needs in a specific country at a specific moment of time.

4. DG ECHO has more than 200 partner organisations for providing humanitarian assistance throughout the world. Humanitarian partners include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations and United Nations agencies. Having a diverse range of partners is important for ECHO because it allows for comprehensive coverage of the ever-expanding needs across the world – and in increasingly complex situations. ECHO has developed increasingly close working relationships with its partners at the level of both policy issues and management of humanitarian operations.

5. DG ECHO has a worldwide network of *field offices* that ensure adequate monitoring of projects funded, provide up-to-date analyses of existing and forecasted needs in a given country or region, contribute to the development of intervention strategies and policy development, provide technical support to EU-funded humanitarian operations, and facilitate donor coordination at field level.

6. DG ECHO has developed a two-phase framework for assessing and analysing needs in specific countries and crises. The first phase of the framework provides the evidence base for prioritisation of needs, funding allocation, and development of the HIPs.

The first phase is a global evaluation with two dimensions:

- **Index for Risk Management (INFORM)** is a tool based on national indicators and data which allows for a comparative analysis of countries to identify their level of risk to humanitarian crisis and disaster. It includes three dimensions of risk: natural and man-made hazards exposure, population vulnerability and national coping capacity. The INFORM data are also used for calculating a Crisis Index that identifies countries suffering from a natural disaster and/or conflict and/or hosting a large number of uprooted people.

- **The Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA)** identifies serious humanitarian crisis situations where the affected populations do not

119 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding-evaluations/funding-decisions-hips_en
receive enough international aid or even none at all. These crises are characterised by low media coverage, a lack of donor interest (as measured through aid per capita) and a weak political commitment to solve the crisis, resulting in an insufficient presence of humanitarian actors.

The second phase of the framework focuses on context and response analysis:

- Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF) is an in-depth assessment carried out by European Commission's humanitarian experts. It consists of a qualitative assessment of humanitarian needs per single crisis, also taking into account the population affected and foreseeable trends.

7. In 2016, the Commission endorsed the Grand Bargain, which is an agreement between more than 30 of the biggest donors and aid providers, with the aim to close the humanitarian financing gap and get more means into the hands of people in need. To that end, it sets out 51 commitments distilled into 10 thematic work streams, including e.g. gearing up cash programming, improving joint and impartial needs assessments, and greater funding for national and local responders.

**Scope & Rationale**

8. The European Union aims at being a reference humanitarian donor, by ensuring that its interventions are coherent with the humanitarian principles, are relevant in targeting the most vulnerable beneficiaries, are duly informed by needs assessments, and promote resilience building to the extent possible.

9. Interventions have a focus on funding critical sectors and addressing gaps in the global response, mobilising partners and supporting the overall capacity of the humanitarian system. As a consequence of the principled approach and addressing gaps in overall response, the EU intervenes in forgotten crises, i.e. severe, protracted humanitarian crisis situations where affected populations are receiving no or insufficient international aid and where there is little possibility or no political commitment to solve the crisis, accompanied by a lack of media interest. This refers primarily to protracted conflict situations, but can also refer to crises resulting from the cumulative effect of recurring natural disasters, or, a combination of different factors. Although the bulk of EU funding goes to major, recognised crisis like the Syrian, it allocated in 2017 almost 16% of its initial humanitarian

---

120 I.e. a principled donor, providing leadership and shaping humanitarian response.  
121 Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality and Independence  
122 The EU Approach to Resilience: learning from food security crises  
aid budget to forgotten crises, including the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria, the Rohingya people in Myanmar/Burma and Bangladesh, and the Colombian refugees in Ecuador and Venezuela.

10. Actions funded by the EU comprise assistance, relief and protection operations on a non-discriminatory basis to help people in third countries, particularly the most vulnerable among them, and as a priority those in developing countries, victims of natural disasters, man-made crises, such as wars and outbreaks of fighting, or exceptional situations or circumstances comparable to natural or man-made disasters. The actions should extend the time needed to meet the humanitarian requirements resulting from these different situations.

11. Food and Nutrition: The poorest people carry the greatest exposure to the consequences of disasters such as food insecurity and under-nutrition. Insufficient food production or an inability of vulnerable people to purchase enough nutritious food leads to malnutrition and under-nutrition. Moreover, dramatic interruptions in food consumption heighten risks of morbidity and mortality. Addressing under-nutrition requires a multi-sector approach and a joint humanitarian and development framework. Humanitarian food assistance aims to ensure the consumption of sufficient, safe and nutritious food in anticipation of, during, and in the aftermath of a humanitarian crisis. Each year, the European Commission allocates well over EUR 100 million to humanitarian assistance actions that are explicitly associated with specific nutrition objectives.

12. Health is both a core sector of humanitarian aid interventions and the main reference for measuring overall humanitarian response. With the global trends of climate change and a growing and ageing population, together with the increasing frequency and scale of natural disasters and the persistence of conflicts, humanitarian health needs are continuing to increase. Given the significance of Commission humanitarian health assistance for the health sector in emergencies, and of the sector for Commission humanitarian health assistance, the Commission developed a set of Guidelines (operational in 2014) to support an improved delivery of affordable health services, based on humanitarian health needs.

13. Protection: The definition of humanitarian protection as formally endorsed by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) states that protection encompasses “all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian

---

124 Staff Working Document on Undernutrition in Emergencies
125 Communication on Humanitarian Food Assistance
law and refugee law).” Thus, international law defines the global framework for the protection of populations. It includes human rights law, International Humanitarian Law and refugee law, which define the obligations of states and warring parties to provide assistance and protection to civilians, as well as to prevent and refrain from behaviour that violates their rights. The Global Protection Cluster coordinates and provides global level inter-agency policy advice and guidance on the implementation of the cluster approach to ProtectionClusters in the field, supports protection responses in non-refugee situation humanitarian action as well as leads standard and policy setting relating to protection in complex and natural disaster humanitarian emergencies, in particular with regard to the protection of internally displaced persons. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the Global Cluster Lead Agency for Protection. Protection is embedded in DG ECHO’s mandate as defined by the HAR and confirmed by the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.

14. **Education in emergencies** is crucial for both the protection and healthy development of girls and boys affected by crises. It can rebuild their lives; restore their sense of normality and safety, and provide them with important life skills. It helps children to be self-sufficient and to have more influence on issues that affect them. It is also one of the best tools to invest in their long-term future, and in the peace, stability and economic growth of their countries. Yet it has traditionally been one of the least funded humanitarian sectors. With the level of funding at 1% of its annual humanitarian budget still in 2015, the European Commission increased this share to 8% in 2018 and aims to reach 10% by 2019. Globally, less than 3% of global humanitarian funding is allocated to education.

15. Strengthening the **gender** approach within the EU humanitarian aid is a commitment made in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, which highlights the need to integrate gender considerations, to promote the active participation of women in humanitarian aid and to incorporate protection strategies against sexual and gender-based violence. A Commission Staff Working document[^127] has been established to address this issue.

16. **Urban areas** are complex settings to implement humanitarian assistance and are different from rural areas in terms of needs and vulnerabilities of the affected people. Furthermore, capacities, methods, and preparedness of local actors, institutions, and partners vary considerably between cities. Humanitarian actors, including DG ECHO, have developed an extensive range of policies, practices, standards and tools for humanitarian work that are often adapted to rural areas, but far less to urban areas. In the past few years a number of studies have been

conducted to explore the drivers of urbanization and its consequences and implications to humanitarian aid. Some of these studies have formulated suggestions on how international humanitarian aid can best engage with the changing settlement patterns.

17. Each year millions of people are forced to leave their homes and seek refuge from conflicts, violence, human rights violations, persecution or natural disasters. The number of forcibly displaced persons (refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons) has continued to rise in 2017, calling for increased humanitarian assistance worldwide. The majority of today's refugees live in the developing world, which means that they flee to countries already struggling with poverty and hardship. In April 2016, the European Commission adopted a new development-led approach to forced displacement, aimed at harnessing and strengthening the resilience and self-reliance of both the forcibly displaced and their host communities. The new approach stipulates that political, economic, development and humanitarian actors should engage from the outset of a displacement crisis, and work with third countries towards the gradual socio-economic inclusion of the forcibly displaced. The objective is to make people's lives more dignified during displacement; and ultimately, to end forced displacement.

18. The EU attaches great importance to the link between humanitarian aid, as a rapid response measure in crisis situations, and more medium and long-term development action. The humanitarian-development nexus is complex and requires increased coordination – leading to joint humanitarian-development approaches and collaborative implementation, monitoring and progress tracking. The Council Conclusions on Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus of 19 May 2017 welcomed cooperation between EU humanitarian and development actors, including in the framework of the EU approach to forced displacement and development. Subsequently, the Council Conclusions of September 2017 identified Iraq as one of the pilot countries for the humanitarian-development nexus.

19. DG ECHO has been instrumental in establishing and funding Emergency Response Mechanisms (ERMs) in several contexts, enabling early, localised response in conflict and natural disaster situations. ERMs are contractual arrangements with one or multiple partners in a given country to ensure that humanitarian organisations can access sufficient personnel, financial and material resources to respond to recurring localised, small-scale emergencies as soon as possible after they occur. They allow a network of humanitarian organizations to rapidly assess and respond to recurring localized emergencies thanks to pre-positioned relief goods, agreed-upon processes, and staff capacity. Donors and humanitarian organizations have long recognised that timely humanitarian action prevents unnecessary suffering and can keep localized or escalating emergencies from deteriorating. Yet, institutional
constraints, among them long and cumbersome contracting procedures, make it difficult to turn commitments to rapid response into reality. To inform an overall reflection on ERMs, DG ECHO has commissioned a study on five ERMs currently in operation in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia and Iraq.

CONTEXT OF THE EVALUATION

This is a combined evaluation, consisting of the following two main aspects:

- A geographical aspect, focusing on DG ECHO’s interventions in Iraq;
- A thematic aspect, focusing on the humanitarian sector of Protection.

Humanitarian Needs in Iraq

The unprecedented scale of conflict over the past four years has forced a cumulative total of more than five million people from their homes across Iraq and left more than 11 million in need of humanitarian aid at the peak of the emergency, reduced to 8.7 million, as of October 2018. During the evaluation period the crisis substantially evolved and moved from widespread active conflict (including in high densely populated contexts, with high impact on civilians) to a relatively stable situation, from early 2018, with the whole of the territory previously held by the so-called Islamic State group (IS) fully retaken, Current key challenges are linked mostly to protection risks and assistance concerns, such as those resulting from protracted displacement in camps and limited freedom of movement, massive numbers of victims of violence and detainees as result of the conflict, the latter in overcrowded prisons in inhuman conditions, and an alarming lack of access to basic services and support in retaken areas. (see factsheet for further information)

DG ECHO’s response in Iraq

The priorities and scope of the humanitarian intervention are defined in the Humanitarian Implementation Plans.

The EU delivers lifesaving assistance such as protection, food, healthcare, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene to all people most in need as result of the conflict. The humanitarian crisis in Iraq has related to a) the internal conflict in Iraq, and b) the conflict in Syria, causing an inflow of Syrian refugees into Iraq. During the evaluation period the main focus of the EU-funded actions was on the internal conflict. These include the most vulnerable displaced and conflict affected populations in newly retaken and

128 Available on request
hard to reach areas, comprising those unable or prevented from returning; victims of violence (including survivors of physical violence, in need of physical rehabilitation, Gender Based Violence survivors and people in need of mental health support) and persons deprived of their liberty. Furthermore, the EU supports the resumption of basic public services including healthcare, education, and water supply in areas that have been recently retaken from the so-called Islamic State Group, such as Mosul, western Anbar, and Hawija. The EU has also scaled up its efforts for legal support to people in detention as well as for guaranteeing minimum conditions of assistance and basic services, in accordance with international legal standards. Where feasible and responsible to do so, transition is promoted to early recovery and development interventions, for a sustainable and complementary response, in line with the Humanitarian-Development nexus.

For a more detailed description of DG ECHO's priorities in the country during the evaluation period, see e.g. the 2017 HIP. For the period of 2014-2017 the total EU funding in the country amounted to about 370 M€. Additional funding has been mobilized in 2018, however not officialised yet.

**DG ECHO's actions in Humanitarian Protection**

The European Commission defines protection as addressing violence, coercion, deliberate deprivation and abuse for persons, groups and communities in the context of humanitarian crises, in compliance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and within the framework of international law and in particular international human rights law (IHRL), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Refugee Law, and accordingly to the UN's Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

The principal objective for the European Commission in humanitarian protection is to prevent, reduce/mitigate and respond to the risks and consequences of violence, coercion, deliberate deprivation and abuse for persons, groups and communities in the context of humanitarian crises.

This can be pursued through three specific objectives:

A. To prevent, reduce, mitigate and respond to protection threats against persons, groups and communities affected by ongoing, imminent or future humanitarian crises;

B. To reduce the protection vulnerabilities and increase the protection capacities of persons, groups and communities affected by ongoing, imminent or future humanitarian crises;
C. To strengthen the capacity of the international humanitarian aid system to enhance efficiency, quality and effectiveness in reducing protection risks in ongoing, imminent or future humanitarian crises.

DG ECHO's Thematic Policy document No. 8 – Humanitarian Protection – that replaced the previous funding guidelines from 2009, outlines the definition and objectives of the EU's humanitarian protection work. It views protection as a single sector, encompassing all aspects of protection, including e.g. child protection, Gender-Based Violence (GBV), Housing, Land and Property (HLP) and mine action. This stems from the perspective that a comprehensive analysis is needed in order to determine the most appropriate response “package” in a given context. It provides guidance for the programming of protection work in humanitarian crises and for measuring the effect of interventions.

The document presents different types of responses that can be implemented in order to work towards protection. It focuses on targeted actions and the mainstreaming of protection in all humanitarian action. Targeted actions consist of two distinct sub-approaches, namely integrated protection programming and stand-alone protection programming. The difference between the two lies in the composition of the response, where stand-alone protection programming will consist of protection sector activities only, while integrated protection programming will employ responses from one or more traditional assistance sectors (shelter, WASH, health, food assistance, nutrition, etc.) in order to achieve a protection outcome. In addition, the document presents other protection-related activities which the EU supports under the Enhanced Response Capacity initiative, namely capacity building activities and advocacy activities. The latter include actions conducted by actors in order to ensure the compliance of the relevant authorities with standards of protection of civilians laid down in international law.

At the global level, based on an initial analysis of DG ECHO's humanitarian project database, the EU spent over 1 Billion € during the period 2014-2018 on protection projects.

Apart from the funded actions, DG ECHO's response in Iraq in the protection sector has consisted of engagement in advocacy and humanitarian diplomacy with all relevant stakeholders, i.e. to promote protection of civilians and respect of IHL, during and after hostilities. This has been done both by means of direct advocacy and indirect advocacy through actors with influence on the parties to the conflict. For this purpose DG ECHO has set up a framework for advocacy in Iraq (the 2017 ECHO Advocacy Logframe and the 2018 Advocacy Strategy are attached to this Request for Services, for information). Furthermore, DG ECHO organised a range of specific
events on advocacy during the evaluation period, and two sets of COHAFA common messages were established. Additional documentation on this topic will be provided to the Contractor in the Inception phase of the evaluation.

**PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

*Purpose and general scope*

Based on Art. 30(4) of the Financial Regulation and Regulation (EC) 1257/96, the purpose of this Request for Services is to have a combined, independent evaluation, covering the period of 2014 – 2018, of

- The EU's humanitarian interventions in **Iraq**; and
- The EU's response (including DG ECHO’s advocacy/humanitarian diplomacy and funded actions) in the area of **Humanitarian Protection**.

The evaluation should provide:

- A retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's interventions in Iraq, which should help shaping the EU’s future approach in the country.
- A retrospective assessment of the EU-funded actions and engagement in the area of Humanitarian Protection. The research should take place at the two following levels, to feed into a common analysis:
  - **Globally**: A portfolio analysis of funded targeted projects should be carried out, and relevant, existing DG ECHO evaluations and studies should be examined.
  - **Iraq**: An assessment should be carried out of the protection actions (both targeted and mainstreamed) carried out in the country. Furthermore, advocacy/humanitarian diplomacy activities should be included in the assessment, following a mapping of those activities (referring to task 5 under subsection 3.3). The assessment should be supported by a dedicated case study of DG ECHO's overall protection activities in Iraq.

The evaluation should cover the evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, EU added value, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, as further detailed below in the Evaluation Questions.

A maximum of 5 prospective, strategic recommendations related to the EU-funded actions in Iraq, and a maximum of 3 prospective, strategic recommendations on the EU-funded action in Humanitarian Protection should be provided. The strategic recommendations could possibly be broken down into further detailed, operational recommendations.
The main users of the evaluation report include inter alia DG ECHO staff at HQ, regional and country level, other EU actors, national and regional stakeholders, implementing partners, and other humanitarian and development donors including EU Member States and agencies.

**Evaluation questions**

The conclusions of the evaluation will be presented in the report in the form of evidence-based, reasoned answers to the evaluation questions presented below. These questions should be further tailored by the Evaluator, and finally agreed with the Steering Group in the inception phase.

**Methodological note on Protection:** Considering that it may be challenging to establish solid conclusions at the global level for some questions relating to Protection, it is expected that the evaluator in such cases bases the analysis on (1) ECHO's advocacy/humanitarian diplomacy engagement on protection in Iraq; (2) a detailed analysis of projects / a sample of projects in Iraq, supposedly linked to the case study on protection mentioned below; (3) the global portfolio analysis of targeted protection projects, possibly including further in-depth desk analysis of a sample of actions; (4) inputs in various forms from stakeholders.

**Relevance**

1. To what extent did the design and implementation of EU-funded humanitarian actions take into account the needs of the most vulnerable population in Iraq, in particular women, children, elderly and persons with disabilities? To what extent were beneficiaries consulted in the design and implementation of EU-funded projects?

2. To what extent was a clear and context-adapted strategy provided and applied in Iraq by DG ECHO? To what extent were DG ECHO and its partners successful in adapting and adjusting their approach as the needs evolved over time?

3. To what extent where the DG ECHO's protection advocacy engagement and actions relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries, and well-articulated with DG ECHO's response in other humanitarian sectors?

**Coherence**

4. To what extent was DG ECHO’s response in Iraq aligned with:
   a. DG ECHO's mandate as provided by the Humanitarian Aid Regulation,
   b. The European Consensus on humanitarian aid,
   c. The humanitarian principles, and
d. DG ECHO’s relevant thematic/sector policies?

5. In the context of the Nexus and humanitarian-development coordination instruments, what measures were taken by DG ECHO to coordinate humanitarian and development interventions in Iraq, and how successful were these measures?

6. To what extent were DG ECHO’s actions in the protection sector coherent with the thematic policy document on humanitarian protection, and – as appropriate – the previous guidelines from 2009?

**EU Added Value**

7. What was the EU added value of DG ECHO’s actions in Iraq during the evaluation period?

8. What was the EU added value of DG ECHO’s protection advocacy engagement and actions during the evaluation period?

**Effectiveness**

9. To what extent were DG ECHO’s objectives (as defined in the HAR, the Consensus and the specific HIPs) achieved in Iraq, and the needs of the targeted end-beneficiaries satisfied? What concrete results were achieved in the country during the evaluation period?

10. How successful was DG ECHO in its advocacy and communication measures in Iraq to influence other actors by direct and indirect advocacy on issues like humanitarian access and space, respect for IHL, addressing gaps in response, applying good practice, and carrying out follow-up actions of DG ECHO’s interventions? Was there an ‘advocacy gap’?

11. To what extent were DG ECHO's protection actions achieving the objectives stated by the Thematic Policy Document on Humanitarian Protection (and quoted above under sub-section 2.3)?
Efficiency

12. To what extent did DG ECHO achieve cost-effectiveness in its response to the crisis in Iraq? What factors affected the cost-effectiveness of the response and to what extent? (The methodology applied for responding to this question must be based on the Cost-effectiveness guidance for DG ECHO evaluations129, which is to be adapted to and applied proportionally to the current exercise.)

13. Was the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO in Iraq appropriate and proportionate to what the actions were meant to achieve?

Sustainability/Connectedness

14. To what extent did DG ECHO manage to achieve sustainable results of its response in Iraq and in the sector of Protection? What could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanism, change of strategy, etc.) to promote sustainability and strengthen links to interventions of development actors? To what extent where appropriate exit strategies put in place and implemented?

Other tasks under the assignment

The Contractor should:

1. Draw up an intervention logic for DG ECHO's intervention in Iraq during the evaluation period;
2. Define and analyse DG ECHO’s portfolio of actions in Iraq during the evaluation period;
3. Define and analyse DG ECHO’s portfolio of funded actions globally in the area of Humanitarian Protection during the evaluation period;
4. As a part of a literature review, examine existing DG ECHO evaluations130 and studies that touch the area of EU humanitarian protection (e.g. the Comprehensive evaluation of the EU's humanitarian aid; the Consensus; Education in Emergencies; etc.);
5. Carry out a mapping of DG ECHO's overall protection activities in Iraq, including funded actions and advocacy and humanitarian diplomacy;
6. To provide a specific deliverable – in addition to those identified in the Framework Contract – on DG ECHO’s humanitarian protection;

130 Available at https://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding-evaluations/evaluations_en
7. For both aspects of the evaluation, to identify **main lessons learnt from EU-funded actions**. What worked and what did not?

8. On the basis of the research carried out for responding to the evaluation questions, and at a general level, identify the main factors **limiting the success of the projects** funded in the country over the period covered by the evaluation. **COMMENT: This relates to an audit recommendation; success-limiting factors should be identified in order to develop indicators for focused monitoring, with the overall purpose of strengthening the monitoring system**;

9. Provide a statement about the **validity of the evaluation results**, i.e. to what extent it has been possible to provide reliable statements on all essential aspects of the intervention examined. Issues to be referred to may include scoping of the evaluation exercise, availability of data, unexpected problems encountered in the evaluation process, proportionality between budget and objectives of the assignment, etc.;

10. Make a proposal for the **dissemination** of the evaluation results;

11. Provide a French **translation** (in addition to the English version) of the executive summary of the Final Report;

12. Provide an **abstract** of the evaluation of no more than 200 words.

**MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE EVALUATION**

The Evaluation Sector of DG ECHO is responsible for the management and the monitoring of the evaluation, together with the DG ECHO Units responsible for the evaluation subject, i.e. B1 and B4. The DG ECHO Evaluation manager is the contact person for the evaluator and shall assist the team during their mission in tasks such as providing documents and facilitating contacts. The Evaluation manager assigned to the evaluation should always be kept informed and consulted by the evaluator and copied on all correspondence with other DG ECHO staff.

A Steering Committee, made up of Commission staff involved in the activity evaluated, will provide general assistance to and feedback on the evaluation exercise, and discuss the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.

**SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS**

**Methodology**

In their offer, the bidders will describe in detail the methodological approach they propose in order to address the evaluation questions listed above, as well as the tasks requested.
This will include a proposal for indicative judgment criteria\textsuperscript{131} that they may consider useful for addressing each evaluation question. The judgement criteria, as well as the information sources to be used in addressing these criteria, will be discussed and validated by the Commission during the Inception phase.

To the extent possible the methodology should promote the participation in the evaluation exercise of all actors concerned, including beneficiaries and local communities when relevant and feasible.

The conclusions of the evaluation must be presented in a transparent way, with clear references to the sources on which they are based.

The evaluator must undertake field visits to Iraq and Amman (Jordan), to be specifically proposed in the tenderer’s offer and agreed in the inception phase. The set of field visits will have to take into account the security situation in the country. Linked to the field visits, a case study on Humanitarian Protection should be carried out. Further case studies could be proposed by the tenderer as appropriate.

**Evaluation team**

In addition to the general requirements of the Framework Contract, the team should include experience of working in unsafe environments.

---

\textsuperscript{131} A judgement criterion specifies an aspect of the evaluated intervention that will allow its merits or success to be assessed. E.g., if the question is “To what extent has DG ECHO assistance, both overall and by sector been appropriate and impacted positively the targeted population?”, a general judgement criterion might be “Assistance goes to the people most in need of assistance”. In developing judgment criteria, the tenderers may make use of existing methodological, technical or political guidance provided by actors in the field of Humanitarian Assistance such as HAP, the Sphere Project, GHD, etc.
CONTENT OF THE OFFER

A. The administrative part of the bidder's offer must include:

1. The tender submission form (annex C to the model specific contract);
2. A signed Experts' declaration of availability, absence of conflict of interest and not being in a situation of exclusion (annex D to the model specific contract – please use corrected version sent by e-mail on 12 April 2018).

B. The technical part of the bidder's offer should be presented in a maximum of 30 pages (excluding CVs and annexes), and must include:

1. A description of the understanding of the Terms of Reference, their scope and the tasks covered by the contract. This should include the bidder's understanding of the evaluation questions, and a first outline for an evaluation framework that provides judgement criteria and the information sources to be used for answering the questions. The final definition of judgement criteria and information sources will be agreed with the Commission during the inception phase;
2. The methodology the bidder intends to apply for this evaluation for each of the phases involved, including a draft proposal for the number of case studies to be carried out during the field visit, the regions to be visited, and the reasons for such a choice. The methodology will be refined and validated by the Commission during the desk phase;
3. A description of the distribution of tasks in the team, including an indicative quantification of the work for each expert in terms of person/days;
4. A detailed proposed timetable for its implementation with the total number of days needed for each of the phases (Desk, Field and Synthesis).

C. The CVs of each of the experts proposed.

D. The financial part of the offer (annex E to the model specific contract) must include the proposed total budget in Euros, taking due account of the maximum amount for this evaluation. The price must be expressed as a lump sum for the whole of the services provided. The expert fees as provided in the Financial Offer for the Framework Contract must be respected.

AMOUNT OF THE CONTRACT

The maximum budget allocated to this study is EUR 280 000.
TIMETABLE

The indicative duration of the evaluation is 8 months. The duration of the contract shall be no more than 9 months.

The evaluation starts after the contract has been signed by both parties, and no expenses may be incurred before that. The main part of the existing relevant documents will be provided after the signature of the contract.

In their offer, the bidders shall provide a schedule based on the indicative table below (T = contract signature date):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T+1 week</td>
<td>Kick-off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T+4 weeks</td>
<td>Draft Inception Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T+5 weeks</td>
<td>Inception meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T+9 weeks</td>
<td>Draft Desk Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T+10 weeks</td>
<td>Desk Report meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T+12 – 15 weeks</td>
<td>Field visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T+17</td>
<td>Draft Field Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T+18</td>
<td>Field Report Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T+26 weeks</td>
<td>Draft Final Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T+28 weeks</td>
<td>Draft Final Report meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T+32 weeks</td>
<td>Final Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T+33 weeks</td>
<td>A presentation to DG ECHO of the evaluation results</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2) **Procedures and instructions**: The procedures and instructions to the Tenderer for Specific Contracts under the Framework Contract are provided under Section 6 of the Tender Specifications for the Framework Contract.

- Sections 6 – 6.4 are fixed and must be fully taken into account for offers submitted in response to Requests for Services. E.g. the **Award Criteria** are presented under Section 6.2.2;
- Section 6.5 is indicative and could be modified in a Request for Services or discussed and agreed during the Inception Phase under a Specific Contract.

3) **EU Bookshop Format**: The template provided in Annex M of the Tender Specifications for the Framework Contract must be followed for the Final Report. Any changes to this format, as introduced by the Publications Office of the European Union, will be communicated to the Framework Contractors by the Commission.

**RAW DATA AND DATASETS**

Any final datasets should be provided as structured data in a machine readable format (e.g. in the form of a spreadsheet and/or an RDF file) for Commission internal usage and for publishing on the Open Data Portal, in compliance with Commission Decision (2011/833/EU)\(^\text{132}\).

The data delivered should include the appropriate metadata (e.g. description of the dataset, definition of the indicators, label and sources for the variables, notes) to facilitate reuse and publication.

The data delivered should be linked to data resources external to the scope of the evaluation, preferably data and semantic resources from the Commission's own data portal or from the Open Data Portal\(^\text{133}\). The contractor should describe in the offer the approach they will adopt to facilitate data linking.

---

\(^{132}\) If third parties' rights do not allow their publication as open data, the tenderers should describe in the offer the subpart that will be provided to the Commission free of rights for publication and the part that will remain for internal use.

\(^{133}\) For a list of shared data interoperability assets see the ISA program joinup catalogue ([https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/catalogue/repository/eu-semantic-interoperability-catalogue](https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/catalogue/repository/eu-semantic-interoperability-catalogue)) and the Open Data Portal resources.